NATIONAL ELITE MEDIA DISCOURSES

ON GLOBALIZATION:

COMPARING CHINA WITH INDIA

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Abstract

In the age of globalization, nation states have to negotiate with the neo-liberal world order, articulating national interest on the one hand and preserving national identity and sovereignty on the other. National media draw a world map for ordinary people and explain the relationship between globalization and their lives. Therefore one important way of examining the international discursive contestation is to look through national media's prisms to explore how the state acts as the repository of national interest. Chinese and Indian elite media discourses offer an illuminating pair for case comparison. This study attempts to investigate the differences between national media construction of globalization in China and India.

Theoretically, this thesis argues that national media discursive construction is shaped and influenced by the national interest as defined by state elites located in a larger international political economy. Empirically, this study compared 1,004 editorials of three national newspapers-- the *People's Daily*, the *Global Times,* and the *Hindu*-- from 1996 to 2006. Besides, 185 editorials from 2000 to 2006 from the *Times of India* were included for further comparison. Content analysis and discourse analysis were applied; the former acts as the prelude to the latter. This study aimed to answer three research questions. (1) What is China and India located in the international political economy? (2) How do Chinese and Indian media construct globalization in line with these contexts? (3) What explain the similarities and differences in their media constructions?

Content analysis revealed that the media in the two countries take a positive attitude towards globalization. Two media frames were prominent in referencing "globalization:" namely, the "Interest" frame and the "Identity" frame. According to the two frames, I unpacked globalization into four issues: the international issues and the benefit-cost in the neo-liberal world order; the domestic conflicts and the contestation among various groups within state; the continuity and discontinuity between history and globalization; the boundary of the "other" and "us" and the construction of the others.

The study finds that the Chinese media believe that China should accommodate to the global world in terms of economic development, but politically to fight against western hegemony to preserve China's autonomy and legitimacy. The Indian media focus

more on military and security issues in the region and sub-continent; they hold a more critical attitude towards the international trade order than do the Chinese media. On the internal conflict issues that may arise from globalization, the Chinese media deemphasize the ill effects of globalization on disadvantaged groups; they emphasize overall national interests rather than specific interest of civil society and the people. The Indian media criticize the government for policy failure, where globalization is concerned, to take care of bad influences on people's lives.

The study also finds that the Chinese media emphasize the historical continuity as if globalization provides a golden opportunity for China's rise to great-power status and to revive the past glory of Chinese civilization. In contrast, the Indian media emphasize the historical discontinuity and seldom refer to the splendid Indian history. At the same time, the Chinese media accept the U.S.'s domination in the global trade and economic system, and overlook the role of other developing countries. The Indian media mainly criticize the U.S. for hurting India's economy and military security, but hold a mixed feeling toward other third world countries.

The study concludes that the Chinese and Indian media apply different frames in globalization discourse. The Chinese media approach globalization issues mainly in an interest frame, paying attention to economic development which can bolster elite power and save the Party from legitimacy crisis. The Indian media's construction of globalization is more identity-based and critical-oriented. China's economic reform has produced wealth for the elite, strengthened the regime's legitimacy, and stimulated national pride. In contrast, the Indian government's neoliberal policies are more often criticized because the ambivalent colonial history has shaped an uncertain national identity, and thus an ambiguous media attitude towards globalization.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

Our knowledge or views of reality are a "selective articulation" (van Ginneken, 1998) of certain aspects of reality. They do not derive from the real world directly, but are mediated by the ways in which we construct what is to be real. As social institutions, media help us to observe, select, emphasize, and organize certain facts to make sense out of the chaos around us. As Tuchman (1978:216) revealed, the production of meaning is intricately embedded in "the activities of men and women…in the institutions, organizations and professions associated with their activities." In this sense, this dissertation aims to investigate how media construct the world by comparing the Chinese and Indian national media constructions of globalization.

Discourse on globalization is at the core of a nation state's imagination of the world. National media are assigned the task of depicting a world map for ordinary people, and explaining the relationship between globalization and their lives. Any change in globalization discourse is not only constructed by a "linguistic turn" (Fairclough, 1992: 2) or a single issue or event, but is linked to wider social and cultural processes. Therefore one important purpose of examining the international discursive contestation is to look through national prisms to explore how the state, the repository of national interest, acts in the media.

The nation state is the "prime definer" of national interest; the media are the "second definer" (Lee et al., 2002). It is argued that media discourse is framed by the national interests in terms of state-centered political and economic interest defined by state elites. Every nation state is an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1991:24), and mass media act as agents of its imagining. However, a new world order characterized by a neo-liberal regime of global capitalism and western democracy created the augur of "the end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992) and the conclusion of "the end of sovereignty" (J. Scholte, 1996). It is argued that nation states may have declined in their scope of policy choices and capacity for self-management (Cooper, 1986; Keohane & Nye, 1972; McGrew & Lewis, 1992). Under globalization, multinational companies and institutions may be more powerful than state authorities and penetrate the boundary of nation states. Other transnational networks, domestic agencies, and local forces also permeate into states and

make them a fragmented policy-making arena (Held & McGrew, 2002). Then what is the "national" interest defined at a time when states are withering in the international order? How do media reflect national interests according to changes in the national and international political economy?

This dissertation strives to scrutinize how national media construct globalization and explore what frames have been applied in the media's interpretations. It is concerned with how state power defines and rationalizes its interests by using various strategies and resources to impose a dominant ideology. It is also associated with how other power forces or interest groups compete to express their definitions of globalization in national media, and contest for the best of their advantages.

1.1 Making Sense of Globalization: Setting the Stage

1.1.1 Globalization and Neoliberalism

An introduction of neoliberalism will be made as a prelude to understanding globalization. Defined as a "movement towards, and the coming into being of, a particular idea of freedom as unfettered circulation, particularly of capital and goods" (Schirato & Webb, 2003:23), neoliberalism was generated from a prevailing value of individual freedom and political movements in the world in the 1960s. In the neoliberal thinking, individual freedom is guaranteed by freedom of the market and trade. To achieve the end of full improvement of its citizens, state power should get out of the way and minimize its influence in market process. Therefore in neoliberal practices, the central mechanism is "not freedom per se, but an unbounded economy" (Schirato & Webb, 2003:25).

Neoliberalism may be the best explanation of what has being happening in the world since the end of the 1970s, particularly since the end of the cold war. The years 1978-1980 witnessed a tide of reforms and transformations. China's economic liberalization initiated by Deng Xiaoping made the country an open center of capitalist economy with sustained growth rates. Then the U.S. Federal Reserve changed the monetary policy to fight inflation. In May 1979, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher curbed the power of the trade union and ended the inflationary stagnation. In 1980, U.S. President Reagan deregulated industries and liberated the financial powers.

Following in their footsteps India and Sweden partially moved to neoliberalization, respectively in the 1980s and in the early 1990s. These new economic configurations did not occur by accident. To some extent these reforms were conducted to prevent a return to the economic conditions in the 1930s when there was excessive state intervention in the market and the capitalist order was much threatened by the intervention. They also prevented a web of social and political powers from regulating the capital.

Globalization is largely driven by various power relations that are associated with the logic of neoliberalism. The central program of globalization, according to Held and McGrew (2002:5), is "the creation of a global free market and the consolidation of Anglo-American capitalism within the world's major economic regions." Some people saw it as a new form of capitalism, driven by "the third industrial revolution," taking place across the world. Friedman (1999:10-11) announced the coming of a new era of globalization that became the dominant international system at the end of the 20th century, and cited "the degree and intensity with which the world is being tied together into a single globalized marketplace." They believed that globalization is different from the old phases because it can transcend and integrate the regional economies as a single global economic force (Dicken, 1998; Frank, 1998; Ohmae, 1990; J. A. Scholte, 1997). For example, in 2004, world foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows amounted to $648 billion[1], and the stock of FDI was $9 trillion which was attributed to 70,000 transnational corporations (TNCs, thereafter) and their 690,000 affiliates abroad with total sales of $19 trillion (UNCTAD, 2005).

However, some theorists attempt to interpret the globalization through different discourses. The Marxist scholar Wallerstein criticized the neoliberal idea of globalization that free trade is good for all. His world-system theory (1974; 1976) categorized the world-system into three main strata: core, semi-periphery and periphery. He argued that the core group can maximize its economic benefits by "playing off" the semi-periphery and "developing" states, to demonize the periphery and maintain world order and the status quo. This world-system is an extension of the old colonial times when the colonizers took advantages of the developing countries by military forces and economic dominance. Wallerstein's critique of neoliberalism is valued for a historical perspective,

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[1] The unit of currency used in this dissertation is U.S. dollars.

but explains all social, cultural and political spheres and activities in terms of economic relations.

Many sociologists, anthropologists, historicists and cultural studies scholars believe in the social and cultural dimensions of globalization and take globalization as a evolutionary process which involves subjectivity and culture as central factors (Becker, 1922; Robertson, 1992; M. Waters, 2001). Cultural theorists reject Marxism's "fatalism" (Bourdieu, 1998a:50) and assert that the flows of power and the movements of history are relatively heterogeneous, dynamic and open-ended. Besides the economic field, Bourdieu emphasized the effects of discourses, cultural capital and various forms of symbolic violence which made up of "doxa." The most pervasive doxa in the contemporary time is neoliberalism. The doxa places economic activities in the central and downsizes education, health and other public institutions including media.

The last but not the least, the group with a socio-historical perspective or the "third way" considers globalization to be a historical reality and attempts to identify the changing contexts and contents of its processes. The socio-historical perspective recognizes the flexible international relations, and argues against the neoliberal ideology that globalization can lead to "a single world society or global civilization" (Held & McGrew, 2002:7). However, globalization is more or less contingent on different groups at different times. This "third way" thought confirms globalization as a long-term phenomenon, and stresses how history drives and shapes globalization. Thus it is different form neoliberalism that believes that it is globalization that drives history.

1.1.2 Nation States in Globalization

Last section concluded different versions of globalization and revealed that the reality of globalization hinged on the deployment of neoliberal ideologies through the "politics of naming" (Schirato & Webb, 2003:2), and the relationship between the ideologies and the changes in everyday life. Among the transformations in society and everyday practices, the transitions of nation states are important.

Anti-globalization scholars alleged that the world economy is less intensively integrated as we expected. The actual net flows between the major economies are even less than that at the early twentieth century (Hirst & Thompson, 1999; Hoogvelt, 2001).

Compared with the world economy in nineteenth century, the contemporary economy is much less open and globalized. The skeptics claimed that global inequality and poverty are enduring features of the world order (Fieldhouse, 1999). They regarded international institutions such as the IMF and the WTO as liberal global governance, which has reinforced dominance, dependence, inequality and poverty (Cammack, 2002). Many developing countries have been marginalized because trade, investment and technology are concentrated in the core of the world economy (Hirst & Thompson, 1999) and the widening of the gap between the rich and the poor accelerated (Burbach, Nunez, & Kagarlitsky, 1997).

To answer the questions that whether globalization weakens states' power and autonomy, and if yes, what is likely to replace the state, scholars come up with two divergent views on globalization. Neo-liberal scholars hold a positive attitude towards the interdependence among states and the influence of globalization in world politics. The most overt sign of the decline of state sovereignty is the institutions and organizations independent of nation states, including TNCs and multi-national corporations (MNCs, thereafter), media and communication networks, World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Foundation (IMF, thereafter) and the World Bank. The supranational international institutions constitute global governance which consistently intervenes in their areas of trade and international relations, not allowing state sovereignty to get in the way in many issues. They believe that a liberal global regime has been established with economic globalization. Keohane and Nye (2000) focus on the power that transnational rules, norms and organizations gained from the complex system of interdependent nation-states. Through the rules, norms and organizations a global regime began to take shape. Horsman and Marshall (1994) believed that the state had become marginalized by the autonomy of companies in the transnational economy. Hardt and Negri (2000) call states in the new form as Empire, and address four main factors that have impacts upon state sovereignty: new communication technologies, changes in economic practice, the "end of history" thesis, and the increasingly global flows of people and the difficulty of maintaining national security.

Parallel to the scholarly discourse, practices in international society also have shown a decline of nation-states. The obvious sign is the establishment of international

organizations to extend, promote and secure the conditions for continued economic globalization. The growth of these institutions and collectivities that were thought to transcend states and societies has altered the domestic and international arenas. The role of individual nation-states began to be shaped, and the states had to commit themselves to the liberal international regime manifested in these institutions, or risk becoming "economic pariahs" (Y. Zheng, 2004). Other economic forces against states are multi-national enterprises (MNE) and transnational companies (TNC). According to Dunning (1993), the largest 300 MNEs account for 70% of the world's foreign direct investment (FDI) and 25% of its capital. In the "borderless economy" or the borderless system of production and sales, the difference between domestic economic activity and global economic activity is more difficult to sustain (Ohmae, 1990).

At the same time, some globalists deny that globalization has led to differentiation among states with poverty and inequality. They demonstrated that the income gap between the developed countries and the rest was narrowing (UNDP, 1999; 2001; World Bank, 2001). Neo-liberalists believed the global economy was a more benign force and promoted trade and investment flows. Globalization contributed significantly to economic growth and to lifting people out of poverty (World Bank, 2001a). The neoliberals believed that economic globalization was the only remedy for global poverty. A few critical globalists admitted the divisions in society caused by globalization. They called for a "Monterrey consensus" on development financing and robust global governance on global markets to promote fairer and more humane globalization (Hoogvelt, 1997; Wade, 2001).

In contrast, skeptics believe that nation states still protect their sovereignty and autonomy to choose their forms of political, economic and social development. "National political traditions are still vibrant, distinctive political bargains can still be struck between governments and electorates" (Held & McGrew, 2002:14), and national sovereignty still matters. From the perspective of origination and development of modern nation states, skeptics believed that the start of the twenty-first century is an age of the modern state, because states have increasingly claimed a monopoly of the legitimate use of military forces and judicial regulation, and regarded them as a symbol of statehood as well as insurance of national security. States also established other infrastructures, such as

communication networks, national or official language, national education system, or national political, economic and cultural institutions, to promote a national identity and build national solidarity (Ashford, 1986). The most representative view in this anti-globalization position is the realism in international relations theory. Realist perspective asserts that in a system of global states, the main purpose of the state is to promote and defend its national interest (S. Smith, 1987; Wight, 1986). The international order can not transcend the logic of state power politics and states are the primary actors in international relations (Gilpin, 1987).

However, the current financial tsunami destroyed some people's rosy dream of globalization. Originating in the U.S. in 2006, the collapse of a global housing bubble led to the global economic downturn which hit most areas in the world. It was estimated that large US and European banks had lost more than $1 trillion on toxic assets and from bad loans from January 2007 to September 2009[2]. In 2008, global stocks slumped 7.7% in January, and the worst start to an investing year since Morgan Stanley began publishing data in the 1970s. Some nation states even faced with bankruptcy in the crisis. Pakistan lost one-third of stock value and its foreign reserve shrank by 67% to $8.14 billion. Iceland, as another example, declared a "national bankrupt" by the Prime Minister Geir Haarde and turned to seek a rescue package from the IMF.

Given that the impacts of current financial crisis on states are much more severe in width and depth than any other economic crisis since the Great Depression, some scholars might conclude that globalization means the marginalization of nation states, national economy and national politics. It may be too early to make that conclusion though. In fact, national states remain as the dominant players in coping with the crisis of globalization. Three aspects of the crisis should be paid special attention.

First, major economies are struggling for their currencies which stand for economic autonomy of nation states. Issuing currency is basic national sovereignty and every country manages to maintain the status of its currency in the international financial system. In the current financial tsunami, the dominant currency, the U.S. dollars, devalued a lot and resulted in losses of assets of many countries that hold the claims on the U.S. dollars. In 2009, Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People's Bank of China

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[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%932009

who chairs the Bank's monetary policy committee, appealed to reforming the international monetary system and to creating an international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations. China's Vise-Premier Wang Qishan expressed the similar opinion in *the Times* because China is the largest creditor nation to the U.S. However, the U.S. was strongly against these proposals on the international monetary system, and asked for help from all the other countries to deal with its subprime mortgage crisis. The U.S. also urged China's appreciation of the RMB. We can see countries in the crisis tried to retain their autonomy on currencies.

Second, the countries in crisis are taking other measures by the means of state control and regulation to revive the economy. The Bush government injected about $3.35 trillion to the financial organizations to ease the crisis; the Federal Reserve System (Fed) has reduced the Federal Fund Rate for nine times and lent money to American companies. The Obama government went on to conduct state interventions in the economy. So did the European countries, Japan, China and other major economies.

Third, even though nation states realized the destructive power of the global financial crisis, the elites still believed in a liberal economy and economic globalization, just as the Chinese neo-liberalist Liu Junning (2009) asked, "To control capital or power?" Liu's answer to the question is to release the capital from political power which represents the ideology of new liberalism in China. Even the *Jiefang Daily*, a traditional party newspaper, argued that globalization is not the reason of the financial crisis. "The world needs globalization which is in a fair and reasonable order." (Z. Ding, 2008)

Because the current crisis happened during a period beyond the scope of my study, little analysis was conducted on the impacts of the crisis on globalization discourses in the Chinese and Indian media. However, my study (S. Jing, 2007) on 1997 Asian financial crisis has revealed that the crisis did not change China's attitude towards globalization; on the contrary, it repeated China's determination of integrating into the global economic order by taking globalization as a chance to develop backward economy. Although the Indian newspapers cited the Asian financial crisis as an example of ill effects of globalization, the pro-globalization discourse still prevailed and insisted that India stood to gain from globalization.

To conclude, the global financial tsunami has proved that nation states still play the

most important role in the international arena. Globalization exerts its influences to nation states. However, in this study, based on the above analysis and reviews, I will consider practices and politics of nation states in globalization are "inflected, if not driven, by the interests of nation states" (Schirato & Webb, 2003:130). States' responses to globalization are taken into consideration and further contextualized in terms of their own national interests.

1.1.3 Definition of Globalization

Based on the above discussion on the meaning of globalization, I argue that globalization is centered on a prevailing capitalist economy with political, cultural, societal changes that should be understood from a historical perspective. Three main elements of the phenomena are to be highlighted before the definition is given. First, globalization began to emerge in the late 20th century. Therefore it involves processes characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. *Neoliberalism*, as a mode of globalization discourse, became hegemonic and became a way for us to interpret, live in and understand the global world (Harvey, 2005).

Second, although the economic aspect of globalization was located in the center and the foremost, the *social and cultural aspects*, or what Waters calls the globalizing "symbolic exchange" (2001:19) were also important. In this sense, globalization is not only about structures, institutions and networks, but also about "the ways in which we think of social life and our place within it" (Robertson, 1992:81).

Third, both themes highlight *the crucial role of state* in globalization. The state has to create, preserve and guarantee an institutional framework that is appropriate to economic practices and symbolic exchanges. However, state interventions in markets must be kept to a minimum, according to Harvey's neoliberalism theory (2005:64) to favor "private property rights, the rule of law and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade."

It is widely believed in the academia that Roland Robertson was the key figure in the formalization and specification of the concept of globalization. To Robertson (1992:8), globalization is "the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole." Waters (2001:5) emphasizes social and cultural forces in

globalization, defining it as "a social process in which the constraints of geography on economic, political, social and cultural arrangements recede, in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding and in which people act accordingly." David Held and Anthony McGrew (2002:1) point out that globalization "denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction." They further pointed out that it refers to "a shift or transformation in the scale of human organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across the world's regions and continents."

In this study, I applied the broad definition of globalization by Giddens (1990:64) who defined globalization as

the intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa…Local transformation is as much a part of globalisation as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space.

This definition implies that globalization covers a broad spectrum from economy to politics, culture, society and military. The discourse of globalization should include various issues in these areas. Globalization also refers to a constructed reality as a very important reaction from the nation states. Based on the understanding of globalization, this study expects different national versions of global issues and discourses in the process of making sense of globalization.

1.2 China, India, and Globalization

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the conversion of Eastern European communist countries marked the end of the Cold War. However, the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1996) proclaimed there are conflicts between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs; resistance within different states to western power and the ecumenism movement was found all over the world (Held & McGrew, 2002).

To answer this question, the compliance and struggles of nation states in globalization should be seriously considered. Among all the nation states in the world,

China and India intrigue the most scholarly inquiries in comparative studies. As age-old Asian countries with distinct and splendid civilizations, they share many experiences and characteristics in common. Facing the trend of globalization, they both take a positive attitude and strive to seize the good opportunity to develop their economy. However, their responses and negotiations are different in line with the interests of dominant political powers during the globalization process.

1.2.1 Juxtaposing the Two States

Historically, China and India are ancient civilizations, with almost five thousand years (for India about four thousand years) of recorded histories and traditions. Their cultures have profound impacts upon the Asian area and other regions. Both have multi religions and multiple ethnics. Their more recent history of the last two to four centuries is replete with distressful colonial memories and feudal weakness, which made them the poorest countries in the world from the mid-eighteenth to the latter half of the twentieth century. In the mid-twentieth century, the two countries beat the western enemies and struggled for their independence as autonomous nation states. Until the late 1970s and early 1980s, they were widely regarded as underdeveloped nations and comparable low-income economies.

Nowadays China and India become important powers in the world with a vast territory and massive populations, and turned into two of the largest world economies (Table 1-1). China has a land area of about 9.6 million sq km, and is the third largest country in the world; India's land covers about 3.3 million sq km, ranking in the seventh. They hold the first and second largest populations in the world, respectively 1,305 and 1,095 millions (in 2005). Together they are home to nearly two-fifths of the total working-age global population (D. K. Das, 2006).

Table 1-1 National Profile of China and India (1999-2000)

Country	Population (millions)	Surface area (,000sq.km)	GNP ($ bn)	Ave. annual economic growth % (1998-1999)	Military expenditures ($ bn)	Armed forces (active)
China	1,250	9,597	980.2	7.2	39.5	2,470,000
India	998	3,288	442.2	6.9	14.2	1,303,000

Source: Nayar, Baldev Raj, and Paul T.V. *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status.* UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

China and India used to shut themselves off from the global world. China conducted a closed-door policy in the 1800s and in most time of the 1900s until the end of the Cultural Revolution. Before China adopted its Reforms and Openness policy in 1978, the country had been closed to the outside world. During the early 1980s, China revamped the foreign trade system and international relations. The monopoly of state trade over the export-import issues came to an end. Special economic zones in coastal cities were set up to absorb foreign capitals. These measures connected China with the western world and with globalization. However, the 1989 crackdown on the pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square interrupted China's pace of global integration. The political crisis made some conservative leaders concerned about the ideological implications of the reforms, so the initial globalizing process was in peril in the late 1980s (Faust & Kornberg, 1995).

The year 1992 is the turning point. Deng Xiaoping made a high profile trip to the southern China to rally support for a new round of reforms and salvage the regime's legitimacy after the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Deng's southern tour ("*Nan Xun*") began China's transition from "an ideologically constructed social order to an interest-based one, from a political society to an economic one" (Y. Zheng, 2004:61). China set out to build a socialist market economy. It further relaxed some restrictions on foreign investment in stock markets, although the access was still restricted. China struggled for fifteen years to be fully integrated into the global economic system. It finally entered the WTO in 2001. The Chinese government saw accession to the WTO as a symbol of entering the liberal international regime. It was also the best chance to develop China's economy. The impact of the WTO membership was enormous in all of China's economic, legal and political institutions. Economic gains were the most obvious and direct. In November 2007, China became the third largest economy in the world, after the US and Japan (Zhixin, 2008).

On the other hand, India was thrust into the globalization process by an internal crisis. India was a founding member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. It also belonged to the successor, the WTO. Its economy, however, was

not totally open to the outside world till the 1990s. India used to have a state-dominant socialist mode of economy for an inward-looking and semi-isolationist period, after it declared independence from Great Britain. It tried to realize primary industrialization following the same road as that of the former Soviet Union. This policy of autarchy, including import substitution, isolated as well as protected India from the world economy.

However, the closed-door policy failed. By 1991, the Planning Commission had no public funds to invest and India could not pay its current account balance. At the same time, India's model, the Soviet Union, collapsed. This collapse was perceived as the victory of market economies over planned economies. The Indian central government began to carry out its economic reforms in 1991, in the face of a severe foreign exchange crisis. India was then forced to follow, almost step by step, the typical IMF-World Bank stabilization-cum-structural adjustment package for the large amount of loan. The economy liberalized along free-market lines from then on.

China and India are both regarded as main beneficiaries in globalization. They rose from a group of under-developed countries, have integrated gradually into the world order, and became an indispensable part of the global body. The economic reforms in the last years brought rapid growths to China and India. China proved to be a superior success in economic performance, and is being seen by some analysts as the economic superpower of the future (Deng & Moore, 2004; Fishman, 2005). During the past ten years, China kept a constantly grow in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at a highest rate about 10% among the world economies. India's long-term growth rate during its pre-reform period was slothful and sarcastically called the "Hindu rate." However, it caught up with the momentum after 1991. Table 1-2 showed the increase in the two countries in the twenty-first century. Compared with the U.S. and Japan, the world first and second economies, China and India showed great potentials in developing the world's fastest growing economies.

Table 1-2 World's Important Economies by GDP

Country	2005 GDP ($billions) /(rank)	GDP Growth Rate (%)			2005 Population (millions)	2005 GDP/Capita ($)
		1999-2000	2000-2005	2005-2006		
U.S.	12,417 / 1	3.5	2.6	3.3	296	41,530
Japan	4,534 /2	1.1	1.4	2.2	128	35,420
China	2,234 / 4	10.6	9.6	10.7	1,305	1,700
India	806 / 10	6.0	7.0	9.2	1,095	726

Source: (Gupta & Wang, 2009:7)

However, Table 1-2 also demonstrated that the level of per capita income of the two countries kept low, much lower than that of the U.S. and Japan. The recent economic development has widened the economic inequality across the countries, especially in India. Despite sustained high economic growth rate, approximately 80% of India's population lives on less than $2 a day (nominal), more than double the same poverty rate in China.

1.2.2 Different States, Different Politics

Nonetheless, differences between the two countries exist. The most significant distinction is their dissimilar political system. The nature of their struggles for independence and freedom from the colonizers had produced two different states: China is a communist authoritarian country, while India implements a democracy of the western style. China is a people's democratic state run by the Communist Party (CPC) in consultation with other parties in the country, while India is a liberal democratic state with a formally multiple party system. In this study, three components of political system were scrutinized in terms of party system, political ideology and press-state relations.

1.2.2.1 Party System

Party system is one of major components of political system in modern states. In China, the CPC seized the state power in decades of revolutions and wars, based on the support from workers and peasants. Workers were regarded as the leading class and peasantry was the main force of the new democratic revolution. The CPC assumed

leadership of the new China and did not allow a competitive party of any other type in the socialist country. However, after coming to power in 1949, the CPC, led by Mao Zedong, launched several mass movements such as the Great Leap Forward of 1958 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76 with the purpose of attacking bureaucratism and elitism and maintaining the party's revolutionary character. In practice, those political movements made the party organization collapse and reduce its legitimacy sharply. When Deng Xiaoping took over the reign in 1978, his ruling thoughts diverged from Mao's ideology. Deng carried out the Reform and Opening Up policies and created a socialist market economy. Although the democratic student movement in the late 1980s seriously damaged the party and the state organs, Deng successfully repressed the opposition and turned the state back to the orbit of economic development. In the post-reform time, the Chinese polity is marked by a transformed communist party with a new social base. It contains more professionals, entrepreneurs, managers and rich peasants as the main social base to exercise political power. The capitalists, who once were considered as enemies of the people, have been given due place in the CPC's constitution since 2002.

Indian politics can be characterized as "politics of democratic transformation" (Mohanty, 2001:136). After its independence from British colonial rule in 1947, India continued the democratic revolution under the leadership of the Indian National Congress Party (INC). The INC maintained its political dominance during the first two decades until challenges from some non-Congress state governments emerged in 1967. The party under Indira Gandhi slowly lost the capacity to lead India's social transformation representing a range of diverse demands and interests, and failed to recover it in 1977. The Emergency (1975-1977) ended the "Congress system," which led to the era of coalition governments. The INC further split, the opposition parties united to form the Janata Party (the predecessor of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)) which later came to the power. Mohanty (2001) concluded the main features of the multi-party system in the nineties India as "the Congress linked to the Indira Gandhi family, the rise of BJP as a Hindu nationalist party, stable political base of the CPI-M in Bengal, Tripura and Kerala, steady rise of the regional parties and the presence of centrist formations linked to the interest of intermediate castes and dalits."

1.2.2.2 Political Ideology

China and India have undergone internal disruptions in terms of different social groups with their distinct interests and propositions competing under globalization. Since China's political system is almost closed to mass participation, the different discourses on state and globalization presented by Chinese established intellectuals are viewed as contending versions of globalization (Table 1-3). According to Zheng (2004), China's neo-liberal discourse regards globalism as a goal of modernization. It believes that China's national interests can be achieved by accepting international rules and norms. It also argues that problems such as income disparities are the products of the old socialist economy and authoritarian politics. Therefore, liberal constitutionalism is regarded as the foundation of China's political structure. For liberals, China's integration into the world will democratize the country's political system and call for democratization through political reforms. Liberals value civil society for its assistance in maintaining social stability and limiting state power. The new left, in contrast, is opposed to capitalism-driven globalism and ascribes social problems to it. It opposes any form of radical reform and stresses the importance of a centralized state; it thus calls for statism and a strong state that make China strong. The new left also supports Maoist democratic practices and is against western models of democracy. The disagreement between China's neo-liberals and the new left reflects their different visions of globalization.

Table 1-3 China's Internal Versions of Globalization

	New liberalism	The new left
Ideological origin	liberal pluralism	neo-Marxism, post-colonialism
Attitude towards globalization	in favor of globalization	against globalization
Marketization and the WTO	advocates liberal market and the WTO	opposes to capitalism-driven globalism, the West and the U.S. Imperialism
Political system	calls for democratization through political reforms	against following the western models of democracy
Impacts of economic reforms on media	supports for "negative freedom"	opposes to globalism and the culture of consumption
Exponents	Liu Junning, Li Shenzhi, Qin Hui, Zhu Xueqin	Cui Zhiyuan, Wang Hui, Wang Shaoguang, Gan Yang

Sources: Zheng, Yongnian. (2004). *Globalization and state transformation in China*. pp.162-186. Lee

Chin-Chuan. (2004). *Beyond western hegemony: Media and Chinese modernity* (in Chinese). p.308-314.

In India, the democratic system guarantees political participation in theory as well as in practice. Therefore the internal contention over globalization is reflected in the party activities and ideologies (Table 1-4). Kapur (2006) identified three ideologies in India: (1) traditional Nehruism (secularism), (2) the Hinduvta, and (3) the Indian Marxism composed of the leftists, Naxalites and the Indian Maoists. Secularism reflects the political ideology of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, and is the philosophy of the INC. It is a liberal utopian type of Fabianist socialism that deeply roots in the Gandhian concept of Sarvodaya (upliftment of all sections of the society). However, since Dr. Manmohan Singh initiated economic liberalizations, the economic policy of the INC has changed from a socialistic pattern to a commitment to liberalization and market; though it also takes a cautious approach to protect the weaker sections of society. The tradition of non-alignment in INC's foreign policy now becomes pragmatic. Hinduvta is the term used to describe movements advocating Hindu nationalism and is reflected in the thinking of the BJP. It is opposed to the Western invasion and historical oppression. The BJP advocates conservative social policies, self-reliance, free market economics, a nationalist foreign policy, and a strong national defense. Indian Marxism seeks both a parliamentary road to power, and fundamental changes through armed struggle.

Table 1-4 India's Internal Versions of Globalization

	The secularism	The Hinduvta	The Indian Marxism
Ideological base	a liberal idealistic type of Fabianist socialism	the radical Hindu Nationalism	Marxism
Marketization and globalization	advocates liberalization and market economy	advocates a free market economy but insists strong national defense	opposes economic globalization and marketization
Foreign relations	Non-Aligned	pragmatically resorts to super powers; Look East policy	opposes the West and the U.S. Imperialism
Impacts on media	ambivalent attitude towards globalization and the western culture	strong nationalism in media discourse	Opposes globalism and the culture of consumption
Political base	The Indian National Congress (INC)	the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)	the CPI(M)* and the other leftist parities
Newspaper	The *Times of India*	The *Hindu*	

Sources: Kapur, Ashok. (2006). *India: From regional to world power.* New York: Routledge. p.206-208.

* Communist Party of India (Marxism)

To sum up, China and India have undergone profound changes and transitions in the political system, social base and political ideology. In China, the CPC's domination remains unchallenged. Its agrarian base was altered into a mixed one with more and more businessmen and professionals. In India, the social base of the INC changed from an all-class united front to a party with special castes, tribes, minorities and women, and much from the increasing middle class. INC's domination is challenged by the rising parties such as the BJP and the CPI(M) which occupy more important seats in the politics. The Indian political elites tend to make an alliance among parties against their rivals.

The ideology of economic globalization has much impact on the CPC and the leading parties of India. However, the CPC government actively chose the road of openness and reform as a reaction to the Cultural Revolution and later the Tiananmen Square crackdown; meanwhile, India has been pushed towards reforms by the World Bank to recover from its economic crisis in 1991. This difference has resulted in different notions of democratic transformations. China emphasizes the priority of economic development, whereas India guarantees people's rights in a liberal democratic framework but in a not substantiated way in economic, social and cultural terms.

1.2.2.3 Press-State Relations

This section will review the research traditions on the media and the state, and examine how the media represents the state and the state interests under the constraints of power structure. In previous studies, scholars in communication, sociology and political science have worked on mass media as institutions in modern society. From the view of political economy of news, Mosco (1996:5) saw political economy as "the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumptions of resources." He insisted that class power remains a central element in the political economy of communication. Unlike Mosco who was standing in the camp of radical Marxists, some scholars took the different approach of liberal-pluralist. Lee's (2000) elaboration on the differences of the two approaches to the political economy of the media took Chinese communication as an example. The radical-Marxist political-economy considered the material base to be "determining" and

supported versions of socialism. They criticized capitalism and saw the state as "an instrument of capitalists, the capitalist class, or transnational corporations." Murdock and Golding (1977:14) contended that the pressure to maximize audiences and revenues produces a consistent tendency to avoid the "unpopular and tendentious and draw instead on the values and assumptions which are most familiar and most widely legitimated." The relationship between ownership of media and news coverage is getting more and more difficult to determine because public and commercial systems of ownership mix, blend and intersect in a growing variety of ways (Noam & ebrary, 1991). As Mosco (1996) summed up, there are four areas for radical Marxists to explore the influences of political forces on media: 1) how market standards establish market regulation; 2) how state intervention expands the number of participants in the market; 3) how state sells of a state enterprise related to public opinion and intervenes in market control; 4) internationalization of the capital and product of the communications industry. Williams (1977) also suggested from the perspective of cultural studies that scholars should investigate how economic infrastructure passively "set limits" and actively "exerts pressure" on the superstructure in actual and active process of social struggle.

On the other hand, liberal pluralists believe that repressive state power threatens media freedom and regarded market as main force to promote diversity. Censorship power is most frequently examined in liberal politics. Keane (1991) found that there are five interlocking types of political censorship in Western liberal states: emergency powers, armed secrecy, lying, state advertising and corporatism. In such countries as Norway, Sweden and France, government has subsidized newspapers directly for many years, especially to strengthen those newspapers that offer substantial political information but receive low advertising revenues (Schudson, 2002). Lee (2000) pointed out that in the Cultural Revolution era in China, the totalitarian state tended to have an omnipresent and omnipotent control over every facet of civil life. In other authoritative societies like Latin American, policy makers in the recent wave of democratization, "strong control, censorship, and manipulation of the mass media during authoritarian and democratic regimes have deeply discredited statist models" (J. Polumbaum, 1997). Besides manipulation and censorship, another way in which the state exerts its control on media is the news sources. Many studies on democratic media considered government officials as

the source of most of the news reports (L. W. Bennett, Gressett, & Hlatom, 1985; Tuchman, 1978).

No matter which approach is taken, the political economy puts media in the larger political and economic conditions and contexts, and under the interactive impact of politics and economies on the media's structure, operation, content and ideology.

In this study, I mainly examine how media representation is constrained by state power structure and political ideology, as well as by the market forces. It is argued that the diverse opinions expressed by the media are highly related to the governmental debate and the dominant political ideology. Bennett (1990) systematically integrated three interpretations of press-state relations in the U.S. The first is a liberal point favoring the "marketplace of ideas." Journalists in this belief may regard this logic of market as routine "professional" decisions (E. S. Herman, 1985). The second views the press-state relations as "transactional" or "symbiotic" ones that journalists and officials both benefit from citing the officials' voices (Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973; Tuchman, 1978). The third explanation argues that the press acts democratically responsible for the people by favoring government officials (Lichter, Rothman, & Lichter, 1986). Therefore the official versions of events should be paid attention to because they are representative of people. Bennett supported his "indexing" hypothesis that media tend to hinder much on the government voices and marginalize public opinion. Other studies (Hallin, 1986; C. Lee, 2002) revealed a restricted diversity of voices in media. Through an analysis of the so-called "propaganda model" in *Manufacturing Consent,* Herman and Chomasky (1988) pointed out that mass media news outlets deeply depend upon major sources of news, particularly the government, and participate in propaganda campaigns helpful to elite interests. However, most of the studies on the press-state relations are applied to the U.S. media, or a western democratic press. A closer examination of the press-state relations in China and India conducted in this study may offer a better explanation for the differences in national media constructions.

