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CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

香港城市大學

Reporting China on the Rise: A Study on the Field of Foreign Correspondence in Contemporary China

當代駐華外媒場域研究

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Abstract

At the time of growing attention from the international community to understand and interpret China as a rising power and global order challenger, foreign press corps in China serve as the vital messengers and sense makers of this distant other for the global public. The pressure from transformation of media industry, change of global geopolitics and economy, as well as China's tightening press control and ideology control all make it overwhelmingly intriguing as well as urgent to examine the field of foreign correspondence in contemporary China.

This study brings together Bourdieu's notion of *journalistic field* and Shoemaker and Reese's model of *Hierarchy of Influence* to map out the structure and dynamics of foreign correspondence in China during China's President Xi Jinping's first term in office (2012~2017). It applies a hierarchical analysis to examine the structure (power relations) and position of the field of foreign correspondence in China and how these power relations shape the news production practice to inform public vision on this rising power. Hallin and Mancini's typology of media system is employed for a cross-national comparison of external pressure from larger field of power.

Drawing on an analysis of 101 online survey response, 19 in-depth semi-structured interview with current and former China correspondents, and discourse analysis of 151 news articles, assisted with secondhand literature of China correspondents' self-accounts, this study examined the *habitus* and *illusio* of the agents, how they take up different positions, negotiating with different pressures from routines, organizational, and institutional levels, consequently projecting these power relations onto the final news product, and how national

prism, as reflected via the shaping power of *media system* and *national interest* of each home country, still hold strong grip over the field of China correspondence.

Chapter 1 conceptualizes the theoretical framework for this study, a hierarchical model of foreign correspondence field; Chapter 2 unpacks the boundary, historical trajectory, and configuration of the field of China correspondence; Chapter 3 analyzes the habitus of China correspondents in terms of their Chinese habitus and journalistic habitus, and proposes two typologies of China correspondents based on their professional role perception and positions in the field; Chapter 4 discusses press review as a source of pressure from routine level; Chapter 5 examines the organizational structure and professional autonomy of China correspondents and how these pressures impact their news production; Chapter 6 focuses on institutional interruptive forces including censorship and repressive regulations; Chapter 7 tackles the national variance reflected on final news product through a comparative discourse analysis of the media coverage on South China Sea from 12 mainstream newspapers in four countries. The final chapter discusses and reflects on the key findings of this study, which argue that the field of foreign correspondence in contemporary China is a rather heteronomous one, subjected to huge external pressures from political and economic fields; national variance still overtakes a "global media culture".

The study is the first of its kind to extensively analyze China correspondents and their work from the perspective of field theory. It advances our understanding of the mechanisms of foreign correspondence, and sheds light on expanding the new journalistic field paradigm in media and journalism study.

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It is late September of 2017 in Shenzhen, China, when I wrote these words to conclude this dissertation manuscript of roughly 300 pages. I feel a bit surreal to humbly present this manuscript now as the outcome of my four years PhD study at the Department of Media and Communication, City University of Hong Kong.

This manuscript was mainly drafted in this small studio in Shenzhen during the past year. I call it my "PhD den", since I moved out from the hassle-driven cramped student residence in June 2016 and rented this studio to focus on writing my dissertation. From its French window I have the privilege to a full city bird-view, a partial mountain view, and a partial sea view, if weather permits. This is where I switch between, or observe the nexus between, the reality of a weirdly interesting metropolis as an exemplar of "China Model" and the broader intellectual world of thinking, reading, and writing about the perceived and constructed "reality".

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To carry out the research has invited quite a few unexpected obstacles, as the time of this research sees China highly alert of any academic activity tapping on media studies and social control in the country, resulting in refusal from both relevant government bodies and many foreign journalists to my research request. When I had huge difficulty even to get a sample frame, the first step to proceed with this research, my friends Liu Xiaochen and Tian Chuan generously offered their help; when I was frustrated at the too many refusals and disappointingly low response rate to my survey request, some editors and journalists, who prefer to not disclose their identities in this writing, warmly offered to help me getting more journalists through their personal connections to talk to. I feel deeply indebted to them. My gratitude also goes to Prof. Rasmus Kleis Nielson, Prof. Henrik Örnebring and Dr. Zvi Reich who offered me very constructive comments on the research design and tremendous encouragement to inspire me to carry on in this fascinating field. Many other names, for reasons to protect their identities for the possible sensitivity of this research topic, cannot be listed here. But I am no less grateful for their help on this study, especially for all the

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In an email, Prof. Chin-Chuan Lee wrote me this sentence which I would like to quote here: "Writing dissertation is a watershed moment to challenge yourself in hopes of crossing over into the next threshold." I hope now I can proudly say: I challenged myself; I made it; and I will embrace the next threshold with a wiser, calmer, and more confident self.

Chapter 1 Introduction

At the time of growing attention from the international community to understand and interpret China as a "major component of a globalizing world" (Lee, 2000, p. 4), foreign press corps in China serve as the major messengers and sense makers of this "distant other" for the global public and policy makers. The case of foreign correspondence in China is part of foreign reporting in a globalized journalism environment that makes sense beyond borders. Media organizations with various national contexts are competing in Beijing, where the Leninist style control of party-journalism (Zhao, 1998) prevails. Especially in the second decade of the 21st century, while China's economy keeps a high growth rate, the new leadership led by President Xi Jinping adopts unprecedentedly assertive diplomatic strategies (so-called "Xiplomacy" with the "China Dream" ambition), showing full momentum and determination to emerge as a new power, or even the new world leader. The Western-orchestrated liberal global order is facing dramatic challenges, with major established Western democracies burned with old and new threats both at home and globally, such as the rise of populism, the increasing distrust in the establishments, global security issues, and climate change. Meanwhile, at home in China, President Xi Jinping has been relentlessly tightening political and ideological control, further undermining press freedom and civil society. Against this backdrop, China's leading role in regional and global arena (or its intention to lead) are drawing close attention and heated debates, if not controversy, from every corner of the world. These debates and global perception of China are largely drawn from traditional media coverage, produced by foreign press corps in China. How these "elite" foreign correspondents respond to pressures from within journalism (such as transformation of media industry) as well as from the changing global geopolitics, and China's restrictive journalistic culture, is the key question this study is exploring.

Building up a notion of "the field of foreign correspondence", this study brings Bourdieu's *journalistic field* and Shoemaker and Reese's model of *Hierarchy of Influence* to map out the structure and dynamics of foreign correspondence in China. It applies a hierarchical analysis to examine the constraints and controls in and on the field, which defines the news production practice and shapes the final news product to inform public vision on this rising power.

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework and sets out the research questions and methodology of this study. The following chapters elaborate on the field and power relations on each of the four levels respectively (individual, routines, organizational, and institutional), using evidence attained from survey, interviews and second-hand documents.

Chapter 2 unpacks the boundary, trajectory, and configuration of the field of China correspondence. Chapter 3 analyzes the habitus of China correspondents in terms of their journalistic habitus (professional role perception, professional education, work experience, etc.) and Chinese habitus (China-related experience, etc.). Chapter 4 discusses China correspondents' press review practice as a routine, and how it impacts their news production. Chapter 5 examines the organizational structure and professional autonomy of China correspondents and how these impact their news production. Chapter 6 focuses on state coercion as a major institutional interruptive force, and how China correspondents negotiate with such heteronomous power. Chapter 7 tackles the national variance reflected on final news product through a comparative discourse analysis of the media coverage on South China Sea from 12 mainstream newspapers in four countries. Discussion and reflection are in the final chapter.

1.1 News as Socially Constructed Reality

News is a knowledge made in a certain paradigm (news paradigm, which works as an occupational ideology) with broader ideological implications, which reinforces and justifies the larger ideological/hegemonic order/boundaries (Bourdieu, 1994; Kuhn, 1970; Gans, 1979; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Reese, 1990; Tuchman, 1978; van Ginneken, 1998). As Bourdieu (1994) explains in his seminal theory of symbolic power and field: "…knowledge…[as] the specifically symbolic power to impose the principles of the construction of reality—in particular, social reality—is a major dimension of political power" (p. 161). Newsworkers make news out of daily occurrences within the ideological boundaries to serve a "media reality" to audiences, and new occurrences rise in response to these "realities", then filtered into another round of "mediated realities" (Lang & Lang, 1955).

News paradigm is a professionalized set of models of information gathering, with news routines as its core, within "a hegemonic framework, articulated by the dominant ideology" (Reese, 1990, p. 403). Gans (1979) calls it "paraideology", not quite as deliberate and well-integrated as ideology. The seminal studies by White (1950), Breed (1955) and many others on newsrooms show the shaping power of newsworkers on social reality. Gans (1979) provides a sociological account of how all participants in the newsmaking process—journalists, sources, audience—collaborate and negotiate to "decide what is news" and how the news is reported.

News production is a structural construction, a collective enterprise that is reached through collaboration in various forms. In the new media ecology, citizen journalism empowered by new ICTs is gaining increasing momentum in working together with traditional journalism professionals to shape a social reality provided by news media. This increasingly networked endeavor requires more spatial perspective in journalism study. Bourdieu's field theory offers a closer look into media sociology. As newsmaking is a

collective construction of social reality, and "every individual journalist is just an expression of the field" (Bourdieu, 1998), it is therefore necessary to study the journalistic field, rather than journalists or news organizations, as the unit of analysis, in any endeavor to understand the process and dynamics in the collective construction of social reality.

1.2 Journalistic Field as the Unit of Analysis

1.2.1 Bourdieu and the field

The notion of power relations in cultural production is elaborated by Bourdieu (1986, 1994). He uses the concept of "*field*" to refer to the social space in which *agents* (isolated individuals, groups or institutions), whose *positions* in the field are defined by their *habitus* (systems of dispositions) and the *capital* they possess, compete or struggle with each other for political, economic and cultural capitals. A field is the space of positions, constituted by the power relations within the space, or a social space of competition and alliances and co-operations between agents (Neveu, 2007). It is relatively autonomous social space with its own "*nomos*", or laws, situated in a broader field of power.

To understand the practices of agents in a field of cultural production, one does not only need to understand the structure of the field and individual agents' *habitus*, but also how the whole field is situated in relation to the broader field of power. Randal Johnson (Bourdieu & Johnson, 1993) identifies three levels of analysis in Bourdieu's field theory to be followed: the position of a specific field within what Bourdieu calls the field of power (i.e. the set of dominant power relations in society, or where it posits on a scale of economic and political capital); the structure of the field (i.e. the structure of the positions taken by agents competing for legitimacy in the field as well as the objective characteristics of the agents themselves); and the genesis of the producers' *habitus* (i.e. the structured and structuring dispositions which generate practices).

These three levels of analysis in field study are also noted by Bourdieu himself:

> *First, one must analyze the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power. In the case of artists and writers, we find that the literary field is contained within the field of power where it occupies a dominated position … Second, one must map out the objective structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions who compete for the legitimate form of specific authority of which this field is the site. And, third, one must analyze the habitus of agents, the different systems of dispositions they have acquired by internalizing a determinate type of social and economic conditions, and which find in a definite trajectory within the field under consideration a more or less favorable opportunity to become actualized.* (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 104)

Hence the concept of field does not only unpack any cultural production analysis into interrelated layers of individual producers (*habitus* of agents) and the profession (structure within the field), but also its relation to power of economy, politics and culture (the position of the field in the broader field of power); and most importantly, it locates the subject of scrutiny or any of its analysis level into a historical (emphasizing the genesis) and structural context.