Chinese media contain their distinct characteristics that differentiate them from the western media and the authoritarian media; Indian media are free and marketized, but they are also embedded in a unique social context. Chinese media were instruments affiliated to the state power. The Central Propaganda Department laid down directions

and standards to manipulate media on what media would report and what it would suppress. Through the General Administration of Press and Publication, the central authorities control the media's license registration system. Newspapers have to be affiliated with a host unit (*Zhuguan Danwei*) and a supervising unit (*Zhuban Danwei*), and then be incorporated into the political power structure at every level of governments. The host unit and supervising unit could censor the media's and control the chief editor and other staff. At the same time, a reading and inspecting system (*Shendu Zhidu*) was built to examine whether the news content abides by the party ideology and government policy line. In this way, the media system prevented dissents and offered "a measure of redemption and a prolonged life to Chinese Communist Party hegemony" (Barmé, 1999:23).

Lee (2001) defined the main characteristics of Chinese media system in the post-Mao political economy as "demobilized liberalisation." The first characteristic is that the Chinese media system had been transformed from the totalitarianism to the state-capitalist authoritarianism. Second, as Pan (2000) pointed out, the media organizations have tried to improve news coverage and engage in marketing in order to attract a more diverse audience. Third, the media have turned into the "Party Publicity Inc" (He, 2000) whose task is to promote the party's images and legitimacy. The party press incorporated city newspapers, some tabloids and marginal newspapers to form the press conglomerates. The parent newspaper remained the party's mouthpiece and the subordinate newspapers acted as a profit center for the conglomerate. In 2005, 39 press groups were based in China. The purpose of building press conglomerates was "to pursue economic efficiency and consolidate a powerful economic base, and to tackle with the pressure of global media capital and competition" (Y. Zhao, 2000:21).

Compared with China, Indian media enjoy a wider range of freedom of speech. After the Independence, India retained the British legacies of universal suffrage, multiple-party system in a democratic constitution, as well as an independent media and judiciary. The Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech as a basic civil right. In 1966 India set up the self-managed Press Council to monitor political powers. The central and state governments did not publish any governmental daily, except that in a few states there were monthly or weekly published by the state governments. The marketized newspapers

do not show much sign of partisan inclination.

Publishers in India benefit from a long tradition of press freedom. The World Association of Newspapers reports that India now has nearly 2,000 daily newspapers, a growth of nearly 25 percent during this decade. National circulation is reported to rise 33% between 2001 and 2005. The 2006 National Readership Survey findings show the largest read newspapers to be *Dainik Jagran* (with 21.2 million readers) and *Rajasthan Patrika* (21.0 million), both published in Hindi. The *Times of India* is the most widely read English language newspaper (7.9 million), followed by the *Hindu* (4.05 million), *Hindustan Times* (3.85 million).The *New Indian Express* is also most widely read (4.0 million). The centralization of media ownership and the invasion of media content by the market weakened the independence of news practices. The Indian press was dominated by private capitals even before independence. For decades the major newspapers were basically controlled by several national and local financial and industrial family groups. There are about ten newspaper groups, each of which is owned by one or several of the major financial groups. For example, the Indian Express group was owned by the Viveck Goenka family, one of India's twelve monopolistic plutocrats. Unlike the western media, Indian newspapers are not listed on the stock market. Therefore the main economic constraints on Indian media came from the interests of the family groups and the market competition for readers.

In this case, it seems questionable to say that the press represents the nation state in India since the political and economic elites both exert great influence on Indian press. It is true that in India the political and economic elites may have internal contradictions. However, whatever the contradictions are, they may converge on the definition of national interest. First, pluralism of elite interest is a crucial characteristic of the current Indian power structure. After the independence, the Congress party had the political domination and controlled the government. It successfully mobilized almost all the sectors of Indian society behind its political leadership and development consensus. "Even the business community, which remained autonomous, found itself overwhelmed by the creation of a hegemonic public sector and a planned, regulated, and controlled economy and was forced to reach an accommodation with the Congress." (Hardgrave & Kochanek, 2000:177) However, under the trend of privatization, liberalization and

globalization, this politics-based pluralism gradually evolved into a more broadly based system of competitive pluralism as groups competed with each other for interest. The traditional division of political and economic powers was replaced by identity-based groups, institutions and political parties. It is more and more difficult to differentiate the interests of political or economic elites.

Second, although little literature on the different relations between Indian political and economic elites and the press can be found, some studies on the Indian newspapers suggest that the national elite media in India represent national interest and ideology. On the issues related to national interest, especially in international relations and foreign policies, the political elites and the economic elites often have common interests. Basu (2003:33) found that the Indian press did question the government's policies in foreign policy-related news. However, the press showed a "consistent national interest bias." Hardgrave and Kochanek (2000) also argued that the decisions in Indian foreign policy were made in the context of a broad national consensus on national interests. Therefore the press is fundamentally supportive for foreign policy issues. The consensus among political and economic elites in the end is shaped and defined by national interest.

In summary, Indian press represent both political and economic elites' views on globalization. It does not imply that the press-state relationship in China and India are the same things. Moreover, how the different press-state relations affect media discourses is exact what this study will elaborate on.

1.3 Outline of the Chapters

In this study, a general question "How do the media in China and India discuss the relationship between globalization and the two countries?" runs through the whole discussion, which is based on the understanding of globalization, and the interplays between China and India and globalization. What I am interested is how media in the two countries articulate globalization in accordance with the contexts of political economies of the two states in globalization.

To sketch a brief theoretical framework of this study, Chapter 2 starts from framing theory and applications in communication studies. Based on a detailed literature review, it elaborates on two media frames on globalization which I call Interest frame and Identity

frame. The two frames offer us two perspectives in which national media conceive of globalization. It is followed by an introduction of the method and a batch of research questions to be answered.

Chapters 3 to 6 further examine how the national media elaborate on globalization. By means of applying Interest frame, the media discourses on two issues are analyzed: the discussion on winners or losers, and on the internal conflicts and social contradictions. Chapter 3 assumed states actively played the role of global actors in globalization and negotiated with the international political economy. It explored how Chinese and Indian media used the frame to gain dominant definition of benefits and costs in globalization. Chapter 4 examined how the media used Interest frame to construct social conflicts within China and India, and how the internal diverse discourses compete for the interest they represented. The nation states act as divided interest groups and sectors at national level; however, under Interest frame differently used by the media, the social conflicts among the groups and sectors presented in different forms and narrations.

Two issues are discussed in the perspective of Identity frame: how did the media portray the "other" and define "us"? How did the media employ history to articulate the globalization? Chapter 5 examined how media used history to make sense of globalization. Chinese and Indian national press strategically used the historical memories in different ways to construct national identities in line with elite-defined identity of the states. Chapter 6 analyzed the media discourses on the states' relations with the others, mainly with the U.S. The categorization of the "other" and themselves was tied to contextualized issues and dimensions. The changing frames of the U.S. in the Chinese and Indian media were in accordance with the reorientation of the two states in the world system and their perceived relations with the other countries.

Chapter 7 summed up the differences between Chinese and Indian media discourses on globalization and attempted to explain the driving mechanism. The discussion is significant for the scholarly inquiries into the theories of framing and social construction of reality, as well as globalization discursive contestation in that it fills the gap between media text and the complicated social reality. However, some limitations of this study are also discussed. The first limitation concerns representation of the outlets. To some extent only one national newspaper could hardly stand for the full landscape of a country's press,

even though it is the most representative one on behalf of national interests. If one more newspaper for each country is concluded in this study, factors such as their media ideology and party identification should be considered too for their impact on conditioning globalization constructions. The second limitation concerns the applicability of the two frames to some other studies on specific issues. Globalization is a prevailing but special phenomenon for its complex and multifaceted so that the media constructions on globalization may be inherently different from those on other social phenomenon.

Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework and Method

This chapter aims to depict a general summary of theoretical framework and method. Chapter 1 has explained that different nation states would present different versions of globalization from their own points of view. Among the world states China and India were to be proved to be a good pair of comparable countries that represent responses to globalization from the rising powers. Although many ways in which the two states are both influenced similarly by the new economy are the same, how media construct the trend and issues is determined by the relations of media with the state power.

2.1 Two Frames in Globalization Discourse

The globalization discourse in national media composes of two very important components. The first centers on interest; it talks about what the interest of nation states in globalization is and how to handle it. Several questions about this issue need to be answered: What is the interest? Will globalization bring us benefits or cause losses? What are the benefits and losses? What does globalization mean to us for our benefit? The second component of globalization discourse is about the subject of interest, that is, what the subjects of the interest are and how to categorize them. When we talk about "interest," there must be "interest of whom." There is not an ideal politics good for everybody; there is always someone's laughter and other one's tear. About globalization, whose interest do media talk about? Which group or social sector is defined as winners? How do media endow the interest with the specific group or sector? There surely are other issues important in media's globalization discourse. However, in this study I will focus on these two and explore the frames Chinese and Indian media used in constructing globalization in terms of the two issues.

2.1.1 Framing Theory and Categories of Frames

Originated in social psychological area, the concept of "framing" is used as "schemata of interpretation" (Goffman, 1974:21) to explore how people rely on expectations to make sense of their everyday social experience. Entman (1993a:52) emphasized the outcome or effect of a frame by the definition: "To frame is to select

some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation." From a sociological perspective, framing is concerned with how issues are constructed, discourses are structured, and meanings are developed (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gamson, 1992). Frames are defined as "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse" (Gitlin, 1980:7). This frequently cited definition emphasizes the role of routine organizations, particularly mass media, in making sense of events in political life.

Framing is concerned with the way "interests, communicators, sources, and culture combine to yield coherent ways of understanding the world, which are developed using all of the available verbal and visual symbolic resources" (Reese, Gandy, & Grant, 2001:11). Some researchers (M. Edelman, 1993; Goffman, 1974) believed that frames help the users to classify and categorize concrete occurrences. Hertog and McLeod (Hertog & McLeod, 1995) argued that framing used to "interpret an event determines what available information is relevant (and thereby what is irrelevant)" (p.4). Thus framing can be used to define the context for an occurrence and excludes what was not defined as relevant.

According to different political issues and social phenomena, researches explored the impact of media frames by categorizing them into different types. At the very high level, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) divided construction mechanisms into two forms, framing devices and reasoning devices. McCombs and Ghanem's (2001) initial distinction between frames that are attributes of communication presentations and frames that are attributes of the objects being presented are much alike Gamson and Modigliani's way. Iyengar (1991) applied "episodic" (or "anecdotal") and "thematic" news frames to respectively examine audience's attributions of responsibility for political issues and media's indirect influence on public opinion in general. The episodic frame focuses on "specific events or particular cases," whereas the thematic frame tries to contextualize political issues and events. However, few frames are formulated and differentiated to apply to a grand and complex social phenomenon like globalization; nevertheless this study will have a trial because of the importance of media discourses on such issues.

Corresponding to the above two issues in globalization discourse, two frames are mainly applied in constructing world affairs and world opinions. Based on previous studies (Brewer, 2006; Gamson, 1992; Iyengar, 1991) and my own observation, national media's construction of globalization can be classified as either in an Interest frame or in an Identity frame. **Interest frame** *that invites strategic judgments and national reasoning, and emphasizes national interest and benefit-cost analysis* is frequently used. For example, as Berinksy and Kinder's study (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006) found, the proponents of the 1999 Kosovo crisis framed Yugoslavian political leader Slobodan Milosevic as a villain between good and bad, and the proponents of the Iraq war often framed Saddam Hussein in the similar way. Presidents, Congress members and officials are engaged in explanations over the meaning of their policies. Therefore, they framed wars towards "evils" which were defined by the media to justify their decision of starting a war. Another often-used frame is the **Identity frame** *that tends to invite ideological judgments and emphasizes emotionally charged symbols*. A good example of this frame comes from the description of China by the U.S. government administrators. President Bill Clinton framed China as a "strategic partner," whereas soon afterwards, his successor George W. Bush framed the same country as a "strategic competitor." By changing the expressions on China and the relations between the U.S. and China, the presidents used the Identity frame to define China as a friend or a competitor, and to address their principles and standpoints in policies on China.

2.1.2 The Interest Frame

Based on strategic judgments and national reasoning, the Interest frame emphasizes the gain-or-loss of interest and a benefit-cost analysis. In most cases, media used the Interest frame to discuss advantages and disadvantages in implementing a policy, the benefits and costs of making a decision and pro-or-against inclinations in molding attitudes. For example, Fiss and Hirsch (2005) studied the discourse contention of globalization by generally dividing the discourse into three categories. The three evaluative frames are the negative, neutral and positive frames. The negative frame described globalization as increasing the potential for economic crisis, threatening the livelihoods of people and resulting in unemployment and poverty, and referred to an

emerging resistance to globalization; the neutral frame depicted it as a natural and evolutionary development process; and the positive frame stated that globalization brings potential gains and benefits, such as the opportunities for economy. Sometimes according to what ordinary people often encounter in media, national interest frame can be divided into several sub-frames, such as conflicting interests frame, common interests frame and reciprocal exchange frame (Brewer, 2006). Research found that changes in collective opinion are typically "predictable and understandable" in terms of national interests as reported by media (Page & Shapiro, 1992:xi). Psychologists suggest that national interest frames in media coverage can affect citizens' opinion and serve as bases for their reasoning about world affairs (Chong, 1993; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Zaller, 1992).

Since frames of national interest are powerful in molding public opinion, media tend to zoom in or zoom out the frames on gains or losses to stress their standpoints to a specific policy. The most typical example is Tversky and Kahneman's famous experiment (1981) on people's responses to differently posed questions about a disease prevention strategy. They found 72% of participants chose option A which is said to save 200 peoples' lives, but only 28% of participants chose option B which proposes a 33% chance of saving all 600 people and a 66% possibility of saving no one. In fact, treatments A and B are mathematically identical; the difference in their responses comes from the experimenters' framing. Media often intentionally emphasize effects on one side but rule out effects on the other side. Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon (2005) found that by discerning and highlighting core U.S. interests and values threatened by the developments in the Bosnia crisis (1992-1995), the U.S. media tried to push the Clinton government to conduct a more active policy in the crisis. In news coverage on other crisis such as the KAL (Korean Air Lines) attack in 1983, and Iran Air incident in 1988, the U.S. media depicted the similar phenomena in different frames (Entman, 1991). The media described the latter downing of an Iranian plane by the U.S. military as "a technical problem" by de-emphasizing the agency and the victims, whereas the Soviet downing of a Korean plane as "a moral outrage." It was concluded that in news coverage the essence of framing is "sizing—magnifying or shrinking elements of the depicted reality to make them more or less salient" (Entman, 1991:9). For a long period in the Cold War, the U.S.

media simplified and prioritized the coverage on international affairs simply by the Cold War frame. Other black-or-white categorized frames include the North-South frame and the dictatorship-democracy frame (Norris, 1995).

The Interest frame refers to substantial benefits accrued or losses incurred which should be substantial and not void. Therefore, the frame is applied most frequently in the circumstances of reporting a specific issue or policy. This issue-based and problem-solving orientation of Interest frame offers scholars a useful tool in analyzing media discourses. Interests that are frequently elaborated on are embedded in foreign trade, foreign relations, domestic policies, and internal and external crisis. Reporting on racial issues was examined for its emphasis on winners or losers (Goshorn & Gandy, 1984). Articulating the linkage between the September 11 terror attack and globalization, Rojecki (2005) focused on terror issues and found a particular frame across the whole coverage (accounting for 51%): the dark side of globalization. This frame, as Rojecki argued, has two versions, one political, the other economic. They together weighed the short-term risks of globalization against long-term benefits. Politically, the world is getting closer but with some problems in distance among states; economically, the short-term risks posed by terrorism was brought up, but the long-term benefits of expanding market economy in globalization was more frequently emphasized. This is because that neoliberalism ideology was supported for its remedy for global prosperity and for its measures to counter terrorism adopted by the U.S. government.

Economic issues or growth issues that are predominantly about interest attract much attention from studies on framing. An "economic consequences frame" is identified as a common frame often used in the news (Graber, 1993; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992). It is applied to the unveiling of an event, problem or issue in terms of the economic consequences on social entities. The report on the meeting of prime ministers of EU countries is a good example of economic consequences frame. Compared with that on television, this frame occurred significantly more often in newspapers and more than the "crime" frame (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Sayer and Walker (2001) argued that globalization can bring consumers more choices with domestic and imported products at lower prices. However, Panayotou (2000) emphasized the reduction of economic prospects in individual countries, sectors and industries as a result of globalization.

Through a careful content analysis, Marks and his research partners (Marks, Kalaitzandonakes, & Konduru, 2006) highlighted several important issues in the media coverage of globalization which included efficiency and growth, wealth distribution and inequality, environment, integration and interdependence, and globalization and democracy. This categorization was based on a benefit-cost analysis, although the authors did not directly discuss it. Reese and his colleague (2001:21) found the "winning" frame that supported Austin local economic interests to estimate benefits escalated from "$80 to 100 million," to "100 million," and finally to "at least a 100 million."

The WTO meetings and other related issues are crucial fortresses for the application of Interest frame for its enormous impacts on politics as well as economy of a state. Zhao (2003) in her study media discourse on China's accession to the WTO found that Chinese media did not disclose the content of the WTO deals, and was limited on the negative valuation on it by the part-state ideology. The hegemonic voice in Chinese media included the statist discourse of building a big nation, the transnational corporatists discourse, the expert discourse and the consumerist discourse. Elite interest is presented "under the guise of a universalizing language and a 'larger rationality'" (Y. Zhao, 2003:51). The dominant frame of reference in the media is a general interest in abstract terms of "the national interest," "the interest of the Chinese people," "China's fundamental interest," "the long-term interest of the Chinese people," or of various economic indicators.

After the benefit-cost analysis, the question on who will be responsible for the losses comes up. Attribution of responsibility is an important element in the Interest frame because there are causes and explanations for the benefits and costs. As Iyengar (1991:8) stated, "Attributions of responsibility are critical ingredients of all social knowledge." The causal responsibility and treatment responsibility respectively focuses on the origin of a problem, and who has the power to solve the problem. The U.S. media were blamed for framing people's opinion in who is responsible for causing social problems, such as poverty (Iyengar, 1987). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000:96) tested the "responsibility frame" and defined it as a frame that "presents an issue or problem in such a way as to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group." They concluded that media in Holland often attributed

responsibility to the government. At the same time, the responsibility was heavily emphasized in the serious news programs. The discussion on attribution of responsibility is important to Identity frame because media's standpoints and interests can be clearly explored by examining who are blamed for by media.

In this study on globalization, the Interest frame is widely used in Chinese and Indian national media. To elaborate on how the frame is applied to construct globalization, two types of issues are examined: costs and benefits of the countries in international trade and internal social conflicts.

2.1.3 The Identity Frame

Ideologically and symbolically oriented, the Identity frame is much associated with the core concept of social identity that addresses the "we-ness" of a group, "stressing the similarities or shared attributes around which group members coalesce" (Cerulo, 1997:386). Social constructionist approach to collective identity believes that there is no essential or core features as the unique property of members in a group; social identity is molded and mobilized in line with centers of power and culture. As a *constructed and public* national self-image, national identity "based on membership in a political community as well as history, myths, symbols, language, and cultural norms commonly held by members of a nation" (Hutcheson, et al.,2004:28).

The Identity frame is most frequently applied by constructing a concept of "we." A nation state is composed of various fragmentations. Every collective, from a gender group to a nation state, becomes a social artifact and forms its own identity in line with a broader social context. Studies on gender identity often conceptualize gender as a subjective definition of femininity or masculinity which is an interactional negotiation with the symbols and social norms (Gailey, 1987; Gerson & Peiss, 1985; Margolis, 1985). Constructionists also broke the gender-sex link and the gender-body link, and highlighted the effects of the social rituals and symbols on practices (Bordo, 1993; Spallone & Steinberg, 1987). Gender categories are one of the rituals that socially construct maleness and femaleness and constrain human behavior (D. E. Smith, 1990). Many studies focused on how individuals use data organized by agents to form a gendered self. The role of popular culture and media is often emphasized as socialization agents in gender identity

(Kalisch & Kalisch, 1984; Miller, 1987; Signorielli, 1990). Irvine (1994:11) identified nine "axes of constructed domains" to describe the process of identity building, including sexual language and public discourse, and knowledge and meaning of the body. Taylor and Whittier (Taylor & Whittier, 1992) bought up a simpler process which contains three steps of constructing the boundaries, building shared consciousness and goals, and politicizing the group's status.

Race and ethnicity is another arena where identity is constructed by media and other socialization institutions. Waters (1990) viewed ethnic identity as a social category that individuals actively choose or adopt. She explained the mixed ancestry switched their ethnic identity in that the identification is rewards of social payoff that is potentially negative for Americans of nonwhite, non-Euro lineage. Davis (1991) introduced the history of the "one drop rule," and revealed the role of the rule in maintaining the salve system. He found the rule had great impact on U.S. race relations. Alba (1990) argued that the changing situational contexts and growing social needs have shaped ethnic identities. Nagel (1995) also scrutinized ethnic identity shifts from a sociopolitical perspective. She concluded three sociopolitical factors that exerted influence to ethnicity: varying federal Indian policy, increasing American ethnic politics, and growing American Indian political activism. Under these policies a consciousness of Native American ethnicity was raised and renewed.

Anderson (1991) is widely cited for the concept of "imagined community" where a national self generated by the intervention of cultural forces such as language, and social factors such as print capitalism in making the collective imagination. Anderson also concluded that national identity was constructed both spatially and temporally, because on the one hand, the absorption of populations into larger politico-cultural units is not possible and immigrant groups have their own cultures and local political ideologies, and on the other hand a nation could not long remain without referring to the history and totally be new.

A rich literature on national identity elaborates how actors, particularly elites, create the identities of nation states, national public, allies and rivals through cultural materials, especially mass media. Zhao (1998) followed Anderson's divisions of space and time, and examined how the Chinese political power was inserted into popular entertainment.

She paid attention to the transition of ways in which nation state power created national identity: the Spring Festival Eve television gala that used to be a traditional family gathering was articulated to a distinctively national character. The gala made "Beijing time" a motif and illustrated a widely shared "century complex" in Chinese people to strengthen the political centralism. It also tied families via television with the central state by emphasizing the traditions and the mass line, which spatially transited the audience's identity from a much private level to a collective one. In this way it unified families into the "imagined community" of the Chinese nation, and the "classical Confucian ideal of the great unity" was implemented by the state's modernization narrative. To expose the social forces behind the transitional trajectory in the gala, Lu (2003; 2006) found several "structural elements" in the multilayer discourses. He pointed out that "Beijing time" was used to embody a sense of nation's territory sovereignty, and was more and more applied to exploit a market of "global Chinese." Language is another structural element which served the purpose of the central ideology to unite the nation. The programs in local dialects were dominated by dialect in northern China which is very close to and similar to the standard national language Putonghua. The party propaganda incorporated local forces and resources to settle the contradictions between the central and the local. Some important issues, such as Taiwan issue and the problems facing China's agriculture, rural areas and farmers (*Sannong*), were embellished in the gala to cover up social conflicts and differentiations. Lu concluded that state ideology and consumerism utilized the function of the ritual gala in constructing identity to struggle for their own discourse space. To explain the reasons that a specific discursive construction of national identity is produced, Martin (1995:13) argued that political emotions could "fuel efforts to modify a balance of power" through the channels of identity narratives. Bourdieu (1994) emphasized political agents and representatives of the state to create national identities.

Besides the time-space framework, culture and value are often emphasized in Identity frame. Hall (1996:20) highlighted the role culture plays and depicted nations as "systems of cultural representations." Sometimes the culture element, such as history, is related to the conception of "time." For example, Niebuhr (1967) addressed that each nation develops a positive "social myth" which frames historical events in positive lights and thus established a sense of superiority over other nations. Deutsch (1953) further

tested such myths, and found them propagated by national elites and through such political and cultural institutions as schools and mass media. Halbwachs (1992) brought forward the notion of "collective memory" and believed it allowed social members to trace back to historical events to build up the similar remembrance and understanding. De Cillia and her colleagues (1999) assumed that national identity is discursively produced and transformed by means of language and other semiotic systems, such as newspaper articles, public speeches and posters. They discovered and distinguished five semantic macro-areas that constructed Austrian identity and nation which included the discursive construction of a common culture, a collective present and future and a "national body," and other narratives. Topics, discursive strategies and linguistic devices were employed to construct national sameness and uniqueness, and differences to other national collectives.

When a state is threatened, it is the high time that political powers use media to mobilize the mass citizenry and suppress competing sub-national identities. Many studies have elaborated on the relationship between crisis times and elite discourses. Hutcheson and his peers (2004:30) found "national identity communication strategies" in the post-terrorism-attack campaign after September 11, 2001. The President and key government leaders used specific language and images to foster and reinforce a collective U.S. identity. At the same time, for the purpose of inclusion in the internal threats, media discourse of Arab American was employed in representing what it meant to be an exemplary patriotic American (Gavrilos, 2002). In a health crisis, the British press covered "mad cow disease" as a threat to the nation's health, and used terms of "we" and "us" to denote the nation. Frosh and Wolfsfeld (2006) concluded four discursive strategies that operate in construction of nationhood in times of crisis: concatenation, convening, nesting and fatalization. However, aside from the moments of hot events like wars, "banal nationalism" is utilized in routine and in an unnoticed way (Billig, 1995). In this way of constructing national identity, "small words, rather than grand memorable phrases, offer constant, but rarely conscious, reminders of the homeland, making 'our' national identity unforgettable" (Billig, 1995:93).

Identity is inherently social. National identity means an inherently associated identity in terms of relations with other national identities. Media construct not only "us," but also "them" to set the boundary of national identity by means of inclusion and

exclusion. The "other" becomes the other side of the coin, and thus "the whole argument of nationalists seems to be reduced to the fundamental question of defining the 'we' and the 'they' " (Triandafyllidou, 1998:596). Smith (1991:75) argued that identity is conceptualized as sameness. The members in a group have some features in common, which constitute their identity; "others" differ from the group members in these features. This pattern of "similarity-cum-dissimilarity" is one meaning of national identity. In this sense, national identity means difference. Its existence presupposes the existence of "others." National identity becomes meaningful in contrast to other nations. Anderson (1991:93) pointed out the difference between empire and nation and emphasized the concept of "nation", because "empire" is self-centered but "nation" means a nation among nations. Therefore, national media sometimes resort to depict the "other" to reinforce the sense of "what we are." In some circumstances, there is an interaction between the "other" and "us." Under a relatively fixed structure, the change of others may result in the reorientation of us. For example, in the Gulf War the U.S. government demonized Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime to emphasize the role of the U.S. in the new world order (Kellner, 1992).

Chinese and Indian media discourses were examined by the use of Identity frame. Based on spatial and temporal definition of national identity, this study discussed two issues: how do the media use history to construct a collective memory to strengthen national identity? How do the media conceive of the others, especially the U.S., to relocate us and reinforce the sense of belongs.

2.1.4 Outline of the Two Frames

From the above review, globalization discourse in media can be unpacked and analyzed in two approaches: interest-based and identity-based. Table 2-1 revealed the general pattern that was found in Chinese and Indian media discourses on globalization. From the interest perspective, two issues were explored: how did the media discuss benefits and costs in globalization and justify the elites' interests? How did the media discuss interest conflicts that resulted from entering the global world? From the ideological perspective, two issues were identified in term of space and time: how did the media construct the others by categorizing nation states? How did the media construct

collective memory by using history to build national identity?

Table 2-1 Outline of the Two Frames in the Chinese and Indian Media (%)

	Globalization discourse					
	Interest frame			Identity frame		
	Benefit-cost	Interest conflict	total	The others	History usage	total
China	9.6 (48)	9.8 (49)	15.4 (97)	27.7 (139)	9.8 (49)	37.5 (188)
India	15.3 (77)	15.7 (79)	31.0 (156)	12.1 (61)	14.5 (73)	26.6 (134)

Table 2-1 shows the mount in percentage of frames applied in the Chinese and Indian media. The Chinese media paid so much attention to the others (especially the U.S.) that the articles on this issue applying the identity frame amount to 139 which are more than the articles on other issues. The amount of related articles is only one indicator in application of the two frames. How the media elaborate on the issues should be further examined. That is why besides content analysis, discourse analysis was also conducted in this study.

2.2 Method

This study employed methods of discourse analysis and content analysis in examining Chinese and Indian newspapers' discourse. The main body of empirical evidence came from the discourse analysis of media construction of globalization. The content analysis is a necessary complement to the discourse analysis because it can provide some basic information and general genre of the media content. Some histories, second-tier studies, official reports and statistic data were used to fill the gap between the media content and the complex context in terms of state power structural reconfiguration, and change of the international political economy. Through a comparative perspective, Chinese and Indian media systems were carefully investigated in the contexts of globalization.

2.2.1 Sampling

2.2.1.1 Outlets

This study basically selected one newspaper in each country as the representative of their national media. The newspapers are prestigious national dailies with a large

circulation. In Chinese media I selected the *People's Daily* (and the *Global Times)* as the representative newspaper(s). The *People's Daily* is an official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) which has a decisive influence on the editorial policy and content of the press. It is the most influential and authoritative newspaper, and one of the largest dailies in China with a circulation of three million copies. As the chief party organ, it sets the tone and agenda for the other newspapers in China. In this sense, the editorials by the *People's Daily* can be seen as the Chinese official ideological version of important issues. The *People's Daily* therefore most represents a state discourse on globalization.

However, the *People's Daily* focuses more on domestic issues and is hesitant to emphasize the importance of foreign news. To make a balance between domestic issues and international issues, I use the *Global Times* as a supplementary part to the *People's Daily*. The *Global Time*s, as a subsidiary of the *People's Daily*, is the most influential Chinese outlet that covers foreign and international issues. It takes best advantages of news resources of the *People's Daily*, claiming to be staffed with more than 350 correspondents and stringers in 75 countries. It alleges to have a national circulation of two million copies. Being a good example of the marketized party press, its focus on hot global issues, usage of eye-catching headlines and pictures, and its coverage from a "soft" perspective on foreign news with nationalistic rhetoric (Jia, 2004). It garners a huge profit from circulation and advertisement. However, the *Global Times* still acts as a complementary party organ. It is a major quasi- or semi-official newspaper. The newspaper was highly praised by the authorities, such as Liu Zuyu, the chief censor in the Central Propaganda Department, and academics from universities, for its "correct direction of public opinion" (Z. Liu, 2004), "social responsibility" (X. Li, 2004) and "reflection of mainstream values" (G. Yu, 2004).

In India, the English press is believed to exercise a disproportionate amount of influence among the educated and literate segments of the population, and plays a very important role in agenda-setting (Haque, 1988). I chose one of the most famous English dailies, the *Hindu,* as the representative of Indian press. The *Hindu* was established in 1878 as a weekly newspaper and became a daily in 1889. It was famous for its role in the independent movement and had enormous influence over the country. The term "Hindu"

at that time and till the early 1900s referred to "Indian." It did not stand only for a particular religious community. The founders were non-Hindu; the name was considered the best because it "expressed the national sentiment best" (Raghavan, 1994:19). Over the past years, the newspaper managed to improve the quality and objectivity in news reports and opinion pieces, and its efforts paid off. The *Hindu* now occupies the second position in Indian newspapers by circulation, slightly behind the *Times of India*.

However, according to the website of the WorldPress[3] lists, the *Hindu* was a left-leaning independent newspaper (see Table 1-4). To guarantee the validity of this study, I also use data from the *Times of India* as a supplement. The data base of the *Times of India* is accessible on the Internet from 2000 to 2006. It is the oldest and the largest English-language newspaper in India, with a claimed circulation of over 3.14 million copies in 2008, which was the widest circulation among all English newspapers in the world (*Dailies add 12.6 million readers: NRS.*2006). Aiming primarily at the English-educated intelligentsia, it is widely read by businessmen, academics, government officials and other urban educated elite. The *Times of India* is self-claimed as a liberal newspaper in its editorial principles. However, it is owned and run by Bennett & Coleman Co. Ltd which is owned by the Sahu Jain family, and thus it supports for the technical and business sides of globalization. Although there were critics that the *Times of India* had been an establishment newspaper, its influence is due to "its role as the spokesman for India's national interest" (Basu, 2003:30).

Although the *Hindu* has its own political inclination and editorial orientation, a pilot test on the overall attitude towards globalization by the *Hindu* and the *Times of India* showed no significant difference between the two outlets ($\chi^2 = 5.4$, $df = 3$)[4]. Again this augments the point that despite differences on domestic issues, these papers are rather consistent on international issues. When the variation in discourses on internal issues was checked, the two Indian newspapers were both in examination under comparison at the same time during 2000 to 2006. Therefore in Chapter 4, 768 articles were sampled out

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[3] See www.worldpress.org

[4] The two Chinese newspapers were also examined and there was no significant difference found in their overall attitude towards globalization. However, in some specific issues, such as background of the authors, the two papers showed a significant difference. Chapter 4 has further explanation in this problem.

from the four newspapers, 397 from the Chinese media (the *People's Daily* 177, the *Global Times* 220) and 371 from the Indian media (the *Times of India* 184, the *Hindu* 187).

2.2.1.2 Time Period

The time period from 1996 to 2006 was examined in this study. This choice of time is based on my practicality plus the aim of research. First, ten-year is a time period that I can handle in this study. Second, it can offer me enough data to support my analysis. Third, this study focuses on the differences between Chinese and Indian media discourses, not difference between two time periods. Therefore, I selected these recent ten years as the time period under study.

2.2.1.3 Article Selection

Type of story. In this study, the articles must be editorials or opinions. Both news and editorials should abide by the principles of objectivity, neutrality and impartiality. In contrast, editorials and commentaries are less restrained in offering the background, analyzing the primary reasons, asserting the journalists' own opinion and idea in a clear and unequivocal voice (Denhan, 1997; Page, 1996). Moreover, the editorials are so important opinions that attract attention from the decision-makers who should give an official response (Grosswiler, 1996). Therefore editorials can explicitly express interests of elites who have great influence in media content production.

Keyword Search. Based on the understanding of globalization and the purpose of this study, a list of keywords (Appendix I) was made to search for the samples. There are two reasons to take the advantages of selecting articles by keyword search. First, globalization is such a popular and widely-used concept that it would be mentioned in various situations. In this case, the pool of articles would be too broad to include those articles with no or little relevance to the study. Compared with methods such as constructed week sampling, the keyword search might narrow down the size of quantity of news stories and focus on the issues which I plan to target in this research. Second, keyword search makes it easier for the researcher to relocate the discussion on a specific topic. In a comparative study applying discourse analysis, keyword search could collect

those relevant articles in similar topics for comparison.

In this study, some general keywords about the topic such as "globalization," "globalism," "neo-liberalism," and "deregulation" and so on were selected out. They are most frequently applied in the narratives of globalization in theoretical literatures and media stories. At the same time, keywords in each dimension of globalization were picked out. In the five main dimensions of globalization, I supplied each with five to ten keywords: economically, "international trade," "foreign capital," "global economy," "free trade," "fair trade," "balance of trade," "Seattle," and "Doha." Politically, "Cold War," "new world order," "hegemony," "multipolar," "unipolar," "international relations" and "foreign policy." Culturally, "universal values," "multicultural," "cultural diversity," "cultural tradition," "local culture" and "pop culture." Socially speaking, "human rights," "global warm," "greenhouse effect," "SARS," "NGO," "terrorism," and "anti-terrorist."

Keywords that were related to research questions would not be missed out either. For example, as the international organizations are taken as important power actors in international relations and as an arena of national interest for states, I investigated the media discourse on global institutions in the Chinese and Indian media. Therefore keywords such as "World Trade Organization," "International Monetary Fund" and "World Bank" were concluded in the keyword list.

Screening Articles. I eventually got a list with 43 keywords as the search inventory. The first search generated a large number of articles. Among all the articles that were searched out by keywords, not every article was suitable for this research though. I read them carefully and decided whether they were related to this study and should be in or out of the data pool. Judging the stories was a tricky job. Some of them contained one or more keywords, but they might have little things to do with the study.

The articles were first filtered by setting the limit of article type as editorial or commentary in the online data bases. After the news was excluded, there were about 5,000 articles left. I knew that among them, some of them talked more about globalization, some of them talked less. Because of practical concerns, I could not read all the articles. At that point, I depended on my subjective judgment. I would select out those articles with more specific, full and detailed discussion, and those can give me rich materials for analysis. To exclude the articles that were not appropriate for the study, I

made some other criteria for the article selection. All the above criteria are references for article selection, not the determinants.

Second, as editorials, commentaries, op-ed or opinions, the stories are more than news reports. They should introduce the background, discuss the issues, or elaborate the authors' own points of view. The analysis and explanation should account for a considerable part in the whole articles. Authors should present their opinions, not just describe the facts or offer others' views. There are some techniques to make judgments. One is to investigate the headlines. An article with a headline speaking out an argument or a claim, or addressing an answer to a question, most possibly is a piece of editorial or commentary. Another technique is to look at the column in which the story is located. Newspapers always have fixed columns for opinions or editorials. For example, the *People's Daily* has set columns like "International Forum" (*Guoji Luntan*) and "The Global Village" (*Diqiucun*). Therefore articles from those columns are usually what we are looking for. The last but not the least, the amount of words is a reference to check with the type of the articles. In most cases, editorials and commentaries have more words than the routine news.

Third, some articles have plenty of opinions and discussion, which were, however, from the interviewers or book authors. These articles were also ruled out of the data pool because there is always difference between the authors' own opinions and the opinions expressed by others. Thus the book reviews and interviews were not included in this research. However, articles in the type of readers' letter or readers' responses were included as one kind of opinion articles.

Forth, the articles should be original, not translated from articles in foreign media or other languages. The articles which had been edited and translated were regarded as been recreated by translators. They are not original in their initial forms and meanings. Therefore the translated articles were excluded in the selection.

Finally, I collected a data pool of 1,204 articles from the *Global Times*, 1,188 from the *People's Daily*, 645 from the *Hindu*, and 184 from the *Times of India* (2000-2006). To get sizable but equal samples between the two media systems, I used systematic sampling to get 501 articles from Chinese newspapers (the *People's Daily* 247, the *Global Times* 254) and 503 from the *Hindu*.

2.2.2 Content Analysis

2.2.2.1 Coding Unit and Categories

Content analysis and discourse analysis are coherently combined and mutually supported in this study. The function of content analysis is to offer supporting evidence for the discourse analysis. In chapters 4 to 6, content analysis was first applied to introduce the basic patterns of media content, such as the sources, the overall attitude, the amount of exposure, the type of topic, and so on. It acts as the prelude of the discourse analysis and the latter would continue to "peel the onion" for those latent meanings.

In this study, every editorial or commentary was taken as a coding unit in this study. The editorials and commentaries were coded by: 1) the time of publication of the article; 2) the newspaper in which the article was on; 3) the subject/topic of the article; 4) the occupational background of the author; 5) the focus of concern of the article; 6) the frequencies the U.S., UK, Russia, the other European countries, the other Asian countries and the other developing countries mentioned in the article; 7) the overall attitude towards those specific countries; and 8) the overall attitude towards globalization (see Appendix II).

In this study, I categorized "political issues" (Appendix II) into: foreign policy and international relations; social system, democracy, election and governance politics; international organizations, institutions and the world order; the national image. The categories covered the main concerns of the state in international politics.

"Economic issues" were categorized as economic development policy and strategies; industry, market and trade; finance and investment; labor resources and human talents; new technology and scientific innovation; and energy crisis.

"Cultural issues" consisted of religion, value, language and education issues; cultural tradition and history; and cultural diversity.

"Social issues" covered human rights and interest, public welfare; global warming and the environment; public health; disadvantaged groups and unemployment.

I analyzed attitude towards globalization in the articles. The attitude was measured on four scales: 1) pro-globalization, which expresses complete or general agreement with globalization; 2) neutral or not clear, which holds a neutral position, or a mixed attitude

that both stands were mentioned six of one and half a dozen of the other, or no clear position; 3) anti-globalization, expresses complete or general opposition to globalization.

In analysis on the articles on each specific issue, different categories were made to check those articles. Table 2-2 lists the categories examined in each chapter.

Table 2-2 Categories in the Content Analysis

Chapter	Variable	Item
Chapter 3	Focus of concern	global; regional; national; local; mixed; none
	Type of issue	Economic; political; cultural; civil; military; others
	Overall attitude towards globalization	Pro-globalization; anti-globalization; neutral or not clear
	Percentage of articles that mentioned benefits or costs	articles mentioned gains; mentioned losses; mentioned both of gains and losses
	Perceived benefits in the WTO	national wealth and economic development; national status; social development; people's life; value and law
	Perceived costs in the WTO	national security; political sovereignty; industrial competition; inequity and poverty; environment and civil rights; value and law
Chapter 4	The background of authors	government officials; experts, scholars or professionals; journalists, editors and writers; ordinary citizens; others
	Type of social conflict	Material ones within sectors; ones between sectors and governments; non-material between sectors and governments; non-material within sectors; mixed
	Ways of representation	describe conflicts; explain the roots and reasons; offer measures to tackle with conflicts
Chapter 5	Percentage of historical figures mentioned	Sun; Mao; Deng; Gandhi; Nehru; Rao
	Attitude towards historical figures mentioned	positive; negative; neutral or not clear
Chapter 6	Percentage of articles on the "others"	the U.S.; UK; Russia; the other European countries; China/India; the other Asian countries; the other developing countries
	Attitude towards the "others"	positive; negative; neutral or not clear

2.2.2.2 Intercoder Reliability

There would not be any ambiguity about first two categories and they were thus excluded from the test of intercoder reliability. The remaining six categories were tested and the coefficient of reliability (CR) was calculated by the formula as followed:

$$CR = 2M / (N1+N2) = 2(426) / (480+480) = 0.89$$

M was the number of times the two coders agree, and N was the total number of decisions the coders made.

Because the categories of 5) the focus of concern of the article, 7) the overall attitude towards those specific countries; and 8) the overall attitude towards globalization were rather subjective, the Scott's pi was calculated to exclude chance agreement. For the focus of the concern, the observed intercoder agreement was 83%, based on a sample of 30 articles. The Scott's pi was calculated as follows:

$$pi = (0.83-0.12) / (1-0.12) = 0.81$$

Followed the same Scott's pi formula, on the overall attitude towards the U.S., UK, Russia, the other European countries, the other Asian countries and the other developing countries, the Scott's pi respectively calculated were 0.81, 0.86, 0.86, 0.97, 0.86, 0.89. The category of overall attitude towards globalization was 0.80.

The overall intercoder reliability is good and acceptable. All of the Scott's pi values were above 0.80. And most of them, such as the overall attitude towards U.K., Russia, the other European countries, the other Asian countries and the other developing countries, also were over 0.85. However, some categories like the overall attitude towards the U.S. and the overall attitude towards globalization were below 0.85 which seems less satisfactory.

2.2.3 Discourse analysis

According to Fairclough (1992), "discourse" can be analyzed in three dimensions in terms of text, discursive practice and social practice. Viewed as text, discourse is a set of coherently organized headings, namely, vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure. Therefore discourse analysis sometimes can be replaced by text analysis. However, texts and languages are not used in a vacuum; they are related to social structures and powers. From a macro-sociological tradition, discourse can be seen as discursive practices that "involve processes of text production, distribution and consumption" (1992: 78; Steger,

2004). In this sense, discourses are related to social structures. For example, news texts are produced in such a specific and routine way that a group of professions access to various news sources, transform the sources into a draft, decide where the article goes and edit the report. The texts are also distributed and consumed in different social contexts. As social practices, discourse is placed within a view of powers as hegemony, and of the evolution of power relations as hegemonic struggle. This way provides for discourse both a "matrix" and a "model" (Fairclough, 1992:95).

To analyze globalization discourses, the dimensions of discursive practices and social practices were emphasized in this study. Therefore, the texts are examined on how they are constrained by the specific nature of the social practice of which they are parts, which is the basis for explaining why the discourse practice is as it is. At the same time, the discursive factices approach emphasizes the textual construction of reality, and provides some guidelines like social matrix of discourse, orders of discourse and so on to conduct the analysis. Gamson (1983) suggested some framing and reasoning devices that constitute a framework of discourse on an issue. They are metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions and visual images for framing, and roots, consequences and appeals to principle for reasoning. The elements are grouped into clusters or interpretive ideological packages, and mutually support and reinforce each other. This study assumes that the interest-based and identity-based approaches respectively constructed globalization through different ideological packages according to differences in politics, economy and identity of the two countries.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

This study analyzes the discursive contestation in national media and compares the different news construction by two national media that are constrained by the internal political economy, their role and place in the internal power structure, as well as the larger international political economy.

2.3.1 Content and Context

First of all, the media editorials were viewed as texts, as well as practices, according to Fairclough (1992). The media content in this study was examined and compared

through analytical and interpretative methods. Textural analysis, such as word frequency and vocabulary analysis, was applied to see how the narrations were coherently organized and developed by the authors of articles to explain and interpret specific issues. Content analysis was employed to check the relations between the texts and the larger social structure. The patterns of categorization and definition were examined, the producers of media content were analyzed as resources and interpreters, and the audiences' consumption of news was taken into account by investigating on the relationship between editorials and the newspaper targeted readership. At the same time, the editorials as social practice was approached to in terms of examining various "ideological packages" (Figure 2- **1**).

Second, before the content was explained by drawing upon the social context, an interpretation of what the context of situation should be elaborated on. The context can be divided into three levels that would lead to the differences between the two media representations. The first is the global level at which the prevalence of neoliberal capitalist economy brought up reconfigurations and restructure in the international political economy. The second is the national level at which the core actors were nation states with authority and autonomy, negotiating with the international forces for their national interests. At the national level, three factors, i.e. the internal political power structure and economic forces, media-state relations, as well as the national identity, were mainly studied in this research. Third, at the media level the media discourse is constrained by the media ideology within each media system. Distinct audience target, style, inclination, and tradition of media may result in different media discourses on globalization.

Figure 2- 1 The Theoretical Framework

2.3.2 The Frames and Research Questions

Based on previous studies, I view frames as strategies of discourse construction that collective actors offer competing interpretations for the social reality. I reduced the empirical explorations on framing into two "ideological categories": the Interest frame and the Identity frame.

The Interest frame is applied by different economic stakeholders and political powers (the states, the various social groups, the government and even the media themselves) to contest and struggle for their interests. These stakeholders and power forces are restricted by the same economic and political power structure. The Identity frames are culture-oriented through which social actors under sharing history, culture or identity used to frame the world. Therefore the Identity frames were most used at the national level when national media under different identities competed with each other.

As latent ideological resources, the Identity frames were also contextualized by national media as strategies to struggle for their interest and opinion dominant.

Based on the above discussion on the contexts of globalization media discourses, this study aimed to answer three sets of research questions as follows:

(1) In what contexts are the media discourses of globalization located? How are the media affected by a web of international and internal political and economic changes and reconfigurations, relations between media and state, media characteristics and national identity?

(2) How do Chinese and Indian national media construct globalization in line with the contexts? How do the two media discourses differently construct the international issues and the negotiation of the state with the neo-liberal world order? How do the discourses differently construct the domestic conflicts and the contestation among various groups within state? How do the discourses differently use historical resources to fill the gap between history and globalization? How do the media categorize the boundary of the "other" and "us" and build their conception of their state status and image in the world system?

(3) What are the similarities and differences between media discourses in Chinese and Indian media? What can explain the similarities and differences?

Chapter 3 National Interest Influences Media Discourse

The later part of the last century witnessed the acceleration of globalization. If the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar division of the world were a symbol, globalization entered a new phase with a liberal market, minimal regulation of capital flows and governance of international institutions. All states, especially those in Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America, have to mold their shapes to globalization and be governed by the "necessary myth" (Held & McGrew, 2002:4) of the global marketplace. However, the ways in which the states accommodate it are diverse. The intriguing questions are how the states negotiate with the inevitable trend of globalization while preserving their national interests and how the international political economy mediates national media represents and influences public perception in everyday life.

Media representation is shaped and defined by the elite's political and economic concerns with their specific structural power, which are situated in a larger international political economy. It has been argued that national media construct the international world according to the national interest as determined by the elites. As Garnett (1994) stated, states rather than individuals, classes or interest groups within a country, are the repository of the national interest. In international relations and global issues, states present their own national interest abroad through elite discourse, no matter how divided they are at home.

The purpose of this chapter is to scrutinize how nation states articulate the neo-liberal order and negotiate with international political and economic structures, and the way in which this articulation and negotiation are represented in national media discourse on international issues. I compared Chinese and Indian media discourse by asking the following questions: 1) how is the elite interest of each nation expressed in terms of attitude and concern of globalization in the national press? 2) To defend the elite interest, how does the national media discourse conceive of costs and benefits as the two countries integrated themselves into the global order? The common assumption of the discussion on these questions is that when it comes to such issues as international relations or international institutions, the discursive contestations in national media are less intense than those on issues at the national or local level. As Bennett put it, "The

range of social voices in the news is likely to vary widely from one issue area to another…narrowing in areas like foreign affairs and monetary policy and widening in coverage of civil liberties and 'pocketbook' economics" (L. W. Bennett, 1990:107). This chapter shall assume that national interest is less divided in international issues than internal issues.

The analysis is developed in three parts. First, globalization brings reconfiguration of power structure in the world political economy in which nation states assume different locations in the hierarchy of states and have distinct capacity to guard their core national interest. Second, China and India may respond to globalization differently. Third, these responses will be reflected in national media discourses differently.

3.1 Globalization, State and National Interest

Nation states play the role of leading actors in the new global order. Ethical nation states were seen to get more distinct, with their louder voice for their interest (Hirst, 1997; Hirst & Thompson, 1999; Leftwich, 2000). Nation states in global system were regarded as a unified entity with the primary purpose to promote and defend their national interest through the exercise of national power (S. Smith, 1987; Wight, 1986). The realpolitik view argued that some military actions were conducted to sustain states positions or defend their national interest, take the assertion of the might of U.S. military power after September 11, 2001, for example. At the same time, the pressures from international financial market and global competition did not exert influence so directly on the local economy, where the pressures were mediated by domestic structures to produce enormous variations in the capacity of nation state to respond (Garrett & Lange, 1996; Garrett, 1998).

In a neo-liberal world order, states still hold their national power and capability to defend national interest, in economy as well as in politics. It does not mean that states are not affected by the external global forces and structures. States do face the challenges of globalization so that they should accommodate to the changes and gain more interest in the process of integrating into the global world.

3.1.1 Impingements of Globalization on the State

In international relations theories, power is traditionally defined as "the ability to influence others to get them to do what you want" (Nye, 2004). With the end of the Second World War, especially with the rapid development in economy, politics, technology, society and culture, and more communication among countries, a trend of interdependence prevailed in the world, bringing much alteration to the construction of nation power. It is hard to judge and compare national power on physical and static measures alone. Some elements like technology, management, social system, culture, human force, value and other "hard-to-quantized" factors have gained a more crucial status in nation power configuration. Therefore some scholars (Fraser, 2005; Lukes, 2007; Nye, 1990; Nye, 2004) further divided power into "hard power" and "soft power" to elaborate on the difference of state powers. Nye (2004) defined soft power as a power to "attract" others or "co-opt" others, "so that they want what you want." From this point of view, the influence on others to which one nation state can exert is the most important aspect in power.

The changes in the international political economy deal out a new hand of cards to every nation state from a reshuffled pack. Under the shadow of globalization, states were struggling in a financial structure that comprises not only of "the political economy through which credit is created" but also "the monetary system which determines the relative values of the different moneys in which credit is denominated" (Strange, 1994:90). The best example is America's dominant status in the world economy. The U.S. supremacy in the global economy was deeply rooted in the Bretton Woods system which was established to govern monetary relations among independent nation-states. In this system the U.S. dollar was the currency with the most purchasing power and the only currency that was backed by gold as a reserve currency. Thus, the U.S. dollar was strongly appreciated in the rest of the world and therefore became the key currency. And the U.S. gained much power in international political economy by means of sustaining the dollar's status.

In the political domain, the structure of the world system was no longer divided by the antagonism between the communism and capitalism. During the Cold War, political power of states was measured by the military strength, and the strategic relations with allies and rivals which were mainly determined by the camps to which states belonged.

However, in globalization era, state power more referred to the ability to exert political influence on the others and the possibility of rewriting the rules in the global order. To obtain and preserve national interest in international relations and issues, nation states became more interested in realistic use of strategies like regionalization and negotiation in international institutions rather than in dependence on traditional bilateral or multilateral relations.

In this study, I apply the concept of "structural power" by Susan Strange (1994) in measuring a state's political, economic and military power, and its influence on other countries. She defined the structural power of states as power which sets the rules of the game and imposed them on others in the international order of political economy. Caporaso and Haggard (1989:104) argued that structural power resides in the "unequal distribution (between states) of various resources or interdependencies, with implications for the relative costs of undertaking certain actions." Konings (2008) defined structural power as power that was exercised indirectly and operated through shaping preferences and influencing the conditions under which other actors made decisions. Unlike relational power, which is the power to get to others to do something they would not otherwise do, structural power is "the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate" (Strange, 1994:24). The crucial impact of globalization on modern states is the transition from relational to structural power.

3.1.2 Comparing China and India in the Neo-Liberal World

In a global age, China and India occupied different statuses in the international hierarchical order of states and held distinctive structural power. In demographic, economic and military terms, China has an advantage over India. According to the annual review of 1999-2000 year, China's Gross National Production was $980.2 billion, more than twice as much as India's. Besides, the annual growth of China in economy is greater than India's. China spent $39.5 billion in developing military power, whereas India's expenditure on military was $14.2 billion. The amount of active armed forces in China possessed reached $2.5 million, much more than India's $1.3 million. In this sense,

China's national economic and military power is greater than India's, so on international issues, China would have possessed greater bargaining power than India.

According to Beukel (2001), structural power can be measured by distinguishing a state's attribute capabilities from its exchange capabilities. Economically, attribute capabilities are level of income, level of education and technology, or natural resources; exchange capabilities include trade relationships, technology transfers, and financial flows such as FDI or foreign aid. Politically, structural power was defined as a country's political position in international institutions and organizations (Kaelberer, 2005). I examined the level of structural power of China and India in the international political economy in terms of their economic and political power. Economic power was measured through GDP (national income), fixed assets investment, the total amount of exports, and the total amount of FDI. Total fixed assets investment in a nation, an indicator that official statistics often use to measure long term national economic growth (De Long & Summer, 1991; 1992). As the "fastest growing form of international capital flows and the most important form of private international financing for emerging market economics" (Albuguerque, Loayza, & Serven, 2005:270), total amount of FDI reveals the level of financial liberalization of a country. To give a brief description of the main economic indicators, I used means to compare the economic power of China and India (Table 3- 1).

Table 3- 1 Means of Main Economic Indicators of China and India (1996-2006)

	China	India
GDP growth (%)	9.12	6.45
Total fixed assets investment (%)	17.0*	18.0**
Total FDI (US$ billion)	1083.28	50.38
Total exports (US$ billion)	4318.93	596.5

Source: Government websites: National Bureau of Statistics of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/; Indian Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, http://mospi.gov.in/mospi_annual_report.htm.
* The data in 2002-2003 was missing.
** The data in 1996-1999, 2005-2006 was missing.

China has advantages over India in most economic indicators, except in total fixed assets investment where they are equal. Table 2 reveals that China has gained a more rapid annual economic growth rate (9.12%) than India (6.45%) from 1996 to 2006. Greater difference lies in the amount of FDI and export values. China absorbed an average amount of FDI (about $1,083 billion), whereas India took in $50 billion which

only accounted for one-twentieth of China's amount. Every year China exported products in about $4,318 billion, almost eight times India's amount of exports. It can be concluded that from 1996 to 2006, China acquired more economic power at the global level than India did.

Political power was measured through the factor of "positioning" (Archetti, 2006): membership and engagement in international alliances. Memberships in regional or global institutions are important because they represent how deeply a state participates in global politics and how close a state can get to the core of international power structure. As Murphy (2000) pointed out, international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, the WTO and G8, comprise a primary arena for struggles over wealth, power and knowledge. Therefore the more institutions a state joins, the more integrated nation state is in global governance; the higher the level of the institutions, the more global power and influence the state will possess; the higher level of membership (for example as a founder member or with observer status) a state holds in an international institution, the more it can bargain for itself in global politics.

Table 3- 2 briefly depicts the membership status of China and India in international and regional organizations. They both belong to most of them, but India does not sit on the UN Security Council as a permanent member or have APEC membership. China has shown its political influence at regional and global level with its rapidly increasing economic power: its indispensable role was indicated its handling of the Asian financial crisis and the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program. In contrast, India's attention and influence is limited to security and stability concerns in Southeast Asian.

To sum up, measured by structural power, China is a rising global power and has a place more proximal to the core of international hierarchy state system and with more influence in the global community. India is a regional power with its influence mostly in South Asia. Therefore the capability of the two countries to achieve and defend their national interest in globalization is quite different.

Table 3- 2 Membership in Main International and Regional Organizations

		China	India
International organizations	UN Security Council	Yes. Permanent member from 1971	No. requested but failed
	ECOSOC	Yes.	Yes.
	WTO	Yes.	Yes.
	G8	No. G8+5 from 2005	No. G8+5 from 2005
	OECD	No.	No.
Regional organizations	APEC	Yes.	No. requested but failed
	ASEAN	No. ASEAN Plus Three	No. East Asia Summit (under ASEAN) plus three
	SAARC	NO. observer status	Yes.
	SCO	Yes. Founder in 1996	No. observer status

ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council

SAARC: South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization

3.2 National Interest and International News

Media bring what is happening in the "distant" international community back to the public. Through the global map media construct, people get to know what happened and is happening in a place far away from where they live. Under the trend of globalization with the spread of new technologies and information, people have more methods and opportunities to make sense of the world. However, mass media still has the ability to control the imagination of others by the means of framing in everyday life.

Galtung and Ruge (1965) examined some culture-bound factors that influence the transition from events to news. They argued that news is elite-centered; therefore the more the event concerns elites, the more probable that it will become a news item. This principle should apply to international news. In this sense, foreign news stories produce and reproduce of the global hegemonic characteristics of international order and domesticate the social order for the local in accordance with national interests as defined by the state.

Media studies have identified the factors that influence the international news coverage on how to report global events, other countries, and relationships among

countries. An array of independent variables involving economic imbalances, political power imbalances, different types of imperialism and geographical proximity has most frequently been examined. Dupree (1971) examined the variables of volume of international trade, population size, gross national product (GNP), literacy and communication facilities to find out their determinate influence on international news flow and coverage. Hester (1973) proposed the concept of "world structure" as an independent variable and found that the more an event concerned "elite" countries, the more likely it is be regarded as newsworthy. In Rusciano's study (1997), the position of a nation in an international hierarchy of power and wealth determined the main concern of the newspaper on the "world opinion." He found that third-world nations like India are on the periphery of world affairs, where the media are more concerned with interests than image. First-world newspapers emphasized a nation's image as their primary concern than interests in world opinion. Sreberny-Mohammadi (1984) identified geographical proximity a factor in unbalanced news coverage: the U.S. and Western Europe are consistently newsmakers in all regions, and after them follows the "hot-spot" stories; however, the third world countries, together with the socialist countries, remain the least covered areas in international news reporting. Galtung (1971) found a "structural imperialism" in terms of Centre and Periphery. He distinguished economic, political, and military from news communication imperialism in explaining the unbalanced flow of information. All these studies note that the news flow and news structure are subject to the influence of the "world structure": the economic strength and the political position of a state in the international hierarchy.

International news was to some extent determined by the issues it covered. Since national security occupies a crucial position, many studies on global wars and international terrorism have focused on the relationship between a nation's power and media discourse. Ruigrok and van Atteveldt (2007) found that on the level of news selection in international news coverage, the news increases most clearly the moment as soon as a local event occurs. They also found that in the international news framing, the investigated newspapers were usually concerned with the influence and consequences of the event on the own country. According to Entman's study (1991) on international politics and the press, news stories described the U.S. downing of an Iranian plane as a

technical problem but the Soviet downing of a Korean jet as a moral outrage. The comparison of media narratives revealed that the choices of the framing devices helped to establish the literally "common sense" interpretation of events, and the "event schema" depended highly on the elite consensus which was reflected through the political importance emphasized in news texts. In his study in progress on the news framing of September 11, 2001, Archietti (2006) found that foreign policy agendas affected editorials by representing a "framing background" and placing a "framing limit" on what editorials could say. Some aspects of foreign policy, particularly the definition of a country's political interests and its sense of identity, affected the news coverage on foreign affairs such as the amount of criticism of the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.

The brief review of international news and national interest leads to a set of factors of state interest influencing news content. The economic and political power of a nation state in a structured international world system affects news coverage on globalization in terms of attitude towards globalization, focus of concern in region, and type of issue.

3.3 Media Construction of Globalization

Based on the literature review on national interest, structural power and international news making, I argue that Chinese and Indian media's construction of globalization is shaped by the national political and economic interest of China and India which locate in a larger international political economy.

With regard to the dependent variables of focus of concern in region, type of issue, and overall attitude towards globalization, significant differences were found between the Chinese and Indian media.

Table 3-3 General Differences in the Chinese and Indian Media

	Focus of concern	Type of issue	Overall attitude towards globalization
χ^2	18.0	27.0	14.7
df	5	5	2
p	0.01	0.001	0.01

3.3.1 Focus of Concern

With greater structural power in the world system, China occupies a more closer-core position in the international political economy and is more capable of dealing with a full agenda of international issues. China has exerted more influence not only in political and economic domains, but also in cultural and civil issues; the influence covers not only Asia and such other third-world areas as Africa and Latin America, but also the developed world. In contrast, India remains a regional force in South Asia. According to Kapur, "(C)urrent Indian diplomatic and strategic behavior has positioned Indian policies in the context of a resurgent Asia whose geographical limits extend from Central Asia to Japan." (2006:1) Therefore the Indian media was predominantly concerned with regional matters.

Table 3- 4 The Focus of Concern of News Coverage in Chinese and Indian Media (%)

	Focus of concern					
	Global	Regional	National	Local	Mixed*	None of above
China (N=501)	50.3	5.2	27.7	0.2	13.8	2.8
India (N=503)	48.1	11.5	23.7	1.0	11.9	3.8
Z	0.7	-3.7	1.5	-1.6	0.9	-0.9
p	n.s.**	0.01	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

* "Mixed" means the focus of concern of the news coverage was domestic as well as global.

** n.s. = not significant

According to Table 3- 4, among the editorials on globalization in the Chinese media, 50.3% were globally concerned. On the regional level, 11.5% of the Indian articles paid attention to issues in Asia, which was twice as much as that of the Chinese articles (5.2%). The concern in national issues of Chinese media was 4.0% greater than that of Indian media, showing that Chinese media were more interested in national issues than Indian media were. According to Table 3- 4, through pairwise comparison, the Z value was -3.7 (p < 0.01), showing that discourses on regional issues were significantly different.

To explain the similarity and difference in media focus of concern, China's and India's changing positions in the international structure should be taken into account. India, as a regional power, tends to protect its interest in Asia; as an emerging global power, China's interest encompasses a broader area. At the same time, both China and India are rising powers in the globalization process. As beneficiaries of the interdependent neo-liberal world, they should be concerned more about the changes in

the international political economy to face challenges and chances in globalization. Therefore the national media of the two countries both exhibited a great concern with global issues.

3.3.2 Type of Issue

Table 3-5 revealed that Chinese media tended to focus on political issues, which accounted for 38.5%t, the largest percentage of the Chinese articles. Table 3-5 strongly supports that India media place much more concern on national or regional security (Z = -4.4, p < 0.01). This type of articles accounted for 14.1%, almost three times as high as the comparable Chinese figure. There was no significant difference in attention on political issues. But political issues had dominated in the most opinion articles in both media system.

Table 3-5 Types of Issues Concerned by Chinese and Indian Media (%)

	Economic	Political	Cultural	Civil	Military	Others
China (N=501)	24.0	38.5	6.8	5.8	5.8	19.2
India (N=503)	24.5	34.0	8.3	6.6	14.1	12.5
Z	-0.2	1.5	-0.9	-0.5	-4.4	2.9
p	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0.01	0.01

China's socialist market economy and its economic achievements were recognized by the world, but its socialist authoritarian system was not. For decades, China carried out an almost closed foreign policy with a few allies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Its socialist system and the authoritative governance were widely criticized by the western capitalist counterpart. The Tiananmen Square crackdown discredited China's international image. But globalization necessitates more interdependent communication and cooperation among nation states. China could not remain isolated from the international world. China decided to avoid suspicion and containment by setting the taboo which alleged to "observe developments soberly, maintain our position, meet challenges calmly, hide our capacities, bide our time, remain free of ambitions, and never claim leadership." (In 1989 Deng Xiaoping mentioned this as the CPC's response to the crisis of world socialism. However, there was no official statement from the Party on this

policy.) The slogan of "peaceful rise" (*Heping Jueqi*)[5] showed China's decision to integrate into the global world in a low-profile way. Political sovereignty and autonomy were considered to be China's core national interest. Therefore Chinese media representation of the state would focus on international relations, global politics, and the activities of international institutions and organizations.

The longstanding political goal of India's elite was to achieve major-power status. However, India also confronted barriers from the international order, among which was the policy of "regional containment" (Nayar & Paul, 2003:2) for example. Regional containment consisted of a series of policies pursued by the major powers, especially the U.S., China and Russia, such as alignment with and arming of Pakistan, India's most important regional rival, and limiting India's influences to the region. India's serious concern with its national security and national status led to the country's rush to develop and test nuclear weapons in 1998. As the world's largest democratic country and one of the most enduring civilizations in human history, India had long struggled for a leading international role. The pursuit of a leading status was reflected in Indian national media, which paid more attention to military and war issues than the Chinese media did.

3.3.3 Overall Attitude towards Globalization

Table 3-6 revealed that both media discourses took a positive attitude towards globalization. Among 501 Chinese articles, 36.5% of them held a positive attitude towards globalization, 29.2% of Indian articles were pro-globalization in contrast. Compared to Indian media's 21.9%, only 14.6% of Chinese articles were anti-globalization. Z test proved that Chinese and Indian media's attitudes of pro-globalization were significantly different ($Z = 2.5$, $p < 0.05$); those of anti-globalization were also significantly different ($Z = -3.0$, $p < 0.01$). Overall, the

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[5] The term of "peaceful rise" was put forward by Zheng Bijian, the vice president of Party School of the CPC in 2004. It was used to assure the U.S. and the other major powers that the rise of economic and military power of China would not pose a threat to the world peace. However, it faded out and was rarely seen in China's diplomatic discourse because of the controversial meaning of the word "rise" which might mean a threat to the established order. These political slogans responded to the "China threat theory" in the global community. This issue will be interpreted in Chapter 5.

Chinese media would hold a more positive attitude towards globalization than the Indian media would, whereas the Indian media took on a more negative attitude than the Chinese media would.

Table 3-6 Overall Attitudes towards Globalization by Chinese and Indian Media (%)

	Overall attitude towards globalization			
	Pro-globalization	Neutral	Anti-globalization	Unclear
China (N=501)	36.5	11.4	14.6	37.5
India (N=503)	29.2	14.9	21.9	34.0
Z	2.5	-1.6	-3.0	1.2
p	0.05	n.s.	0.01	n.s.

According to Table 3-8 and Table 3-8, there were significantly more pro-globalization articles on economic issues in the Chinese media than in the Indian media ($Z = 7.4$, $p < 0.01$); on social, military and the other issues, the Chinese and Indian media was significantly different in the number of pro-globalization articles. With the exception of political and military issues, the Indian media have more anti-globalization articles than the Chinese media. However, there was no significant difference in political issues between Chinese and Indian media in their attitude towards globalization.

Table 3-7 Support for Different Issues (%)

	economic	political	cultural	social	military	the others
China	52.5	36.3	35.3	20.7	34.5	22.9
India	30.1	32.7	31	9.1	43.7	11.1
Z	7.4	1.2	1.4	5.2	-3.0	5.0
p	0.01	n.s.	n.s.	0.01	0.01	0.01

Table 3-8 Opposition to Different Issues (%)

	economic	political	cultural	social	military	the others
China	10	15.5	14.7	20.7	24.1	13.5
India	28.5	17	23.8	27.3	19.7	20.6
Z	-7.7	-0.6	-3.7	-2. 5	1.7	-3.0
p	0.01	n.s.	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.01

The attitude towards globalization of the Chinese and Indian media was highly related to the perceived gains and loss of the nation states. One country's change in

structural power will change that country's attitude towards the global order. It was hypothesized that China would become more pro-globalization when it signed the bilateral trade agreement with the U.S. at the end of 1999, which was a crucial step in China's accession to the WTO. Since then, China embraced globalization and was accepted by the western world, at least in the economic domain. Thus China would be more likely to accept the international trade system, and accorded to the economic dimension of the neo-liberal ideology; elite media discourse would take a more positive attitude towards globalization. Following the same logic, Indian media would be inclined to become more critical of globalization after September 11, 2001 and a global war against terrorism was declared. Southern Asia turned into a "hot spot" and India's arch-rival Pakistan rose as an important strategic force in the region. India's status as the regional major power was threatened. In this case, India may have an opinion on the U.S. war on terrorism.

Table 3-9 Overall Attitudes towards Globalization over Time (%)

	China (N=501)				India (N=503)			
	1996-1999	2000-2006	Z	p	1996-2000	2001-2006	Z	p
Pro-globalization	32.7	37.5	-1.6	n.s.	29.8	28.8	0.3	n.s.
Neutral	5.8	12.8	-3.8	0.01	6.3	21.0	-7.0	0.01
Anti-globalization	21.2	12.8	3.6	0.01	22.1	21.7	0.2	n.s.
Unclear	40.4	36.8	1.2	n.s.	41.8	28.5	4.5	0.01

As Table 3-9 revealed, the percentage of the pro-globalization articles in Chinese media went up from 32.7 between 1996 and 1999 to 37.5 between 2000 and 2006. The percentage of the anti-globalization articles fell from 21.2 between 1996 and 1999 to 12.8 between 2000 and 2006 ($Z = 3.6$, $p < 0.01$). It can be concluded that the attitudes towards globalization of the two periods changed significantly as the Chinese media became more neutral in globalization, and opposition to globalization faded.

According to Table 3-9, a neutral attitude ($Z = -7.0$, $p < 0.01$) increased in the Indian media and the unclear attitude ($Z = 4.5$, $p < 0.01$) significantly dropped. Therefore, September 11 did not have much impact on attitude towards globalization in the Indian media. The possible reasons are twofold. First, although the event of September 11 raised the strategic importance of Pakistan in South Asia and broke the power balance in the

area, India was not left out. India's key role in fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban is more valued by the western countries. India would like to join the anti-terrorism war. Second, although the U.S. hegemony was severely criticized by the Indian newspapers, the editorials would put more emphasis on the immorality of September 11 than on the structural reasons of the calamity.

3.3.4 Findings in General Patterns

In summary, China and India held different positions in the international political economy, and this affected their ability to bargain and protect their national interest. The Chinese and Indian elite press represented the national interest in terms of national attitudes towards globalization, the focus of concern in region and the preferred issues. I reached the following conclusions on the media discourses on globalization:

(1) Both China and India tend to integrate into the global world and hold a pro-globalization attitude.

(2) The Chinese media was more positive to globalization than the Indian media was, whereas the Indian media took on a more negative attitude than the Chinese media did.

(3) The Chinese and Indian media had different concern of area; The Indian media was more concerned with regional issues than the Chinese media was.

(4) Chinese and Indian editorials were significantly different in type of issues; the Indian media paid more attention to military issues than the Chinese media did.

(5) The Chinese media became neutral and less opposed to globalization after its accession into the WTO; the Indian media's attitude towards globalization tended to be neutral after 2000 and its opposition to globalization decreased after the September 11, 2001.

3.4 Winners and Losers: The WTO Negotiations

Both China and India tend to integrate into the global world and support globalization. However, this support was contingent on specific issues and regional concerns of the two countries. China and India had different interests and intention to relation to globalization. Take the WTO issue for example. Membership in the WTO was a major issue for China since the 1990s. The impact has extended to the new century.

India is a founding member of the WTO. To India, the negotiations are a chance to gain more power in the world system on the one hand, and are obligation and responsibility even burdens laid by the western developed countries on the other hand. From the media's acknowledgement of what can be gained from and lost in the WTO, the perceived national interests of them were reflected in media discourse.

This section discusses the construction of winners and losers in the WTO negotiations and international trade through benefit-cost analysis by Chinese and Indian media. The WTO negotiations and relevant trade issues were prominent events in globalization and national economic development programs, especially for developing countries like China and India. They were "hot issues" and received much media attention. What's more, these issues are of general concern. In some cases, the WTO issues are related to economic development and to domestic and international politics. Thus the findings on the relationship between international trade and news may be generalized to the international context and national media discourse.

In this section, the economic performance and characteristics of China and India, their economic interests in the WTO, and the relationship between economic performance and media content, are examined. I read all the articles and selected 126 articles on the WTO negotiations and international trade, 48 from China and 78 from India. The articles were carefully read through and the content was analyzed on whether they mentioned advantages and disadvantages, or benefits and costs in the WTO negotiations. I outlined three benefits and costs mentioned: national, social and ideological. National benefits included national wealth, economic development, and improvement in national status; the costs were economic slowdown and industrial competition, interference in political sovereignty and national security. On the social level, the benefits included social development and improvement of the standard of living; the costs covered inequity and poverty, destruction of environment and violations of civil rights. The ideological benefits and costs consisted of changes in value and law system caused by international trade activities.