1.2.2 Journalistic Field

In conceptualizing the notion of field in relation to cultural production, Bourdieu did not specifically address "journalistic field" until in his late academic life (1998, 2005):

> *Journalism is a microcosm with its own laws, defined both by its position in the world at large and by the attractions and repulsions to which it is subject from other such microcosms* (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 39).

Bourdieu puts journalistic field in broader power relations with other fields and forces, to emphasize the structural construction of news. It rides on a scale between heteronomous pole, where economic (pressures from audience and advertisers) and political power is dominant, and autonomous pole, where cultural or symbolic power is dominant. But

in his classic critique of French television as a case of highly heteronomous journalistic field subject to huge pressures from the broader field of power, Bourdieu mainly addressed the economic power as the dominant heteronomous pressure onto the field, leaving the political power largely ignored.

Benson (2005) developed Bourdieu's under-elaborated notion of journalistic field by incorporating the elaboration of pressures from political field, structural-ecological properties, and historical path-dependent processes. These properties together are expected to produce the "cultural inertia" within the journalistic field (p. 104). Other researchers using or critiquing Bourdieu's crude notion of journalistic field also acknowledge the importance of political power pitifully being overlooked by Bourdieu (Darras, 2005; Schudson, 2005).

Highlighting political power as a dominant heteronomous pressure is particularly essential and necessary for media studies in non-democracies, such as China, where heavy political pressures onto media are institutionalized. Chinese journalism is much skewed toward the very heteronomous pole, for its overwhelmingly dominant political power, rather than pressures from audience and advertisers alone.

Bourdieu's "journalistic field" explicitly notes that news is produced by journalistic field, rather than by journalists. Since journalists are position seekers in the power relations with other agents, journalism study shouldn't analyze individual journalists or news outlets alone, but to understand them in the larger context of dynamics within and between these relatively autonomous yet structurally homologous "fields". The practice of journalists should thus be understood via three parameters: the relative position of the news medium and the positions occupied by the journalists themselves, as well as the structural position of the journalistic field per se.

This suggests that there are hierarchical power relations within and between the journalistic field and other fields, and researchers take a systematic and dynamic approach,

connecting micro, mezzo, and macro levels of analysis in news production study (Benson, 2006; Bourdieu, 2005). While treating individual journalists, ownership, ideology, or newsroom routines as the unit of analysis, the study should not stop short of examining "the entire universe of journalists and media organizations acting and reacting in relation to one another" (Benson & Neveu, 2005. p. 11). Attention should be focused on the boundary and structure of the field, both of which are essentially power struggles.

1.2.3 Field of Foreign Correspondence

Constructing the Concept

Besides Benson, others such as Neveu (2005, 2007), Hesmondhalgh (2006) and Couldry (2003) have placed journalism in a relational and dynamic social space, thus departing from the tendency toward media-centrism (Lindell, 2015). Van Ginneken (1998) also subscribes to this view by noting that news making is a consensus of intersubjectivities, which are "always situated and shaped socio-historically" (p. 19). This perspective bridges the analytical divide between the macro-sociological level of structural factors and the micro-sociological level of organizational factors (Dickinson, 2008); it also bridges between agency and structure.

Field theory has been thus applied to empirical journalism studies such as Schultz (2007) and Willig (2013) focusing on "doxa" news values as "constructed by reading the positions in the field" in Swedish TV newsroom, and Krause (2011)'s focus on the shifting autonomy of journalistic field in the United States; Murrell (2014)'s study on the relational interaction between foreign correspondents and their fixers is another brilliant attempt in this regard.

But such applications, like Bourdieu's own analysis on French journalistic field, only focus on a specific national journalistic field. Bourdieu did very briefly mention the symbolic

dominance of American media as an example of the relations between national journalistic field in France and the global journalistic field; yet field perspective is still rare in comparative foreign correspondence studies. Benson (2006) and Hallin (2005) especially applaud using journalistic field to underscore cross-national differences. Benson (2006) for example compares the "political/literary" French journalism and the "informational" American journalism, and argues that the comparison helps to map out the "variable qualities of the field and field configurations" (p. 86) including the external and internal economic organization, the restrictive or enabling role of the state (as the narrow sense of "political field"), historical trajectory and level of autonomy, and internal morphology and demography of the field.

Existing scholarship on foreign correspondents and foreign news production have their focus and perspectives either on the agents or the structure of such social space. For example, many, especially earlier scholarships, mainly tap on foreign correspondents' demographic profile and other characteristics (Hess, 1996, 2005; Lambert, 1956; Mowlana, 1975; Nair, 1991; Terzis, 2008; Willnat & Weaver, 2003); Erickson and Hamilton (2006), Hamilton and Jenner (2004) identified the evolved different overseas assignment modes. These studies have a clear focus on individual agents and their morphologies in the field, rather than the broader structure.

Other scholars focus on the determinants of foreign news selection and flow (Chang & Lee, 1992; Chang et al., 1987; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Nossek, 2004; Wu, 1998, 2000, 2007), which span across individual (gatekeeper factors), organizational, institutional (e.g. Golan [2006]'s study on inter-media agenda setting) and sociocultural constraints (see, e.g. Starck & Villanueva, 1992). But these studies only focus on "selection", shunning away from the "reinterpretation" process; as van Ginneken (1998) and other media sociology scholars

rightly pointed out, newspeople's construction of the mediated reality involves both selection and reinterpretation.

The structural power behind interpretation in foreign news reporting has been addressed, though not extensively yet. Lee at al. (2002) studied the foreign media coverage on Hong Kong handover and concluded that national frame dominates the global media spectacle; Song and Lee (2014, 2016)'s study on US journalists covering China in the 1970s and 1980s identified the authority structure and "enduring values" behind US correspondents' "journalistic paradigm shifts". Such studies take merits for brilliantly mapping out the broader power structure in foreign correspondence, but pitifully shunned away from examining the agency; foreign correspondence, in other words, is not treated as a social space with its own autonomy and norms.

The ethnographic study by Pedelty (1995) on US war correspondents in El Salvador is an exemplar locating agents in the structures to examine the dynamics of foreign news reporting, but the innate unstructured data collection of ethnographic study casts doubts on the external validity of such works. As Willig (2013) rightly points out, ethnographic studies on journalistic practice "are less convincing when it comes to documenting and analyzing the structures that enable and constrain journalistic practice" (p. 373).

These gaps could be hopefully filled by adopting the notion of a "foreign correspondence field", which effectively bridges agency and structure in a relational, structuralist-constructivist approach. It emphasizes power relations as the structuring drive for any practice, and locates the positions and practice of agents and institutions into the broader power relations to scrutinize. For example, to interpret the aforementioned inter-media agenda setting, one can draw on the field approach to identify some agenda-setting news organizations, such as the *New York Times,* as possessing more capitals, economic and symbolic, thus powerful enough to "deform all the space, force all the other space to organize

itself around it" (Benson, 1998, p. 469. trans. from Bourdieu). They acquire advantageous positions through competition with other news organizations and internalization of the dominant position of the nation-state in the global communication arena.

Meanwhile, foreign correspondence draws on power relations across national borders; for example, correspondents born and educated in UK may work for news media of the US in China. Hence, it is important to understand the power relations between the field of foreign correspondence itself and the broader field of power of and across different national context. But existing studies almost unanimously focus on western foreign correspondents or foreign correspondents based in western countries. Stories from the other side of the world may fill a void.

The power relations in the field of foreign correspondence are arguably more complicated as it is situated in a global social space, or a trans-national power field, rather than in a single nation-state context. It is not only dictated by the power field of the home country, but also by the power relations between home and host countries, which is to be conceptualized as national interests of home country. The concept of "field" adds complexity of multiple national contexts, woven with different sets of power relations and economic and political capitals, to the analysis. Such intertwined trans-national power relations are especially worth studying when power struggles between foreign correspondents and host country's institutional powers are prevailing and active, such as in the case of China.

Foreign correspondents working for different news organizations of various national contexts are *agents* with certain *habitus*. Journalists acquire values and preconceptions through what van Ginneken (1998) identifies as "threefold socialization": cultural, professional, and organizational. They seek and take on their own *positions*, which are the legitimized and institutionalized social conditions of news production in the field. They interact and negotiate in multiple power relations with other players from sources, audience,

peers and editors, to regulators, political actors, interest group, etc. from both their home country and host China, from both within and outside the field of foreign correspondence. It is an ensemble of dynamics in and among these relational power struggles that defines the foreign correspondence in a specific host country.

Given a clearly laid out levels of analysis, placing foreign correspondence in a field perspective is not only possible, but also epistemologically rewarding. It offers a relational and dynamic approach and, as Benson (2004) notes, a cross-national context in which nation-state variation can be best situated to contest with other powers or sources of influence.

1.3 Modelling the Field: A Hierarchical Framework

Bourdieu's notion of journalistic field, however valuable in addressing relational and dynamic systems of power, is by no means a clear-cut framework for journalism studies (Benson, 2006; Hesmondhalgh, 2005; Marliere, 1998). Nonetheless, Benson (2006) argues for the benefits of incorporating field theory into existing models in the sociology of news.

1.3.1 Hierarchy of Influence and the Field of Foreign Correspondence

Journalistic field, in Bourdieuian terms, is on a hierarchical ladder of multiple diverse fields, with its broader fields in sequence being the cultural production field and larger field of power (the ensemble of economic and political fields); the national journalistic field is also situated in the global social space. Thus it seems the structural location of the field of foreign correspondence can be conceptualized as in twofold hierarchy: the one of journalistic field nested in the economic and political fields, and the one of foreign correspondence field vis-à-vis the national journalistic field of host and home countries, all situated in a global journalistic field. In other words, the study involves the structural position of a hierarchy of individual agent, news organizations, and the journalistic field in the host country, home countries as well as globally.

Shoemaker and Reese (1996, 2013)'s *Hierarchy of Influences Model* may partly help to unpack Bourdieu's field theory. They propose a five-level hierarchy of influences model in studying news media and news making (1996, 2013). Forces shaping journalists' practice of newsmaking are organized into a hierarchical five-level model, from the most micro to the most macro: individual level, including personal demographic characteristics, background and experiences, attitudes, values and beliefs, professional backgrounds, roles and ethics; routines level of the patterned news making practices (rules, norms, procedures) widely accepted and observed in newsrooms; organizational level, including organizational structure, editorial autonomy, economic expectations, etc.; institutional (extra-media) level, including influence from the government, advertisers, news sources, interest groups, and other media organizations; and social system level, where the whole media system is examined against its relation with the larger social interests. Factors at different levels interact across levels and can be compared across different contexts. It is the nested contextual structural factors that shape journalistic work.

This *Hierarchy of Influences* model "proposes important distinctions between levels of analysis and locates the individual journalist within a web of organizational and ideological constraints" (Reese, 2001). This "web of organizational and ideological constraints" is what Bourdieu would call "a social space with power relations", though not all of the power relations in the journalistic field. Encompassing micro, mezzo and macro levels, the levels-of-analysis helps to sort out the multidirectional and diverse power relations in the field of foreign correspondence.