3.4.1 "Rule" or "Power"? : How was the WTO Perceived?

Having been isolated from the outside world for many years, the GATT (later

changed into the WTO) was portrayed by the Chinese government as "capitalist club" (Song,2006). Since economic globalization demanded more global economic interaction, and since China carried out an out-warded, export-based economic development model, China had to integrate quickly into the global trade system. Convincing the Chinese people of the necessity of joining the WTO was an important task for Chinese national media.

The *People's Daily* and the *Global Times* acted as educator and advocator to Chinese people with some persuasive strategies. They constructed China's accession into the WTO as a trend or a natural rule. Shi Guangsheng, the former Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation, was quoted by the *People's Daily* as saying, "The WTO is an international organization which is based on established principles of international law." (Shi, 1999) As some articles articulated, since no country can avoid this destiny of globalizing, and everyone should obey the law sooner or later anyway, the earlier China entered the world system, the better for it to gain what it wanted. Some articles depicted joining the WTO as a trend, "The coming of the knowledge economy and the new economic era is a historically unresisting trend…It is those who makes its way ahead of the times that own wealth for sure." (Yue, 2000) The Chinese government praised the fair and incontrovertible nature of the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. Some compared these institutions to sports competition (D. Wang, 1999), implying that the rules of the international trade system were fair, objective and transparent. Others compared the international economic institutions to a performance stage (Mengkui, 2001). This analogy implied that the success of the show depended on every actor's performance; if a country failed in developing its economy, it was its own fault and the institutions should not be blamed for. Therefore the construction of the WTO--or economic globalization in a broader sense--was a must for national development and modernization could exempt the Chinese government from decision-making responsibility.

However, China never could develop its economy if it did not try to join these organizations. This argument echoed Hardt and Negri's ideology of "no alternative" (2000). It was believed that the capitalist market force can solve any problem, and this neo-liberal ideology excluded all other alternative choices. The Chinese media adopted the idea of "no alternative" and promoted economic globalization without mentioning the

other ways to solve its internal and external problems. In this way, the Chinese media successfully constructed China's entry to the WTO as an inevitable but wise decision made by the government. To some extent, this construction glossed over the rough transition from the socialist economy and ideology to its socialist market economy which promoted neoliberal globalization as a pathway to prosperity. This framing strategy was not limited to the issue of winners and losers. It predicted and assured gains to the Chinese people, at least the gains for the country.

Unlike China's focus on the "natural rule" of the WTO, Indian newspapers emphasized the "power" aspect of the GATT and the WTO. As one of the 23 founding Contracting Parties of the GATT, India did not face the same problem that China did in having to fight to enter the international trade system. Therefore there was no need for Indian media to rationalize the accession. However, the trade imbalance between developed and developing countries, and between the rich and the poor in India, was sharpened under globalization. As I discussed in the Introduction part, the reintegration of India's economy into the world system was initiated by the 1991 crisis. The reforms were unexpected controlled by international institutions. India was forced to open its market, lower its tariffs and eliminate restrictions on imports by the WTO regime with the Uruguay Round Agreements (Mathur, 2002; Srinivasan & Tendulkar, 2003). In the WTO Seattle meetings, some developed countries and entities like the U.S., E.U. and Japan insisted on adding new issues to the new round of negotiations and on linking trade with non-trade issues. Indian media thus attributed the fail of the Seattle meetings to the West and criticized the western countries' control of the negotiation. Therefore, in the Indian media international organizations like the WTO and World Bank were mainly described as unfair and dominated by the western powers. India would lose a great deal if it did not defend its interest in the international trade system.

Regarding the WTO and the international trade order as an unfair game, Indian media believed that the trade system caused India's poverty and backwardness. As one article concluded,

> The WTO is today the international body with power because it is the only one whose decisions can be enforced across borders with the use of punitive trade measures. There is therefore relentless pressure from governments and businesses in

(Anonymous., 1999c)

Indian media expressed strong discontentment "because of the wide-ranging nature of eight such negotiations in the history of GATT/WTO, most notably in the controversial Uruguay Round of 1986-93" (Reddy, 2001). The criticism on the WTO negotiations was rooted in India's discontentment with the uneven distribution of power between the developed and developing countries. Even on the issue of selecting a Director-General for the WTO, the Indian media stated that "it is time that a representative of the developing world headed the WTO." (Anonymous., 1999b)

3.4.2 What to be won and what to be lost?

Among the articles (220 out of the sample of 1,004) on the WTO negotiations and international trade, 58.3% and 52.6% discussed the winners-or-losers issue by the Chinese and Indian newspapers, respectively. I first selected out all the articles on the WTO and the international trade-related issues. Then I picked out the articles mentioning the advantages and disadvantages, benefits and costs, or gains and losses. The Chinese media covered this question more than the Indian media did ($Z = 3.3$, $p < 0.01$). At the same time, their answers to the question were clear and direct. Nearly 60.7% of Chinese editorials thought that China was a winner in its accession to the WTO, whereas only 7.1% (two articles) saw more disadvantages. In contrast, 68.3% of Indian editorials saw India as a loser and only 17.1% of articles insisted on its benefits in the WTO and international trades (Table 3-10).

Table 3-10 The Winner-or-Losers Issues in Chinese and India Media Discourses

China (N=48)				India (N=78)			
No (41.7%)	Yes (58.3%)			No (47.4%)	Yes (52.6%)		
	winner	loser	both		winner	loser	both
	60.7%	7.1%	32.1%		17.1%	68.3%	14.6%

In addition, the media discourses on the benefit-cost issue changed with the time. Figure 3-1 shows that the total number of articles mentioning the winners-losers question in the Chinese newspapers reached a peak in 2000, when China was in the final phase of entering the WTO. The winner-point-of-view was the dominant position when China signed the U.S-China Bilateral WTO Agreement in 1999, and when China officially

entered the organization in November 2001. As the most important package of international trade agreements and rules, the WTO was a valuable channel to reconnect with the world and reinstate "China's rightful place" (Y. Zhao, 2003:33) in the international system. As a Communist country that had committed to a planned economy for decades, China applied to apply to enter the GATT in 1986 under the open-door policy. After 15 years, it finally got the entrance ticket in 2001 at the Seattle ministerial conference. During this long waiting period, propaganda organizations, especially the national newspapers, conducted persuasion and mobilization campaigns toward the Chinese people, but the occasion of accession became "a key slice of an arguably highly fluid discourse over a fifteen-year span." (Y. Zhao, 2003:33) Therefore between 1999 and 2001, many reports on international trade were published in the Chinese newspapers, and most of the articles depicted China as a winner.

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
both	0%	0%	17%	20%	33%	60%	0%	17%	0%	0%
loser	0%	50%	0%	10%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
winner	0%	50%	50%	50%	33%	40%	29%	33%	0%	0%
no	100%	0%	33%	20%	33%	0%	71%	50%	100%	100%

Figure 3-1 The Winners-or-Losers Issues in Chinese and India Media Discourse

The Indian media opined that India lost a lot in the WTO and international trade agreements, especially from 1998 to 2003 (Figure 3-2). The criticism of the WTO negotiations increased with India's plan to lift restrictions on imports as demanded by the Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements on Tariffs and Trade provide that no prohibitions were maintained by any WTO member. However, India kept many restrictions on imports of items in respect of 2,400 tariff lines (Mathur, 2002). Under the pressure of the other WTO members, especially developed

countries, India planned to eliminate the restrictions on imports over a period of six years. The phase-out started in 1997. Since then, India should open its economy to clear the way for reforms, and the openness exposed India's economy more vulnerable to international economic competition. Therefore India tended to blame the WTO negotiations and ask for a fairer global trade order.

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ both	0%	100%	14%	6%	6%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%
□ loser	0%	0%	57%	38%	33%	40%	33%	0%	50%	25%
□ winner	0%	0%	0%	0%	11%	10%	33%	100%	0%	0%
■ no	100%	0%	29%	56%	50%	45%	33%	0%	50%	75%

Figure 3-2 The Mentions of Winners-or-Losers Issues over Time by the Indian Media

A cost-benefit analysis was applied to both the Chinese and Indian media. The Chinese media highlighted the gains and losses that China would derive from entering the WTO and the international trade system. Among all the perceived benefits that the WTO would bring to China, the most frequently mentioned one was national wealth accumulation and economic development, accounting for about 60.7% of the articles (Table 3-11). The next most-frequently mentioned benefit was China's political ascendency in the international system. The ideological aspects, including improving the legal system, education and culture industry, accounted for 7.1% of all articles. Social development and improvement in people's life were the least emphasized, each accounting for 3.6%. The Chinese media sang high praise for the interest of the nation, not of its citizens. Economic growth and national prosperity were the trump card the media played to ally internal grievances. The Chinese media often linked the entry into the WTO to Deng's Reform and Open Policy and the objectives of modernization:

> Entering the WTO is the sign of a new phase of China's Reform and Open Policy…The experience of developed countries and areas as well as that of our country in the last twenty years indicated that implementing Reform and Open Policy, grasping the chance and facing with the challenge is the only way to develop economy. The modernization in China should be realized in the broader context of economic globalization. (Wang, 2001)

Economic development strengthened political power and lifted China to a status of a key player in the international political economy.

In contrast, only a few articles (7.1%) in the Chinese media talked about the losses that the WTO and international trade would bring to the country. Local industries and social justice were taken as the most vulnerable to the WTO negotiation and trade issues, accounting for 17.9%. The destruction of the environment and violations of civil rights were the least mentioned (3.6%). However, the value and law system of the society were intensively covered (10.7%). This revealed the struggles and negotiations of the Chinese national ideology and the neo-liberal capitalist values.

Table 3-11 Perceived Benefits from the WTO in the Chinese and Indian Media (%)

	National wealth and economic development	Ascending national status	Social development	Improving people's life	Value and law
China (N=28)	60.7 (17)	14.3 (4)	3.6 (1)	3.6 (1)	7.1 (2)
India (N=41)	9.8 (4)	0 (0)	7.3 (3)	4.9 (2)	0 (0)

The Indian media seldom spoke of benefits the country or the society might gain from the international trade system. Among the few articles discussing gains, economic development was a benefit that the Indian media most frequently mentioned. Social development and increase of people's living standards were also concerned about. No article mentioned that integration into international trade order would bring good effects on national political status, or social value and law system.

The Indian media still focused on the unfairness of the international trade system. The media discourse paid most attention to inequity and imbalance in economic development and saw it as the result of the trade system. "The great benefits which were supposed to flow from the Uruguay Round are nowhere. Indian exports still face numerous barriers in the U.S. and European markets." (Anonymous., 1999c) Take textiles

for example. Though the Uruguay Round was supposed to see an end to the quota system that operates under the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA), these restrictions did not end until 2004. Therefore India could not immediately benefit from the MFA. At the same time, its textile exports were at the receiving end of the anti-dumping investigations and health-related bans, and faced competition from China when it entered the WTO in 2001. India strongly opposed a new round of negotiations in the Ministerial conference in Seattle because the old one had not been fully implemented (Srinivasan & Tendulkar, 2003). The unsatisfactory results from the Uruguay Round led to the strong sentiment in the media that India benefited little in the WTO (Table 3-12).

Table 3-12 Perceived Costs in the WTO (%)

Country	National security	Political sovereignty	Industrial competition	Inequity and poverty	Environment and civil right	Value and law
China (N=28)	7.1 (2)	7.1 (2)	17.9 (5)	17.9 (5)	3.6 (1)	10.7 (3)
India (N=41)	4.9 (2)	22.0 (9)	34.1 (14)	39.0 (16)	31.7 (13)	2.4 (1)

At the same time, 34.1% of the Indian articles cited the loss of local industry in international trades. India's indigenous factories and companies lost their advantages under more intense competition. The next sector to suffer was public interest, including human rights, local natural resources and diversity, employment, and health conditions, accounting for about 31.7%. Over one-fifth of the Indian editorials covered the erosion of national sovereignty, worrying that trade agreements and the MNCs might set up shop in any corner of the world with little government interference. In the ideological category of "value and law", the Indian media paid little attention to the gains or losses caused by economic globalization (2.4%).

3.4.3 Gains for the Nation or Losses for Society?

The media's cost-benefit analysis is not totally consistent with the actual economic situation in international trade. I chose statistics from 2001 because it is the middle year of the time period under consideration. In this section, economic performance was compared with the news content. The Chinese media paid much attention to imports and exports and all articles on these issues mentioned the virtues of the WTO strategic negotiations, because international trade had contributed about 60% to China's GDP

(Table 3-13). However, Chinese agriculture suffered a great deal; the U.S.-China Bilateral WTO Agreement required China to reduce tariffs from 31.5% to 14.5% by January 2004. The damage to agriculture would be enormous if not the heaviest among all sectors. The Chinese media, however, seldom mentioned the problem. The amount of Chinese news coverage did not relate to the sector's importance in the national economy. Only 5 articles cited the losses of specific sectors. The number of editorials in the Indian media was not necessarily correlated with the sectors' contribution to India's total GDP. However, the sectors that were more crucial to the national economy were more likely to be perceived as victims in Indian media. For example, contributing a large proportion to India's GDP, trade and manufacturing industries received much media attention in their encounters in globalization. The attitude of the media was negative. The reasons might be rooted in India's intention of to protect its comparative advantages in these sectors in the next round of the WTO negotiations, and the damages to those sectors that the Uruguay round agreements had inflicted on them.

Table 3-13 Media Coverage on Economy and Actual Economic Performance

	% of pro or con in the news				% of total attention in the news		% of sector in total GDP (2001)	
	China (N=48)		India (N=78)		China	India	China	India
	pro	con	pro	con	(N=48)	(N=78)		
Trade	10.4	0	3.8	11.5	29.2	20.5	60.0*	24.0**
Agriculture	0	0	1.3	7.7	0	9.0	15.2	17.2
Tech service and I.T.	2.1	4.2	0	1.3	8.3	14.1	0.7	1***
Manufactures	22.9	6.3	3.8	11.5	18.8	9.0	44.4	29.1

Source: Chinese data were collected from Government websites: National Bureau of Statistics of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/; Indian data were collected mainly from Indian Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Wikipedia and other websites: http://mospi.gov.in/mospi_annual_report.htm. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_India#Globalization.

* Data in 2005.

** Data in 2006.

*** India's IT industry, despite of its significant contribution to the balance of payments, accounted for only about 1% of the total GDP or 1/50th of the total services in 2001. For explanations see Gordon, Jim and Gupta, Poonam. "Understanding India's Services Revolution". Nov 12, 2003. http://www.imf.org/external/np/apd//seminars/2003/newdelhi/gordon.pdf.

From Table 3-14, we see that national benefits were heavily emphasized in the Chinese media, accounting for three quarters of the Chinese articles; gains at the social and ideological levels were equally mentioned with a percentage of 7.1. In the Indian media, benefits at the social level were most frequently elaborated, and no benefit in ideological aspect was mentioned. As far as the costs and losses in the international trade system were concerned, the Chinese media still made the national losses a top priority, while the Indian media made social costs the highest priority.

Table 3-14 Benefits and Costs on Three Levels (%)

	Benefits			Costs		
	national	social	ideological	national	social	ideological
China (N=28)	75.0	7.2	7.1	32.1	21.5	10.7
India (N=41)	9.8	12.2	0	61.0	70.7	2.4

To sum up, Chinese media emphasized benefits over costs, and focused on the national rather than the social level. The reverse was true of the Indian media. The discussion of being a "winner or loser" in the international trade system in the national media is more than a question of media attitudes towards globalization. It reveals a sharp contrast in Chinese and Indian national interests. The Chinese media focused on the nature of law and trend of the WTO, and mentioned few of the ill effects on the country, especially on ordinary people's lives, the environment, and public services. The main media attention was paid to the sectors that had rapidly developed and most likely benefited from globalization. The philosophy of Chinese policy is the trickle-down of the neoliberal global order. In contrast, India's equalitarianism resulted from the country's traditions and its democratic political system. Therefore, India paid much attention to the benefits of its people and society. The media regarded the WTO treaties as "top down" pressures and international trade as a necessary evil that had to be controlled with the full force of state power. Its deep suspicion of globalization was fully represented in media on the question of being a winner or loser in international trade.

3.5 Summary

Globalization has brought many changes to the world power structure. As developing countries and the Third World countries, China and India both responded to

the reconfiguration by grasping the opportunity of globalization and defending the core national interest of elites. On the one hand, China possessed more structural power than India, through which national interest could be realized more easily in the western neo-liberal capitalist order. On the other hand, China's eagerness to develop its economy at any cost determined its more positive attitude towards globalization. India's skepticism about globalization was rooted in its attention to its own social interests and needs.

This chapter examined the constructions of international issues in elite media and found that they were closely related to the states' interests as defined by their social elites. Content analysis and discourse analysis revealed that the Chinese media adopted a more positive attitude towards globalization and held a more international perspective on the global political economy. The Chinese media also saw China as a winner in globalization and would continue to benefit from greater economic integration into the neo-liberal capitalist world; however, the alternative interests or the losses of social groups were not mentioned. The Chinese media admired the U.S. as an economic model and strongly criticized the U.S. in political and ideological domains. In contrast, the Indian media was more hostile to globalization and described itself as a loser in globalization; it paid more attention to regional security and cooperation and marginal voices could be heard. The Indian media constructed the U.S. as a mighty power with which India had to engage and collaborate in security and military affairs, and regarded it as its neo-liberal capital guardian and protector. In short, Chinese media discourse believed that China should accommodate itself to the global world in economic development, but fight the political hegemony of the western developed countries in order to preserve its own autonomy and legitimacy. The Indian media focused more on full-scale globalization and paid more attention to the region and sub-continent on military and security issues; its attitude on how to negotiate with the global structure was ambivalent.

These explanations were related to the structural power of the two countries. On the one hand, China's economic and political power was increasing. It could defend its interest in the international political economy which makes it advocate globalization and stick to the right road in economic development. India lags behind China in structural power, and is not satisfied with the current global order. Therefore the media expresses disappointment with globalization. On the other hand, the Chinese elite had the task of

maintaining its authoritarian governance under the leadership of CPC. Politically it resisted being drawn into the orbit of western capitalist democracy. China alleged a series of planks such as "peaceful rise", "Three representatives" and "harmonious society" that were examples of China's strategies to deal with conflicts between its autonomy and political globalization. In contrast, India does not have this concern. However, India's biggest problem is the longstanding threat from Pakistan and its other neighbors. Only if the opposition and suspicion between India and Pakistan are eliminated, will India embrace globalization wholeheartedly.

Chapter 4 National Interest and Media Construction of Conflicts

The end of the Cold War and the coming of globalization transformed global political economy. The Soviet communist bloc collapsed; some authoritarian countries in Asia and Latin America experienced momentous changes in regime. In the economic domain, some western developed countries dominated a neoliberal order which called for the free flow of capital and new technology, free international trade, and deregulation of market and minimization of state control. At the same time, some states feared being ruled by the western capitalist ideology and losing their economic authority; therefore they resisted the erosion of the governance of global economy and its institutions like the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO.

This chapter examines the way in which the Chinese and Indian media frame domestic issues in the national and the global contexts and then relates these issues to globalization. The elite media's construction of social conflicts which were associated with globalization was shaped by the internal power structure, the relationship between media and the national political economy, and by the ideology of the national media.

4.1 Conflict, Media and Power Structure

Nation states are facing two tiers of influence of globalization. On the first tier, states bargain with the international political economy for their interest as independent entities at the national level. On the second tier, events abroad have an impact at home. Globalization was "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (Giddens, 1990:64). Therefore globalization interacts with domestic and local power forces which represent the interests of internal groups and sectors within states. National interest is not always unitary; it is sometimes divided into parts, especially when it comes to domestic issues and internal conflicts. However, much of the previous research examined the impact of globalization at the state level to the exclusion of negotiation between local and national structures.

Under the shadow of globalization, China and India thrust themselves into the neoliberal global order. At first, their commitments to globalization were based on the

need to settle their own internal conflicts. In China, the Communist Party wanted to salvage its regime from the legitimacy crisis after the Cultural Revolution and later the Tiananmen crackdown by building state capitalism. In India, the Congress Party government faced a current account crisis and the regime was in peril. India's economic liberalization policy transformed the planned economy into a market one. Both China and India have enjoyed tremendous economic development.

However, with globalization, social polarization and division increased within Chinese and Indian society. The accession into the WTO has harmed China's traditional industries like steel, textile, particularly agriculture. The imbalance in economic reform policies has created gaps between rich and poor, among industries and in districts. Benefiting from the advantages in new technology and highly-educated talents in the outsourcing service market, India's middle classes have expanded, but the poor population remains large and living in bad conditions. Uncivilized and crude phenomenon still exists; prejudices against ethnicity, religion, gender, language and caste have not been obliterated. To some social sectors in both countries, globalization poses more threats than opportunities, and some groups may express their grievances through struggle.

As a channel of interest expression in modern countries, mass media play an important role in the control and management of social conflicts. Media often serve the political powers, although they do not totally surrender to them (Donohue, Tichenor, & Olien, 1995). American officials were the major sources of news; in news coverage that cited more than one major source, officials occupied a more significant place (Sigal, 1973). In an investigation of the *New York Times'* coverage of U.S. funding for the Nicaraguan contras, Bennett (1990) found that the media tended to "index" the range of voices and viewpoints in line with the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate. This implied that the non-official voices can be included in news coverage when those voices express opinions already emerging in official opinion area. In societies in which media act as "lapdogs" or were owned by state, media framed all issues according to the perspective of the highest powers, mostly state and government. As Lenin stated, the press is a propagandist, an agitator, and a political organizer.

Donohue, Tichenor and Olien (1995; 1968; 1995a) argued that conflict reporting by

the media maintains the power system by publicizing disputes among the major powers in that system. The media play a "guard dog" role in reporting conflict, which demonstrates its dependence on dominant powers and their relationship with them. Hallin (1986) pointed out that in the "Sphere of Legitimate Controversy," namely electoral contests and legislative debates, the norms of journalistic objectivity and balance were guaranteed. The "Sphere of Consensus" included the social objects that were not regarded as controversial by the journalists and most of society. The outermost sphere was "Sphere of Deviance" in which the political actors and views violate or at least challenge the political mainstream. Journalists then became the "boundary-maintaining mechanism."

Conflict reporting is constrained by community structure: the more pluralistic the structure, the more likely the media is to report social conflict. The more intense the conflict, the greater the amount of information reported. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the boundary of conflict issues determined the contestation and consensus in media discourse (Janowitz, 1967; Olien et al., 1968). (Olien et al., 1968)Intense media competition for audience market encouraged conflict reporting. Social conflict was often newsworthy. Crime, poverty, unemployment and discrimination made for the main types of social conflict. Violence, dirty dealings of money, abuse of power, and corruption, also tend to attract media attention (M. Edelman, 1988).

From the perspectives of political economy, this chapter will examine how the media construct domestic conflicts as a consequence of globalization according to state power structure and state-press relations. Specifically, (1) how does the political economy of China and India affect the media environment of social conflict construction? (2) How do Chinese and Indian media construct social conflict? What are the differences and similarities? (3) Is there any difference in media construction within each media system? If so, how can it explain the different media discourses?

4.2 Social Conflicts in Chinese and Indian Media

Chinese media have long been banned from reporting on social conflict. In 1953, the Chinese government prohibited newspapers from criticizing the party committee with which they were affiliated by imposing direct editorial censorship and a licensing system. Lower-level newspapers could not criticize higher-level party organizations and

government; news coverage had to stress "positive reporting" (*Zhengmian Baodao*) (Tong, 1988). Social conflict issues were covered in Chinese media, but in the form of "negative reporting" (*Fumian Baodao*) or "criticism reporting" (*Piping Baodao*). Controlled by central government, the critics in these forms seldom questioned the government and the executive officers.

In the 1980s, the impacts of economic liberalization "spill(ed) out" into the political area and the trend could not be reversed by the authoritarian regime (Wu, 2000). In 1987, the State Science and Technology Commission listed newspaper publishing and broadcasting as "information commodification industries" to develop an information economy (Huang & Ding,1997). The central government reduced financial report to the media, and some media had to enter the market and compete for advertising share. The media gradually became economic or semi-economic entities, labeled "institutions under enterprises management." In the Thirteenth National Congress Report of 1987, the phrase "public opinion supervision" was used. The official report pointed out that "(media) should release the important information for people to know, and reveal the significant problem for people to discuss." "Public opinion supervision should play an important role, let people criticize the flaws and mistakes made in work, strongly be against bureaucratism and fight with various malpractices" (K. Wang, 2005).

In 1992, Chinese newspapers, except for a few central party organs like the *People's Daily*, were asked to achieve financial independence by 1994. Under the pressure of market competition, Chinese newspapers tried to gain readers by offering useful content. Since economic development and integration incited intense social conflicts in interests, corruption, graft, and crimes had to be disclosed in media to satisfy the need of knowing the facts. The "investigative report" became popular, and it helped newspaper circulation. This kind of conflict reporting both met the political requirements of the authoritarians of the government and catered to the commercial interests of the papers themselves on the other hand. This made construction of social conflicts an imperative, conflict issues like the Sun Zhigang case,[6] the Xiamen PX Project,[7] and issues such as food safety were

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[6] Sun, a 27-year-old man who had been found without any ID by the police, was detained at the Guangzhou Police Holding Center and died three days later in 2003. The media attention to this case led to the abolition of custody and repatriation regulations in the same year.

covered by the media, and the conflicts in a period of social transition could be raised for public discussion.

Confronted with the interest conflicts among different departments, sectors, districts and industries, Chinese mass media became an important power force in power structure. Media can exercise their right of "supervision by public opinion" by criticizing local governments or reporting on social conflicts and the opinions of interest groups. However, in a "patron-client" relationship (C. Lee, He, & Huang, 2007:24) the media can only operate within an established circle of ideology (H. L. Chen & Chan, 1998). Serving two masters, leaders and readers, Chinese journalists are working under various formal and informal constraints. Some stories about crimes and disasters that impinge on political matters may be routinely suppressed. Critical reports were "hard to cover, hard to get into print, and hard on one afterwards," (J. Polumbaum, 1990:58) even for large and influential national newspapers. The *Shenzhen Youth News* (*Shenzhen Tequbao*) was closed for suggesting that Deng Xiaoping resign. Some journalists asserted that readers were not ready to see various viewpoints and accept a diversity of opinion in the press (J. Polumbaum, 1990).

Although the Indian press enjoys a wider range of freedom of speech, the state still limited the newspapers. A swing between strict and lenient treatments on the press persisted in post-independence India. Historically speaking, the important newspapers and the government were close to each other during the independence movement. Party newspapers occupied a large part in the press system. After the Independence, the number of party newspapers significantly declined, but the influence of the parties on press remained. During the Emergency from 1975 to 1977, to appease the internal anti-government movement, the Congress government led by Indira Gandhi launched news censorship which forbade papers to criticize officials above the level of Minister of state (L. Chen, 2001). Press freedom was limited for about two years until the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power. The Press Council was rebuilt in 1978 and the freedom of speech was restored. In the Kargil crisis of 1999, the English journal *Outlook* offended

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[7] A paraxylene (PX) plant planned by the Xianglu Tenglong Group for the city's Haicang, Xiamen kicked off. In the process of anti-PX movement, media played a very important role in mobilizing Xiamen residents to question on the influence of the project to the environment and to people's life.

the military because of its criticism of army leaders. The government demanded that press stopped reporting on the crisis (S. Lu, 2005). One study found that politics and government received the most attention, and the dailies devoted more space to positive news than to negative news (Haque, 1988).

In addition, with the reconfiguration of party power, the press seemed to have internally reconstructed. The BJP became to power in 1978, breaking the long-term political monopoly of the Congress since the Independence. Since then India started a new chapter of multi-party coalition government. Economic development strengthened districts and states. States were able to negotiate with the Central on some issues, and in some states, opposition parties instead of the ruling party (i.e. NCI) came to power. The different stages of economic development, and the differences in ethnicity, religion and language among the states generated the appearance of many local newspapers and tabloids, which in turn highly related to the local governments and parties. To face these local challenges, the national newspapers published metro editions or subsidiary papers that were also under the influence of local political powers.

Finally, the parties asserted their influence on the press through advertising. One unique phenomenon in Indian media is that the governments were VIPs of the elite newspapers, particularly the English newspapers. In addition to the advertisings of political campaigns and military recruitments in normal times, the government would spend a lot of money on public service ads in the electoral times and the important festivals (S. K. Sharma, 2006). In 2004 when the BJP promoted its electoral campaign of "India Shining", the colorful newspaper ads accounted for about 93% of print ads, which ranked second in its total advertising expenditure (J. Chen, 2005).

However, the centralization of media ownership and the impact on media content by the market weakened the independence of news practices. One owner of the *Times of India,* Samir Jain, abolished the post of chief editor but appointed an executive editor who reported to Jain himself. The brand manager he appointed had the right to question any proposal of the editors on the content (Singh, 1992). Influenced by liberal market forces, the Indian press separated itself from the masses and marginalized the untouchables. While only six nationally accredited journalists had covered the unprecedented agricultural crisis in India in 2002, 412 accredited journalists covered

India Fashion Week in Mumbai (Sainath, 2003). Moreover, the relations between the huge family groups containing the press maintained as in interavailability as well as in opposition to each other. Therefore, the criticism on the government in India's major papers was actually representative opinions of the bosses of the financial groups who owned the newspapers, although it often appeared in terms of public criticism (S. Lu, 2005).

In conclusion, the different political economies in Chinese and Indian affected the media construction of social conflicts. The ownerships of the media in both counties is highly centralized; they are both under the influence of the government or the parties (in China the Communist Party); both are competing under market pressure, and appeal to middle-class readers. However, most Chinese newspapers were owned and controlled by the political forces, whereas Indian media was held by private capitals. The power structure with which the Chinese media affiliated was relatively homogenous, but Indian media was in a more heterogeneous power structure. These comparisons offered a historical background and realistic context for the analysis of social conflicts by Chinese and Indian media in a neo-liberal order.

4.3 Construction of Conflicts in Chinese and India Media

Social conflicts are "rising from the coordination failure among social groups" which "act independently and face a shrinking pie as a result of external shocks" (Rodrik, 1999:392). In this definition the conflict was defined in a broader conception that it did not necessarily refer to external clashes. Other scholars (P. e. a. Li , 2007) defined "social conflicts" as various contradictions in material and non-material interests (religious, beliefs and values) among social groups or between groups and the government; social conflicts generate from differences or confrontations of economic interests and values during the time when the social structure goes through profound changes with the interest reconfiguration. The political conflicts, which were embedded in the economic interest contestation, were also regarded as material conflicts.

To examine the internal media difference, four newspapers namely the *People's Daily*, the *Global Times*, the *Times of India* and the *Hindu* were concluded as sampled papers. Based on the availability of data access of the *Times of India*, the time period

under consideration was from 2000 to 2006. I chose 177 articles from the *People's Daily*, 220 from the *Global Times*, 185 from the *Times of India* and 373 from the *Hindu*. For the sake of balance, the *Hindu* articles were systematically sampled into a half, i.e. 186. Finally, a sample of 768 articles in four newspapers from 2000 to 2006 was examined. According to Zheng's definition (Y. Zheng, 2007), the editorials concerned with social conflict among social groups or between groups and the governments about material or ideological objections were selected. A total of 121 editorial articles about social conflict were chosen from 768 articles[8].

By investigating the percentages (Table 4-1), I found that 10.6% of articles in the Chinese media, and 21.3% in the Indian media constructed social conflicts. It can be concluded that the Indian media covered significantly more conflicts than the Chinese media did ($Z = 4.1$, $p < 0.01$). Among the Chinese newspapers, the number of articles in the *People's Daily* and the *Global Times* were not much different, only with a 9.6% distinction. The nuance may be explained by the reason that the *Global Times* focused more on international news so that it would cover global conflicts more often than it covered internal ones. Between the two Indian newspapers, the *Hindu* published more editorials (21.6%) on social conflicts than the *Times of India* did. According to the 2008 Indian Readership Survey (IRS), the *Times of India*, the most widely read English newspaper in India, has a national orientation, while as the second-largest English daily, the *Hindu*, headquartered at Chennai, has its largest base of circulation in South India, especially Tamil Nadu. The *Hindu* targeted manufacturing centers of automobile, steel, textile and so on, in addition to traditionally agricultural states which had been deeply influenced by new economic reforms. By appealing to the readers in those sectors and areas, the *Hindu* would concentrate on the conflicts of interest in these areas more than the *Times of India* did. Table 4-2 revealed that the Chinese and Indian media constructed social conflicts in a significant way.

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[8] Given that only 378 of the 768 were concerned with domestic and local issues, the 121 articles related on social conflicts occupied more than 49% of the Chinese and Indian newspapers.

Table 4-1 Percentages of Social Conflict Construction

	Total (N=768)	Articles on conflict	Newspapers	Articles on conflict in every newspaper
China	51.7 (397)	10.6 (42)	People's Daily	54.8 (23)
			Global Times	45.2 (19)
India	48.3 (371)	21.3 (79)	Hindu	60.8 (48)
			Times of India	39.2 (31)

Table 4-2 General Differences in Conflict Construction

	Background of author	Type of social conflict	Ways of media representation
χ^2	12.5	26.0	11.3
df	4	4	2
p	0.05	0.001	0.01

4.3.1 The Authors: Agents and Spectators

If the publishers of the community press are viewed as agents of communications in terms of their contacts with local people and interactions with community leaders (Janowitz, 1967), authors in national media can be viewed as agents of media discourses that negotiate with both the political powers and the readers. The authors of the editorials in media organizations were affected not only by political rules and control, but also by institutional regulations. At the same time, they represented the political and economic interests of several social groups.

In this study, the authors in the Chinese and Indian media were categorized into five groups according to their professions: government officials; experts, scholars and professionals; journalists, editors and special writers; ordinary citizens; and others that can not be identified. The identities of the first three groups of people can be confirmed through name and title of the author. For the articles that only gave the author's name, I used the Internet and other materials to identify them. The "ordinary citizens" category referred to people who signed their name but could not be identified. The "others" were anonymous authors. In most cases, the articles written by the "ordinary citizens" were the readers' letters to the editors.

According to Table 4-3, to construct social conflict, more experts expressed their opinions in the Chinese media, whereas more media professionals wrote editorials in the Indian newspapers.

Table 4-3 The Background of Authors

	China (n=42)	India (n=79)
Government officials	9.5 (4)	7.6 (6)
Experts, scholars or professionals	38.1 (16)	20.3 (16)
Journalists, editors, etc	19.0 (8)	35.4 (28)
Ordinary citizens	7.1 (3)	0 (0)
Others	26.2 (11)	36.7 (29)

In China, the scholars and experts from educational institutions like universities and research organizations were the most important part of intellectuals. Their relationship with the political powers could be dialectic. On the one hand, they perceived themselves as independent wisdom and as a social conscience who represented the interests of the underprivileged. They should be critical to the ruling power, explore the truth and justice, and explain social conflicts to the public. Their professions and knowledge made them more legitimated to do so (Y. Zheng, 2004). In this sense, Chinese media tended to invite scholars and experts in the established system to define, explain and offer solutions to social conflicts. Social groups also found it a channel to enter the discursive contestations. On the other hand, the party-state never relaxed its control over public discussion. Intellectuals had to give up some autonomy to advance their own interests by "following the routinely operating rule of political clientelism" (E. X. Gu, 1999:426). In this study, among the Chinese authors, most of the experts and scholars came from top universities like Tsinghua and Peking universities, national research institutions like Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Engineering and the State Information Center, and state think tanks like Development Research Centre of the State Council and Party School of the CPC. In the sample articles in this study, one exceptional author was a business expert from a consultant company; and two overseas scholars, Pei Minxin from the U.S. and Wang Gengwu from Singapore, also were different from the other authors in the sampling pool.

Journalists and editors are also viewed as intellectuals in China. In the *People's Daily*, editorials were taken as the life and source of its reputation of (Zhang, 2009). The writers signing with "Ren Zhongping," "Zhong Xuanli" and "Guo Jiping"[9], were

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[9] In Chinese, literally, "Ren Zhongping" is a pen name for "important editorials of the Renmin (people)

specially assigned the task to write the editorials expressing the newspaper's opinions on some important issues. All the articles of theirs are much pro-established power system. Between the two articles of "Ren Zhongping," one was about general principles about globalization, whereas the other regarded "current times" as a special period, and constructed the downfall of some corrupt cadres and leaders as "normal phenomena in social transition and costs that should be paid" (Z. Ren, 2000). The second article mentioned Falungong, a controversial religion that was suppressed by Chinese government. It pointed out that the corruption and religious crisis were caused by a void of belief, the steadfast belief in Marxism, Communist, socialist China and the Chinese Communist Party. Thus the article proved the necessity of belief in solving the problems arising from globalization, and legitimized the socialist system and the CPC.