Journalists as *agents* in the field form the individual level of analysis in Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchy model. The notion of *habitus* or *dispositions* in Bourdieuian term includes their demographic characteristics, educational background, priori life and career experience, values and beliefs in the profession as well as in general. The habitus shapes their

different positions, which legitimize their power and capital in the field. For example, correspondents with higher education and richer experience with elite media outlets (possessing more symbolic capital, that is, more autonomous than heteronomous) would have higher chance of occupying a higher status, thus a more autonomous and higher position in the field, which in turn legitimize their symbolic capital. Between correspondents, they cooperate and compete with each other, driven by what Bourdieu calls "positional pressures" (1998, p. 49), which leads to their routine practice such as press review, and potential homogenization of final news product.

Routinized practices are norms passed down in or across newsrooms along the historical trajectory of journalism as a profession. Entrants pick up these routines as unquestioned rules to resist external pressures in the field, thus securing their positions. Like inertia, these norms are routinized and naturalized, thus endure and are seldom subject to change. These routines reflect what Kuhn terms as "paradigm" (1970). Both Hallin (1992) and Høyer (2005) observe that contemporary journalists have better internalized the basic norms of journalism, which now "have crossed borders" (Høyer, 2005, p. 9). These widely accepted newsroom norms, or "newsroom inertia", not only mirrors the historical account of power struggle between journalistic field with the external pressures, but also reflect the current structural position of the field, and especially that of the newsroom in the field.

Organizational influence is the power relations between the newsrooms and broader institutional forces (profit pressure or political pressure), as well as between journalists and other players in the bureaucracy of news organizations (editors, management, etc.). In other words, influence at organizational level measures the position of the news organization in the field, and the position of individual journalist in the news organization. Correspondents with higher autonomy in news organizations that are situated near the autonomous pole face

different pressure and influence than those with less autonomy and working in news organizations situated near the heteronomous pole.

The focus of institutional level, as Reese (2001) argues, is on those "systemic, patterned, and ongoing ways media are connected with their host society." These institutional position holders locate within or outside field of foreign correspondence. For example, governing bodies, regulators and other news organizations are major power players at institutional level who occupy their positions within the journalistic field[1], whereas audience and advertisers are located in the immediate economic field outside the field of foreign correspondence. State coercion or censorship is a typical power player in the immediate political field, while keeping close interaction with the field as well as with foreign correspondents.

The final level of analysis of social system in this *Hierarchical Model,* together with the aforementioned external institutional factors, echo what Bourdieu emphasizes as the broader field of power, where the field of foreign correspondence is positioned between the autonomous pole and the heteronomous pole. The difference is that the external institutional factors directly exert their influence onto foreign correspondents' news production, while social system at the most macro level functions in a more invisible and indirect way, influencing journalists' practice by affecting institutional pressures or organizational objectives, as well as invisibly shaping the values of individual journalists (Shoemaker & Reese, 2013). For example, in comparing the national journalistic fields in France and the United States, Benson (2005) notes that French journalists are more concerned with "expressing their opinion" than in digging up "facts", compared with their American peers (p. 98). These, as in path independency, are the impact from national journalistic fields of home

[1] A field is made up of governing bodies, rules and regulations, and languages which both influence practitioners and evaluate their activities (Webb, Schirato & Danaher, 2002)

countries onto journalists who are professionally socialized in these distinct national journalistic fields.

As Reese (2001) notes, this hierarchical model helps to situate any study in the sociology of journalism within "a structural context" (p. 174). Meanwhile, though methodologically we can draw lines between different levels in this hierarchical model, epistemologically there exists no clear-cut boundary between levels. Relationships among different levels, which Shoemaker and Reese (2013) warn not to ignore, can also be adequately addressed from a field perspective. Therefore, in reverse, field theory as a conceptual tool benefits to cut across the five hierarchical levels to integrate key players and interactions into a holistic system of powers. In fact, Shoemaker notes that journalistic field is "the interaction of factor in the model" of five-level of hierarchy (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009, p. 120).

Above discussion suggests that if we could analyze the power struggles in and of this foreign correspondence field against the hierarchy model, we may approach a clearer picture of the dynamics of foreign correspondence in contemporary China, through comparing the power of influence from each major relation on journalists' practice in the field. By doing so, we could have the opportunity to understand the main shaping force of foreign news production from a rare scholarly scrutiny inside the field.

To incorporate the notion of field into the *Hierarchical Model* bridges journalistic field with previous traditional news production studies which mostly limit their visions either on organizational levels or macro level emphasizing the role of societal factors.

1.3.2 Modelling the Hierarchical Model

In an effort to build up a model to unpack the dynamics of the field of foreign correspondence in China, I identified from the five hierarchical levels some of the most

salient influencing factors on foreign correspondents' journalistic practice in China, based on an examination of previous literature on news production and China correspondence.

At individual level, be it the well-debated and extensively applied "gatekeeping theory" or in what Mills (1963) criticizes as "molecular" approach, individual newsworkers' personal beliefs and values are widely held for deciding what's news (Breed, 1955; Patterson & Donsbach, 1996; White, 1950). Their individual background characteristics, including gender (Armstrong, 2004; Rodgers & Thorson, 2003), professional values and attitudes (McLeod & Hawley, 1964), are believed to have an impact on news production. These individual traits are *habitus,* "an organizing principle of practices" (Neuve, 2007), learned through their primary and secondary journalistic socializations. As Bourdieu argues:

> *The habitus is not only a structuring structure, which organizes practices and the perception of practices, but also a structured structure: the principle of division into logical classes which organizes the perception of the social world is itself the product of internalization of the division into social classes.* (Bourdieu, 1984[1979], p. 170)

At a higher level, newsrooms have traditionally been the focal point to understand how news is produced at the mezzo level (Epstein, 1974; Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Tuchman, 1978). Routinized news worthiness (Clayman & Reisner, 1998), defensive routines such as objectivity, and space and time constraints (Tuchman, 1978), exert considerable influence on news content. Shoemaker and Reese (2013) also identity the influence on news content from media groupthink (Crouse, 1973; McCluskey, 2008; Sigal, 1973) and source routines (Sigal, 1973) at routine level.

Another mezzo level is from the vantage point of news organization, where different gatekeepers in the news organization from journalists, editors to management, engage in negotiating a story and its presentation (Bailey & Lichty, 1972; Breed, 1955; Gans, 1979). The negotiation is shaped by economic considerations of the news organization (Sigal, 1973;

Gans, 1979; Lesly, 1991), ownership (Dunaway, 2008; Scott, Gobetz & Chanslor, 2008), as well as organizational structure (Hart, 2009; Gade, 2008). Economic consideration and ownership can be taken as indicators for the structural position of the news organization.

Various institutional players in both host and home countries work together with foreign journalists to form a networked media space, where sources, audience, other news organizations, advertisers and state actors (through regulations, governing, and other forms of political pressure such as state coercion) all take part in the process of news making (Breed, 1955; Corcoran & Fahy, 2009; Reese & Danielian, 1989). Of them institutional players within the foreign correspondence field include source, other news organizations, regulators and government (as governing bodies, of both host and home countries). Audience, advertisers and state coercion are major external sources of pressure.

At the most macro national or societal level, the whole foreign correspondence field is situated in the global social space, meshing power relations with the political and economic power in a nation-state context. The national journalistic field of the home countries is where foreign journalists internalized local journalistic cultures and formed their journalistic habitus. The power relations between host and home countries in such nation-state context are the subject of analysis at this level. But they ask for being operationalized into measurable variables.


Foreign news reporting in nature is ethnocentric (van Ginneken, 1998). Lee et al. (2002)'s study of foreign correspondents' coverage on Hong Kong handover eloquently demonstrated the structuring power of national interest in global news event. As the international society is still organized in sovereign states, foreign newsmaking is "inherently ethnocentric, nationalistic, and even state-centered" (Lee at al., 2002, p. 2). Thus "national interest" as an indicator of the power relations between countries serves well as an independent variable in assessing foreign correspondence.

To locate an indicator for national journalistic fields of home countries, we may turn to national media system. Hallin and Mancini (2004)'s analysis in their seminal work *Comparing Media Systems* identified four key dimensions of media system: commercial media market, political parallelism, professionalism and state intervention. All of these four dimensions in effect measure the degree of autonomy of journalistic field, hence echoing the field perspective of autonomy in the broader power field. The less developed its mass media market, the higher political parallelism, the lower professionalism and the higher state intervention, the less autonomous the journalistic field is in the broader field of power.

Thus this study borrows the concept of "media system" from Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2013) to facilitate the measurement of national journalistic field in a comparative context; the notion of "national interests" (Finnemore, 1996; Weldes, 1996) is similarly borrowed from international relations to connote the power relations between the home country and host country. These two variables are thus to operationalize the analysis at national level of influence on foreign correspondence.

To model such a field of foreign correspondence with hierarchical power relations, I visualize the conceptualized model as below:

Figure 1. *Model of the Field of Foreign Correspondence*



Model based on Bourdieu (2000 [1977], p. 168) (1983, p. 319) and Shoemaker & Reese (2013, p. 9)

As shown in Figure 1, the foreign correspondence field, together with other national journalistic fields, are situated within the broader field of power, or "global social space", where national interest and media system symbolize the power in the national journalistic field of each home country and the power relations between host and home country. The

institutional factors are arbitrarily put in two boxes: the one with sources, competitors (other news organizations), regulators and governing bodies in both home and host countries represents position-taking institutional players within the foreign journalistic field, whereas the other one including audience, advertisers, and state coercion refers to external institutional players. The foreign journalistic field is positioned somewhere in between the positive pole of autonomy and negative pole of heteronomy. Within the field, individual agents (foreign correspondents) as well as their news organizations take up different positions either closer to the positive autonomous pole of professionalism or closer to the negative heteronomous pole of market profit or/and political parallelism. Their positions are in constant interaction with their habitus, and with other players in the field, at routines, organizational and institutional levels.

1.4 China: Attractive News Hotspot, Unwelcoming Media Culture

This study seeks to examine the specific foreign correspondence field in the non-democratic setting of contemporary China. The wide variety of foreign media operating in China, the country's strong tradition of party-media system (Zhao, 1998, 2012) in which media are held to be "mouthpiece of the party" and highly restrictive media controls (Shirk, 2011)[2], as well as the long standing antagonism between China and foreign especially Western press corps, make the field of China correspondence an interesting case to unpack.

As mentioned earlier, Bourdieu, almost in passing, only narrated the concept of journalistic field in the democratic setting of France; subsequent scholars such as Benson, though having rightly pointed out the missing of political pressures as a significant heteronomous power, still reside in the liberal democratic contexts of Anglo-American countries. In this regard, a scrutiny on the foreign journalistic field in the non-democratic

[2] Press freedom in China is rated as "not free" by Freedom House and ranks 176 out of 180 countries in RSF's 2016 World Press Freedom Index: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/china

setting of China is expected to expand our understanding of journalistic field in diverse social settings and shed new insights into the collective intellectual efforts in building field theory as a promising new paradigm for media studies.

China's rapid economic development outshining any major nation and growing assertive diplomatic stance brought it as the emerging new power, or even the new world order leader, to extensive global media attention. With the America-led liberal world order in an unpredictable state of change especially since 2016 when Britain voted to exit the EU and populism rising high in major established Western democracies, China's leading role is being heatedly debated and growingly accepted on both regional and global scales. The whole world is watching China attentively, largely via media coverage. It has become an arguably international news hotspot, attracting global journalists with "a billion stories" (Osnos, 2013) and being "one of the wonderful places to be for a reporter, because it is both amazing and important" (Forsythe, personal communication, 2016).

News organizations are also trying to maintain, if not expand, their presence in China. The number of registered foreign correspondents only showed a slight drop, from 682 in 2013 to 636 in 2015[3]. Presence of major media outlets especially from countries such as the United States, Britain and Japan remains stable. NPR has 17 overseas bureaus, but only in China it has two correspondents, with one based in Beijing and the other covering from Shanghai. Smaller news outlets such as *India Today* only opened one overseas bureau which is found in China. *Economist* has launched a special column for China, the first time in its history.

The Chinese economy has transitioned from developing-country status to newly-industrialized economy (NIE) status, on its way to a fully developed economy. Riding on this economic success, Chinese President Xi Jinping, ever since his assuming power in 2012, has

[3] The figure is based on registration information at *International Press Center* of Foreign Ministry.

been aiming at a massive vision of the "great rejuvenation of Chinese nation" coupled with omni-directional efforts in building up China's strong image and pervasive influence in international relations and global affairs, from proposing *One Belt One Road Initiative* as an "innovative global governance" (He, 2017) to the ongoing unprecedented assertiveness in the South China Sea dispute[4]. But its political system remains rigidly authoritarian, known for a media system highly controlled by the Party, or even more so under Xi's reign (Lam, 2015). Such paradox of China's economic prowess and continued political authoritarian control is the first challenge for foreign correspondents in China to reconcile, posing one of the most conflict-driven power relations in journalism and nation-state.

1.4.1 Party Journalism in China

China is a transitional and mixed society (Curran & Park, 2000), better to be labeled a "partially liberalized authoritarian" system (Chan & Qiu, 2002, p. 36) or "Communist capitalism" (Lee, 2005, p. 108). Media system in China started as a Maoist style signifying the Leninist press theory and the Soviet model (Zhao, 1998, 2011), which showed some sign of liberalization adopting market reforms in the 1980s but get fortified after the failed democracy movement in 1989.

"Party journalism" is dominant in China both epistemologically and practically. In practice for example, even Hu Yaobang, who is considered the most liberal leader of China, and purged in 1987, states the role of Party journalism as "the mouthpiece of the Party"[5].

Throughout the 1990s, Chinese media saw a sweeping change toward commercialization, still the primary context remains party journalism apparatus. Marching into the new century, China has grown increasingly integrated into international society, marked by its entry into WTO in 2001 and winning the bid for Olympics in 2000. Chinese

[4] More details about China in SCS dispute can be found in Chapter 7.
[5] Hu Yaobang. On the Party's Journalism Work. *People's Daily*. 14 August 1985. P1.

media showed a stronger "nascent journalistic independence" during the deepening process of commercialization and increased contact with the Western media (Zhao, 2012). But President Xi curbs the trend towards any journalistic independence from Party control by explicitly requiring Party journalism to "strictly follow the party's leadership, reflect the Party's will, and be the mouthpiece of the Party and the people", "align their ideology, political thinking and deeds to those of the Party, and focus on positive reporting only".[6] Under President Xi's reign since 2012, Chinese media culture sees a shift further toward a more tightly controlled authoritarian mode with a strong conservative leader, who calls for tighter ideology and press control (Economy, 2014; Lam, 2015).

Party journalism in China is thus still a structured dominance to ensure the legitimacy of CCP ruling, running contrary to the Anglo-American tradition of journalism as the "Fourth Estate". To borrow Hallin and Mancini (2004)'s four-dimension analytical toolkit, media system in China is extremely high in political parallelism and lacking professionalism, with a not fully developed mass media market (Zhao, 2012). It is heavily controlled by the ruling Communist Party, displaying "the highest level of political instrumentalization" (Zhao, 2012, p. 161).

The impact of the dominant party journalism culture of China on foreign correspondents is mainly reflected on the institutional factors of government regulations and state coercion, which include codified regulations such as credentials control[7], regulations restricting access to sources and information[8], and a set of uncodified coercion and censorship mechanism ranging from official flak, access blockage, to harassment and

[6] Xi's speech in a symposium on the Party's media work on February 19, 2016
[7] Foreign journalists working in China are required to apply for J visa and accreditations; both are renewed on a yearly basis.
[8] Examples of such restrictive regulations include: Chinese nationals are not allowed to work as journalists for foreign media; Chinese journalists are not allowed to pass information to foreign media; certain areas (Tibet) are not freely accessible for foreign journalists.

surveillance[9]. Such institutional constraints are most likely to put foreign correspondents, especially those from liberal media tradition, in oppositional stance with Chinese authorities. These arguably embody the previously discussed intense power struggle between foreign correspondents as agents and institutional political constraints.

These codified and uncodified political pressures, together with the power relations from economic field (pressures from audience and advertisers), exert influence onto foreign journalistic field, where foreign correspondents adapt their practice accordingly to maintain their positions amid all the pressures.

1.4.2 Reporting from China: Alice in the Wonderland of Middle Kingdom

Geographically vast, culturally diverse and ideologically remote as China has been for foreign correspondents, there is no easy interpretation of this Middle Kingdom. French (2009) likens foreign correspondents trying to get sense out of China to Lewis Carroll's Alice who, "after passing through her looking glass, found herself in the Garden of Live Flowers where she realized that no path ever leads where she expects, and the twists and turns on the journey result in unexpected places and chance encounters" (p. 3). Here lies an important implication: as Alice, foreign correspondents come to China with expectations, *dispositions* or *habitus*. Their post as a China correspondent is the result structured by their previously structured *habitus*, either consciously or unconsciously. So is their news production practice.

An example is the legendary publisher Henry Luce and his journalism-personal-agenda-mixed endeavor in China. During WWII, Luce and his *Time* and *Life* magazines' unhidden support for Chiang's Nationalist China is widely recognized as having cast huge influence on Roosevelt administration's China policy, which also partly led to the huge shock

[9] China uses its large and sophisticated internet filtering system Great Firewall to surveillance and censor foreign media as well; other extra-legal sabotage activities including discrediting foreign media, detaining or harassing foreign correspondents.

and disappointment of "loss" of China, after general optimism about Nationalist China over Communist China.[10]

Western correspondents were most famously failed by their Alice-style expectation during reporting the democracy movement in 1989, when the student protest in Tiananmen Square was brutally crashed, completely against most Western correspondents' over-romantic presumption of China. James Mann (2001) notes: "we need to challenge existing assumptions and be ready for the unexpected. By doing so, we can avoid the sense of shock that erupts in America at each swing of Chinese history, including most recently after the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989" (p. 106).

Journalists and scholars have made painful inquiry and exploration afterwards as to the over-romantization and illusion of China in the 70's and 80's (see, e.g. Bennett, 1990; Farmer, 1990; Long, 1992; Mirsky, 1999). Song and Lee (2014, 2015, 2016) in their series studies on various cohorts of American correspondents' change of paradigms in covering China in the decades from 1970s to 1990s, note that journalists largely employ the "enduring values" of America as paradigms to make sense of China. In the 70's American correspondents largely romantized China through the lens of what the two authors call "embedded journalism" in political context, and their "preconceptions" intertwined with insufficient information access contribute to the perception gap; whereas during the decade of the 80's American journalists shifted from "radical" to a "liberal" paradigm, embracing "American-cum-universal values", reporting "enthusiastically and rather uncritically" (Song & Lee, 2015, p. 4), and after 1989 they put on a "strategic ritual of irony" (Song & Lee, 2015) to cover the "intellectually and morally tainted" post-Tiananmen China.

Likewise, Lee (1990) and Womack (1990), in their respective studies of American journalists covering China, also point out the influential mechanisms of "enduring American

[10] See, for example, Salisbury, H. E. (1990). China reporting: From Red Star to Long March. *Voices of China: The interplay of politics and journalism*, 216-228.

values" embedded in journalists' perceptions and practices. Lee (1990) especially candidly highlighted their "epistemological ethnocentrism on China", noting that most American journalists are "patriotic individuals with a vested interest in bolstering US global strength" (p. 20).

Scholars further provide similar accounts in comparative context. In a study on the different perceptions of China in media images in Britain, the US and Switzerland in the first half of the 20th century, Knusel (2012) notes that correspondents tend to interpret stories about China based on their national interests, self-perceptions and cultural stereotypes. In the aforementioned Lee et al. (2002)'s comparative study on foreign media coverage on Hong Kong handover, the researchers scrutinized reporters and news coverage from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, US, UK, Canada, Australia and Japan, and concluded that foreign correspondents largely adhere to their enduring values and dominant ideologies even when reporting such a "global media event" as Hong Kong handover.

These studies have in effect set the tone for scrutinizing correspondents' diverse habitus in historical and cultural trajectory, by noting the importance of individual correspondents' preconceptions, self-perceptions, national values and interests, etc. (though none of them directly use this field concept), an exemplar being Lee (1990)'s assertion that American journalists "are members of the professional class whose upbringing and basic values are deeply embedded in the dominant American culture" (p. 19).

Back to the metaphor of "Alice in the wonderland of Middle Kingdom", if these studies have tapped on Alice's preconceptions, what is left unanswered is what wonders Middle Kingdom is to offer to Alice, and how Alice is to unpack and repack these wonders back to her fellow folks at home. The multi-layered power relations in the foreign journalistic field of China, especially how foreign correspondents interact and negotiate with regulations

and state coercion, and the competition and cooperation among foreign press corps in China, ask for scholarly attention.

The practice of individual foreign correspondent or individual news outlet should be understood in the larger context of both the news outlets where foreign correspondents are employed and other interacting institutions outside news outlets per se, with proper consideration of the dynamics affecting journalistic practice at both organizational level and institutional level. Only with more knowing on this, could we understand how the wandering Alice makes sense of the wonderland of Middle Kingdom, as well as why so.

1.5 Research Questions

This study seeks to understand the power relations and dynamics of the field of China reporting by foreign correspondents stationed in contemporary China, through a hierarchical analysis of power relations between foreign correspondents as agents and external pressures (both journalistic and non-journalistic), and how autonomous or heteronomous the field of China correspondence is against the broader power field at nation-state level.

It focuses on foreign correspondence in China during the most recent (the first) tenure of China's President Xi Jinping, from 2012 to 2017, the time of writing this thesis. This is a period of drastic change globally in every aspect of life. World economy is slowing down especially in established democracies; changes of regimes bring uncertainties in volatile countries in Middle East and North Africa especially during "Arab Spring"; wars never cease, creating huge refugee crisis for Western countries, the worst humanitarian crisis the world is facing since the end of the Second World War[11]; European Union as a unified world power is severely threatened and torn apart after UK voted for a "Brexit"; protectionism and populism rise on the high in every corner including Europe and America, where the world's

[11] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/11/world-faces-worst-humanitarian-crisis-since-1945-says-un-official

sole Superpower is now led by an unconventional and unstable real estate tycoon; meanwhile fake news and social media are further complicating the landscape of global journalism. Amongst this worldwide nervousness and bewilderment is a genuine need for better knowledge of the construction of reality.

At home, Xi is taking a distinctively tough and assertive governing style. Under his reign, China is seen growingly repressive on domestic public sphere yet assertive in global arena. Civil societies and dissents are being cracked down[12]; tighter regulations on Internet news gathering[13], international NGOs[14], etc. come out one after another; censorship both online and offline is getting appallingly rigid and tight, with Chinese journalists being jailed[15] and foreign correspondents being expelled[16]. Yet undeniably China has become an important power player and the whole world, especially those with close geopolitical ties with China, is eager to understand the implications of China's rise. Foreign correspondents, as sense makers, drawn by the paradox of a significant China and a repressive reporting environment, fight for their positions where they help to frame the world's understanding of China, and furthermore shape international relations. Especially in the internet age, foreign media coverage also shapes public discourse in China, by being largely circulated back into China.