The Chinese media constructions of social conflict by the intellectuals had two similarities. First, they started from the perspectives of their professions, and paid little attention to specific conflicts in an industry. Qin, a researcher from the State Information Center pointed out that electronic division existed in domestic sectors and that conflicts should be converted into opportunities (2000). However, he failed to specify which social groups were in conflict and which ones were badly affected, and did not explain how the division was manifested in China. In other authors' articles, sectors like manufacturing, education, and agriculture also confronted internal crisis. The groups of workers, peasants and the poor were mentioned, but as interest subjects they were limitedly referred to within the framework of their industries. Second, in their articles the experts and scholars often used ambiguous anaphora as "we," "our" and "the people" to gloss over the gaps between the groups and minimize the intensity of the conflict. As one article stated,

> At home, the factors that affected social stabilization include the unemployment problem, corruption, wealth gap. It requires *us* to insist on the principles of being a party for *the public*, and being in the saddle for *the people*. *We* should take it as the aim and outcome that the interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people are realized, preserved and developed well. (Italics added) (Commentator.,

2002)

By participating in the conflict, the authors tried to soften the confrontation and made the conflict more like an "internal contradiction."

Based on this analysis, the purpose of Chinese media's discussion of social conflicts was to help the political power end conflicts, rally the social forces, and solidify its regime. Since Chinese intellectuals, as "establishment intellectuals" (Hamrin & Cheek, 1986) are state employees, their critiques of the status quo operated within an institutional framework and circulated their opinions only through authorized channels. As a subgroup within the ruling elite, they "had a deep interest in perpetuating the system" (Hamrin & Cheek, 1986:3). The authors themselves were affiliated with the elite power, and toed the Party line. Therefore they tried to minimize the differences and conflicts among the groups and the sectors. The selective publication of readers' letters to the editor may be seen as "a vehicle for mediating social conflict in the interests of political stability as well as for promoting specific policies" (J. Polumbaum, 1990:34). In this way, the opinions and needs of social groups were suppressed. Non-elites had few channels to have their voices heard and to advance their interests. Thus the interests of the elite were defended.

In the Indian newspapers, most of the social conflicts were constructed by journalists and editors. In general, Indian media professionals have three characteristics. From the perspective of history, the Indian media had inherited the press system from the U.K. Article 19 and Part III of the Constitution enumerated the citizens' fundamental rights including freedom of expression. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of the Independent India, said in a speech at the annual meeting of the All India Newspaper Editors' Conference in 1952:

> Does the freedom of the Press ultimately mean freedom of the rich man to do what he likes with his money through the Press? Normally speaking—and I speak with all deference—high standards and high intelligence are not allied with large quantities of money. A person with a large amount of money need not necessarily have high cultural standards or high literary standards or any high standards at all, though he may have the knack of making money. Therefore, the freedom of the Press may come to mean the freedom of persons who have a knack of making money and that, after all, is not such a noble thing. (Raghavan, 1994:143)

Nehru's speech was denunciation of money power that had controlled press, but also a creed made for Indian media. Most of the Indian journalists believe in a liberal and responsible press (Raghavan, 1994).

Second, in India, a job in media promises high income and decent social status. According to some studies of Indian journalists (Anonymous., 1996; Anonymous., 1996; J. Liang, 2001; Y. Wang, 2008), an assistant chief editor in the *Times of India* could earn 50 thousand rupee (more than $1,000) monthly[10]; in the *Hindustan Times*, a new journalist's salary could earn up to $400; if an experienced journalist hopped from one job to another in media industry, he or she would get a rate of pay that is two to four times the original one. Because journalists have a high reputation and are well paid, it is hard to enter the field. The media, particularly English newspapers, set a high standard for recruitment. All the journalists must have graduated from college; they must undergo strict screening test and training before being hired, and they were required to work as interns for a long time.

Third, some Indian journalists and editors, especially those who were writing editorials, were experts in politics, economics or the law. Many of them had published academic works, or been consultants of social organizations and industrial institutions as experts. For example, J. Mulraj was a stock market columnist and observer of the *Times of India*. His weekly column on stock markets has run for more than 19 years. With an MBA from IIM Kolkata, he is now India Representative for Institutional Investors. C. Raja Mohan has a master's degree in nuclear physics and a Ph.D. in International Relations. He was a strategic affairs editor of the *Indian Express* and diplomatic editor and Washington correspondent of the Hindu. He has written several books on India's foreign policy and now is a professor in Singapore and a leading analyst. C. Rammanohar Reddy was a prolific journalist and an associate editor with the Hindu in Chennai. He participated in the peace movement and was a member of the Indian Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace. He holds a post-graduate diploma in management from the Indian Institute of Management, and completed his Ph.D. at Jawaharlal Nehru University in Economics. He is now running at least two journals as the editor. These three cases are not special ones.

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[10] India's per capita income (nominal) is $1,016 per year, less than $85 per month.

In this sense, Indian journalists and editors were educated professionals with extensive knowledge in disciplines like politics, economy, foreign relations, and history. They were regarded as India's social morality and conscience with good reputation, and well-trained professionals in specific social domains. Therefore they have the legitimacy to offer their opinions and comments on social conflicts. According to Table 4-2, 35.4% of the Indian articles on conflicts were written by journalists or editors. They were concerned with the life of farmers and workers under globalization, freely criticized the center and state governments and their policies, and revealed the deep contradictions within the power structures. Their independence offered them great freedom in commenting on social conflicts.

In both media systems, there were significant differences in the backgrounds of their authors. Between the two Chinese newspapers, the *People's Daily* depended more on government officials and anonymous authors, whereas the *Global Times* counted more on experts and journalists. The difference may be attributed to different roles of the two papers. The *People's Daily*'s party organ role reduced its intention to report social conflicts and criticize the political powers; if it did, the government officials were more authoritative and legitimated than the others. The *Global Times* played a more marketized role in the party media, and it faced with a dilemma in constructing conflict. On the one hand it had to report social conflicts to the public objectively and gained its market in news competitions; on the other hand, it could not cross the political line so far as to invitee troubles. Asking experts and journalists to write the reports avoided some problem, although they acted "independently" in making public opinion in established institutions. The main difference in the two Indian newspapers was in their political inclination. The *Times of India* took a pro-government stand and was closer to large financial and industrial groups and influential politicians. Therefore it relied more on officials and experts. The *Hindu* was in more left-leaning, and was more critical towards the political powers. Therefore it had more opinions from the social forces that were clearly identified.

Based on the above analysis of authors in the Chinese and Indian media, I found that Chinese journalists were affected by political and economic forces in social structures and more dependent on political structure and media organization. In the meanwhile, Indian journalists had more autonomy to express their opinions and criticize the authority.

This difference may have affected the media construction of social conflicts that Chinese journalists saw themselves a part of the conflict actors and tended to defuse the tension among interests groups. Indian journalists could be spectators who were more independent in objectively constructing the conflicts.

4.3.2 The Conflict Type: Boundary of Consensus and Contestation

The types of issues can be used to test the boundary of consensus and contestation in public opinion. In American society, the limits of the sphere of legitimate controversy are the two-party system and bureaucratic decision-making process (Hallin, 1986). In this study, social conflicts constructed in media can be divided into four types. According to sociological theories and my definition of social conflict, the conflicts in Chinese and Indian media fall under two perspectives: conflict subject (within or between groups and governments) and conflict object (for material or non-material purpose). The conflicts of the first type usually take place among various social groups and sectors for material objectives, such as economic disputes, or lawsuits on contract between companies. If these conflicts can not be settled, they escalated into the second type of conflicts: economic confrontations between groups and the ruling political power. For example, demonstrations of citizens to fight against the government's new taxation law, or the protests of the farmers to against land requisition of government. The third type conflicts are political ones between groups and government for non-material interests. They are different from the second type because they are well organized and asking for political interest, and because they are acknowledged by the opposite side. Conflicts among social groups over beliefs or religions make up the fourth type of conflicts. If the articles mentioned more than one type of conflicts, I categorized them as a fifth type of social conflict: mixed conflicts.

As Table 4-4 reveals, the Chinese media paid more attention to material conflicts among sectors (42.9%) than the Indian media did (13.9%); meanwhile, the Indian media focused on material (50.6%) and non-material (25.3%) conflicts between sectors and governments more than the Chinese media did (31.0% and 4.8% respectively). It implied that Chinese newspapers tended to present more general economic conflicts in people's life, and fewer political ones. At the same time, the study found that the Chinese media

focused more on material conflicts than on non-material ones.

Table 4-4 Types of Social Conflict

	Material among sectors	Material between sectors and governments	Non-material between sectors and governments	Non-material among sectors	Mixed
China（n=42）	42.9 (18)	31.0 (13)	4.8 (2)	11.9 (5)	9.5 (4)
India （n=79）	13.9 (11)	50.6 (40)	25.3 (20)	10.1 (8)	0 (0)

	Conflict objects		Conflict subjects	
	Material	Non-material	Among sectors	Between sectors and governments
China（n=42）	73.9 (31)	16.7 (7)	54.8 (23)	35.8 (15)
India （n=79）	64.5 (51)	35.4 (28)	24.0 (19)	75.9 (60)

The differences may result from the distinct political economy and different relationships between media and state in the two countries. The Chinese leadership consciously pursued an "interest-based social order" (Y. Zheng, 2004:61) through which capitalism was justified. In the pre-reform times, what made China a nation state was "ideology and organization" (Schurmann, 1968). Mao Zedong, the founder and archon of the new China initiated several political movements, one of which was the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. Mao wished to eliminate the private interests and possible conflicts within people, and to establish a good political order. (What should be mentioned here is that the Chinese media have been acted as an important ideological tool in politicizing the society till today.) At the same time, the policies of registered permanent residence system (*Hukou*) and work unit system (*Danwei*) as institutional mechanisms organized the society. This ideologically organized country, with a highly planned economy, united all social groups and formed a strong power within Chinese society to implement the tasks like land reform, the collectivization and nationalization of business.

As I have mentioned before, the decision to carry out state-capitalism and integrate China's economy into the global world was made to rescue the country from a series of crisis that threatened the CPC's legitimacy. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping's southern tour established capitalism as a way of promoting economic development. The policy of economic expansion changed the structure of space in China. It led to the creation and

development of the private space and the non-state sector. According to statistics, the number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) declined from 54.6% in 1990 to 26.5% in 1998, and the number of individually owned enterprises rose from 5.4% to 16.0% during the same period.[11] In 2003, the number of private enterprises was up to 9.2 million which contain the about 119 million employees in urban and rural areas (Zhou, 2003). The rapid development of private space undermined the previous ideologically based social order. First, with the need for mobile labor, the permanent residence system was relaxed, and the work units could no longer restrict the employees. Second, the interest-based social order encouraged people to care more about their economic interests and to become apolitical because political indifference was no longer risky. The market can satisfy people's basic needs.

Therefore, the shift from an ideology-based social order to an interest-based one diverted the attention of the public to political issues. Economic issues rather than non-economic ones thus received more media attention. It can be concluded that Chinese newspapers constructed more material conflicts because there were more of them in economic domain in people's life, and because the public and the society were more concerned with their material interests.

From the perspective of conflict subjects, the Chinese press emphasized conflicts among social sectors and groups (54.8%) more than those between sectors and governments (35.8%). In China, the leadership valued stability and economic development, and suppressed any internal challenges to the regime. However, capitalistic development and economic globalization brought intense conflicts. A far cry from the Maoist egalitarian policy, integration into the global order resulted from income disparities and unequal development. According to many studies (S. Wang & Hu, 1999; Xu & Li, 1999; Y. Zheng, 2004), disparities existed in urban and rural areas, the west and the east, and within each sector and region. For example, farmers, SOE workers and migrant labors benefited the least from the WTO. According to the World Bank, in 1995 China's Gini coefficient was 38.8, lower than that in most Latin American, African and East Asian countries, but higher than most transitional economies in Eastern Europe and

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[11] From the State Statistical Bureau, *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1999 (China Statistical Yearbook 1999).* Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 1999, p.423.

many high income countries in Western Europe. The income disparities worsened after the mid-1990s (The World Bank, 1997).

As to the conflicts between sectors and the government, the political domain has undergone changes under the economic reforms and globalization. On the one hand, some progress towards democracy had taken place (Chow, 2001). The representatives to the People's Congress, particularly those at the lowest level in village, were publicly elected. In addition, elections for village officials prevailed in China, despite many problems and flaws in the process. On the other hand, corruption, unemployment and economic disparity caused dissatisfaction in the political power and disputes over public services. According to a 1998 survey (C. Wang, 1998), about 49% of the respondents thought of seeking help from the media, and 24.7% from individual leaders instead of in court in the case of conflicts or disputes with others. About 16% would turn to some radical forms like collective action, or collective visits to higher authorities to ask for intervention (*Shangfang*). Farmers' protests arose from the heavy burdens imposed by the governments and protests were not uncommon (Y. Zhao & Zhou, 2000). Farmers' property of land and the government's exploitation of real estate also led to protests and disputes. The number of labor protests increases. Capitalism reforms, especially the SOE reforms and privatization, created serious off-post (*Xiagang*) and unemployment. In 1998, about 3.6 million workers participated in demonstrations and protests (F. Chen, 2000).

However, few of these conflicts and disputes between sectors and governments were reported in the Chinese media. The non-material conflicts between sectors and governments were mentioned the least, only accounting for 4.8% of all Chinese articles. One of the two editorials was about Taiwan, and the other was about capitalism. It means that the political conflicts between the social forces and the government are still a forbidden zone for Chinese media. The Chinese leadership was protected and enhanced by developing market-oriented economy. The social movements and protests initiated by marginal groups and sectors infringed on the authority of the state and invited new solutions to the problems. The political order was maintained by the adjustment of ruling structure to favor the structural changes by the leadership. In addition, the national media was still under the strict control of the political power as propaganda tools devoid of independence. The media tended to exclude opinions that challenged and violated the

interests and wills of the core political consensus. Even when the newspapers did cover political conflicts, they did not aim to neutrally represent opinions on both sides but only served to the interest of the elites.

The Indian media paid more attention to non-material conflicts than the Chinese media did; and focused more on conflicts between social sectors and governments. Globalization has greatly impinged on the Indian society. One of the most prominent transitions is the move from Nehruvian secularism to Hindu nationalism and back. According to Rudolph and Rudolph (1987; 2008), Nehruvian secularism rooted in Nehru's Enlightenment-style rationalism and Gandhi's thought of truth as multiple and inclusive. It insisted on the separation of religion from politics. This secularism was incorporated into India's Constitution by providing that there could not be an established state religion and religion should be confined to the private sphere. However, the revival of Hindu nationalism after the Emergency of 1975-1977 which was rooted in the nationalist movement sought to strengthen India's Hindu character, consciousness and action. It soon turned to the politics of Hindutva, "an ideology that claims India is an exclusively Hindu nation in which Muslims and other religious minorities have no place" (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2008:40). By abandoning extremist Hindu nationalism for centrist politics, the BJP successfully led the National Democratic Alliance for six years, from 1998 to 2004.

Paralleling this ideological transition, two interwoven confrontations took place in Indian society. The first was between the Congress and the BJP, and the other was between the national and the state parties. In 1977 the Janata party won the national election and ended the Congress Party's monopoly since the Independence. The 1989 national election marked the beginning of a multi-party system and of coalition governments. With the rise of regional political forces, some state parties were gaining on the national parties. In the first-past-the-post electoral system, state parties such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazagam in Tamil Nadu and the Telegu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh were winning more shares of votes and seats in the election. The second was the contestation among the castes in India's social system. More members of lower castes hold top positions in the central and state governments. The introduction of universal suffrage for the lower castes and caste associations which united local jatis or sub-castes

brought political opportunities to the caste like Dalit (the untouchables).

The transitions and social changes offered a structural basis for social conflicts. The social change and power reconfiguration in India's society under globalization piled up too many social contradictions. Terrorist attacks increased in number and frequency. According to some statistics, 50 thousand people were killed in terrorist attacks during the 14 years from 1984 to 2008. During the later part of 2008, at least four attacks took place, causing at least 289 deaths (Ren,etc.,2008). Conflicts between ethnic groups continued, especially those intense ones between Hindus and Muslims. On December 6, 1992, the BJP-led Hindus surrounded the Babri Masjid, said to be the birthplace site of Lord Rama, and destroyed the mosque. The action aroused violence between the two groups, causing a death of two thousand people, mostly Muslims. Ten years later in 2002, the religious-sects conflicts in Gujarat killed over one thousand people, fueling the hatred between Hindus and Muslims.

As to the caste conflicts, the shift from Brahmin raj (rule by the upper castes) to Sudra raj (rule by the lower castes) gave the Indian majority a chance at power. However, in 2008, when the government passed the act to increase the educational and employment quota for the lower castes to 51%, the upper castes were strongly against it by protesting, and killing the members of the lower castes.

The conflicts among religion, caste and party in India were related to the wealth gap and unbalanced distribution which was attributed to the government's new economic policies. The economic liberalization program launched by the Congress government in 1991 was continued by the BJP. While much has been accomplished, many Indian people did not benefit from it. In terms of the imparities in living standard, 44% of the population remains below the poverty line, which still remains high; however, the middle class was estimated over 250 million (about 25.1%). Millions of people earned less than one U.S. dollar and the unemployment climbed up to 10%. The agricultural sector's share of the gross domestic product fell from a high of 50% to 27% in 2007 (Rudolph & Rudolph, 2008), but the sector's population accounted for over 60% of the population. Seventeen thousand rural suicides in 2006 and the "Maoist" anti-government violence in 160 of the 602 districts of India in the same year may have resulted from the economic imparities and reduction of income in the agricultural sector.

Indian media's construction of social conflict reflected that the main social conflicts were those with the purpose for material interests and those between sectors and governments. Compared with the Chinese media, the Indian media focused on conflicts in politics, religion and belief in line with the confrontations among classes, castes, religious sects and parties. The Indian media's emphasis on conflicts between sectors and governments reflected its wider political spectrum in media. The diverse voices of social groups and sectors that opposed the government could be expressed. The benefits and losses of farmers, workers, IT employees and bankers in the economic reforms were discussed in the articles. The government's liberal economic policies became the culprit for the grievance and loss. However, although the government was often criticized for its conservative or liberal orientation, on its secularist or nationalist or centralist policy, and on its corruption and inefficiency, the democratic political system and election system was not.[12]

4.3.3 The Representation Strategies: Functions of Conflict Construction

According to the functions of conflict in media content, this study divided the strategies of media representations of social conflicts into three categories. First, when a conflict arose, what media would do is to define and describe it, offering basic information of the conflict and viewpoints of the participants to the public. Second, media analyzed the reasons for the conflict, and gave value judgments and explanations to the public. Third, media would figure out measures and remedies to the crisis, serving

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[12] Within the two media systems, there was a significant difference in the type of conflict constructed within Chinese newspapers ($\chi^2 = 12.8$, $df = 4$, $p < 0.05$). The People's Daily focused on material conflicts among social sectors and groups, and no article in it mentioned non-material conflicts, either among sectors or between sectors and governments. Seven out of 19 articles in the Global Times mentioned non-material conflicts, accounting for 36.8% of all articles on social construction. Still, the political role of the former and the market role with the latter can explain the difference. At the same time, there was no significant difference between the two Indian newspapers. It is because that within in the domain of legitimacy consensus and controversy, the boundary in conflict reports is not related to the political interests of different powers, and so the two newspapers with distinct political inclinations set similar boundaries in conflicts in the news discourses.

the interest of the ruling powers and of media's own interest. The three functions are not exclusive, but are three ordinal stages of constructing a conflict. According to Table 4-5, the Chinese media tended to offer measures to deal with the conflicts, but not to describe the conflict and explain its causes. The Indian media, in contrast, was more inclined to provide details and explanations of the conflict. However, neither media systems had significant internal differences.

Table 4-5 Ways of Representing Social Conflicts

	Describe conflicts	Explain conflicts	Deal with conflicts
China（n=42）	28.6 (12)	16.7 (7)	54.8 (23)
India（n=79）	36.7 (29)	38.0 (30)	25.3 (20)

The Chinese media constructed conflicts in abstract terms without elaboration, whereas the Indian media presented conflicts with examples and opinions. An editorial in the *People's Daily* in 2002 about the benefits and harms of the reforms said,

> The accession into the WTO is an opportunity as well as a challenge. It will be beneficial if it was well used and harmful if it was badly used. Whether the advantages are fully taken of, to reduce the disadvantages to the absolute minimal should be comprehensively acknowledged. Neither should the impingements of the accession to the WTO on our country be aggrandized, nor should the possible side effects be underestimated…(Every sector) should carefully analyze the influence the accession would bring to the district, the sector and the industry according to the rules of the WTO and the commitment our country made, and bring forward focused measures timely. (Commentator., 2002)

In referring to the potential conflicts, the author used such negative words or phrases as "a challenge," "harmful," "badly used," "disadvantages," "impingements," "side effects," and "influence," and implied that conflicts could be brought up by the accession and those commitments. However, Chinese elite media rarely explained the government's commitment to the WTO and the effects on the deprived groups. On the contrary, in the Indian newspapers the conflicts were very specific. The government was often blamed, and sometimes harshly. According to one article about selling public-owned units (PSU),

> One of the worst enemies of bullishness is the continued profligacy of government spending. One was hopeful that this would end with the passage of the Fiscal

Responsibility Bill. It was just such an Act, passed in the early 80s in the US Congress that paved the way for the current healthy state of its economy. Alas, not unexpectedly, the bill has been diluted to make it a non-starter. The finance ministry has not agreed to giving a commitment on graded reduction in fiscal deficit. With unbridled spending and unabashed reluctance to sell assets to finance profligacy, we are heading towards another fiscal crisis. (Mulraj, 2000)

The Chinese and Indian media both applied strategies in explaining the origins of the conflicts. Sometimes the Chinese newspapers attributed the conflicts to partial and temporary dysfunction of the power structure. One article described the gains and losses of China in the WTO and took negotiations on national boundaries as an example,

The textile industry would naturally think there are more advantages than disadvantages in China's accession into the WTO because Chinese more textile products can enter the global market. However, the insurance industry would believe that the government compromised a lot in the negotiation and was too weak. It is natural because the permission of foreign companies entering Chinese insurance market would lead to a profit incline. Take another example. In boundary negotiations…I gave you this place, and you gave me that place. It is normal. But to the residents living beside the boundary on both sides, one part would praise highly for it, but the other should say the government is "too weak". It is a difference in "tough" and "weak" between parts…Strategic "tough" and "weak" aims at gaining, at least not losing. The public should not care much about these negotiation strategies. (F. Yu, 2003)

Actually, in the WTO negotiation, Chinese government made so many concessions that the negotiation delegation led by then Premier Zhu Rongji was furiously denounced by many domestic powers (Panitchapakdi & Clifford, 2002). Another typical example is the agriculture. The integration into the economic globalization and the accession into the WTO robbed Chinese farmers of their wealth and left them in poverty and distress. The Chinese media blamed these effects on an "unreasonable agricultural structure" instead of the unbalanced policies of government (Z. Ma, 2000). The media did not blame the whole power structure, but part of it. As the Chinese people said, "Swat flies but do not beat tigers."

The Indian media attributed many conflicts to the bureaucratic system and drawbacks of the governments. To the same problem of agricultural failure in global times, one article said,

> Again, one must ask whether this is not a case of globalisation being made the scapegoat for governmental failure. An urban-rural divide has existed long before globalisation and, contrary to popular perception, rural areas have been actively shielded from globalisation around the world… N R Narayana Murthy of Infosys, once a committed socialist, explained his change of heart by saying that he preferred to create wealth rather than redistribute poverty. It's too bad Mr. Narayana Murthy has proved a bigger inspiration for young geeks than for wizened politicians. (Global scapegoat.2001)

There were also voices against globalization and the liberal capitalist for the problems they caused in domestic agriculture and other sectors. However, the government was mostly blamed because it was the decision and policy maker, and because it represented the internal power forces and interests to negotiate with the global structure.

The Chinese media and Indian media offered different solutions and ideologies to the disputes and conflicts. The Chinese newspapers prescribed economic development as a panacea, including material ones and non-material ones. To solve the problems in the economic domain, "(that) to stick to development (*Fazhan*) is to hold the golden key to settle the problems" (Y. Liang, 2001). A study conducted by the *Southern Weekend* found that by searching the keyword in the National Party Congress reports during the last 30 years, "development" and "construction" (*Jianshe*) were the three most frequently used words (Table 4-6). It revealed the ideology of a Central leadership that worshiped economic "development" and "efficiency." As to the non-material conflicts, "If socialism does not retain the comparative advantages in contrast to capitalism, neither can it be solidified, nor can the renaissance of the Chinese people be realized" (Y. Liang, 2001).

Table 4-6 The Rank of Keywords Used in all National Party Congress Reports

	11th	12th	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th
1	President Mao	we	socialist	socialist	socialist	development	development
2	we	the Party	development	construction	development	the Party	construction
3	Gang of Four	socialist	the Party	development	construction	construction	socialist
4	the Party	construction	reform	economy	economy	socialist	society
5	the proletariat	economy	economy	the Party	the Party	insist	the Party
6	revolution	development	we	reform	we	society	insist
7	socialist	country	construction	we	theory	economy	strengthen
8	they	work	must	open	country	we	reform
9	struggle	must	country	country	insist	strengthen	economy
10	great	our country	society	modernization	Deng Xiaoping	improve	system

Source: Liu, Xiaobiao. (2008). The change of word used in the National Party Congress reports in last 30 years. *Southern Weekend*. 2008-11-27.

In contrast, the Indian media emphasized "democracy" (or a repaired democracy) and "equity." "Consistency and fairness in application of law is a quintessential part of a truly global economy and we are yet to learn this" (Mulraj, 2004). The programs like the common minimum program (CMP) were introduced and welcomed by the media because "the greatest impact that the new coalition could make to improve the living conditions of the less well-to-do rural and urban under-classes is by extending and improving basic facilities and amenities" (Vaidyanathan, 2004). Some groups like women, ethnic minority, the farmers and the lower caste people were widely mentioned and concerned of in the Indian newspapers. Their poverty and misfortune were rooted in the unfair globalization. To eliminate imparities and build an equal society for every group and sector, the Indian government should consider more about the powerless.

4.4 Summary

In chapter 3, the constructions of international issues of the Chinese and Indian elite media were shown to reflect the national interest as defined by elites. However, the elite media reflect the divided national interest in a more diverse way on domestic issues and social conflicts.

In China and India, social conflicts are rooted in the diversity of religion, language

and ethnicity, and inequalities of economic and political opportunity among sectors and social groups. The groups' reactions to the changes were seen to represent differences in political and economic interests. Thus the diversity of points of view reflected the social contradictions and conflicts which were moderated by the status of the view-holder in the power structure.

China and India both are experiencing intense social conflicts in the process of globalization. However, in the Chinese media, the construction of conflicts was unitary with more consonance, and the people who were responsible for the conflict were not identified. In contrast, the Indian media constructed the social conflicts in the sphere of legitimate controversy, and attributed the conflicts to specific individuals or institutions, in most cases the governments. It may result from the different political economy in the two countries. The Indian society was more diverse and heterogeneous than the Chinese society, and its interest groups and sectors were more fragmented. It also may result from the relations between press and state of the two countries. Chinese media was more dependent on the government and the elite, whereas Indian media was relatively freer and more independent to the political powers. Therefore the Chinese media constructed social conflicts with its function as a submissive lap dog, whereas the Indian media constructed conflicts as a watch dog of the power structure.

Market force was a determinant in social conflict construction in the Chinese media system. The *Global Times*, a party organ subsidiary with a less political function, discussed the conflicts as results of globalization more often, and sometimes it criticized the government and revealed some of its non-material conflicts with the social sectors. As a result it gained an enormous economic success in news market. In Indian, both the *Times of India* and the *Hindu* were privately owned newspapers. However, they were somehow of some distinct characteristics in political inclination and targeted audience. The *Times of India* was more sympathetic to big companies and political powers; therefore it often held a pro-government attitude. The *Global Times*, which was politically left-leaning and popular with middle-class readers and owners of middle-and-small-scaled enterprises; therefore it was more critical of the governments in conflict constructions.

Chapter 5 Historical Continuity and Discontinuity

It has become well accepted that news media write the first draft of history. However, less attention has been paid to the fact they also rewrite history and present the second draft of history to the public. This chapter aims to examine how differently and similarly the national media in China and India employ resources in their history to construct collective memories, in which way the interests and ideologies of the social actors in the two developing countries can be revealed in the historical conjunction of globalization.

Globalization punctuates into the history of the two countries during their national development process. Under the shadow of globalization, the two Asian nations have undergone dramatic and profound changes in such realms as politics, economy, society, culture and language resulted from the new trend. In three decades China has made all efforts to build a modern economy which serves to strengthen the power of the state in coping with stress within and without (Y. Zheng, 2004). In contrast, India chooses gradualist economic reforms to balance the interests of various actors in the society (G. Das, 2000). Their different responses to globalization rooted in their unique historical and cultural characteristics. However, the challenge to explain their past and the task to articulate the present to the future is extraordinarily huge. Take a few of the historical disconnections for example. For China, politically, the state, which was once agitating to assert "anti-bourgeois liberalization"(*Fandui Zichan Jieji Ziyouhua*), should offer a reasonable explanation for not mentioning it any more. Economically, it needs to elaborate the reasons for its shift from a socialist economy to a socialist market economy, and the seemingly contradictory coexistence of socialist system and capitalist economy. India faces a mission to relocate its national identity between a loser with bitter memory of colonial history, and a strong power in the world rich club. Its historical legacies like egalitarianism, principles in Nonviolent Satyagraha Movement and Non-Aligned Movement won great world reputation in the past. But the legacies seem to lose their influence when they confronted neo-liberal economic intervention.

I argue that contextualized in two different nations with different history and national identity, Chinese and Indian national press strategically use historical memories in different ways to construct globalization. It is hypothesized that the Chinese media

emphasize on historical continuity, whereas the Indian media emphasize on historical discontinuity between globalization and history.

5.1 "The Use of History" and Collective Memory

As Carl Becker (1922) argued, history can be referred to present past and bring up reflections on present. Hardt (1988:142) took history as "a record of human experience" and "a source for understanding the meaning and importance of social phenomena, including the role and function of the media in society." People tend to use the past as contemporary force, making history a metaphor through which the current world is viewed (Schudson, 1992), or use history to expand their reservoir of experience, extend the social memory, and free them from the prison of the present (Carlson, 2007; Edy, 1999; Lang & Lang, 1989; Schudson, 1992; Sturken, 1997; Zelizer, 1992; Zelizer, 1998). Vaughn (1985) argued that far from being irrelevant, the past constantly intrudes on the present and shapes the future; our understanding of contemporary events rests on our assumptions about the past. History, or past experience, or memory, therefore turns out to be a useful reference to review the past, understand the present, and explore the future.

5.1.1 Social Change and Collective Memory

Collective memory is a form of historical memory on the societal level. As social accomplishment in the collective build-up of tradition and reputation, memory, the analogy of history, reminds us that what it is to remember and forget can focus on intentional representations of past experience. Halbwachs (1992) gave a definition to collective memories as present interpretations shaped by members of social groups concerning objects, persons and events from the past. Schwartz (2000:9) described collective memory as "a representation of the past embodied in both historical evidence and commemorative symbolism;" it is "a metaphor that formulates society's retention and loss of information about its past in the familiar terms of individual remembering and forgetting" (Schwartz, 1991b:302).

Collective memory has social foundations of the past and the present. It is a sociological construct that explains how members of different social groups remember the past. Furthermore, there can be many collective memories as there are various interest

groups in the society. The "objects, persons and events" in Halbwachs's definition are interpreted by social groups differently depending on their points of view and experiences they possess. In addition, group members can contest for their interests, needs, beliefs and ideals in terms of selectively retaining, interpreting, emphasizing, or forgetting historical information. Collective memory, according to Halbwachs (1992)(1992), maintains historical continuity by recalling specific elements from the archive of "historical memory." Mead (1929) and Halbwachs (1941) believe the use of history for present purpose, and assume that social change that alters people's perception of the past is reconstructive change, and the collective memory undergoes revisions as new values and social structures replace the old. The dynamics of the collective memory reflects the change of values and social structures.

The relationship between social change and collective memory was elaborated in Schwartz's studies (1990; 1991a) through the reconstruction of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. Take Washington for example. George Washington got a genteel image between 1800 and 1865. However, between 1865 and 1920, two images of Washington appeared: one is as a common man with dignity and democratic values; the other is as an aristocratic and set apart from the people. The former is deeply rooted in the egalitarian values of the antebellum Democratic tradition, and the latter resonates with the hierarchical values of the Federalist-antebellum Whig tradition. The very nature of American societal changes determined how much of Washington's original image was revised and retained. The shift of image of Washington affirms the "use value" of history, as Schudson (1987) addressed that the past is being retold in order to legitimate present interests. At the same time, the arguments that collective memories outlive changes in society (Durkheim, 1965; Nisbet, 1978; Schwartz, 1990; Shils, 1981) are also proved. This perspective emphasizes the continuities in the conceptions of the past and to the way these perceptions are maintained in the face of social change.

5.1.2 National Identity and Collective Memory

Collective memory and shared understanding of the past is crucial to the very survival of national identity. As Anderson (1991) argues, nations are merely "imaginative communities" that we can not really know or see but can agree to put our faith in. Nations

are represented in the minds and memories of the nationalized subjects as sovereign and limited political units. Collective memory which is functional to the cohesion and maintenance of the nation or the group helps us to "make connections—to each other over time and space, and to ourselves" (Zelizer, 1995:226). The selective recollection of past events allows us to identify a connection between national identity and myths, symbols and rituals of everyday life (Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999) . During the process, national identity is constructed through answering the question of which "national history" is told by a nation's citizens, what and how they recollect, and between which "events" they make a connection in their subjective "national narrative."

Collective memory is taken as one of the important imaginative ties that bond individuals together and make them feel inclined to "believe in" their nation, and thus to act in its interest. The construction of national identity builds on the emphasis on a common history, and history has always to do with remembrance and forgetting. Nora (1996) pointed out that when individual historical memories settle, they take on a collective memory and a nation learns what it is like to be a particular nation and thus obtain a national identity. The sites of memory, or say *lieux de mémoires*, buttress individuals' identities as bastions. If what they defended were not threatened, there would be no need for them. In some contexts, the cultural products that explicitly go about bolstering national identity through collective memory would appear too propagandistic (West, 2002), or play a crucial role in inflaming and mobilizing nationalistic feelings in wars (Volčič, 2006). These extreme examples prove the relationship between national identity and collective memory.

To explore how people use collective memory to construct national identity, some empirical studies compared two nation states and examined what affects their promoting collective memories and building the national identities in different concrete national contexts. Élisabeth Le's study (Le, 2006) on how mentions of French and American collective memory of Communist Russia frame representations of post war Russia dissolved the conceptualization of collective memory into three types of historical factors: the objects through which memory is transmitted, the senders, and receivers of the representations of the past. She found that the representation of another national identity, i.e. of "Them," can be a "prisoner of its past," and the construction of collective memory

can be explained by the cultural conceptions of history in the two countries. Winfield's study (Winfield, 2002) on British and American newspapers' uses of history following September 11 terrorist attacks investigated the differences between the coverage. The author attributed the differences to their military involvement in the conflict and different national histories.

5.2 Media, History and Journalistic Uses of Collective Memory

In a sense, news somehow implies a discontinuity, a rupture, even an eruption (van Ginneken, 1998:107). It is produced by a group of skilled and apt professionals within a limited time period, so that the latest happenings can get to be known by the public. The production goes on and repeats the process in every minute and second, which makes the news receivers continually forget the old events. Therefore news presents itself to readers or audience as a natural succession of unrelated events or as a discontinuous understanding of what is actually going on.

However, media should offer a background of continuities for explaining these foregrounding discontinuities. As each piece of news takes off from a "news peg," news tends to select some previous events to legitimate its importance and "worthiness" as "hard" news. Moreover, some news traces back to the past to make the news understandable and believable, because the past and the future selectively imply some of the probable causes, relevant contexts and possible consequences of the reported issues. As Manoff and Schudson stated (1986), many events cannot be understood as important news (front-page stories in their study) if some degree of "shared historic depth" could not be assumed. As one kind of "soft" news (2002), including light-hearted anecdotes, historical episodes, or the "mood" pieces, history is likely to be as ideological as the "hard" news.

Another professional need of the media to use historical mentions is the purpose to strengthen their control of news work by preferring "prescheduled, continuing news" (Tuchman, 1973), to raise the circulation or rating by using "media events" (Dayan & Katz, 1992; Lee at el.,2002) through the memorial ceremonies, rituals and myth (Peri, 1999). Therefore media become the central arena of meaningful social interaction and determine the ritual calendar, which is a central factor in forming collective memories. In

return, the media can break the public dissatisfaction with their routine role.