China's rise may provide China correspondents better-than-ever organizational resource support and make it easier for them to mobilize interest from both audience and editors; also the boundary of the field or entry delimitation may be challenged to grow more diverse and competitive, as more individuals are trying to grab a position in the field. But the competition within the field is also understandably intensified, potentially resulting in changes on the power relations, for example, with external pressures.

[12] See, for example, 709 crackdown, at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2071188/709-lawyer-face-court-tianjin-subversion
[13] *Rules for the Implementation of Internet News Information Services Licensing* released in May, 2017.
[14] *Management of Foreign Non-Government Organizations Activities in China* released in April, 2016.
[15] For example, Gao Yu jailed and later released for illness in 2015 and Liu Wei jailed in 2015.
[16] The two most recent cases of expelling foreign correspondents are *Al Jazeera* English's Melissa Chan in 2012 (Chan, 2012) and French magazine *L'Obs*' Ursula Gauthier in the end of 2015 (Page, 2015).

The tension in change in the field of China correspondence is for now at its high level, experiencing pressure from transformation of media industry, change of global geopolitics and economy, as well as China's tightening policies domestically. All these make it overwhelmingly intriguing as well as urgent to examine the field of foreign correspondence in contemporary China.

This study seeks to understand the structure[17] of the foreign journalistic field in China and how the structure shapes news production practice. Based on a modeled foreign correspondence field with hierarchical levels of analysis, as visualized in Figure 1, I develop my first set of research questions from micro and mezzo levels:

RQ1. What is the current configuration of the field of China correspondence?

RQ1.1. Who are the key agents in the field of China correspondence?

RQ1.2. How do China correspondents' habitus, or individual traits, shape their positions and influence their news production practice in the field?

RQ1.3. How do China correspondents negotiate with pressures at routines level?

RQ1.4. What is the power structure within news organizations and how foreign correspondents negotiate with this organizational power relation and resources available at organizational level?

RQ1.5. What is the relative position of the news organizations, especially that between western and non-western news outlets, in reporting China? How does this media power structure influence China correspondents?

RQ1.6. How China correspondents negotiate with other institutional factors in the field, predominantly the state coercion in China?

[17] the structure of a field refers to the structure of the positions of individual agents and institutions competing for legitimate positions in the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

The second set of questions, from the macro perspective, address the power relation between China correspondence field and the broader field of power, which is operationalized into national journalistic field (measured by media system) and national interest. In other words, this inquiry is about the position of China correspondence field in a broader social space:

RQ2. Between the poles of autonomy and heteronomy, where is the field of China correspondence situated in the broader field of power?

RQ2.1. How are differences across media systems embedded in influencing power relations at previous four levels of analysis?

RQ2.2. How is national interest embedded in the final news content?

1.6 Research Methods

To answer the above questions, this study uses online survey and in-depth interview with China correspondents based in Beijing and Shanghai, assisted with secondary data of existing records by China correspondents, professional groups and researchers, to picture the structure and power relations within the foreign journalistic field in China in a comparative context across media systems, and a comparative discourse analysis of foreign news outlets' coverage of China to understand how national interest is embedded in news content.

Though several seminal studies on journalists' news production employed newsroom observation as the main methods (see, e.g. Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978), I decided against this research method. For one thing, it is very challenging and time-consuming for a three-year PhD program; for the other, foreign correspondents work in very different organizational settings compared with domestic journalists whom Gans (1979) and Tuchman (1978) studied, especially in that foreign correspondents mostly work in very small-sized newsrooms in host country. A large number of the foreign newsrooms in China are one-person bureaus. Even for

study on journalists in the most general sense, it is becoming less necessary to "make newsroom the center of attention", as much of journalists' work is done outside a newsroom (Dickinson, 2008; Zelizer, 2004). Thus newsroom observation may hardly generate a satisfactory picture of news making, even for organizational level, for this study.

I had developed my interest in international news in high school and had hoped to become a foreign correspondent myself, but my career path has been always circling around the profession of foreign correspondent, never really hit its core. When I decided on this topic as my doctoral thesis, I thought I would talk with these "China sense makers" from different influential news outlets, from different national settings, about how they make news here. Thus I wasn't fully prepared for the actual hardship of the study, which soon proved to be so overwhelming that it nearly smashed my research plan. The main difficulty came from the reluctance of most foreign correspondents to be interviewed. Most of them expressed suspicion about my real intention and identity: Am I a spy from Chinese government? Am I really contacting them for academic purpose?

After a painful and struggling attempt stretching from October 2015 to April 2016, by the end of 2016, I have collected 101 responses from China correspondents for online survey, which ask the respondents about their demographic characteristics, working routines, role perception and perceived influence.

The whole population of foreign correspondents effectively registered in mainland China at the time of the study (May 2015 to April 2016) with a valid email address provided by the "Foreign Press Directory" issued by International Press Office is selected for the survey (N=604). To maximize the response rate, I designed the questionnaire both in English and Chinese, and pre-tested it with former foreign correspondents in China.

From October 2015 to February 2016, four rounds of survey invitation were sent out. In several cases, the questionnaire was completed face to face, due to the respondents' concern

over online security, or for convenience when I visited the respondents' office or I met with respondents for coffee outside his/her working environment. No incentive was provided to respondents.

Of the 101 responses, 95 were collected via English language questionnaire, and 6 were from Chinese language version. Response rate is 16.7%. (Response rate of survey depends on the journalists' willingness thus is understandably low. In previous similar studies, the response rate for a survey among US foreign correspondents, based on a mailed paper questionnaire was 17%, or 152 responses out of a sample size of 900, in a study by Willnat and Weaver, 2003. As Wilnat and Weaver rightly note, "the transient nature of foreign correspondents" makes it especially difficult to have a satisfyingly large size of sample to study).

The respondents are from news outlets of 25 countries. For comparison across media systems, countries are regrouped into four clusters based on the similarities and differences of the media system of each country: the Liberal Model countries (US, UK, Canada, Ireland, Australia)[18], the Democratic Corporatist Model countries (Germany, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland), the Polarized Pluralist Model countries (France, Italy, Spain, Colombia), and non-Western countries[19].

The response rate is admittedly low. But some assurance can be gained by a Chi-Square Goodness of fit test (see Table 1) that shows little significant deviation ($p>.05$) of the country distribution of the sample from that of the population of foreign journalists in China. Some small misrepresentations are observed, such as the under-represented number of non-Western journalists, which is largely attributed to the missing of Japanese correspondents,

[18] Australia is added to the group of Liberal Model for its close pattern following the British political, economic and media institutions, and the same reason for grouping Colombia into Latin tradition of Polarized Pluralist Model (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002)

[19] Considering the distinct journalistic culture shared among non-Western countries (Hanitzsch et al, 2010; Voltmer, 2012), as well as the fact that correspondents from non-Western news organizations are much smaller in number, I group all Asian countries (excluding Australia), Eastern European countries and Middle East & African countries into one category: non-Western.[19]

who top in size among all foreign correspondents in China (N=117) but are among the least responsive (sample N=8). The flaw of underrepresented Japanese correspondents may be explained by the highly institutionalized journalistic culture of Japan and the sensitivity of Sino-Japan relations. Japanese correspondents are seen to be institutionalized into a "corporate mindset" rather than journalistic mindset, more identifying themselves as "belong to a particular company" (Hayashi & Kopper, 2014, p.1145); the sensitive Sino-Japan relations also renders Japanese correspondents reluctant to participate in research led by Chinese scholars[20].

Table 1.
Spread of Sample across Country

Country of News Org	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
Liberal Countries	36	32.9 (197)	3.1
Social Corporatist Countries	20	17.1 (102)	2.9
Polarized Pluralist Countries	18	15.3 (91)	2.7
Non-Western Countries	27	35.8 (214)	-8.8
Total	101		
$X^2(2, N = 101) = 3.429, p = .33$			

To substantiate the survey data, I conducted 19 in-depth interviews with former and current China correspondents. The identities of the correspondents who responded to the survey and whom I talked to are withheld. But of the 19 correspondents who accepted to be interviewed, two are from Indian news organizations, three from German news organizations, eight from American news organizations, four from international news agencies, one from Columbia and one from Turkey. Apart from the two Indian correspondents, no one from Asian news outlets (Japan, South Korea, etc.) responded to my interview request. It would be desirable to have a bigger interviewee size ranging from a more diverse national context. But due to logistic constraints I could not have a more satisfying sample size in a short period of

[20] Hannerz in his ethnographic study also notes the similar feature of Japanese correspondent. "They are reluctant to stick their necks out," as a Japanese correspondent explains (Hannerz, 2004, p.68).

time. The limited size of interviewee is hopefully remedied by secondary data retrieved from online records of correspondents' interviews, self-reported work accounts, and other relevant studies and reports such as annual reports by Foreign Correspondents Club of China.

As insufficient as only focusing on the agents in the journalistic field, only focusing on news content, either by content analysis or discourse analysis, is far from satisfying either. Bourdieu, trying in all his scholarly life to connect internal analysis with external analysis into a dynamic field study, notes that discourse analysis "has relapsed into indefensible forms of internal analysis" and "scientific analysis must work to relate to each other the space of work or discourse and the space of positions" (Johnson, 1993, p. 11). Hence this study tries to interweave individual account and media discourse in news product, so as to address the questions of China news production by foreign correspondents through incorporating these three levels of social reality: the position of *foreign correspondence field* within what Bourdieu calls the *field of power*; the structure of foreign correspondence field; the genesis of the habitus of the producers, which, in this case, are China correspondents. To achieve this goal, apart from looking into the individual correspondents and influencing factors as they perceive on their news production, via survey, interview and secondary data, national difference is also introduced in as a variable indicating the broader power field, via comparing media discourse in different national contexts.

A comparative examination of the influence from national interests of home country with host country on news production provides another perspective to understand the relative position of foreign journalistic field in the broader nation-state power field.

For this part, I focus on media discourse on China by media outlets from four countries: the United States (North American nation/world power), the United Kingdom (European nation/world power), Japan (Asian industrial power) and India (emerging Asian power). All of the four countries are established democracies, sharing similar journalism

values which are deemed to be the cornerstone of democracy; all have distinctive close interests as well as tensions with China, either be it geopolitical, economic or both[21]; the most important, which makes these cases suitable for the study, is that all of these countries have a strong, or somehow strong, presence of foreign journalists in China, though the presence varies in quantity. The US and Japan have the two largest correspondent corps in China, closely followed by Britain, while India only sees five correspondents based in Beijing.

Another reason to select these four countries is for the concern of language. Both United States and Britain are English speaking countries; English is one of the official languages and is widely used among educated in India; Japan is the only country where English is not used as official language[22], but it has widely-consumed English language media, which target on educated Japanese and expatriates living in Japan.

The case of South China Sea is selected to compare media discourse on this specific issue by media from these four distinctive national contexts, because of its international prominence and regional tension which best fits in a "China's rise" framework. The four selected nations have their respective national interests in the dispute, making it possible to compare news discourse against their own national interests. As an editorial on the *New York Times* explains, the issue is "as much about China's rise into a major world power as it is about this one sea" (Fisher, 2016). With China's growing presence in the region—by reclaiming lands to build artificial islands and deploying military staffing or patrols —the world is highly concerned about China's move and attitudes on the issue, regarding it about what kind of major power China is becoming—either a "responsible global leader" who respects and abides by existing global order shaped by major Western powers since the end

[21] The US has no previous colonial occupation ties with China, while Britain and Japan do. Yet Britain has no ongoing territorial disputes with China, while Japan and India do. US and China are the two biggest economies and competitors, while India and China are to biggest Asian economies and rivals in Asia.