As Lang and Lang (1989) argued, there are four basic reasons for media to use history and evoke the past: (1) to delimit an era; (2) to provide yardsticks which can be used to evaluate the significance of an event, (3) to draw explicit analogies, or (4) to give short-hand explanations or lessons it can provide. They also retained that collective memory embodies an orientation to the past and frames the reporting of news. As time goes by and personal memories of events tend to fade, the more remote an event is, the more important mediation is for it to be remembered. Journalistic construction of collective memory by reporters is found to be applied to retain and bolster their roles as authoritative storytellers about public events (Carlson, 2007; Schudson, 1992; Zelizer, 1992). In his study on Watergate stories, Schudson (1992) argued that the stories perform other functions such as providing analytical tools for describing government scandals.

Among social institutions, mass media play an important role in constructing and maintaining a national collective memory. Classroom teaches history with focus on offering information and presenting facts objectively, whereas media may connect personal and emotional feelings and ideas with the past usually (Edy, 1999; Winfield, 2002). Therefore emotional emphasis is likely to appear in the dramatic storytelling of the news media and influences the mass society (W. L. Bennett, 1988). According to Edy (1999), media tells the history in a more rapid and succinct way than museum, statues and other commemorative forms that the media reminders for us are more or less at once. What's more, the reminders of mass media are everywhere and relatively unavoidable in our daily life. In its unique way media depicts history to the purpose of constructing the collective memory based on media organizations characteristics and functions.

The different roles media play in the society can partly explain different media use of history and collective memory construction. According to Le's research (2006) , the French newspaper *Le Monde* takes a negative attitude towards Russia in the 1999-2000 editorials because of the watchdog function it exercises. Therefore it constructs Russia by relying on a historical framework that goes beyond political regimes and has a bleak outlook on the future of Russia. In contrast, *The New York Times*'s positive perspective on Russia is linked to its "government's little helpers" function. It constructs Russia by emphasizing the continuity of some changeable characteristics that associated with Soviet

Union, and takes a more positive attitude towards Russia's future.

In this study, the use of history to build collective memory in the Chinese and Indian newspaper editorials is under careful examination. Research attention is especially paid to commemorations and themes to see how the media selects and applies history to serve its national interests and national identities in globalization.

5.3 Similar Stories, Different Telling

China and India have shared much similar experience in history. Their histories are so unique that the figures, times, plots, and sequences are in enormous distinctions. However, the contexts of the two stories are akin to each other. Both as oriental countries with an ancient civilization, China and India have gone through a very similar process of national development in the past. Standing out among the nations in the world with a long tradition and a splendid civilization, the two countries also, since the eighteenth century, suffered from dark days under invasions and colonization, from painful fights with feudalism and imperialism for independence, and from arduous struggles for development.

The work of journalists is like taking a picture. In the course of taking pictures or creating an album, they decide what they want to remember or ignore, and how they want to remember it (Halbwachs, 1992). Through discourse analysis, this section presents how the Chinese and Indian media differently selected similar historical pictures to make albums, and to decide what the albums look like.

5.3.1 Historical Figures as Commemorations

Commemoration is a system of "condensation symbols" (Sapir, 1930). It makes the past an object of commitment and expresses the moral sentiments the past events inspire. It promotes commitment to the world by producing symbols of its values and aspirations, which makes it more ideological (Nora, 1989) . Commemoration is sometimes referred to as "anniversary journalism" which offers opportunities to re-examine the past (Edy, 1999). Commemorative stories often relate to commemorated dates, events or persons that are usually sanctioned by some social authority and thus are rarely controversial. However, they can still offer a forum or an arena for contests about the meaning of the

past. The debate among groups that do not agree with the official retelling of the past and the authorities represents the negotiation on what the past means and how we think about it.

According to Nora (1984), the sites of commemorations are not only geographical, but also sacred, including the flag and anthem, monument and shrine, sanctuary and ruin, statue and bust, portrait and history painting, coin and medallion. Among sites of memory, historical figures as symbolic icons of the culture, zeitgeist, ethos and events are very important. Personalization adds to the legitimacy of storytelling about the past (Kitch, 2006) . "With the memorialization of a figure from a past era, collective memory can take the form of nostalgia for the figure as well as for her specific era" (Carlson, 2007:169). In this way, a kind of "collective nostalgia" or condition, in which "the symbolic objects are of a highly public, widely shared and familiar character" (F. Davis, 1979), can be evoked. Some studies (Schwartz, 1990; Schwartz, 1991b; Schwartz, 1997) take their efforts in exploring how persons and figures are constructed and shaped through news articles, books, iconography and other media forms.

In the Chinese and Indian newspapers, six historical figures are most frequently mentioned and paid attention to. Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping from the Chinese side, and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi), Jawaharlal Nehru and P.V. Narasimha Rao from the India side. They are six great political figures in history of the two countries, and occupy an important position in historical narratives. Being the symbolic icons of history and culture, they represent three memorial periods: anti-imperialism and anti-colonization times, national independence and development times, and globalization times. The division of time periods and the one-to-one correspondence between the figures and the periods may be a little rough and mechanical. However, based on the empirical and theoretical studies on collective memory and commemorations, I have enough confidence to say that the references to these great men can trace back to the relevant past and construct collective memory of these figures as well as of the three specific eras. According to Table 5-1, there were 122 articles (China 49, India 73) invited history by tracing back to historical figures. Although the sample is relatively small (about 12.1% of the whole sample), the analysis of historical figures reveal ideological underpinnings of media discourses on globalization.

Table 5-1 The Historical Figures Used in Chinese and Indian Newspapers

Country		China (N=501)			India (N=503)		
Historical figure		Sun	Mao	Deng	Gandhi	Nehru	Rao
Symbolic historical period		Anti-imperialism	National independence	Globalization	Anti-imperialism	National independence	Globalization
Frequencies mentioned		4	17	28	33	27	13
Ratio of mentioned (%)		0.8	3.4	5.6	6.5	5.4	2.6
Attitude (%)	Positive	50	94.1	100	75.8	55.6	30.8
	Negative	0	0	0	6.1	7.4	46.2
	Neutral	50	5.9	0	18.2	37.0	23.1

5.3.1.1 Sun and Gandhi

Among the six figures, Sun Yat-sen is the least frequently referred to in the Chinese media (Table 5-1). As a revolutionary and political leader in the late Qing Dynasty, Sun united some revolutionary forces to overthrow the Qing Dynasty in 1911, and became the first provisional president when the Republic of China (ROC) was founded in 1912. He was also remembered as the founder of the Kuomintang (KMT), or the Nationalist Party. He thus won a high reputation and was referred to as the Father of Modern China by the Chinese people. In spite of his important role in Chinese modern history, Sun is not often evoked in the Chinese media in globalization discourse. Only four times remembered, he was highly related to nationalism or patriotism when the newspapers bolstered feelings of national pride and faith to the Party. Three articles mentioned him as a Chinese nationalist. One article (Z. Ren, 2000a) reviewed a five-thousand-year history of patriotic tradition of the nation of China, and sang high praise for such national heroes and patriotic martyrs as Quyuan, Wen Tianxiang, Lin Zexu and then Sun Yat-sen. Among the heroes, Sun is distinguished for his effort in "saving the country and reviving China."[13] The article continued to argue that the CPC was the most steadfast and complete patriot; the Party inherited and developed the patriotic tradition. Therefore, "in the new era, patriotism and

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[13] This political slogan was brought up by Sun. Here "the country" and "China" are not the communist country led by the CPC as what media usually refer to in "patriotism" (*Aiguo Zhuyi*). Sun was trying to pull down the feudalism Qing and set up a republic state, which would carry out a western democratic system. But the article did not discuss his "country" in depth and just used it as communist China.

socialism is coherent in essence." The other two articles adhered to the same logic but took an opposite approach. Although they did not criticize Sun, they pointed out that Sun and his political philosophy, the Three Principles of the People (*Sanmin Zhuyi* or *San-min Doctrine*)[14], the principle of nationalism (*Minzu*), democracy (*Minquan*) and People's Livelihood (*Minsheng*), could not salvage China from poverty and backwardness. Not only Sun, but other preceding revolutionists from various classes with their planks to realize national modernization, failed to do so. Actually, according to the media discourse on the unremitting efforts for modernization, the Chinese people could not find their right way to win the revolution until the CPC introduced Marxism and Leninism into China. It was often implied that only the CPC could save China and the Chinese people. The CPC's legitimacy in national reforms and constructions is thus built up. It should also be noted that the communist media have tried to depict Sun as a prelude to Communist victory in a seemingly evolving and evolutionary story. Hence, the CPC represents the culmination of national salvation started by Sun. The CPC not only inherits Sun's legitimacy but also surpasses him in leading Marxist revolution to its success.

On the contrary, representative of the history of anti-imperialism and anti-colonization, Mahatma Gandhi is revered by the Indian people as a political and spiritual leader. He is the most frequently mentioned among the Indian historical figures. Gandhi successfully led the Satyagraha (Non-Violent) Movement to gain Indian independence and is universally honored as the Father of the Nation. Gandhi has a high reputation in the international community and the Third World because of his inspiration for movements for civil rights and freedom across the world. I found that Gandhi's three legacies are highly recognized and advocated in the Indian media: non-violent Satyagraha, persistence in struggling for civil rights and freedom, swadeshi and self-purification life style. However, they were described and constructed in manifold ways.

The concept of nonviolence and nonresistance has a long history in Indian religious thought, but it is Gandhi who first applied it in the political realm. Upholding the

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[14] The Three Principles of the People is influenced by Sun's experiences in the U.S. and contains elements of the American progressive movement and the thought championed by Abraham Lincoln. However, the Chinese media mentioned little about those ideologies, although it boosted privatization and liberalization in globalization, which were regarded as core elements of the American creeds.

religious faith that "An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind," Gandhi chose nonviolence as the weapon to evoke Indian people to strive for national independence and freedom. An article in 1998 (Nuclear tests and indian values.1998a; Nuclear tests and indian values.1998a) responded to India's five nuclear explosions and criticized the deeds of armament race and military threat. The context of the nuclear explosions is that in 1998, the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) obtained a slim majority in elections, and Vajpayee was appointed as Prime Minister. Soon after the BJP's debut, the government carried out an electoral promise with the 5 nuclear tests and alleged India a weaponised nuclear country. The BJP has long been criticized for its nationalist policy and launching the Kargil War with Pakistan. The article interrogated on the BJP: "What an irony that a party which swears by Indian culture feels so proud of the destructive power of nuclear explosion?" Other articles also highly praised Gandhi's nonviolence revolution for liberation and regarded it as the best alternative way to violence (Non-violence and liberation struggles.2003). However, for those who value the nature of law and the international order, nonviolence is less attractive and sometimes even implausible, because those people would use nonviolence as a weapon to refuse cooperation with the new order. A story on a cricket tampering controversy between India and Pakistan further elevated the conflict to the level of international relations. The author attributed the disorder and disturbance in the South Asia to the two countries' "being historically a latecomer to the idea of written constitutions and the attendant culture of rule of law," and to the Gandhian nonviolence tradition as well. In the age of globalization, the encounter with the international laws is such a painful experience that "our recent history of non-cooperation against imperial rulers has induced an approach that a citizen can withhold his or her consent to the obligation to obey the law" (Khare, 2006). The globalization advocators thus easily left out the reasons which led to the resistance to globalization and conflicts between local forces and global rules.

Calling for boycotting foreign products and a revival of domestic-made products and production techniques, Swadeshi becomes another example of historical references that invite heated discussion on globalization in Indian media discourse. Elaborating the influences of economic globalization on indigenous economy, three perspectives were taken to construct self-reliance economy. One believed that the expanded global free

market and capital, its representative MNCs and the international organizations have penetrated the borders of nation states in the Third World and taken control of their economies. Economic globalization has "scuttled swadeshi, blotted out Gandhian vision, and self-reliant economy and public sector enterprises as obsolete Nehru obsessions," (Iyer, 2000) and turns into a fundamental force in shaping patterns of global inequality and exclusion. The fact that the trade, investment and technological flows become increasingly concentrated in the OECD core of the world economy tended to trigger a fear of recolonization which was thought to be "making a steady headway, ignoring national loyalties and bending before GATTocrats with a global village-global tillage agenda" (Iyer, 2000).

The second perspective regards Swadeshi as blind opposition to globalization. Three articles have cited Gandhi's idea of self-sufficiency in economic development, but hold a critical attitude towards its practical significance in globalization. To them, the world market could "meet our needs more quickly and at a very acceptable cost. To make everything we need by using huge amounts of resources and time for setting up indigenous production units … (seems) of little sense" (Gopalakrishnan, 2001). One article pointed out that "the purpose of recapitulating this history (the Khadi movement and the boycott of British goods, the author adds) is to invite attention to how time makes many things irrelevant" (Gopalakrishnan, 2001). It was implied that Gandhian swadeshi movement was behind the times and should be abandoned. Even Gandhi had to struggle to de-westernize himself and be like a Hindu. Those who "praised Gandhi for adopting Indian simplicity are now competing to adopt the Western culture" (Ilaiah, 2003). Therefore globalization, at least cultural globalization, should not be challenged.

The third perspective on Swadeshi is called "globalization with safeguards." This point of view was held by the BJP government in their economic policies. The Home Minister and the Union Minister of Commerce and Industry respectively quoted Gandhi and his sayings on Swadeshi, to express their argument that "in this context of globalisation meaning different things to different people, India would continue to press for 'a rule-based multilateral (trading) system which is just and fair'" (Maran for globalisation with 'safeguards'.2000). Indian governmental officials believed that India should prepare for globalization with their feet solidly rooted in Swadeshi. It is a much

more conservative and conditional standpoint on globalization than the second one.

To construct Swadeshi as a strategic way to confront the global order, Gandhi's pursuit of equity and independence, his resolution, faithfulness and compassion, and his religious combination with political opinions, is mostly used positively. In addition to neo-liberalism and Hindu conservatism, social groups like Social Forum (SF) referred to this valuable historical resource in their anti-globalization discourse. They paralleled Gandhism in with socialism, Marxism and Ambedkarism (M. Sharma, 2006).

5.3.1.2 Mao and Nehru

Both as the first leader and inaugurating pathfinder of their nations, Mao Zedong and Nehru faced the same tasks and challenges at the very time the countries gained independence and freedom: externally, how to interact with the other countries and find their own position in the Cold War; internally, how to balance the interests of power forces and resolve conflicts and problems within. To revisit the strategies and approaches they solved the problems is a way to reflect the current challenges and rationalize the ideas to overcome the barriers and difficulties in the present.

Compared with Sun, Mao's role as the founder of the "new China" is officially established in high regard. Having defeated Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Civil War, Mao was unquestionably the leader of the People's Republic of China from its establishment in 1949 until his death in 1976. He is even regarded as one of the most important figures in modern world history. However, Mao is also a controversial figure in the official and popular discourses. His initiatives on such socio-political movements as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution caused severe damages to China's culture, society, economy, and foreign relations. He is blamed by critics from both within and outside China. In 1981, five years after Mao's death, the CPC released an official document *On the Various Historical Issues since the Founding of the People's Republic of China* and finally set the tone of Mao's valuation. It said that Mao is a great Marxist, a proletarian revolutionist, strategist and theorist. Although having made serious mistakes in the Cultural Revolution, his contribution to the Chinese revolution overshadows his fault, judging from the span of his whole life. "His accomplishments must be considered before his mistakes," the document declared. His ideology which is entitled Mao Zedong

Thought (*Mao Zedong Sixiang*) is regarded as a combined product of Marxism-Leninism principles and specific Chinese revolution practices. Following in this line, the propaganda organs in China, including mass media, take Mao as the core of the first generation of the Chinese revolution leaders, who led the revolution for independence to a success and established a strong socialist power in the world. Little critics and resentments are seen in the official media.

This study found that the Chinese media mentioned Mao infrequently and superficially. Only 3.4% of the Chinese editorials mentioned Mao in the discussion on globalization. Almost all the articles took a positive attitude towards Mao and his thought, except one on the issue of promoting cultural and ideological progress in the new era (B. Zheng, Gong, & etc., Nov 12, 1996). However, the exception that did not sing high praise of Mao did not criticize him either. It mentioned Mao's ideal perception of rapidly promoting the iron and steel output, and later the Great Leap Forward in 1958. The movements did not realize national development and prosperity, but the Reform and Opening Up policy did. Instead of uncovering the structural reasons for Mao's mistakes in those movements, the article compared the situations before and after the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC, which announced the nascent Reform and Opening Up policy, and emphasized China's economic achievements during the past eighteen years. The negligence of the mistakes and faults committed by Mao and the CPC and the conscious ignorance of the relationship between Mao and the Cultural Revolution was typical in the Chinese media, and echoed the propaganda line upon Mao I mentioned above.

Most articles referring to Mao described him as the successor of Marx and Lenin, and highly praised his innovation of combining Marxism-Leninism with Chinese revolution for national independence and liberation. In globalization, the purpose to highlight Mao's continuity with Marxism is to legitimate Deng Xiaoping Theory and Jiang Zemin's important thought of Three Represents. Insofar as the official verdict was that Mao was 70 percent right and 30 percent wrong, his successors are characterized as standing on the legacy of Mao's "right" ideology and policy. Because Deng's and Jiang's ideologies carry on the orthodoxy of Mao's thought, they are real Marxism and not heterodoxy. Mao acts as a link between the preceding and the following historical periods.

To juxtapose present planks with Mao, Lenin and Marx, the current Reform and Opening Up policy can win support from both the Left and the Right groups and convince the public to embrace the reforms. Just as Terrill (1980) said in his first edition of the Mao's biography, "China must, and I believe it will tactfully use Mao's legacy. China no longer needs Mao Zedong himself, but something he left over."

What is missing in the historical narrative about Mao should be of great importance. We can say that Mao is a sceptic of "globalization" in some sense: his patriarchal autocracy contradicted to individual rights and democratic agenda; he emphasized economic equalitarianism and collectivism, which did not match the philosophy of releasing labor force in the new economy; he criticized and suppressed the "Rightists" and "Capitalist roaders" within the Communist Party, and presented himself as a rival to landowners, businessmen, and Western imperialism. These historical memories are never or seldom mentioned in the Chinese media, so they were limited to personal memory instead of collective memory. On the one hand they can not adjust to the globalization age. Terrill (1999) concluded that Mao is a reformist, however, this reformist can not—absolutely—be one of the modern people. It's hard for the media to link the image of Mao and his times to a new global order. On the other hand, recalling the travails under Mao's rule would arouse suspicion and repudiation of the CPC's leadership. The official document has denounced the Cultural Revolution as a mistake. But when the Chinese media occasionally made mention of the Cultural Revolution, it did not attribute the responsibility to Mao or the government or the CPC, as if no one was responsible for the mistakes. Moreover, to justify the current policy, the Chinese media selectively interpreted Maoist policies as examples that Mao was pro-liberal economy. For example, one article mentioned that communists, from Marx to Mao, all had suggested making use of foreign investment and learning from capitalism. That China did not take Hong Kong and Macao back when it was established in the 1950s was a strategy of "thinking in the long term and taking full advantage of capitalism." The ingenious "one country, two systems" idea of Deng conformed to this strategy and to Mao's thought as well (Qiu, 2004).

The Indian media diversely depicted India's first and longest-serving Prime Minister Nehru. Many policies and principles in his times are referred to in different ways in the

Indian media. Two ideas are frequently accentuated in Indian media discourse: the "Nehru model" in economy, and the Non-Aligned Movement (Panchsheel). The first focused on the mode of national development, and the relationship between state control and economic progress in the post-war time; the latter is about how India relates itself to the international community and integrates into the global world.

The term "non-alignment" was created by Nehru during his speech in 1954 in Colombo, Sri Lanka. It advocates mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. The idea originated the need to preserve India's freedom of action and reap benefits from cooperation with both the East and the West, and from its refusal to align with any blocs or alliances. The concept of non-alignment brought India considerable international prestige among newly independent states and established a significant role for India as a leader of the Third World. However, with the end of the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement lost its original raison d'être.

Among the articles referring to Nehru's thoughts, about 30% of them, which occupied a large proportion of all the stories, discussed the nonalignment idea in the analysis. The overall attitude is positive. The Indian media remembered Nehru as a symbol of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Panchsheel policy. Non-alignment was advocated by the media for offering the principles in dealing with international issues and disputes through peaceful means. Instead, it was used as impetus to engage with the global powerful forces corresponding to the change of the outside regional or international power configuration.

What is inherited of the non-alignment tradition is peaceful co-existence with other countries, especially those close neighbors in Southeast Asia and such strong neighbors as China, Russia and Pakistan. In 1947, the Partition forged a treacherous concomitant menace for India—Pakistan. Since then, during the past five decades, national security has been one of India's top priorities. India had to variably resort to America, Soviet Russia and China in different phases and alter its alliance strategy accordingly. However, the end of the Cold War did not bring much change to the situation. The disputes between Hindu and Pakistan Muslims constantly escalated; tensions between the two countries

increased after a series of nuclear tests in mid 1998 and the Sep 11 catastrophe. At the same time, India was anxious to rebuild trust and friendship with China and the U.S. in recent years because of "the radically-altered international situation after the collapse of communism: the emergence of the U.S. as the only superpower, amazing technological advances and the terror of a nuclear war" (Kargil and after.1999). To engage with China, "Communist dictatorship is virtually over. There is devolution of power from the Centre to the provinces and market economy has created an economic boom, particularly in coastal areas." Ideological hostility and boarder disputes make place for the increasing Indo-China economic cooperation and possible political support from China. The other article traced back to the history of the Panchsheel and proposed "the Asian destiny—not a destiny isolated from the rest of the world but as part and parcel of the destiny of the world" (Narayanan, 2004). In the new century, co-operation between the two largest countries of Asia and the world is "a historic necessity." It is in this context that India media discourse suggests that India should correspond with the evolution of a regional balance and keep good relationships with the regional and international powers. The Non-Aligned Movement and the Five Principles of Panchsheel is a neology for India's international policies of coexisting with world powers.

Changes in the conception of non-alignment were represented as a critical attitude towards the Third World. The movement was founded and developed by many developing countries that represent nearly two-thirds of the United Nation's members. It made a commitment to "third worldism" (Anonymous., 1998). India's historical vision was informed with the memory of the colonial past which influenced the independent India to locate itself at the head and front of an anti-imperialist Third World bloc. In the globalization times that bloc "is part of history, an almost forgotten history" (Bhattacharya, 2005). The "Third World" was "first conceived by Jawaharlal Nehru as 'a badge of pride' and as a collective identity of countries not allied with both the West and the old Soviet Union, and was now being looked upon as a bastion of the 'backward, poor and less developed' nations" (Maran for globalisation with 'safeguards'.2000). Obviously India would no longer like to stand in the line of third world countries. The opposition between the Third World and the West was soft-pedaled in the Indian media. The role of India being a third world country and leading struggles against the imperialism was rarely

mentioned. One article pointed out that Nehru never saw non-alignment as "anti-Western"; it was the radicalization of the Third World in the 1970s and the domestic drift in many countries, including India, towards left-wing populism that saw the interpretation of non-alignment as "anti-imperialism" (Anonymous., 1998).

In contrast, Nehru's another innovation, the "Nehru model", was widely criticized in the globalization discourse. During his reign from 1947 to 1964, Nehru remained committed to the idea of state domination of the economy. He was fascinated by the basic industry, heavy industry and infrastructure, to which the former Soviet Union referred as primary industrialization. Investment was state funded and channeled through a Planning Commission under the control of himself. This economic model which mixed socialist and capitalist economies was a compromise to the complicated and protean international situation, and to a protection of vulnerable national industry in the very time after independence.

In the eyes of globalists who sang highly for liberal trade and new technology, the Nehru model of development has "resulted in backwardness and its continuation today would only prolong backwardness… (India should) stop romanticizing the backward aspects of the past, and learn from the equally Indian tradition of using globalisation" (Omvedt, 2001a). By talking about the backward aspects of the past, three stories (11.1% of memories about Nehru) revisited the historical periods of colonial times and Nehru times. The colonial times was blamed for devastating India's weaving communities, while British taxes devastating the peasantry. The colonial power did not so much force free trade as take over the regulation of Indian trade. The Nehru model led to policies of protectionism, disengagement from the world market and heavy state controls. It isolated India's economy from the outside world and resulted in seclusion and backwardness. Actually India has a tradition of "globalization". It had trading links with Rome and China about two thousand years ago, and was considered a land of fine products at the time. Tamils brought various goods along with Saivism and Vaishnavism (two branches of the Indian religion) to South East Asia. Buddhism also spread as a missionary religion to such areas as central and Southeast Asia and China. The globalization tradition was interpreted by colonialism. However, another tradition of the non-Brahman and Dalit movements asking for equality in education and up-to-date technology continued and

escalated. The castes which were ruled out of power structure and civil rights gradually seized power and took the chance of globalization to develop their economy. They raised the idea that education and modern technologies, including the controversial areas of biotechnology and irrigation, have to be truly universalized. In this sense, Nehru's economic policy was considered either protectionism cum barriers for India to entering the global world (Omvedt, 2001b), or a continuity of the elite economic nationalism with the centered theme of swadeshi which was generated by the colonial history (Omvedt, 2001a).

5.3.1.3 Deng and Rao

In Chinese media discourse on globalization, Deng Xiaoping is the most frequently mentioned historical icon. 28 articles, accounting for 5.6% of all Chinese articles referred to Deng's times and his policies. Being highly spoken of by the official, Deng is a prominent Marxist, a great proletariat revolutionist, politician, militarist, diplomat, time-tested Communist fighter, the grand designer of socialist reforms and openness and modernization construction in China, and the founder of The theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, according to the eulogy from the obituary of Deng released by the central government. It is also the propaganda line about him that all the Chinese media should follow with.

Deng was a rule-breaker in Chinese history. He improved China's relations with the West, gave historical valuation to the Cultural Revolution and Mao, creatively promoted the socialist market economy and initiated the Reforms and Openness policy. Every time a new policy was carried out, Chinese media would be confronted with the task of rationalizing it and mobilizing the mass for support. The solution of the media is to relate Deng and his new idea to the previous leadership. "To weld 'ancestors' (*Lao Zuzong*) linking 'new situation' (*Xin Jingjie*)" (B. Zheng et al., Nov 12, 1996), as the article said, is the way to legitimate new path taking by the reign.

The "ancestors" in the media discourse referred to prominent thinkers of the Marxist school, namely Marx, Lenin and Mao. In particularly, Deng's thought, which was titled Deng Xiaoping Theory, is in accordance with Marxism-Leninism principles and Mao Zedong Thought. Two aspects were repeatedly accentuated in the historical narratives.

First, Deng Xiaoping Theory was juxtaposed with Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, and the continuity was emphasized. Before 2001, Deng's thought was mentioned in the media in the fixed expression of "Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought especially Deng Xiaoping Theory." In this sense, Deng's thought was regarded as a part of Maoism, with some revision to respond to the new "political and economic practices." When Deng's Theory was officially sanctioned as the Party's guiding ideology and put into the Party's Constitution in the 15th National Congress, the expression changed to "Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory." This change significantly established and highlighted Deng's position in the Party. Besides this rhetorical expression, the Chinese media also used other devices to emphasize the continuity of Deng's theory and the communist orthodoxy. Deng was much often mentioned as an important member of the first generation leadership in China's New Democratic Revolution and as close comrades of Mao, Zhou Enlai and other leaders. In this way Deng was not only remembered as a revolutionist in the "new times", but also a successor who came from the old times and inherited the tradition.

Second, the Chinese media accentuated Deng's philosophy on economic development. China began to integrate itself into the global world when it implemented Deng's policy of Reforms and Openness in the late 1970s, and speeded up the process after 1992 when Deng conducted the southern tour to call for a more dramatic pace in reforms. Economic development has always been the main theme and priority in China's political agenda. To justify Deng's Reforms and Openness, the history of the last three decades was frequently used in the Chinese media. More specifically, the media focused on the improvement and success China had achieved since it implemented the policy in 1978. The piece of history was referred to mostly as a context for China's four modernizations project. The accomplishment in economy undoubtedly proved the reforms' success and the policy's effects. To demonstrate the correctness of the development road Deng chose, the mistakes and failures that the previous revolutionists had made since the semi-colonialism times were compared to achievements in open times. This strategy is similar to the one discussed above using Mao as a turning point in Chinese history. According to an article,

    (Deng) rectified the former mistakes, and pioneered the new way of building

socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era … Just as Deng Xiaoping said, without Chariman Mao, at least should we Chinese people have groped in the dark for a longer time. Likewise, now we can say without Comrade Deng Xiaoping and Deng Xiaoping's Theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, should there have not been the cross-century right path to national affluence and prosperity.

(B. Zheng et al., Nov 12, 1996)

The presuppositions and the analogy again ensure Deng's significance and his role in Chinese history, in which way the legitimacy of Deng's Reform and Opening Up policy has been established.

Compared with Deng, Rao, the then Prime Minister of India, was not so luckily welcomed in the Indian media, although he led Indian economic reform from the socialist orientation to the neo-liberal trend as Deng did to China. The ushering in of liberalization and globalization by Rao salvaged India from a current account crisis. Fifteen years later, India has achieved remarkable economic development to emerge as an important player in the world economy. But rarely the achievements since 1991 were elaborated. The Indian Media which reflected pluralistic public opinion constructed Rao's economic reforms negatively. Only one article affirmed Rao's economic policies: "The Congress(I) Government led by Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao focused on reintegrating India into the global economy and redefining India's relations with the great powers after the Cold War." (The foreign policy tripod.1998) However, the author also pointed out that none of India's governments including Rao's did well in the tripod of globalization, neighborhood relationship and nuclear dilemmas. Rao's government did not take credit for the historical achievements and Indian people responded with a verdict that booted the Congress in 1996 general elections. The possible reason to explain the identical attitude of both right and left wings towards the reforms may exist in his concentration on the corporate sector over agriculture and agro-based industries, and the ignorance of the poor and low-caste people. It was believed that "people perceived Rao merely as a gatekeeper to history—he was there at the right time when history broke. They did not credit him for their improved lot" (G. Das, 2000:214).

Rao was also mentioned for his "Look East" policy. Contrary to the 1991 economic reform, the history of "Look East" was applausible and acceptable in the media. It was

actually a policy to bring India back into focus with the old ties with countries in East and Southeast Asia when the Soviet Union collapsed and the cold war ended. Rao wanted to prepare for a platform of "re-engagement" with a familiar region and it did that with difficulty because of the Cold War fallout and India's separation from Southeast Asia during the past decades. As an example of the policy, India was taken as a full dialogue partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from 1996. However, the policy was again remembered and promoted in the media for a practical purpose. "With the arrival of what is being heralded as the 'new economy', India is back in the reckoning and much sought after by its eastern neighbours" (Jayanth, 2000). With the nationalist BJP government came to power in 1999, India was more concerned with regional alliance and regionalization, and the "Look East" policy was taken up by the government in its diplomacy. The former President, Mr. K. R. Narayanan called it a "re-engagement" phase in India's approach to Southeast Asia. At the same time, economic impulse is another reason to explain the "Look East" policy (Baruah, 2003). On the one hand, the policy emerged from the fact that India was poised to "take off in the new economy" which "sets the stage for the broadening and deepening of India's ties with Southeast Asia." On the other hand, India's indigenous capitals tend to expand. "Instead of always looking for investors, they (Indian multinational companies) must also scout for investment opportunities in the developing economies and register their presence" (Jayanth, 2000).

However, "Look East" does not mean that India would value the East more than the West. The former Foreign Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh, "has managed to spend as much time in the East as he does in the West, to balance the equations" (Jayanth, 2000). The "Look East" policy was also related to the non-alignment which emphasizes an independent policy. Therefore the crux of "Look East" was to be friendly with all and not to forge exclusive alliances. "In its own way, India was trying to achieve this—working for a 'strategic partnership' with the U.S., holding the first summit with the European Union…" (Jayanth, 2000) That is to say, Rao's idea of re-engaging with the Southeast countries in the post cold war times was applied in the media for constructing India's important position in Southeast Asia, and for keeping on regionalization in the globalization era.

Based on the above analysis of historical icons, the Chinese media constructed the

memory of historical figures and the history they signified in the similar tone and in a fixed style; the media descriptions were devoid of details; and the historical memories were mentioned more as contexts than values. In contrast, the Indian media used historical memories from different points of view and diverse perspectives; the descriptions were detailed, sometimes personal and emotional; the historical references were often with "particular values" (Neustadt & May, 1986) which include lessons taken from the past or evaluations of the merit of ideas or events, and evaluation of several periods of histories.

Through this vertical analysis of each media construction, the most intriguing finding is that the Chinese media more often traced back to the history of Reforms and Openness, and mentioned achievements gained during the past 30 years. The Indian media tended to trace back to the history of colonialism and anti-colonialism before India's independence. Deng and his "openness times" were highly praised in the Chinese media which revealed a positive attitude towards economic globalization and national revival. In India, Gandhi's spirit of self-reliance, and the poverty and backwardness brought by colonialism were emphasized, expressing the media's critical attitude towards globalization.

5.3.2 Thematic Analysis

The retrospect of the historical figures and their representative historical periods narrated by the Chinese and Indian media paved the way in which the themes of globalization constructed by the media can be induced. The similarity was found that both countries selectively use histories to construct collective memory of the past. However, different themes of history were accentuated to serve the current need of addressing two national concerns—economic development and political stabilization.

5.3.2.1 China: An Extended Version of National Modernization

Chinese media discourse on globalization was centered on three themes by employing history: first, China should realize modernization through economic development; second, the splendid ancient history prophesies a predetermined rise of China; third, the CPC leadership is proven historically correct and should be followed

steadfastly in the new era.

Economic development is the key theme in Chinese globalization discourse. ***Chinese media discourse framed the bitter history as the incentive to develop economy.*** The painful memories of western oppression were a recurring motif in the historical narrative on the Ming and Qing Dynasty, among which the Opium War was the iconic event. The Opium War seized much attention because it was "the biggest national disgrace for the Chinese people" (Lin, 2002) and resembled a watershed in the Chinese history. From then on China began to suffer from a long century of humiliation. Colonialism and imperialism brought us wounded psychology and emotions. However, the media did not elaborate how the colonial history affects the Chinese society and people's life in detail, except that Taiwan and Hong Kong were separated from the motherland (Qiu, 2004). The corrupt feudal Ming and Qing dynasties were criticized for their policy of ban on maritime voyages and closing their boarders off to the international community, and the out-dated trade policy as well (D. Wang, 1999) . Therefore the bitter history was told to demonstrate a theory that "lagging behind leaves one vulnerable to attacks", and "a weak country in power has no voice in diplomacy … As history shows, poor country can not last long" (Xiao, 2000). Now there is a historical chance ahead which we should grasp timely to realize social development and national revival. "If the critical opportunity is missed, any nation should be lagged behind, no matter how brilliant it was" (Tian, 2000). The chance exactly is economic globalization. China would not let the history happen again so that it should develop its economy in the global trend and make the state stronger. Speaking the bitterness ends up with a national sense of pride and affirmation of the current policy, and the motivation for future action.

The splendid achievements China has been experiencing proved that the policy of economic development was correct. First, as I have discussed in the last section, the achievements China has reaped since the implementation of Reform and Opening Up policy were framed in the media as the best empirical evidence of modernization and liberation in economy. The fixed expressions usually were: "Since the Reform and Opening Up policy," "The history of the Reform and Opening Up policy tells us," "during the past…years," "Under the direction of Deng's idea of Reform and Opening Up," etc. Then there always followed with data in economic development seen during the

past two decades. Although the reforms also brought such challenges and risks as financial turbulence, trade wars, and imparity, the problems will not last long and can all be resolved by development. "Development (*Fazhan*) is the 'natural law' (*Ying Daoli*)… Development is the fundamental base to tackle all the domestic and international problems we face" (Kuang, 1997). At the same time, the failing struggles of the revolutionaries of the Republic of China for national independence were taken as counterexamples to show the legitimacy of the CPC's leadership. From the Westernization Movement mobilized by Liang Qichao and other reformists, to the Three People's Principles put forward by Sun Sat-sen, neither of their blueprints was realized. Since only the CPC can make the right decisions, and since the leadership has been wise and fruitful which brings forth a rising China in globalization, the reforms conducted by the CPC should be correct and carried forward (Y. Wang, 2005; B. Zheng et al., Nov 12, 1996).

   The Chinese media used the splendid ancient history to predict the rise of China in a global era. Three ancient time periods, Qin, Han and Ming Dynasty, were traced back in this theme as the first three rises of China and three most glorious times in history. In Wang's article (2004),

> Qin Dynasty is the time of extraordinary importance because China for the first time was united as a feudal country. Its currently-used English name "China" may come into being at that time. Since then the country has got its unique label in the international world.

The following dynasty, Han Dynasty, was also important for its power of influence on the Korean Peninsula and some Southeast Asia area. The Chinese people were called and remembered as "Han People" (*Hanren*). Han's commodities and technologies were imported by the neighboring countries. These historical facts made Han, combined with Qin, a symbol of China's wonderful debut on the global stage, although it is the economic culture that was highlighted while the Chinese religion, ritual or etiquette was not widely diffused in the world. Four hundred years later in the seventh century, Tang Dynasty declared to be the second rise of China to the whole world. Tang further expanded its influence especially southwards, and even exerted impacts on Japan which stood on itself across an ocean to China. During the three hundred years between the two rises,

Buddhism was widespread, and the north horde settled down and mixed with the "Chinese people" who stayed in the Central Plains. All of these were framed as a high level of "cosmopolitanism." The Tang Dynasty was taken as the most glorious time of China not only because of its booming trade and industry but also its openness to exotic friends and travelers who contributed a lot to the Chinese culture. However, as the empire maintained its reign mainly through aristocrats and their military forces, peace and prosperity can not last long. In Ming Dynasty, China rose up as an important power in the world for the third time. Foreign trade was admitted by the government, and Zheng He, an official of Ming, sailed to the West seven times and promoted the exchange between Chinese and foreign cultures. Zheng's adventure was highly praised for being "a valuable trial to opening to the outside world in history" and "making China known by countries far away" (Commentator., 2005). Unfortunately, in the late Ming the government implemented a closed-door policy and secluded the country from the outside world. Ming Dynasty declined and was taken over by Qing that continued close-doorism. That finally resulted in China's being was invaded by the western countries in 1840. China came to the turning point in history.

An analogy was used by the Chinese media to construct the current as "the fourth rise" of China. The comparability between the fourth and the other three rises are embedded in similarities that "today's China also won battles with external invasions, absorbed in foreign ideas and culture, and opened its door to international trade and new technologies" (G. Wang, 2004). The similarities were decisive factors that led to China's rise as a regional and global power in globalization. Based on the continuity of history, the rise of China is certain and inevitable. However, this rise is totally different from the other three. Nowadays China should face the various problems left over by the two-hundred-year colonial history; in the meantime, it developed itself in a unipolar world with the threats from the U.S. For fear of being replaced by China in Asia, the U.S. would like to see a hostile alliance to China existing and is willing to help it formulate by spreading the "China threat" theory. "In this situation, it is not wise for China to offer any excuse to the superpower to disturb itself in surviving and developing" (G. Wang, 2004). Therefore, the fourth rise of China must be a peaceful and benign one, which will not bring any threat to any other country in the world.

The rise of China was also compared with the rises of some other countries in history by the Chinese media. It differed from the previous rises of America, German and Japan in that it alleged a peaceful development rather than aggressive expansion. It would not imperil world peace; on the contrary, it would share its dream with others. By reviewing the histories of other countries and comparing them with the current Chinese situation, the Chinese media constructed China's definite rise in the globalization era, and stressed its characteristics of peaceful co-existence with others and openness to the outside world.

The third theme that ***the CPC leadership is historically proved to be in a right direction and should be followed steadfastly*** was woven into the narration of the first two themes. In an article celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the CPC and elaborating on the great importance of Jiang Zemin's speech on July 1 (Anonymous., 2002), first, the themes of "Reform and Opening Up" and "national rejuvenation" were unified as a whole. Economic development is the only way leading to Chinese national revival in globalization. Second, Reform and Opening Up policy is the theoretical innovation by the CPC, combing Marxism and brand-new practices in the new context. The history of the development of Marxism, the successes reaped in socialist construction practices, and the fact of China's fourth rise, all showed the Reform and Opening Up policy is on the right track. Being the creative subject of Chinese Marxism, the CPC and its vitality is highly related to the enrichment and development of Marxism, the prosperity and strength of the country, and the great revival of the nation.

5.3.2.2 India: An Ambiguous Attitude towards Modernization and Globalization

From a historical perspective, Indian media discourse on globalization centered on two paradoxical themes: globalization is contrary to Indian tradition; globalization is part of Indian tradition. To interpret the two arguments, the Indian media used India's history from the beginning of colonial times in the 18th century to the near-term events taking place in India. The media used historical periods and events to discuss the issues in two main topics, economic development in the global market and the relationship India keeps with other countries in a new world order.

In most historical contexts, ***globalization was constructed as something deeply***

departing from Indian traditions. India rapidly fell into the whirlpool of globalization at the beginning of 1990s by Rao's comprehensive economic reforms. It lashed Indian traditional society and values in religion, culture pluralism and biodiversity. In this sense, globalization was badly evaluated in the Indian media. The rejection was firstly represented on the issue of religion. In India, religion is a way of life. There are 80% of Indian people who believe in Hinduism. Other religions that have a long history in India and huge numbers of adherents include Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Judaism. Religion is an integral part of the entire Indian tradition and identity.

> Hinduism is the most tolerant religion known for its emphasis on pluralism. India has been a pluralistic country for ages. It assimilated all religious and cultural traditions. With certain exceptions, India was never known for its religious or sectarian wars. (Education, the BJP & hindutva.1998)

However, with the co-existing religions and various powers behind them contesting with each other in modern societies in South area, the conflicts among the religions and powers became more and more acute. The best example is the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although India's society is widely accepted as a much tolerant one, violence is incredibly increasing, and the ethnic groups and social classes resort more to violent means to express their needs to the nation state. "Be it Islamic extremism or Hindu extremism, it is a product of the post-modern situation--in other words, a consequence of globalization" (Beher, 1999). Extremism negates the religious qualities of compassion, peace, endurance and patience, and engenders disquiet, disharmony and impatience and often leads to conflict. The warning of extremism arose from the fear of the prevalent Hindutva in recent years in Indian society since the Hindu nationalist BJP became the single largest party in the Parliament. The BJP governance advocated economic nationalism and Hindu value, which led to the Babri Masjid violence, the intra-party convulsions in the Congress, the fodder scam, and the Kashmir turmoil. The warning of extremism came from fears of other ill effects of globalization, global terrorism and global hegemony that were pervasive in the world after the September 11. On the one hand, the terror threats from Islamic world triggered the long-term but haunting dispute on Kashmir between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, the anti-terrorism war boosted the unilateralism of the U.S.,

who assaulted on Afghanistan with no warrant in international law (Chapter 3). In the Indian media discourse, extremists' actions and ideology which were taken as a product of globalization was antithetic to the peaceful and tolerant essences in the Indian religious tradition.

Globalization was framed as a threat to the continuity of tradition and culture, in addition to religion. For example, the traditional knowledge of healthcare, biodiversity and food industry in India is of enormous value for its uniqueness. However, globalization, "a process of denationalisation of production and consumption; capital flow and services; as well as of laws and politics," put the traditions and cultural pluralism at stake. The intellectual property laws pertaining to biotechnology and impinging on such civilizationally basic areas as food and health are "being framed at the outset itself, when there is neither any ethical framework to interpret them nor benefit of actual practice to fall back upon" (Towards a global perspective on globalisation.2003). In another article, globalization of culture is termed as westernization or, to be precise, Americanization. Every country in the third world is facing the threat of cultural homogenization from the process of globalization. India can not be an exception. The process of cultural homogenization began with the colonization of Afro-Asian countries, the threat, for a number of reasons, was more acutely felt in the post-Second World War period than before.

> During the colonial days, the native country was culturally influenced mainly by its own metropolitan country, say Britain, Germany, Holland, Italy or France. But now the cultural or political influences are not restricted to any one metropolitan country. Television, Internet and the satellite have demolished all cultural boundaries and brought the whole globe under a cultural network. And hence the term globalisation… There is hardly any true interaction among the cultures of different countries. It is Western, particularly, North American culture which is hegemonic. It has become, in a way, a "global" culture. All other cultures are termed "ethnic".
> (Engineer, 1997)

To the west, one's ethnicity but not one's civilization is tolerable; the Indian civilization would lose its status in cultural globalization.

Economically, globalization betrayed the purpose and mission of Indian people's

struggles for wealth. Carrying on the heritage of western democracy from the British colonist, India to some extent is regarded as one of the members of the West in ideology. India also prides itself on its legacy of egalitarianism. The ideologies of equality and liberty have long been the pursuit of India. "Over the past 50 years, (it has) been attempting to lay down the foundations of a modern Indian state based on egalitarian principles" (Kurian, 2005). That is one of the reasons why Gandhi staked out a claim of "sarvodaya" (Swaminathan, 2000); that is one of the reasons why Nehru chose state-planned socialist economy when India got its independence in 1940s. However, the neo-liberal capitalist and western democracy system did not realize the dreams of creating an equal world. One article ironically pointed out, "The scandal of inequality in an age that was inaugurated by the passionate cry of the French Revolution: 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity!' " On the contrary, "the West has operated on the privileges and profits of inequality" (Agnivesh, 2001). After recalling of the two-hundred-year bitter colonial history of India, Sainath (Sainath, 2005) argued that "barring the scale, it all sounds depressingly like the present. The Raj nostalgia of today's neo-liberals is quite heart-felt." As the articles revealed, integration into the global economy made India an unequal society in which Indian peasants are suffering from poverty, starvation and backwardness, and the number of suicide peasants increased sharply. Great inequality and class difference were also seen in other social sectors such as health, rights of women and children and education.

Some articles constructed ***globalization as a continuous part of history***. This theme should be reviewed from a perspective of dichotomy. One thing is that the paradigm of colonization emerges in new forms in the pursuit of liberalization and globalization by independent India. One article cited Francois Partant, a French banker-turned-critic of development, as stating:

> the developed nations have discovered for themselves a new mission -- to help the Third World countries advance along the same road to development which is nothing more than the road on which the West has guided the rest of humanity for several centuries. … Essentially the story is one of continuity; a continuity of exploitation, neglect, dispossession and powerlessness. (Towards a paradigm shift.1998)

In the globalization era, the rulers are either the U.S. cum the international organizations as "universal dominion" (Suryanarayana, 1998), or ruling elite in India as native colonialists. A paradigm shift is taking place, with the escalating emergence of market-grab trends, deleterious domination of the economies of weaker nations and the north (the G-7) occupying the economic space of the South, "creating a deja vu, as it were, of the old colonial era" (Globalisation and the U.N.1997). On account of the drive for economic liberalization, an article cited Chomsky,

> The labour's share in the wealth of the country will decline, inequality will increase, hunger will increase, environmental destruction will increase, health will be worse and a section of (Indian) population will be very very rich. (Liberalisation will not help the poor.1996)

To the developing countries, development means making the South a market of the North, robbing the resources of the South nations, and mesmerizing them to be inseminated by the profit-hungry MNCs. That's the truth of globalization, the same logic as the act of colonization. Although this point of view admitted that globalization is a continuity of history, the continuity is evil and can not be helped.

The other aspect is that globalization is part of the history of foreign exchanges with other countries. Centuries ago India had liaisons with the outside through trade, cultural exchange and technology diffusion. In the late 1700s, the Indian manufacturers were so advanced and the free trade was so unrestrained that the Indian products made the British afraid of free trade and competition from India. The tradition of exchanging manufactures and trading with foreigners were cut off by the British colony which impoverished India for centuries. Globalization calls for free trade and productive manufacture, in which way India can return to the glorious imperial times and retrieve the splendid civilization (Omvedt, 2001a). At the same time, non-alignment which rooted deeply in realistic and pragmatic needs of the newly-born independent India, was framed as part of tradition and an imperative to adhere to in the new world order. From this perspective of view, globalization can be articulated to the splendid Indian history by economically, culturally or diplomatically relating to foreign countries.

5.4 Summary

Dominant historical narratives depend on media control by elites who have the capacity to block, blunt, blur or erase counter-narratives as national narratives. Both Chinese and Indian national elite media used history selectively and strategically when they constructed globalization. The Chinese discourse on globalization followed the modernization theory, as an extended version of national modernization. The Chinese media emphasized economic development and omitted the other dimensions of globalization, and placed the "useful history" under a frame of economic progressivism. This underlying philosophy was rooted in China's desire to integrate itself into the global economy. Under the ushering in of economic globalization, China saw a rapid economic growth and a rocketing increase in the degree of economic marketization during the past two decades. Its successful access to the WTO in the new millennium further deregulated markets of industrial, agriculture and financial services, and forged a social class of business men and industrialists. In 2002 the CPC officially admitted capitalists into it and expanded its regime foundation. This in turn strengthens the leadership of the Party and the implementation of its policy of Reform and Opening Up. Chinese media referred to the history of the previous national rises and the achievement reaped during the past two decades to repeatedly build up the collective memory of the continuity between globalization and history.

Indian media discourse framed globalization in a critical way. Every piece of history was visited and translated from different perspective. The dominant narrative is that globalization to some extent was contradictory to Indian tradition. Globalization should be embraced only if the poor and the backward have also benefited. Therefore, neo-liberal society was criticized for producing inequality and exploitation within India and between India and the other countries, paying no attention to the other social sectors and the poor people. At the same time, some counter-narratives constructed globalization as continuities of the destiny of economic development. Therefore the characteristics of openness and liaison with the outside world in history were emphasized.

National historical narratives are shaped by media representations on the past embedded in national identity. Prosperous culture and splendid history predicted that China is "bound to lead" (C. Lee, in press) in a global era. With the explosive increase in economic and political power, China began to picture a "big nation dream" for its people.

The transfer of Hong Kong and Macau to Chinese sovereignty, the successful bid for hosting the Olympic Games in 2008, and the launch and recovery of the first unmanned experimental spacecraft "Shenzhou", all strengthened national pride and self-respect in the people's mind. As to the semi-colonial history, Chinese media framed it as a symbol of humiliation which has been washed off by the achievements. The bitterness was diluted by and by and traced back less and less. The Chinese people can identify their national identity easily with the propaganda on one "Chinese" nation, erasing the differences in ethnic groups, social classes and stratums, and interest groups. From 2003, China successively alleged "a peaceful rise" (*Heping Jueqi*), "a harmonious society" (*Hexie Shehui*), and "the eight honors and eight shames" (*Ba Rong Ba Chi*), which were references to Confucian ideals. It intensified the national identity of the Chinese people as offspring of ancient China, and impelled them to embrace a beautiful future of globalization.

The colonial history brought much more bitter memories and complex influence on the Indian people. As "a wounded civilization" (Naipaul, 1979; 1977), India was caught in colonization for a longer time and in a deeper level, compared with China. On the one hand, the British rulers brought backwardness and poverty to India, through "the mental resistance to imports having a history dating back to British colonialism which snuffed out Indian industry, restricting it to being a supplier of raw materials for British manufacturers." On the other hand, as the article said, "Our judiciary, our legal system, our bureaucracy, and our police are all great institutions, derived from British-Indian administration and they have served the country well" (Gopalakrishnan, 2001). As the largest democracy in the world, India is proud of the legacies from colonial times and worshiped the western countries. The love-hatred of colonization left Indians an uncertain national identity, which revealed an ambiguous attitude towards globalization in the Indian media.

India is a multi-religion, multi-ethnic and multi-language nation. Its political powers are categorized by party, caste and Central-state system. Within the country, the social groups and divisions constructed globalization from their own identities and interests. The different constructions of collective memory by media reflected the pluralistic society in economy, politics, culture, and identity.

In summary, the Chinese and Indian national media invited history in the discourse on globalization in accordance with different contexts of history and national identity of the two countries. Whatever and however they used the historical memories, media tends to construct the current needs reasonable and feasible for the mass.

Chapter 6 Media Construction of the "Other"

How nation states in a global world conceive of the others and the world order is an issue at the very heart of foreign news making studies and international relations studies. Jervis (1976) addressed that elite images and perceptions of the others were the single most important variable in international relations. Although he came to the conclusion to apply on foreign policy decision makers, the point of view fits also for the mass audience. For the people who have few opportunities to travel to or experience of the other countries by themselves, and those who have no time or will not spend time in understanding the complex international world, journalists try to transform global events or the "outside" world into the "relevance structure of a national home audience in accordance with the primary definitions of the nation-state" (C. Lee, etc.:43). The "domestication" of the alien, uncertain, unfamiliar, or unknown into the acceptable, recognizable and familiar is a process of educating the people about the place of their own country in the world and the relations with others by media.

China and India have been long regarded as eastern countries. Opposite to "The East" (or the south), there was always The West (or the north) which consists of the U.S., most European countries, Japan and the other developed countries. After the independence, China and India turned into the main force of the Third World. China who aligned with the Soviet Union against the capitalist camp with the head of the U.S. long closed its door to the west (more exactly, the capitalist world), whereas India brought up and carried on the Non-Aligned Movement, keeping a safe distance to both camps cautiously and not willing to engage in a close relationship with either of them. However, under the trend of globalization, China and India were no longer in the original position in the world system. The two countries would be more integrated into the world order, but their distinct power strength may lead to different strategies. China's economic power is times as great as India's, and occupies a position of semi-periphery-core which is much closer to the core than India does; however, India peruse the capitalist system and western democracy, which made India more popular and proximal to most countries in the same value and belief in the world.

Under the shadow of globalization, China and India no longer maintained their

original positions in the world system. China's economic power is greater than India's, and so it occupies the semi-periphery-core position; its socialist system and autocratic government opposed western democracy and minimum state control. In contrast, India aspires to a capitalist system and western democracy, which makes India more popular and proximal to the western countries in the same value and belief in the world. Then, how did the national elite media in the two countries differently construct the other countries?

6.1 Identity, Media Categorization and the "Other"

National identity can be constructed spatially and temporally. Spatially, the identity is revealed in psychological theories as conception of the relationship between "me" and the "other." National identity resembles the concept of ethnic identity described in the historical and theoretical literature. It is a representative prototype to make a contrast between nations. Therefore, nations divide the world into two kinds, self and the others, according to the national identity theory. That is to say, at the national level, nations tend to conceive themselves to the global world in two perspectives: the way they reflect on themselves, and the way they conceive of the outside world.

The cognitive dimension of social identity is specified by self-categorization theory (Turner, John C. et al., 1987; J. C. Turner, 1985) in terms of the causes and consequences of social categorization of self and others (Hogg & Reid, 2001). The process of social categorization perceptually segments the social world into ingroups and outgroups that are cognitively represented as prototypes. These prototypes are context specific, multidimensional fuzzy sets of attributes that define and prescribe attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that characterize one group and distinguish it from other groups (Rosch, 1978). Social categorization of other people perceptually assimilates them to the relevant ingroup or outgroup prototype and thus perceptually accentuates prototypical similarities among people in the same group and prototypical differences between people from different groups; there is an accentuation effect (Tajfel, 1959; 1969) that underpins stereotyping. This overall process is called depersonalization because people are not viewed as unique and multifaceted individuals but as matches to the relevant ingroup or outgroup prototype; prototypicality, not individuality, is the focus of attention.

Depersonalization refers to change in the basis of perception; it does not have the negative connotations of deindividuation or dehumanization.

Self-categorization theory takes the static conceptualization of prototypes a step further. In Self-Categorization theory, prototypes are often stored in memory to be "called forth" by social categorization in a particular context to guide perception, self-conception, and action. However, they are almost always modified to varying degrees, and they can be entirely constructed by specifics of a particular social context. Prototypes are contextually responsive, and the principle governing this contextual sensitivity is meta-contrast. New prototypes form, or existing ones are modified, in such a way as to maximize the ratio of perceived intergroup differences to intragroup similarities; prototypes form to accentuate similarities within a category and differences between categories. According to self-categorization theory, prototypes are context dependent and fluid. Thus, take China and India for example, compared with India, China may be fasting developing, rich, energetic and full of mystery, whereas in comparison with the U.S., its self-definition may be poor, kind, harmonious, and full of problems. Further, the degree to which an individual embodies the prototype depends upon their position within the frame of reference. For example, India might find a lot of difference between China and itself in prototypes. However, when in comparison with America, it might categorize itself with China as developing countries, because of the same long oriental culture and colonial history. Another possibility is that India might categorize China as the congener because they share a similar experience in development history and reality. However, when compared with America, China will not be India's congener because it shares a more normative prototype with America which turns out to be democratic politics and capitalist system. The prototype is therefore normative in the sense that it captures the meaning of inter-category differences for a specific social comparison; in so doing, it provides a basis for self-definition and behavior.

The way in which nation states in a global world conceive of "the others" and of the world order is at the very heart of foreign news and international relations studies. For people who have few opportunities to travel to and experience of other countries in themselves, and for those who do not understand the international world, journalists try to transform global events or the "outside world" into the "relevance structure of a national

home audience" (C. Lee, et al.:43) in accordance with the definitions of the nation-state. The "domestication" of the alien, unfamiliar, or unknown into the acceptable, familiar and recognizable is a process of educating people about how their country is related to the other countries and to the world.

This chapter is aimed to analyze how the different discourse in Chinese and Indian media on international relations is accordance with the structural power of the two countries. Content analysis will first give a brief picture of the difference, and discourse analysis follows to describe the media discourses and to compare the two discourses according to changes in international political economy. My argument is that the perception of "the others" is closely related to the foreign policy of nation states, with distinctive structural power and interests in the international system.

6.2 "The Others" in the Chinese and Indian Newspapers

The construction of the U.S. and the relationship with the U.S. by a national country crystallizes the national perception and imagination of the global world order and the international relations among the states. According to the statistic data (see Table 6-1), the U.S. was mentioned 14.2 times per article in the Chinese media, which revealed that the Chinese media paid much attention to the U.S. Asian countries were also frequently mentioned—about 8.4 times per article. European countries (including UK and Russia) were the third in the list, being mentioned 7.1 times in each editorial. In contrast, Asian countries attracted the most attention from the Indian media. They were mentioned about 9.7 times in every Indian story. The U.S. ranked the second in a frequency of 5.7 times per article. European countries were mentioned about 5 times every story in the Indian media. Given that the U.S. is a single country whereas the others are groups of countries, the U.S. was the most important "the other" in the Chinese and Indian media. Also, it can be concluded that the other developing countries which include those in Africa and South America were paid the least attention and marginalized in the Chinese and Indian media.

Table 6-1 General Differences in Frequencies of "the others" (per article)

	US	UK	Russia	Other European countries	Asian countries	Other developing countries
China	14.2	0.6	1.8	4.7	8.4	2.2
India	5.7	0.8	1.5	2.7	9.7	1.1

According to Table 6-2, a brief investigation on the difference in Chinese and Indian news coverage of other countries showed that the attitudes towards the U.S., Russia, the other Asian countries and the other developing countries (except those in Asia) were significantly different; the attitudes towards the U.K. and other European countries (except Russia and the U.K.) by Chinese and Indian media had no significant difference overall. This section is aimed to analyze what is the discourse difference in Chinese and Indian national media in the context of globalization.

Table 6-2 General Differences in Attitude towards "the others" (%)

	China			India			x2	p
	Positive	Mixed	Negative	Positive	Mixed	Negative		
The U.S.	3.6	5.8	31.9	7.6	4.2	14.9	61.0	.0001
The U.K.	1.0	.2	3.8	1.7	.6	3.5	5.8	n.s.
Russia	1.8	.2	.6	2.6	.2	4.0	18.6	.001
Other European countries	6.4	2.4	4.6	5.3	2.2	4.7	2.8	n.s.
Asian countries	6.8	4.2	6.2	9.7	10.5	7.4	77.4	.0001
Other developing countries	5.6	.6	1.4	3.0	.6	2.2	16.7	.01

6.3 The U.S. in the Chinese and Indian Newspapers

In this section, I examine how Chinese and Indian national media construct the U.S. This decision is logical, because to a large extent globalization is Americanization. American industrialization and U.S. policies have dominated international political economy since the end of World War Two. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. became the unipolar superpower which created a global world under the control of neo-liberal capitalism. The idea of freedom that was deeply embedded in U.S. tradition asked for economic liberalism and a minimal role of the state. The U.S. conceived a new orthodoxy of what became known as the "Washington consensus" (Williamson, 1989:7)[15]. The U.S. may not be in charge of globalization, but

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[15] The Washington consensus consisted of ten economic policy instruments that Williamson thought that "Washington" considered important. It suggests that it is possible to separate objective and scientific analysis from the value-laden political domain. It also assumes a unitary model of capitalism: economic liberalism represents the highest level of human being's attainment; and its adoption is inevitable. The Washington consensus claimed that full-scale liberalization, at all costs, is associated with superior

"it is the country with the greatest ability, for the moment, to shape the coalitions that can manage globalisation geopolitically." (Friedman, 1999:24) In most cases, what is termed globalization is westernization, or more specifically, Americanization.

6.3.1 The Image of U.S. in Media

The construction of the U.S. in national media crystallizes the national perception and imagination of the global world order and the international relations. Gerbner and Marvanyi (1977) found that significant attention to the United States would be anticipated in media. The UNESCO study (Annabelle, 1984) concluded that North America was a consistent news maker in the media of many countries. Hanson (1995) found that the U.S. received far more attention than any other single country: twice more than the Soviet Union/Russia and South Asia; North America consistently received more attention than any other region.

In his study on the image of the U.S. in Chinese media in 1972-1990, Shambaugh (1991) argued that China held a series of ambivalent images of the U.S. He concluded that the image of the U.S. in Chinese media somewhat paralleled the fluctuating status of state-to-state relations between the two countries to some extent, but it also showed a linear development "from the critical and ideological" to "the respectful and nuanced." Shambaugh examined the two tendencies of the Marxist and non-Marxist thoughts within Chinese society. The conclusion was that for the Chinese the U.S. remained a Beautiful Imperialist. Chang, Chen and Wang (2002) analyzed CCTV's coverage in the 1990s and found that the Chinese window on the world was at least ajar. They innovatively concluded that although America and its people were more heavily covered on CCTV than any other nation state and its citizens, the coverage was used to spotlight Chinese diplomatic achievements and international prestige.

> The essence of such reports (on American visitors) is to articulate the importance attached to the event on one hand and to gravitate public focus toward China's prevailing national engagement and policy direction on the other hand. The implicit message is that China stands as an important country to be reckoned with in international cooperation and global stability.

economic performance (Öniş & Şenses, 2005).

Lee (in press) put his insights on Chinese media discourse on the global order from 2000 to 2005 and confirmed a bilateral relationship characterized by "considerable anxiety, high anticipation, and deep ambivalence." The Chinese media still concerned on the U.S-China relationship and "global" ties were reducible to China-U.S. relations.

These prominent studies revealed that the national media's construction of others depends on domestic dynamics. Foreign policy and a country's intention to engage with or isolate itself from the U.S. determined the elite media discourse on the U.S. In this study, I argued that Chinese and Indian media's perceptions of the U.S. are highly related to the foreign policies of China and India and their interaction with the U.S. in defense of their interests.

6.3.2 China: Engagement in Economy, Antagonism in Politics

In the Chinese media, the U.S. was the most prominent "the other". The Chinese media reported on the U.S. significantly more often than the Indian media did ($F = 135.7$, $p < 0.001$). The Chinese media was more negative ($F = -2.8$, $p < 0.01$) and the Indian media held a more positive attitude towards the U.S. ($F = 6.5$, $p < 0.001$).

Based on previous studies on construction of Sino-U.S. relations in Chinese media, I identified four themes about the U.S.: "economic model and constructive cooperation," "neo-isolationism and neo-interventionism," "decentralize America and China rise," and "an arrogant hegemon" (Table 6-3). About 70.0% of the 139 articles related to Sino-U.S. relations fell into one of these categories. The other articles covered diverse topics from American language, culture to lifestyle.

6.3.2.1 Neo-Isolationism and Neo-Interventionism

The first theme was that the U.S. neo-isolationism and neo-interventionism was the primary reason for inequity and injustice in the global world. The *Global Times* defined neo-isolationism as "a revival of isolationism arising from increasing anti-Soviet and anti-European sentiments and a reluctance to involve the nation in further political and military commitments abroad." (J. Wang, 2000) Neo-conservatism, a political philosophy in favor of using economic and military power to impose liberalism, democracy and human rights on other countries, was heavily criticized by Chinese media (Anonymous.,

2003). This theme was accentuated before 2001. Related to this main theme, two issues were often taken as examples. The first was about the Most Favorite Nation (MFN) and human rights. Articles on this issue lashed out at the U.S. economic sanctions against China. For years, the Chinese government struggled to enter the WTO and to integrate itself into the international economic system. Its application took 15 years and the final protocol of accession was rejected by the developed countries, particularly by the U.S., for China's eligibility of developing-country status. To avoid the result that China's accession as a developing country would result in a flood of exports and higher subsidies to China's agricultural market and other sectors, the U.S. did not expect China's accession. The U.S. even used unilateral trade sanctions to threaten China. During most of the 1990s, it conducted an annual debate on the MFN status of China, using trade "as a weapon" (Panitchpakdi & Clifford, 2002:80). The Chinese media compared MFN as the "cap" (*Maozi*) and the "stick" (*Gunzi*) which had been used on dissidents during the Cultural Revolution. Some Americans were described as having a "missionary mindset" and "abolishing MFN on China was like a declaration of an economic war." "The stick (MFN, author added) was a double-edged sword hurting both sides of China and the U.S." (Yi, 1997) The author used an old Chinese fable "the wolves are coming" to satirize America's bravado. However, "How can a country with only two-hundred-year history come to instruct a country with more than five-thousand-year history? How can a country with only two hundred million people try to reconstruct a country with a population of twelve hundred million?" At the end the author cautioned against sanctions and pointed out their ill effects.

Another topic is trade-related human rights. The American government linked human rights issue to trade, claiming that China promoted its productivity at the cost of human rights; children and political prisoners were recruited to work, and women were exploited (J. Wang, 2000). The Chinese media regarded the U.S. accusations as another type of sanction, a political "cap," to teach China a lesson. The human rights issue was used by the U.S. neo-isolationists, wishing to protect American trade from competition with China.

The second type of issues under the neo-isolationism and neo-conservatism theme was the military actions the U.S. had taken in some countries. During the last years of the

20th century, the Sino-U.S. relationship was confronted with many challenges, such as the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the collision of a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet in 2001. The accidents aroused a storm of Chinese nationalism which might have been expressed in the Chinese national media. But what most affected the Chinese media was the elites' frustration with U.S. policy on regional security. China worried that the Gorge W. Bush administration deliberately disobeyed international rules and acted in the same way to any other country as it did to Iraq and Afghanistan. The intervention was compared to colonial expansion and fascist aggression (P. Gu, 2000). Among the conflicts between China and the U.S., the Taiwan issue was the most intense. Given that the military threat from the U.S. had long lingered above the Taiwan Strait, China had reason to believe that neo-conservatism would destroy peace and balance in East Asia, and the U.S. was the reason that China could not resolve the Taiwan issue successfully by "Chinese people" themselves (Y. Yu, 2005). In addition, the U.S.-Japan military alliance exerted great pressure and threats on security of China and on East Asia (L. Jiang, 1999).

Used as a puppet by America's neo-isolationism and neo-conservatism, NATO was the most frequently condemned in the Chinese media. As the largest military alliance in world, NATO provided the power base for the U.S.'s hegemony and power politics, therefore the organization was portrayed as "America's baton to pursue power politics and hegemony" (L. Jiang, 1999), an "international gendarme" (Q. Huang, 1999) or as a "lonely shepherd" (Guo, 2000). The eastward and globalization of NATO was so strongly opposed by the Chinese media that one article even compared NATO's leader, the U.S., to Japan and Germany in the Second World War (Q. Huang, 1998). This analogy denounced America as evil and defined NATO's activities as invasions. All the images of NATO were negative. NATO's peacekeeping missions, especially in the wars against terrorism were not mentioned at all in the Chinese media.

6.3.2.2 Economic Model and Constructive Cooperation

However, in the new century, the attacks on American's unilateralism gave way to an engagement in the international economic order. This second theme took the U.S. as an economic model and cooperative partner with a common or complementary economic

interest with China. Since Chinese President Jiang Zemin and American President Clinton exchanged summit visits in 1997 and 1998, Sino-U.S. relations had stabilized and improved a great deal. The Chinese media emphasized China's comparative advantages like the vast market, cheap labor and good commodity quality with a low price to attract the U.S. to invest in China. They urged the U.S. to offer its market, capitals and advanced technology to China. The Chinese media listed the advantages and strengths of the development of the American economy, and showed great respect to "new economy" and "new technology" symbolizing the U.S. economy. Some articles even brought up "Clinton Economics," and attributed the rapid economic increase to the knowledge economy and the free flow of capital (Yue, 2000).

At the same time, the relationship between China and the U.S. was emphasized. The Sino-China relationship transformed into a "structural" interdependence:

> China and the U.S. developed a relationship beyond state-to-state. The cross-Pacific communication in commodities, capitals, technologies, labors and information has made the bilateral relationship penetrate into the two societies, and influence the daily life of every single ordinary citizen…Economic globalization has changed the connotation, essence and game rules of Sino-U.S. relationship, which enables cross-national entities forming a web of close and interactive relations. (W. Yu, 2005)

The articles emphasized the common economic interests of China and the U.S. China's economic growth generated direct bilateral conflicts with the U.S. The development in foreign trade and investment in China involved it in conflicts over economic policy, mainly with the U.S. China's annual trade surplus with the U.S. topped $200 billion, and the American trade deficit surpassed $700 billion in 2005 (Kirshner, 2008). The trade war intensified after China's accession to the WTO. Chinese media discourse was meant to ease the worries about the trade imbalance to maintain China's economic development. The articles explained how the U.S. miscalculated the data in Sino-U.S. trade, trying to make up for the trade surplus with the U.S. The most popular example was that Americans spent only a little more than one penny out of every dollar on Chinese commodities. The American people could not live a life without products "made in China" (Kong, 2006) Ding Gang, a high-ranking editor of the *People's Daily*,

argued that China and America, "the largest and most rapidly growing developing country and the largest and most powerful developed country, were in different development phases, and had different industry construction and labor division." However, the differences between the two countries showed that "the two economies can supplement each other and get reciprocal interest." In this sense, China and the U.S. should work together and reduce dissension through au pair negotiation (G. Ding, 2006).

6.3.2.3 An Arrogant Hegemon

The third theme about the U.S. was the most colorfully narrated in the Chinese media. The U.S. was constructed as an arrogant hegemon ruling the world with a stick and a carrot. In contrast to the critics of neo-isolationism and neo-interventionism, the accusation of hegemony arose from a strong disagreement with American ideology and western values. The theme usually appeared in the discussions of human rights, public services or international conflicts. The Chinese media criticized the U.S. for its arbitrary nature and obstinacy in international relations. During the 1990s, such conflicts as the nuclear espionage scandal surrounding Wen Ho Lee, the embargo on arms sales to China, and the rape of a Chinese student by an American soldier troubled their bilateral relationship. Under this theme, the human rights issue would no longer be related to trade issues; on the contrary, human rights became a political issue, by which "American Imperialism" attempted to force others to implement democratic system. The U.S. was condemned for its declaration that human rights are more important than national sovereignty. "It (human rights overweight national sovereignty) aims to intervene in other countries' domestic politics on the excuse of ethnic issues and with the help of human rights, and further to realize a western hegemony" (S. Ma, 2000). Human rights were portrayed as a good excuse for the U.S. to punish the disobedient. The media doubted the real purpose of bringing up human rights, and attributed the critics from international community to "human rights diplomacy" of western countries.

> The purpose of the attacks on human rights condition in China from the U.S., totally based on the need of implementing hegemony and on an ideological bias, was to deface the China's image, disturb its stability, contain its development and finally "westernize or disrupt" China. (Dong, 2003)

However, the Chinese media discourse on human rights did not reflect the social reality.

The Communist-Capitalist confrontation which had long been a motif in Chinese media in history could still be found in Chinese media. However, "Capitalist Democracy" was in most cases replaced by "American Democracy." There was no clear definition of "American Democracy," but its characteristics were clear. First, U.S. democracy was promoted internationally with the ambition of sustaining the hegemony of the U.S. Americans arbitrarily divided states into two types: western democracies and non-western authoritarian regimes. The former are "civilized" and guardians of human rights; the latter ones are "savage" and offenders of human rights. In the Cold War, western democratic values at last prevailed. Under globalization, the U.S. continued to fight its opponents by using western values as soft power to realize its hegemonic dream (H. Zheng, 1999). The means changed but the purposes were the same (Q. Huang, 2006).

Second, the U.S. democracy was not really "democratic," even in domestic politics. Political rights only belonged to the elite and the bourgeois minority; elections were no more than a game played by the rich; the two-party system was controlled by a single class. Some narration was emotional on the aspect of coercion and dictatorship, and on the falsification and cheating in the U.S. democratic system (Wen, 2004).

Third, the U.S. government had double standards when spreading democracy. The American government implemented democracy according to its interest. If an election did not serve the U.S. national interests, the U.S. would employ every possible means to overthrow the regime. Examples were the Palestine votes issue and the 1991 election in Algeria. Democracy was never a general value but a judging process conducted by the U.S. (Q. Huang, 2006)

The theme of "an arrogant hegemon" was emphasized in the Chinese media discourse on the U.S. was based in the conflict between the Chinese and American political systems. As China integrated into the international political economy, and as it became a major power, it challenged the regional and global interests of the other countries, particularly the U.S. Its economic integration into the neo-liberal capitalist does not necessarily mean that China would follow the western political model, separate the three branches of government or have a bicameral legislature. The Chinese leadership insisted on building socialism with Chinese characteristics, which supported economic

globalization and the Reforms and Openness policy. However, to defend its core interest in sovereignty, the Chinese elite refused to comply with power politics and to be tamed by capitalist values and ideology. The U.S. still held the Cold War mentality and wanted to contain China. Therefore this theme was accentuated in Chinese media all the times.