[22] Though in 2000, then Prime Minister of Japan, Keizo Obuchi, did planned to make English the official second language. The plan never materialized, but many Japanese companies indeed have made English their official working language.

of WWII or a more “aggressive” superpower which seeks to overturn the statue quo and establish a new order. How global media cover the issue also largely reflects this framework.

The time of this study covers several highlights of the South China Sea disputes, one of which is the court of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea at The Hague ruling against China over its dispute with the Philippines on July 12, 2016. Coverage within two months of the ruling by mainstream newspapers from the four countries is selected for a qualitative content and discourse analysis.

Chapter 2 An Overview of the Field of China Correspondence

Admittedly, in the increasingly interconnected globe where the public have various information channels to know about the rest of the world, the foreign news hole in general is shrinking (Emery, 1989; Hannerz, 2004; Hachten & Scotton, 2011). Global media conglomeration in pursuit of maximum profit has also contributed to the decline of foreign correspondence. Even though foreign correspondence in general is undergoing "structural changes" (Sambrook, 2010), it is not dying out. The traditional market for foreign correspondence has declined for Western media, who have been the dominant players in international reporting for decades, if not a century (Fleeson, 2003; Sambrook, 2010). In contrast, China has been expanding its foreign correspondence capacity (Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International, China Central Television) to increase its international visibility commensurate with its growing world role. Qatar's *Al Jazeera* is also a prominent exception to the general decline of foreign correspondence.

Meanwhile, the profession of foreign correspondents has "evolved to flourish" (Hamilton & Jenner, 2004) to fit "a similarly connected and contextualized form of journalism" (Sambrook, 2010, p. 7). With the interconnectedness brought by globalization and new technology, the value of foreign correspondence is shifting from witness journalism to in-depth specialism.

In this sense, what Vartan Gregorian calls journalists as "sense maker" of the society (Shoemaker & Reese, 2013, p. 107) could only be more accurate for foreign correspondents, a group of enthusiastic, vigorous and adventurous observers, writers to help readers making sense of distant others, through a process of "selective articulation" (Van Ginneken, 1998). Foreign correspondence does not only provide world citizens with understanding of a mediated reality "foreign" to them, but also affect foreign policy which leads to an impact on

international relations and global power wrestle. As Ebo (1997) notes, "the international image of a nation as articulated in the international media is an important assessment of the acceptance or impact of a nation's foreign policy in the global arena" (p. 47). A conduit for influence from policy maker, both domestic and foreign, it is also a counter force to influence back on policy making.

The process of foreign news making is a tug of war between all stakeholders involved: foreign correspondents, editors and management of news organizations, sources, audience, advertisers, politicians, business elites, etc. This chapter unfolds an overall picture of the state of the field and identifies key players in it.

2.1 Historical Trajectory: A Brief History of Foreign Correspondence in China

Benson (2005) in summarizing major Bourdieuian arguments of theoretical significance clearly points out the importance of understanding the initial formation and subsequent historical trajectory of the journalistic field. To overview today's field of China correspondence, we should begin with a historical account of its formation, development and changes along the way.

The history of foreign reporting, especially Western reporting, from and about China, is originated from reporting national policy for the government of the foreign countries, and for the economic and industrial interests of that country in China. The first batch of foreign correspondents landed in China as early as 1820s. Since then, foreign correspondence has gone through the decline of Feudalist Qing, the Nationalists, and then the Communist China.

In covering contemporary China, or the China since the founding of PRC in 1949, foreign correspondents went through four phases in their touch of this new sovereignty: out of direct touch from 1949 to late 1970s; curious engagement in 1980s; skeptical observation after Tiananmen incident in 1989; and a mixed close concern for "China's rise" since the

beginning of the new century. Consequently, foreign media coverage on China also sees a similar four-phase change, though existing literature is mostly restricted to discussions on the first three phases. Taking American media's frames of China for example, it changes from "red China" and "virtuous Chinese" in the 1970s and "going capitalist" in the 1980s to a "repressive China" in the 1990s (Mann, 2001; Song & Lee, 2014, 2015, 2016).

After CCP came into power in 1949, China dispelled most Western correspondents; only a handful of "CCP-friendly" journalists were allowed to report in the new communist China (Chu, 1984). Farmer (1990) recounts that not one foreign correspondent was on site in Beijing to cover the historic moment when Mao Zedong announced the official establishment of the People's Republic of China. By the late 1950s, Communist China was so isolated that only Reuters, AP, AFP and some Canadian news outlets still had correspondents there (Hohenberg, 1967).

2.1.1 1960s~1970s: Red and Virtuous China

During the Cultural Revolution which started in 1966, foreign media had to observe the red China from Hong Kong, Tokyo, Bangkok, or even their home desks, and via China's official Xinhua News Agency. China reportage during this period was largely analysis and interpretation of official handouts and other second-hand accounts from mainland refugees and foreign business people visiting China (Chu, 1984). The vacuum of China reportage lasted till Ping Pong tournament in 1972, since when China gradually opened its door to international community as well as Western media, who were allowed to set their feet on the soil of Beijing for the first time ever since the Cold War. American journalists saw it a "golden opportunity" to "see the 'mysterious land' and to report it in a 'fresh way'" (Chu, 1984). Chinese government, hoping to influence American public opinion in favour of the communist regime over Taiwan as well as to enlist sympathy against the Soviet Union, staged comprehensive propaganda; as Chu (1984) writes, "Ping Pong diplomacy was turned

into banquet diplomacy", to which most American journalists fell. For the US, throughout the 1970s it allied with China to fight against the common enemy: the Soviet Union, and one of the notable influences on media coverage is the different treatment of human rights abuse in the Soviet Union and China— US media tended to downplay China's human rights abuse (Harding, 1990; Lee, 2002).

For the side of agents, these journalists came to China with little knowledge about this culturally and ideologically distant country. Few of them in the 1970s systematically studied China before their China assignments; what they largely relied on was the Maoist propaganda apparatus. Besides, against the background of domestic social movement in the US, many of these American journalists were themselves left-leaning activists holding huge hope for the communist model. For example, Song and Lee (2016) note that in the 1960s and 1970s, American correspondents' sympathies toward China were tied to their opposition to US involvement in the Vietnam War and domestic social injustice at home. Many of them were antiwar activist, such as Mike Chinoy, Edward Gargan, Orville Schell, just to name a few.

Thus because of the structural constraints (highly restricted information access and the US's national interests both politically and economically) as well as their own dispositions (left-leaning, lacking sufficient knowledge on China), they portrayed China during the radical Cultural Revolution as a romantic new China with "material progress through self-reliance", a pre-industrial society with "high purpose and morality" and equality, only to be shocked by the horror stories of persecution, starvation (Song and Lee, 2014). This what Song and Lee (2014) call "embedded journalism" proved to be an inauspicious chapter in US journalism.

2.1.2 Late 1970s ~ late 1980s: Liberal China Going Capitalist

After the Cultural Revolution, with the debut of Deng's reform and opening up policy,

China opened its door, though not on full wings, to foreign media. Western media were allowed to open offices in Beijing for the first time. American press corps, firstly led by AP, followed by CNN, NBC, opened their Beijing offices in a row and since then foreign journalists could work and report in China on a regular basis. China correspondents came into being in its fresh configuration.

During this period till 1989, US media coverage on China, having abandoned the Maoist revolutionary paradigm, entered a decade of "liberal" set sympathizing with Deng's economic reform rhetoric (Song & Lee, 2016). Against the broader picture of US strategically allying with China, American journalists began to perceive China from the lenses of the US-cum-universal values, cheering for marketization and the emerging capitalist way, and continued downplaying human rights abuse of China (Song & Lee, 2016).

Foreign journalists had some improved but still restricted access to information and sources (Mirsky, 2000). Barely speaking Chinese, they totally relied on interpreters, who were Chinese government employees, doing research and interview (Chu, 1984). As the first official batch of resident Western correspondents in China, they faced what Chu (1984) calls "splendid isolation": they were put into certain diplomatic apartment complexes in Beijing where ordinary Chinese were literally forbidden. By so doing, "a resident correspondent in Beijing is restricted in his/her social contacts almost entirely to the members of the foreign colony" (Chu, 1984).

Similar to the previous journalistic paradigms, this paradigm again was not only structured by the structural forces but also constructed, to a large degree, via journalists' individual dispositions. This batch of American journalists are mostly what Bennett (1990) calls "the second wave". Different from previous "first wave" in Bennett (1990)'s definition who studied China afar in the 1960s and 1970s, the "second wave" were professional journalists and barely spoke the language, with very limited knowledge about China. This

lack of "Chineseness", added by their political optimism that China was taking a familiar path of economic growth leading to democracy (Song & Lee, 2016), work together with structural forces to construct a China under the theme of "reform and opening up". Overseas readers read about discos, jeans, and the first KFC in China. The whole media narratives about China seemed to be indicating the direction of capitalism and democracy. This "liberal China going Capitalist" paradigm was again notoriously shattered by the bloodshed in the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989.

The failed democracy movement in China echoed the drastic political change in 1989 in the world, with the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of Cold War. This was a time when foreign correspondents, especially American correspondents, heavily engaged in the incidents they were supposed to cover, as many of them sympathized the students in the pro-democracy movement[23]. After the crackdown by China's hardliners, most foreign journalists were expelled, and some of them were never allowed to go back on China assignment.

2.1.3 Post-Tiananmen: Repressive China depicted with Caution

The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the world order from bi-polar to the US-led "new world order"; and the US-China alliance against the Soviet Union was consequently smashed, with China replacing the former Soviet Union as the "new enemy" of the US (Lee, 2002). As China was actively pursuing its position in the wave of economic globalization since late 1990s, the two countries had clashes over difficult issues such as trade, human rights, and Taiwan during this period. Amid this shift in global power structure and US-China relations, US media coverage on China correspondingly shifted towards a more cautious stance.

[23] Mike Chinoy's documentary series "China Assignment" reveals many backstage stories of American journalists' illusion and disillusion during covering Tiananmen crackdown.

No less importantly, the aftermath of Tiananmen crackdown of 1989 has not only been haunting China's politics, but also haunting foreign correspondents covering China. Since then, they became very sensitive to topics like repression, press freedom, etc. As Lee, Li and Lee (2011) rightly point out, the Tiananmen crackdown has provided an enduring prism for foreign media's coverage on China. China reportage "descended into the abyss of despair" (Song & Lee, 2015). Song and Lee (2015) argue that American correspondents, afraid of making similar mistakes as misjudging the democracy movement in 1989, tended to refrain from predicting China's prospects, and thus adopted a "ritual of irony" strategy to hedge their journalistic claims.

These new batch of American journalists are the "third wave" or "open-door-era journalists", after the second wave in the 1980s (Bennett, 1990). They studied China after China's opening-up, and thus benefited from a more direct and personal experience with China and Chinese culture, which helped to shape a more realistic view of China.

They covered both positive and negative aspects of China, from the continued economic reform and rapid growth to environment deterioration, inequality and moral vacuum. Through these contradictory discrepancies, "journalistic ironists have described China's modernization in the post-Cold War and post-Tiananmen era as outrageous abridgments of hope", thus serves to subvert the CCP's rhetoric of its development model (Song & Lee, 2015).

In the new century, with incentives brought by China's entry into the WTO, Beijing Games, Shanghai Expo and especially by China's rocketing influence in world economy and international affairs, the number of foreign correspondents stationed on China's territory has been increasing exponentially. According to data from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, the number of registered foreign correspondents in China was 170 by the year of 1990[24], but

[24] http://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbxw_673019/t282278.shtml

jumped to 480 in 2005 (Qian, 2012), and peaked during Beijing Games in 2008 at around 700, and remaining roughly more than 600 ever since, with many from non-western countries as well.

The increase in size of correspondents on the same posting, the change of their social and cultural habitus, together with the rapid development of China's economic power and global presence, understandably bring changes to the dynamics of the field. CNN's Beijing Bureau Chief Jaime FlorCruz terms foreign media's depiction of China in the new era as "diversification" (Zhang & Ye, 2009); Peng (2004), through empirical analysis, also notes that both the quantity and the diversity of the themes of China coverage have been greatly extended, from economic growth and human rights to Chinese expansionism, and relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan, etc.

2.1.4 A Fourth Phase? Rising and Assertive China

China had been posturing itself as "peaceful rise" in late 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, cautiously promoting a benign image of a rising China (Zhu & Lu, 2013). But since the debut of the second decade of the 21st century, both of China's domestic policies and global significance have taken a noticeable change. It became the world's second biggest economy in 2010, and kept the highest growth rate till 2015; it overtook the US to become the world's largest trading nation in 2013 (Monaghan, 2014).

China is growingly perceived as an eminent challenger not only to the US but to most major countries and its close neighbours such as India, Japan, and other Asian countries. China's huge overseas investment especially in Africa has been bashed as "neo-colonialism" (Zhu & Lu, 2013). Against the backdrop of social problems such as terrorism, refugee crisis, economy and the rise of populism and racism in major Western countries especially after

2016, “the rise of China” is often contextualized as against “the decline of the West”, and the debate over the so-called “China Model” became a global subject (Zhao, 2017).

Lee (2010) accurately points out that since Tiananmen crackdown, Chinese government has been eagerly trying to swipe out the stain by emphasizing economic growth and nationalism as the main sources of its regime legitimacy. Since president Xi Jinping took the reign in late 2012, a new slogan “Chinese Dream” has been widely propagated as the dominant domestic theme to strengthen regime legitimacy by “rejuvenating the great Chinese nation”, addressing the combined drive of economic growth and nationalism, and anti-corruption campaign has been used as a third source of regime legitimacy.

Especially after China’s economy started to show signs of recession in 2015, the new leadership hastened its completely new style of strong assertiveness in foreign policy and significantly tightened ideological control at home. The previously upheld “peaceful rise” diplomacy bid now is shifted to “competing for discursive power on the global stage”, illustrated by Xi’s signature “One Belt, One Road” initiative, assertive response to the South China Sea dispute, and the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank[25], etc. (Lee, 2016).

This new era of foreign correspondence in China thus could be taken as the fourth phase of foreign reporting in China, attentively focusing on China’s challenge to the post-1945 global order in a more mixed and realistic tone. If we follow van Ginneken (1998)’s categorization of “news center” versus “news periphery” to scale the significance of China as a host country for foreign press, we observe a clear shift of China from “news periphery” towards the “news center”. Though two decades ago van Ginneken has already noted “a noticeable shift” from being heavily West centered to East Asia, now we can safely say that

[25] In October 2014, China launched the AIIB with 21 initial signatories, which was joined later by some US allies, including Britain, Australia, Germany, Italy, South Korea, and the Philippines. It is widely regarded as challenging the existing international financial institutions and rewriting a new order led by China.

the shift is onto China specifically. *The New York Times* in 2013 has 75 foreign correspondents in 30 bureaus, with six staff correspondents in China; in comparison, five were based in its Tokyo bureau (Foreign Press Center Japan, 2013).

A brief retrospect of the trajectory of foreign correspondence in China shows both the agents or correspondents per se and the power structures (national interests, information access, etc.) in the field have been changing, thus the changing news paradigms in covering China. Situated in different stage of historical development, journalists' corresponding habitus also shape what Gans (1979) calls "enduring values" or what Bennett (1990) alternatively terms as "myth structure", which fundamentally help to construct the news narrative of China. Consideration of these historical heritages is essential to understand today's field of China correspondence, especially the new phase of China reportage under Xi's leadership. The structural forces, the new (or not new) configuration of China correspondents, of the new phase are all gravely under-studied.

2.2 Boundary of the Field of China Correspondence

In Bourdieuism, a field "is made up of governing bodies, rules and regulations, and languages which both influence practitioners and evaluate their activities" (Webb, Schirato & Danaher, 2002, p. 184). Thus to define the boundary of the journalistic field, we need to define the entry delimitation of agents, as well as to identify rules and regulations, not only those "autonomous rules" of the profession per se, but also the ones imposed by institutional regulators in the field.

2.2.1 Defining Foreign Correspondents in China

As Bourdieu (1983) notes, "every literary field is the site of a struggle over the definition of the writer" (p. 321), so is the definition of foreign correspondents as the news

writers in the field of foreign correspondence. To accurately define foreign correspondents is the first step to understand the boundary of the field, which sets the entry delimitation for individuals striving to become such an agent, and is "a stake of struggles" with "extreme permeability" (Bourdieu, 1983, p. 322).

The boundary may or may not be institutionalized. In traditional definitions, such as defining foreign correspondents as "a journalist who works in a state different from the one in which his information-medium is located" (Marx, 1970 in Hahn & Lönnendonker, 2009, p. 56), the boundary is not drawn institutionalized; instead, emphasis is put in the difference between a foreign correspondent and journalist in general.

Others pinpoint the advantageous position occupied by foreign correspondents in journalistic field, viewing them as a special species in journalist profession. Typical definitions of such perspective include "a cosmopolitan among cosmopolitans, a man in gray flannels who ranks very high in the hierarchy of reporters" (Cohen, 1963, p. 17; Tunstall, 1974). They have been "the princes of the profession" (Yemma, 2007), enjoying relatively high autonomy (see, e.g. Morrison & Tumber, 1985). Foreign correspondents are more elite than general journalists because they possess relatively more symbolic capital, and less subjected to market pressures.

But such boundary has been challenged by struggles with external power led by the proliferation of "global village" and new ICTs. Internet-based technologies are making it easier for editors at home to control foreign correspondents abroad; citizen reporters made possible by social media are squeezing the legitimate space for foreign correspondents.

Besides the technological imperative, major causes for the changing ecology of foreign correspondence include rapid and vast media conglomeration that places profit above all other considerations, and the loss of appetite for international news after the end of the cold war.

These new changes led some scholars to argue that foreign correspondents as a species are waning (Merle, 2013; Willnat & Martin, 2012), or evolved into a more diverse and less elite species including "traditional foreign correspondents" and "new foreign correspondents" such as freelancers and bloggers (Hamilton & Jenner, 2004). Individuals with less economic and cultural capitals compared with traditional foreign correspondents are seen getting into the field as "new foreign correspondents".

Yet the field of foreign correspondence, with its boundary permeable, still retains its legitimacy in the larger journalistic field. The profession of foreign correspondents stays on in an updated form as "sense maker" (Archetti, 2012, 2013; Brüggemann et al., 2016), as the abundant and accessible information is actually making the competitive advantages of foreign correspondents shifting from providing timely information to providing interpretation. Consumers of foreign news understandably lack background knowledge about a distant foreign nation to make sense out of a news story as news makers expect they do. They need a professional guide or "curator", as how an American correspondent I interviewed terms their role as foreign correspondent, or a "mediator and translator between cultures" (Beliveau, Hahn & Ipsen, 2011), to walk the public through the knotted net of contextualized information and meanings, or, to "sift truth from facts" (Farmer, 1990, p. 243).

Meanwhile, within the foreign correspondence field, as discussed earlier, the competition among individuals for legitimate positions in the field is getting tense, as "China assignment" is now embedded with more symbolic capital for a journalist profession than in the last century. New generation of journalists equipped with better cultural understanding of China are marching into the field, visibly transforming the boundary into more competitive and demanding for individual agents. Among the position-takers in the field, "traditional correspondents" and "new correspondents" are mobile and interchangeable. More and more traditional foreign correspondents are not born elite; they come from positions as "new

foreign correspondents" like freelancers, bloggers, etc.; freelancers work their ways into an economically and socially more secured traditional correspondent position; foreign correspondents also extensively rely on these non-traditional foreign correspondents for information and connections, and sometimes become freelancers themselves. That being said, in the field of foreign correspondence, non-traditional foreign correspondents are still struggling for a legitimate position as traditional foreign correspondent, which promise them much more reliable economic and cultural capitals in the field.

In the case of China, the contemporary field of China correspondence has just come into being since 1970s, when Communist China began to open itself up to the international community, international press corps included. With bumpy social development and changes siding with the opening-up, the boundary of the field of China correspondence, though with intermittent relaxation, has remained rigidly institutionalized. Foreign correspondents are strictly regulated through institutionalized accreditations and visas, information access tightly restrictive, and even local fixers whom foreign correspondents traditionally rely on as an indispensable extension of their own limited local knowledge and connections are kept under highly centralized management; the traditional foreign correspondents in Hamilton and Jenner's definition are still the major players in China.

For these reasons, we should turn to an institutionalized boundary of foreign correspondence field in China. The United Nations (UN) Convention on the International Right of Correction sets an exemplary institutional definition of foreign correspondent as an individual employed by a media organization who is regularly engaged in the collection and the reporting of news material and who, when abroad, is identified as a correspondent by a valid passport or by a similar document (*Convention on the International Right of Correction*, 435 U.N.T.S. 191). This is the case in China, where foreign correspondents are officially defined by China's Foreign Ministry as "career journalists who are dispatched by

foreign media organizations to be stationed in China for a period of no less than six months for news coverage and reporting" and explicitly codified through laws and regulations[26].

2.2.2 Institutional Regulations: the Changed and Unchanged

Foreign media and foreign correspondents in China are subjected to regulations from at least six government units: the State Council Information Office, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT), the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Cyberspace Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Public Security (PEN America, 2016). Local public security bureaus and foreign affair offices are also commonly seen in regulating journalistic activities in their realm and enforcing above regulations.

In 1981, China for the first time issued formal regulation on foreign media, requiring all resident foreign journalists to apply and register with MOFA; foreign journalists need to apply for permission to interview any group, company or institute. Later, in 1983, it opened up 29 cities, apart from Beijing, for foreign correspondents to travel without the requirement of a travel permit, yet still with requirement to report to local foreign affairs department (Chu, 1984).

After the turmoil of Tiananmen crackdown, which inerasably embarrassed Chinese government thanks to the pervasive foreign media coverage, China tightened the regulation on foreign media. The 1990 version of foreign press regulation was the strictest, not only requiring rigid permission application procedure[27], but also for the first time explicitly stated the punishments foreign journalists were to face in case of any "violation"; freelancers were explicitly forbidden.

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[26] Such as *Regulations of People's Republic of China on News Coverage by Permanent Offices of Foreign Media Organizations and Foreign Correspondents.*

[27] Foreign journalists need to get permission from local Foreign Affair Offices for any interview activity.