6.3.2.4 "Decentralizing America" vs. "China Rise"

The fourth theme was decentralizing America and the rise of China. About 7.2% of the articles discussed this point. The Chinese media's allegations of "De-Americanization" did not mean antagonism to the U.S. It meant critically and selectively learning from the U.S. It advocated for the neo-liberal economy, as long as China did not blindly copy the American model. This point of view admitted the dominance of the U.S. in the international order; it does not challenge U.S. domination (Pang, 2004). In the Chinese media, one way in which China could preserve its power under the U.S. control of international order, and not provoke the U.S. was "regionalization." Twenty percent of the articles in this theme claimed that China should organize the forces in Asia and establish regionalization to maintain China's regional and global interests. The bottom line was "not to annoy the U.S. and break the balance of power in Asia" (Yan, 2000). That is the main idea of Deng's "hide the capacities and bide the time" (*Tao Guang Yang Hui*). What is parallel with "De-Americanization" was another topic of "China rise." The emphasis on China's rise was meant to remind the U.S. of China's significance. Its rapid economic development and increasing strength growth made China more confident of its power in the international community. To ease worries of "China's threat" from the western world, especially from the U.S., and to reassure the U.S. and other countries[16], one response from the Chinese government is "peaceful rise" (Chapter 5), by which China promised the world that China would attain its development

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[16] U.S. President Clinton once defined China as a "strategic partner" and pursued a constructive regional and global relationship with China. When President George W. Bush took office, he changed the relationship into a "strategic competitive" one. China saw Bush's definition as a signal that the U.S. maintained sharp vigilance on China's rise and changed from engagement to containment. Therefore China brought up a "peaceful rise" and emphasized peace in the balance of the world power structure which China would not want to break.

without aspiring to domination.

Table 6-3 Chinese media discourse on the U.S. (N=139)

Theme categories	Economic model and constructive cooperation	Neo-isolationism and neo-interventionism
Percent of coverage	20.9（29）	25.9（36）
Occurrence time	After 1999	Before 2001
Dimension	Economic	Economic and political
Metaphors	• Fast ice began to thaw.	• "world police" • NATO became America's baton to pursue power politics and hegemony • "enemy anosognosic" and "empire illness" • Looking for imperils and rivals everywhere with microscope and telescope • "lonely shepherd" • Do not be an unruly cowboy hero any more.
Exemplars	• Even if America admitted its intended bombing over the Chinese embassy, what kind of reaction could China response to it? • "Clinton Economy" • In every dollar the Americans spent there was only a little more than one penny used on Chinese commodities.	• "the lonely super power" • The White House knows much of "geopolitics gastrology"
Catchphrases	• Go higher and look ahead • Coexist with the U.S. rationally. • Structural interdependence	• A tall tree catches the wind. • Ethnic egoism • A typical country with split national personality • A bottomless hole
Descriptions	• China needs the market and technology from the U.S. and the U.S. needs the market, cheap labor, and good and fine commodities. • "September 11" offered great common strategic interests for China and America for the first time, which	• The real purpose of the U.S. to urge NATO taking military actions was to break down the last "Communist regime" in Europe, sweeping all the obstacles in controlling all the Europe. • The U.S. offered supports to Israel and some authoritarianism regimes in Middle East, launched a

	turned into "strategy adhesives" between the two countries.	war in Iraq and occupied territory of Arabs. • Whipping the stick of human rights is the means by which the U.S. can sweep off the handicaps in values on the way of uniting market. • NATO probably metamorphoses into an organization to break stability and conduct invasions.
Theme categories	De-Americanization and China rise	An arrogant hegemon
Percent of coverage	7.2（10）	15.8（22）
Occurrence time	After 2004	Throughout the time period studied
Dimension	Political	Ideological and political
Metaphors	• Like a nouveau riche who wins a prize in a lottery but does not know how to spend the windfall	• Missionary mindset • "democracy" camouflage • a big butter-and-egg man • hold the mirror of "human rights" on others instead of itself
Exemplars	• "China threat paranoia"	• The proposal of renew the term for Ghali was rejected. • Human rights are more important than national sovereignty • "moral imperialism" mindset
Catchphrases	• Let America know the value of China • Do not be afraid of the mightiness of America	• American democracy, not western democracy • Democracy is not Coca Cola. • American democracy does not work.
Descriptions	• China is likely to be the most qualified "First World Country" in politics to compete with the U.S. • The U.S. did not take China as a rival in war.	• The conflict in human rights between China and America actually reflects the confrontation between democracy and hegemony in the world. • The "democracy promotion" of the U.S. actually opened a Pandora's Box of a new round of ethnic conflicts.

6.3.3 India: Pragmatism in the Bilateral Relations

India's media perception of the U.S. was ambivalent with a mixture of engagement,

adulation, uncertainty, prudence and condemnation. However, the general attitude was that the U.S. was a powerful and benevolent nation state, so "engagement with the U.S. is a must." This idea threaded through the editorials, accounting for 27.9% of the 61 articles on the U.S. (Table 6-4). At the same time, 26.2% of the articles in the Indian media constructed the U.S. as a country that was dangerously expanding its imperial power, leading the world to a disturbed one.

6.3.3.1 Engagement with the U.S. is a Must

Advocating for an engagement with the U.S., Indian media concentrated on Indo-U.S. relations and its diplomatic policies in South Asia. Admitting that it was not the focal point of American international strategy, India craved attention from the world's only superpower, for two reasons. First, the complex power structure in Asia made India choose the U.S. as an alliance partner and shelter country. The greatest threat to India was its security. Fears of Pakistan, a longtime enemy that could not be kept at arm's length, lingered in the mind of the Indian people. Powerful neighbors like China, Russia, Iran, Bengal and others plunged India into a deep sentiment of misgiving and disquiet with bitter memories: the Sino-Indian Border Conflict in the 1960s, Kosygin's mediation at Tashkent, and Soviet military aid to Pakistan clouded Indo-Soviet relations. The dilemma between engagement and opposition to the U.S. was described in one article as follows:

> This (the temptation for alliances) has resulted in two different tendencies in the foreign policy thinking. The first line is represented by the occasional bouts of enthusiasm for a grand coalition with Russia and China (some throw in Iran as well) to counter the new U.S. hegemony… The second trend is an alliance with the U.S. against such perceived threats as China and Islam. (Anonymous., 1998)

However, the U.S. was so mighty that India could not compete with it, even with some "unreal allies," "for the imagined 'enemies' are the products of a paranoid thinking and the suggested 'alliances' are rooted in unreal expectations" (Anonymous., 1998). Therefore the best strategy for India was to engage with the U.S. The Indian media insisted that India and the U.S. had a common interest not only in economic and political cooperation, but also in regional and international security. In particular, when the terrorists started the war between the U.S. and the Islamic world, India stood out in

strategic and geopolitical importance. In this sense, the Indian media appealed for a mutually beneficial Indo-U.S. alliance. The convergence of India's and the American interests was an imperative.

Ironically, India had supported a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for decades. The engagement with the U.S. clashed with the NAM tradition. However, Indian media rationalized the alliance in a term of "a new romance" (Anonymous., 2000) , and attacked NAM as "Cold War mindset" and "morality and 'old mantras'" (Malhotra, 2001) . The world was no longer that of the Cold War. Globalization required all nation states to change their international relations paradigms; alliance did not mean surrender. Even in the Cold War, and even to Nehru, Malhotra continued to argue from his own wartime experience that India and the U.S. had been allied in the 1962 Sino-Indo border conflict: "All this happened, significantly, with the full approval of Jawaharlal Nehru than whom there hasn't been and cannot be a greater a postal of nonalignment" (Malhotra, 2001).

The other reason why an Indo-U.S. convergence was highly praised in the Indian media was that the alliance could offer strong support to and exempt India from reprisals for its radical actions in the nuclear tests, the Kashmir conflict and Indo-Pakistan relations. Since Pakistan had long been regarded as America's "most allied ally," American support to India in the Kargil conflict was quite unexpected and pleasantly surprised. The Indian media lauded America for its determining role in South Asia security and valued this shift in America's policy.

A welcome shift in the U.S. understanding of the present situation in Kashmir… has been brought about by Pakistan's proneness to use force to resolve the problem in its favour and the U.S. perception that this can lead to an all-out war, sliding into a nuclear war. As the only superpower in the world, the U.S. deems it a duty to prevent such a drift to disaster in South Asia. This shift which was evident since the Kargil crisis was confirmed at the highest level when Mr. Clinton stated in his press conference in New Delhi on March 21: "you cannot expect a dialogue to go forward until there is absence of violence and respect for the Line of Control." (Dubey, 2000)

The coalition with the only superpower in the world added so much weight to the Indo-Pakistan relation that the Indian media began to dream about future resolutions of

Kashmir and other issues. At the same time, India conducted three underground nuclear tests on May 11, 1998, which aroused fear in the region. India had not expected support from the U.S. on the nuclear issue and stood its ground, but it thought that the Clinton government would not be strongly against its foul play, given America's own stance on the National Missile Defense program and its intention of containing Pakistan by using India's nuclear threat. What India could do is to hold its main security interests with "softer choices" —to comply with the U.S. but negotiate for its own core interest.

6.3.3.2 The Imperial Expansion is a Peril

The second theme was America's imperial expansion in Central and South Asia. Like the Chinese media, the Indian media inveighed against the George W. Bush administration's unilateralism in Afghanistan and Iraq. The hostility to the U.S. deepened with America's involvement in wars against the Taliban. At the outset, India reminded the Clinton government of putting Pakistan on watch list as President George W. Bush had, and accused of the U.S. imperialism. When the U.S. was attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001, the Indian media sympathized with America and its people, declaring India's support against terrorism. Later the U.S launched military actions in Afghanistan against the Taliban without any certain evidence validated by the Taliban. The Indian media therefore alleged that the war against Afghanistan was not a just war:

> it has been a response to one kind of terrorism with another kind! This has been the U.S.'s terrorist war of revenge and imperial expansion. The U.S. Government in its foreign policy behavior has never given serious weight to public opinion in other countries. This has always been a minor and secondary consideration. (Vanaik, 2002)

In 2003, the U.S. began with the invasion of Iraq without official resolution issued by UN Security Council. This time Indian media condemned that the war was "a U.S.-led aggression on Iraq" (Reddy, 2003) and that "the U.S. is engaged in a neo-imperialist enterprise" (Menon, 2006). The Bush administration's neo-conservatism, unilateralism and global interventionism were bitterly criticized because the invasion of a sovereign country had no moral and legal justifications. The U.S. was attacked because India's interest in South Asia was encroached little by little by the new order the U.S. set in

Central Asia and South Asia. One article stated,

> In India, an independent Kashmir has been high on the agenda of U.S. imperialism. It is towards this end that it has been lending its support to the demand for a plebiscite... Even the offers of establishing a democratic regime in Kabul by Mr. Rabbani were not allowed to be pursued. The U.S. wishes to see in Kabul a regime which will serve its interests in the region. (Surjeet, 1996)

6.3.3.3 The U.S. is the Neo-Liberal Guardian

The third theme was the role of the U.S. in leading a neo-liberal capitalist world. Approximately 9.8% of the articles fell into this category. The articles discussed the role of the U.S. in reinforcing globalization and the free flow of capitals, labors, technology and information, enhancing the international cooperation among nation states (Anonymous., 1999d; Krugman, 2000). Under this theme the attitude of the articles towards the U.S. was not necessarily positive. For example, one article discussed the need for a national missile defense system (NMD) proposed by U.S. President George W. Bush. It agreed that the U.S. dominated the world as the "leader" of an interdependent and globalizing world of free markets, and as "the prime mover" of democracy around the world. The article stated,

> Globalisation has often been associated almost exclusively with Washington's agenda of catalysing the creation of an integrated network of market- oriented economies across a diverse matrix of sovereign states. On a related front, the notion of globalisation of politics first came into focus when the U.S. stunned the forum for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) at its summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1998 by commending democracy - as an imperative feature of individual statehood for the success of free- market systems in each of the countries concerned. This theme is being articulated at this moment, too, by the new Bush administration in Washington. (P. S. Suryanarayana., 2001)

There are two reasons for the loss of attention to this theme after 2001. First, the media's interest was diverted to the security issue after September 11. The U.S. changed from a leader to a hegemonic power. Second, with India's increasingly positive attitude towards globalization, this theme of a neo-liberal guardian was incorporated into the first theme of

engagement.

    The theme of American economic model was not as marked in the Indian media discourse as in the Chinese media. The Indian media took a relatively dim view of economic globalization. Therefore it seldom regarded the U.S. economic mode as an inspiring model to emulate. In the Indian media, the U.S. was more meaningful in politics and national security. India was also a democratic country and carried out the same style of political system, namely western democracy; in this sense, the Indian elite media would describe a less intense conflict in politics and ideology than the Chinese media.

Table 6-4 Indian Media Discourse on the U.S. (N=61)

Theme categories	Engagement with the U.S. is a must	The imperial expansion is a peril.	The U.S. is the neo-liberal guardian.
Percent of coverage	29.5 (18)	24.6 (15)	9.8 (6)
Occurrence time	Throughout the time period studied	After 2001	Before 2001
Dimension	Economic and political	Security and strategy related	Economic and political
Metaphors	• a new romance	• "Prometheus unbound" • She was sugar and spice and all things nice, but waits until the outer coating wears off.	
Exemplars	• The history of international relations has never seen such a skewed distribution of power in favor of one nation.	• the invasion of Iraq is nothing but a neo-colonialist enterprise	• The return of the Democrats to the White House after the end of the Cold War saw the dominance of the liberal internationalist vision over American foreign policy.
Catchphrases	• Indian and America convergence • a new convergence	• foreign policy ambitions • imperial fundamentalism • to bend the world to America's will	• "leadership" auspices • "Clinton plus"
Descriptions	• The transition of Indo-U.S. ties from a state of estranged democracies to a mode of engaged democracies is now being addressed from other	• The U.S. Government in its foreign policy behavior has never given serious weight to public opinion in other countries. This has always been a minor and secondary consideration.	• The U.S. did not have the right to ask anybody to give up economic growth, but it did have a right to say, "if we're prepared to help you

perspectives as well, including that of global partnership. • The dominant section of its foreign policy and security establishment still clings to the notion that the U.S. could help the country "balance" a rising China in Asia. This was the burden of the major policy speech made by Shyam Saran as Foreign Secretary last November at an India-U.S. business meet in New Delhi.	• The non-homogenous NAM would be up against the United States, which is "unilaterally" seeking to determine a new world order by taking a definitive line that both Iraq and North Korea should be disarmed but at a pace and in a manner that Washington would be comfortable with. • Even if John Kerry is elected president, the U.S. will not revert to its pre-9/11 behavior. Mr. Kerry may emphasize the importance of allies, but the unilateralist instincts of the sole superpower will not be put back in the bottle. • The Iraqi dictator went from "good guy" to bad in Washington's view not because he invaded a sovereign country. Saddam earned the wrath of the U. S. because he presumed to put himself in a position from which he could control West Asian oil.	finance a different path to growth... that your growth will be faster, not smaller, that you'll have more good jobs, more new technology, a broader base for your economy - then I believe we ought to have those kind of environmental standards." • As with the economic and political dimensions of globalisation, the U.S. will not remain unchallenged in the security-related domain of this process.

On the whole, the constructions of the U.S. in the Chinese and Indian media had commonness as well as difference. The U.S. dominated both media systems beyond question; its hegemony over the world was widely confirmed and condemned. China valued the U.S. for its exemplary role in economic development, looking up to it as a model and seeking opportunities to cooperate with it; India focused on relations with the U.S. in a pragmatic way, longing for an alliance on military matters and national security. Both media discourses constructed the U.S. as an arrogant and undesirable hegemony. However, the Chinese media more emphasized the ideological conflicts with the U.S., whereas the Indian media emphasized its security differences with the U.S.

Different political systems and elite core interests determined by the countries' respective positions in the international political economy can explain the differences in their discourses. China gained more structural power and held a semi-periphery-core

position in the world system, which aroused more conflicts in interest with the U.S. In contrast to conflicts between India and the U.S. which revolved around on the region's security and power reconfiguration, the conflicts between China and the U.S. spanned both the regional and the global levels, and were economic and political in nature. At the same time, China's socialist social system and authoritarian regime different from neo-liberal capitalist and western values, leading to ideological conflicts with the U.S. and to negative coverage in Chinese media.

6.4 The Other Countries in the Chinese and Indian Media

In international world system, the core interests of the nation states are concrete and solid to every state as a whole. The united national interest, mainly of elites, is represented in national media as unitary media constructions on how the states conceive of the world, the others and the relationship between the two. As the third world countries, how the Chinese and Indian media conceive of themselves and of the other third world countries is a good way to examine their points of view on globalization.

In the Chinese media discourse, the other developing countries, mainly countries in Latin American and Africa, did not get much attention. The image of Africa was "the poorest continent," and the poverty was "absolute poverty." Many problems existed: low income, deficient employment, poverty, etc (Ni, 1996). And the difficulty in economic development and situation of political turbulence rooted in the developed countries more or less; Africa was "an outcast Africa" (Z. Huang, 2000). As to the Latin American countries, they were described as potential markets. China should increase investments and trades in Latin American to help them develop economy (S. Jiang, 2006). In Chinese media, Africa and Latin American were still marginal actors in the global arena. China had little identity the same as the other third world countries, however, to keep its dominance and influence in those third-world countries, it tried to unite them together, reinforce the economic cooperation and communication with them, and offer financial and technological aids to them.

The Indian media did not pay much attention to the other developing countries either. During the 1950s to the 1970s, for a long time India had been regarded as the leader of the third world countries and occupied a very important position in dealing with regional

issues. In the post-Cold War era, on the one hand, its economic reforms, with advanced high-new technology and outsourcing industry, created a rapid growth in national power. It is eager to break away from the non-aligned group and squeeze itself into the "rich club." On the other hand, compared with other rising powers such as Japan and China, India did not catch up with them and gradually lost its strategic status gained in the bipolar world order. To India, "Globalisation should not become the worldwide manifestation of the highest and subtlest form of capitalism but as Mahatma Gandhi envisaged 'a federation of friendly, interdependent nations'" (Narayanan, 2004) where India also has a chance to share with the developed countries. The Indian elites decided to abandon the "third worldism" (see chapter 5). They categorized the other developing countries as disordered, chaotic, underdeveloped, unsafe places. So in the Indian elite newspapers the other developing countries were rarely mentioned, and if mentioned, they were negatively referred to (see Table 6-2).

China and India saw each other in a different way. Table 6-5 showed the amount of attention the Chinese and Indian media paid to the other country. The Chinese articles that mentioned India accounted for about 14.6% in all the Chinese editorials. In contrast, the Indian articles that mentioned China amounted to about 31.6%. The Chinese media kept their eyes on the U.S. In their categories, India is an important neighbor but not a crucial actor. However, the Indian media looked up to China and praised China for its dramatic increase in national strength and its success in improving people's lives.

Table 6-5 Amount of Attention China and India Paid to Each Other in Media

	Number of articles that mentioned the other	Percentage of articles that mentioned the other
China (N=501)	69	13.8
India (N=503)	159	31.6

6.5 Summary

The Chinese and Indian media constructed the others particularly the U.S. in different ways. The Chinese media depicted the U.S. as hegemony in the world order. On the one hand, they accepted the U.S.'s domination in the global trade and economic system, and looked up to it as a good model in developing economy. On the other hand, they differentiated the U.S.'s hegemony in ideology and politics from what China

believes in, and attacked the U.S. The Indian media mainly criticized the U.S. for its economic depredations and military invasions.

The Chinese and Indian elites contested their interests in the public through mass media. The CPC and political elites valued the U.S. for its trade relations with China and its investments on China's numerous manufacturing factories. However, political confrontations between the two countries constantly threatened the elites' political leadership. In addition, the internal struggles for democracy and civil rights also made the CPC regime unstable. The elite would like to create a public enemy to divert the attention inside to the outside threat. The U.S. was suitable to be a target that can easily be used to arouse the national emotions because of the history in national independence times and the Cold War. Therefore the Chinese media reflected this elite ideology and constructed an identity in relations with the U.S. The Indian media was an arena for the political forces to compete for their distinct identities. With different perspectives to the U.S., most political forces used the U.S. strategically to win constituency and finally the elections. To serve their own interest and policies, they constructed the U.S. from a pragmatic way. When the terror of September 11 happened, and India was involved in a regional turbulence, the elites felt uneasy and began to condemn the U.S. for its expansion in the region. In this issue most of them had the similar interest, i.e. the national security and political stability. Therefore it was revealed in the Indian media as a more and more negative image of the U.S.

For the construction of the other developing countries and of each other, the Chinese and Indian media have more differences than commonness. It was attributed in part to the different state status in the international system of China and India. It also resulted from different self-categorization of the two countries. China identified itself a big nation which is bound to rise; it regarded itself a superior ethnic who finally stood up from being suffering so much pains and humiliation. India of course felt proud of itself too. But it viewed itself as a country that had not released its power. Therefore it tried very hard to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, conduct nuclear tests and maintain good relationships with the U.S., China, Russia and other major powers. India's ambition and reluctance mixed into a complex that made itself difficult to locate in the new world order.

Chapter 7 Conclusion and Discussion

In this study I have compared two media discourses on globalization in China and India. The purpose is to understand how national media in these countries use discursive strategies to negotiate with the state-centered political economy defined by elites. This dissertation first described the landscape of globalization and the conditions of national development of the two countries. Then it viewed China and India as autonomic actors contesting for their national interest by integrating themselves into a neoliberal international order. The study further examined how the national media defined their interest and explained domestic issues related to globalization. At the same time, how media strategically used history to build collective memories and used national identity to construct the others was investigated.

This chapter offers a coherent and synthetical description and explanation for the media discourses on globalization in the Chinese and Indian media. I shall first present my findings in comparing Chinese and Indian media discourses on globalization. Then I shall discuss the theoretical and methodological contributions to international news making and framing analysis, and conclude the limitations and possible directions for further studies.

7.1 Findings and Discussion

The Chinese and Indian media are both generally in favor of globalization. However, they responded differently to globalization. The Chinese media saw the phenomenon of globalization as economic globalization, and emphasized economic development while ignoring the costs to social groups and the environment. The Indian was more ambivalent about globalization which meant "going abroad with safeguard." The media viewed globalization as a strategic game that it could win if the right choices were made. The two media discourses on globalization contested for the dominant meaning of national interests in the global order in accordance with their positions in the global power structure and the elite-defined interest in global issues.

Global news is also local. As a global phenomenon embedded in the international political economy but greatly influencing nation states, globalization should be

rationalized by national media through "domestication." I also examined the media's framing of social conflicts which were related to globalization. The Chinese media rarely mentioned the interest conflicts caused by economic reforms, and categorized most conflicts as materials ones among social sectors. The government's responsibility in these conflicts was not explored. The solutions to the conflicts focused on economic development in the belief that economic globalization could eliminate social conflicts and conflicts were inevitable but temporary when a nation state transformed from modernization to globalization. The Indian media constructed the social conflicts in "the sphere of legitimate controversy," and usually attributed the conflicts to government policies. The media discourses on social conflicts mirrored the differences in the domestic political economy and the relationship between press and state.

Globalization is an integral part of the history. Both the Chinese and the Indian media used history strategically when they constructed globalization as a current trend or a future objective by articulating globalization to the past. The Chinese media narrated the "useful history" in a frame of economic progressivism, and traced back to the national rises in its ancient history and the achievements during the past two decades. In this way they stressed the continuity between globalization and history, and the relationship between legitimated economic reforms and elite interests. The Indian media used history in a more diverse way. The dominant narrative is that globalization was contrary to Indian traditions; at the same time, some counter-narratives constructed globalization as destiny.

The Chinese media looked up to the U.S as an economic model and accepted the U.S.'s domination in the global trade and economic system. However, they also strongly criticized the U.S. for its political arrogance and ideological hegemony. The Chinese media overlooked the role of other developing countries. The Indian media constructed the U.S. as a mighty power with which India must collaborate, particularly in foreign relations and national security. The U.S. was seen as the neo-liberal capital guardian and protector. However, he Indian media criticized the U.S. for hurting India's economy and military security, but held a mixed feeling toward other third world countries.

The national media discourses on globalization were constrained and framed by the national interest defined by elites. Based on strategic judgments and national reasoning, the "Interest" frame emphasizes the gain-or-loss of interest and a benefit-cost analysis. In

most cases, media used the Interest frame to discuss advantages and disadvantages in implementing a policy, the benefits and costs of making a decision and pro-or-against inclinations in molding attitudes. At the global level, international news was based on the interest of nation states with unique cultural values. Globalization discourses in China and India were different from each other; both competed for the definition and explanation of globalization under the constraints from international structure. As what Wallerstein called a "semi-peripheral" nation (1976), China's structural power was greater than India's and it was more competitive for legitimacy and recognition on the global state via media discourses. The state elites benefited from economic development and salvaged the state from ideological crisis by adopting globalization. Therefore the Chinese elite media discourse viewed globalization as panacea, although the wary of the political and ideological threats to national sovereignty and autonomy remained. India's position in the global order is more "peripheral." It was more critical of west-dominant neoliberal order and thus its will of integrating into globalization was more hesitated. The Indian media discourse on globalization was ambiguous and tortuous.

At the local level, domestic news was shaped by national interest in terms of political and economic interest of various classes, sectors and communities. The Chinese and Indian media used different frames to construct the social conflicts that resulted from globalization. By strategically defining conflict, ignoring dissenting views, and purposely emphasizing the function of conflict, the internal groups and sectors competed with each other to define the effects of globalization through media. The Chinese media discourse was with less consonance. To justify the policies of the central government and rationalize globalization, the party organs seldom mentioned conflicts between the social power and the political power, especially non-material conflicts over religions, beliefs and values. Because of political constraints, the media omitted explanations of conflicts but proposed solutions that would protect the interest of elites. The fragmented reality in the Indian society and the freedom of its media system offered a context in which the media discourses were used by power forces in the society competing for their interests. The economic influence on the Indian media mainly came from intense market competition; to maximize the readership and advertising share, the newspapers utilized the selling points of social conflicts and contradictions, and criticized government

policies.

The positions of China and India in the global world, their distinctive political economies, and the relations between press and state powers comprised a coherent interpretative frame (the "Identity" frame) on media discourse on globalization.

The discourses on globalization in the national media are also rooted in each country's national identity. The Chinese and Indian national presses strategically used historical memories in different ways to construct globalization in terms of the "identity" frame. The media often evoked traditions and memories to construct a common sentiment and identity to rationalize globalization. China had a long and glorious history in ancient times, but had been humiliated in recent centuries. At the same time, it would like to rebound and realize the national rise again. The national dream and a sense of national pride were reflected in the Chinese media by referring to ancient history and choosing to ignore the preceding disgraceful memories such as the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Square crackdown. India had been under the control of British for several centuries and suffered a lot under British imperialism. The mixture of Indians' sense of victimization and their pride in the democratic system as historical legacy created an uncertain national identity which led to an ambivalent attitude towards history and globalization.

7.2 Contributions of This Study

This study makes a contribution to the theories in framing analysis and international news. International news was a site of discourse contestation among nation states. In the arena of international news, international and national groups and institutions, state officials, correspondents and local editors made up a discursive community and interpreted global issues and events from their own perspectives. The frames that dominated national media represented the interests of state elites. Therefore the international news was prisms of elite interest based on nation states which were located in the international political economy.

However, national interest is a multidimensional and multilateral concept. Domestic dissent, differences and struggles exerted great influence on media discourse. The competition of the forces reflected local reactions to globalization. No matter how much

diverse and inconsonant opinion the media can represent, given the constraints of political system and media system, there was room for social groups, the alternative powers or the dissents to fight for their interests. These alternative interest narratives in media rewrote and redefined the national interest in the international news. In this sense, national interest is defined as core interests of the dominant power when states negotiate with the international political economy, but as more specific and diverse interests when local power forces actively negotiates with the established elite interest.

Table 7-1 Two Frames in Globalization Discourse

	Interest frame		Identity frame	
	International news	Domestic news	Time	Space
Interest base	Nation states	Social sectors and groups	Nation states	National states
Frame base	Global political and economic interest	Internal political and economic interest	Culture and history	National identity
Resources	Foreign policies, international relations, global strategies	Internal controversial issues related to globalization, social conflicts brought up by reforms	Usage of history	National image, categorization of the others and us
Main forces	Positions of the states in the hierarchy of international power structure	Power structure within states, press-state relationships	Collective memories and national identity	National identity defined by elites
Functions *	Legitimizing and binding the home system, articulating foreign policy and reflecting preferred identity and image	A forum for the local social forces; building consensus and legitimacy, and maintaining the status quo	Legitimizing the current policies, articulating histories, and invoking a shared sentiments	Differentiating "us" from "them", forming a sense of belonging, and constructing the others in a specific way

* This item and the first two cells were borrowed from Lee, Chin-Chuan, Chan, J. Man, Pan, Zhongdang, and So Clement Y.K. (2002). *Global media spectacle: News war over Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. pp.173.

In addition to political and economic power flow and interest exchange, national identity played a very important role in the media's construction of reality. However, most media studies that emphasized national interest as a determinant of international

news content neglected the dimension of identity and history. This study unpacked "globalization" into dimensions of space as well as time, which viewed social phenomena as a negotiation with history and tradition. Globalization discourse was tied with modernization discourse; it was pictured as an ideal model which is deeply rooted in national dreams and ideology. Therefore media in different contexts of culture and identity would construct the historical aspects of globalization in distinct ways. This is what Gamson (1989) called "cultural resonances" of frames that combined culture, tradition and history with symbolic meaning to create resonance in the public.

Finally, an integrative and coherent theoretical framework of globalization discourse was of great importance (Table 7-1). Instead of focusing on specific issues, this study offered a general framework for globalization, the complicated and omnipresent social phenomena. The way in which globalization was unpacked, and the categorization and application of different frames enriched and broadened some perspectives in globalization media discourse for future studies.

7.3 Limitations and Further Studies

This study started from a perspective of political economy to compare the different contexts of Chinese and Indian media. It then examined each country's media discourse on globalization to interpret what determined the journalistic construction and what generated the differences between the media discourses. However, some limitations of the research deserve special attention.

The first limitation of this study concerns the representation of news outlets. Because the accessibility of the online database of the newspapers is limited, this study selected outlets of the *People's Daily* (and its affiliated *Global Times*) from China and the *Hindu* from India as sampled national newspapers. To some extent only one national newspaper could hardly stand for the full landscape of a country's press, even though it is one of the most representative national newspapers. However, I should admit that the sampling of outlets does leave a flaw in this study which has affected some of findings. Even in China, there are alternatives to the press under great control and regulation. The *Southern Weekend*, alleging itself as "the Chinese conscience," is famous for its investigative reports and regarded as a representative medium to reflect public opinion

and interests of social groups. If one more newspaper for each country is concluded in this study, the internal variations such as their media ideology and party identification should be considered for their impact in conditioning globalization constructions. The Chinese media diversity may show somehow a different picture. However, even I add another newspaper in the sample pool, the fact that Chinese power structure and media structure can not change still works. That is to say, the diversity of voices in Chinese media is very limited. Zhao (2003) selected 11 news outlets in China and studied on their discussion in globalization and the WTO issue, only to find that there was not much different among them. I should also point out that the *Southern Weekend*, although located in the South China and is popular in the market, is still under the strict control of the central propaganda department and the province government. There were several times of turn-over of the senior leaders in the newspaper, because the newspaper published something that did not satisfy the powers. From these cases, we can see that the diversity can hardly be realized in the Chinese media.

The second limitation concerns the applicability of the two in some specific issues. Globalization is a prevailing but special phenomena for its complex and multifaceted characteristic so that the media constructions of globalization may be inherently different from those of other social phenomenon. The extent to which a social context can explain media content needs more empirical studies. International and national political economy are interwoven, so the effects on media are hard to discern. Framing analysis, combining the advantages of content analysis and textural analysis, is a good way to relate discursive practices to social structure, and to reveal the latent connection between contexts and texts. Sometimes this connection is not fully unfolded, especially when the context is too broad to define and thus the categories of frames are roughly divided. Future studies could divide the Interest frame and Identity frame into some sub-frames and offer a more detailed examination of media texts. The sub-frames could be based on issues or transformative categories in accordance with the redefinition of globalization.

Finally, this study did not talk about production and consumption of news products. Although the news organization routine, the journalists, and their bargaining with the press in daily life, and professionalism have an enormous influence on media discourse, I am very aware that I examine the construction of globalization by media and at the

question that how the media narratives compete with each other. The media production process was beyond the scope of this study, but this topic can be further explored by interviews or field study. The consumption of globalization discourse by readers is very important to the public debate on globalization. Although this was not within the scope of this study, it can be studied in the future.

Appendix I Keywords of Globalization

English keywords	中文關鍵字
globalization / globalisation	全球化
capitalism	資本主義
neo-liberalism	新自由主義
localization	本土化
global village	地球村
internationalization	國際化
World Trade Organization (WTO)	世界貿易組織 / 世貿
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	國際貨幣基金組織
World Economic Forum (WEF)	世界經濟論壇
UNESCO	聯合國教科文組織
OECD	經合組織
APEC	亞太經合組織
European Union (EU)	歐盟
G7	七國集團 / 峰會
G8	八國集團 / 峰會
United Nations (UN)	聯合國
World Health Organization (WHO)	世界衛生組織 / 世衛組織
UNCED	聯合國環境與發展大會 / 環發大會
international trade	國際貿易
foreign capital	國際資本
global economy	全球經濟
free trade	自由貿易
fair trade	公平貿易
balance of trade	貿易差額
Seattle	西雅圖
Cold War	冷戰
new world order	世界新秩序
hegemony	霸權
multipolarization	多極化

unipolar	單極化
international relations	國際關係
foreign policy	外交政策
universal values	普適價值
multicultural	多元文化
cultural diversity	文化多樣性
cultural tradition	文化傳統
local culture	本地文化
pop culture	流行文化
human rights	人權
global warm	全球變暖
greenhouse effect	溫室效應
SARS	非典/SARS
NGO	非贏利機構
immigration	移民
terrorism	恐怖主義
anti-terrorist	反恐

Appendix II Content Analysis Coding Sheet

Variables	Coding schema
storyno	1・The number of the story
time	2・The article was published in _____ (year)
papertyp	3・The story was published in the paper of _____ (1) The People's Daily (2) The Global Times (3) The Hindu (4) The Times of India
subject	4・The subject of the story is (1) economic development policy and strategies (2) industry, market, trade and investment (3) financial exchange and crisis (4) labor resources and human talents (5) science and tech issues (6) energy issue (7) foreign policy and international relations (8) social system, democracy, politics, election and governance (9) international organizations, institutions and the world order (10) national image (11) religion, value, identity, language and education (12) cultural tradition and history (13) culture diversity (14) human interest, human rights and public welfare (15) global warming and environmental issues (16) public health issues） (17) war and anti-war, terrorism, military and security (18) equality and poverty (19) unemployment, financial assistant, disadvantaged group (20) others

occupati	5 · The occupational background of the authors: (1) government officials (2) experts, scholars or professionals (3) journalists, editors, columnists, writers, etc (4) ordinary citizens (5) others
focus	6 · The story puts its focus on a _____ level. (1) global (2) regional (3) national (4) local (5) none of above
frequsa	7a · How many times is the U.S. mentioned in the story?
frequk	7b · How many times are the United Kingdom mentioned in the story?
freqruss	7c · How many times Russia mentioned in the story?
freqeuro	7d · How many times are the other European countries (except Russia and U.K) mentioned in the story?
freqasia	7e · How many times are the Asian countries mentioned in the story?
freqdeve	7f · How many times are the other developing countries (except those in Asia) mentioned in the story?
attitusa	8a · How is the overall attitude towards the U.S.? (1) positive (2) mixed or not clear (3) negative
attituk	8b · How is the overall attitude towards the U.K.? (1) positive (2) mixed or not clear (3) negative
attitrus	8c · How is the overall attitude towards Russia (or Soviet)? (1) positive

	(2) mixed or not clear (3) negative

attiteuro	8d · How is the overall attitude towards the other European countries (except Russia and U.K)?
	    (1) positive
	    (2) mixed or not clear
	    (3) negative

attitasi	8e · How is the overall attitude towards the Asian countries?
	    (1) positive
	    (2) mixed or not clear
	    (3) negative

attitdev	8f · How is the overall attitude towards the other developing countries (except those in Asia)?
	    (1) positive
	    (2) mixed or not clear
	    (3) negative

overatti	9 · The attitude towards globalization expressed in the story is _____
	    (1) pro globalization
	    (2) mixed or not clear
	    (3) against globalization

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