This strictest version lasted till the eve of Beijing Games in 2008, when the State Council issued the new "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on News Coverage by Permanent Offices of Foreign Media Organizations and Foreign Journalists"[28]. The biggest change in the new version is that government permission is no longer required for foreign journalists on reporting activity; they only need to get prior consent from the interviewees. This change is widely acclaimed as a big progress in loosening the media environment for foreign press, though maybe just a bit.

Besides, similar to previous versions, it regulates that all resident foreign journalists, once approved by foreign ministry, shall register with foreign ministry or local foreign affair offices within seven days of arrival to be issued Press Card, after which they are required to register with public security authority; and a resident foreign journalist needs to stay in China for no less than six months on an accumulative basis, otherwise his/her Press Card would be canceled; foreign news outlets in China can employ Chinese nationals only for "auxiliary work"; when carrying out any reporting activity in China, foreign journalists are required to carry either their press cards (in the case of resident foreign journalists) or Journalist Visa for Short Visit (J2 visa, in the case of "parachute journalist").

But for a temporary J2 visa, journalists are required to submit applications 30 days in advance. This in practice is "mission impossible" for breaking news stories; it only works for pre-staged "media event".

Though still strictly confining, this latest regulation is substantially relaxed compared with the previous 1990 version, which required all reporting activities should get official approval from local governments. However, in practice, the seemingly relaxed articles do not validate in all parts of China. Tibet is strictly kept out of foreign journalists' free access. Also, in practice, foreign reporters complain that the regulations "never translated into changes in

[28] http://ipc.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wgjzzhzn/t716835.htm

reality", as "local officials continue to ignore—or are unaware—of the 2008 version and detain or otherwise harass journalists when they travel outside Beijing or Shanghai" (PEN America, 2016, p. 10).

This suggests the strong retention of social practices shaped via old, though officially annulled, laws and regulations. Especially when new regulations are not issued or implemented with enough sincerity and seriousness, the dynamics and tension in the field are not to be changed significantly.

Reuter's Carsten is not alone among the foreign press corps in commenting that: "Rules are so vague that obviously it works in the favour of the authorities because they can interpret them however they need to in any given situation."

Other regulations and rules are aiming at directly or indirectly restricting foreign media's information access, which has always been difficult and reportedly more so since 2012. One example is in June 2014, SAPPRFT issued a directive to Chinese journalists warning there could be punishment if they passed information to foreign journalists.[29]

Similar is the *Law on Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas Non-governmental Organizations*, which was announced in April 2016 and to be effective since January 2017.[30] The law requires overseas NGOs operating in China register with the Ministry of Public Security or its local bureaus, and not engage in any fundraising in China; nor are they allowed to fund Chinese organizations from overseas. This move was widely regarded as a further grip over civil society in China and signaling Chinese authorities' "determination to repress unwelcome foreign influences and activities that foster the spread of 'Western values'" (Lubman, 2015). The closing up of both domestic and foreign NGOs serves to clamp the field in which China correspondents largely rely for sources.

[29] State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Televsion of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国新闻出版广电总局, 国家新闻出版广电总局印发《新闻从业人员职务行为信息管理办法》规范新闻从业人员职务行为信息使用和管理(Jul 8. 2014), http://www.gapp.gov.cn/news/1656/211765.shtml

[30] http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/29/c_1118765888.htm

Meanwhile, in recent years, to respond to the internet-led new publishing ecology, China also issued strict and ambitious rules and regulations to administer cyberspace, promoting an authoritarian mode of "Internet sovereignty"[31] which is completely at odds with "free speech, free Internet" mode which is familiarized by most Western foreign correspondents.

In February 2016, SAPPRFT and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology jointly issued the "Online Publishing Service Administration Rules" with new regulations on online content by foreign company, in effect forbidding foreign media from publishing any online content in China without prior approval; and approval would only be issued to those partner with Chinese companies and have their servers inside China, so to make them legitimately subject to the constraints and ruling of Chinese laws and regulations.[32]

Though, similar restrictions on foreign online content provider are seen before, *Wall Street Journal*, in an article published upon the release of the aforementioned regulation, interprets that "gathering them together in a single regulatory scheme allows Beijing to cite a legal justification for its intensifying drive to fortify Chinese society, particularly the Internet, against what the authoritarian government sees as unwanted foreign influences" (Chin, 2016).

To sum up, the boundary of the field of China correspondence is strictly institutionally defined by a set of rules and regulations, even though the broader economic and social forces (such as globalization, ICTs) are pushing the boundary of journalism in

[31] Starting from 2010, China issued the first white paper on Internet in which the notion "Internet sovereignty" which became the core agenda for China's "authoritarian Internet regulatory model" (Jiang, 2010), was formally outlined. By advocating that national sovereignty should be applied to cyberspace, it asserts that "within Chinese territory the Internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty", an act of further attempt to legitimize its grid over cyberspace. This notion was further proclaimed at the 1st and 2nd Wuzhen World Internet Conference held in December 2014 and 2015 respectively. Reference can be found at http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146290/n4388791/c4638978/content.html

general toward a more permeable direction (Lewis, 2012). In China reporting at least, open participation is still largely out of the picture; entering the field is still strictly delimited to professional journalists, or more precisely, *licensed* professional journalists. Such a rigid institutionalized boundary of China correspondence effectively facilitates China's control over the agents, if not necessarily the field.

There is not much room for foreign journalists' negotiation with control exerted via codified rules and regulations. Every journalist ready to step in the field of China correspondence prepares him/herself with all the directly relevant regulations, via channels of their newsrooms and predecessors, the Foreign Correspondents Club in China, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.; many China correspondents report being lectured their "dos and don'ts while reporting in China" when being interviewed for the journalist visa.

China correspondents tend to obey these codifed regulations, as their accreditations depend on their obedience. At local level, in fact, sometimes these foreign journalists find themselves using these codified regulations to negotiate with official disrupts, when such disrupts come in disguise as not knowing the 2008 version of regulation. As aforementioned, the latest 2008 version of "regulations on foreign press and correspondents" is clearly loosened up, at least in its literal sense; yet due to the retention of the historically restrictive rules on and suspicious or even hostile attitude toward foreign press, foreign correspondents on reporting trip outside Beijing or Shanghai often encounter local level authorities refusing their interview request citing "lacking permission from Foreign Affair Office"; correspondents on site who are familiarized with all the articles in the regulations would refute such excuse immediately or even contact Foreign Ministry officials in Beijing for help if their direct negotiation fails.

2.3 Mapping the Map of China Correspondence

As aforementioned, today's field of China correspondence is more diverse than previous generations in terms of beats and compositions of correspondents themselves. But as to geographic spread of the headquarters of these foreign news organizations and of foreign press corps in China, a center-periphery structure has remained prominent.

In terms of the nation-state power balance in global news prism, with most of the news organizations maintaining a stable and visible presence in China being those from industrialized G7 countries or other major Western developed countries. These very few news organizations at "central" positions in the field are more likely to have a larger-sized newsroom in China, whereas most others could only afford one single staff correspondent in China.

Meanwhile of the foreign press corps in China, they also follow a clear center-periphery structure in terms of the geographic spread of their newsrooms in China: all are based in several major metropolises in China, with the "periphery" parts of China such as less economically developed western China largely ignored.

Such configuration, from geographic, national, to organizational, inevitably contributes to shaping certain dynamics within the field and thus shaping correspondents' practice of news production.

2.3.1 Beijing and Shanghai: Center of China

News is where newsmen/women are (Morrison & Tumber, 1985). Geographic location of bureaus is an indicator of the structure of institutional power relations, as news organizations tend to base their limited number of staff correspondents in places where most sources and resources are; Chinese regulators also require foreign news organizations to base their China bureaus in certain big cities for easier management. Besides, Van Ginneken

(1998) notes that a large foreign community is another consideration for the selection of geographic location of overseas bureaus for foreign media, as they favour a more congenial environment with similar cultural values and ideological affinities. For example, Korean news organizations in Beijing are mostly located in Wangjing area, where the biggest Korean community in the city is to be found.

The more than 600 registered China correspondents are scattered in major megacities in China, from Beijing (77.8%) to Shanghai (19.6%) and a small number in other big cities including Guangzhou in southern China, Chongqing in mid-West China, and Shenyang in Northeast China, showing a clear-cut center-periphery structure, with Beijing and Shanghai as the unquestionable center.

Beijing, the capital city, is the political and cultural center of China; whereas Shanghai, China's financial hub, understandably serving as the ideal base for news organizations and journalists specializing on business and economy news, covering the stock markets, etc. To echo this geographic spread of foreign correspondents in China, the *Foreign Correspondents Club of China* also has two bases in these two cities respectively.

Between the two "centers", Beijing is understandably the priority choice for any news organization. But for big news organizations with correspondents in both cities, there is not necessarily a hierarchy between Beijing bureau and Shanghai bureau. For example, German radio ARD has one Beijing-based and one Shanghai-based correspondents, but the two correspondents both report to editors back in Germany. Between the two, they have beats-and-geography-based labour division: Beijing correspondent covers northern China with Mongolia, and all general beats such as politics and foreign policy; Shanghai correspondent covers all economy stories, and, southern China. As ARD does not have a correspondent in Hong Kong, the Shanghai correspondent also covers significant political stories in Hong Kong. The division is not codified, but can be rigid sometimes. For example, the annual

Beijing International Auto Expo is routinely covered by the Shanghai correspondent, because "it's an economy beat". *Wall Street Journal* has a Shanghai-based correspondent covering auto industry, and he flies to Beijing every year for the auto expo as well.

In the case of ARD, a typical example of small newsroom in both Beijing and Shanghai, correspondents based in the two cities in effect form a "virtual office", where they are peers at the same hierarchical level and take duty shift on weekends. But larger and more resourceful news organizations have bigger size of staff correspondents in both cities, thus unavoidably have a more hierarchical structure between the two bases, with Beijing office almost always the superior, both in size and in bureaucratic hierarchy. For example, the *Wall Street Journal* has a size of 10 staff in their Beijing bureau (correspondents) and three in Shanghai; Beijing serves as both its "Beijing office" as well as "China bureau", led by its China Bureau Chief Charles Hutzler. AFP has a team size of 15 in Beijing, including chiefs[33], correspondents, editors, and video and photo journalists, but only one correspondent and one photographer in Shanghai; the only Shanghai correspondent reports to Beijing Bureau Chief Patrick Lescot as well as Asia editors in Hong Kong.

Beijing has all the reasons to secure such a superior geographic location in terms of basing a foreign reporting team. It is where the most routine sources prevail: central government press briefings, official proceedings, national ceremonial events, etc. Other regular sources such as officials, academics, China experts are also mostly found in Beijing. The city itself is a big news generator house, producing endless fascinating stories for foreign correspondents to decide on their focus. With the best public infrastructure and the largest number of English-speaking locals in China, it is also one of the most accommodating cities to live in China for expatriates, who are also attracted by the unique cultural heritage the city boasts of. They can send their young children to international schools, dog gardens for dogs,

[33] AFP has one Beijing Bureau Chief and one Deputy Beijing Bureau Chief.

supermarkets where they can find imported goods from their home countries, hike on a wild section of the Great Wall and pose for a picture on top of the great world wonder.

Beijing is the news hub not only of China, but also of Asia. For many small media organizations with limited resources, when dispatching only one correspondent to cover the entire Far East or part of this vast land, they would most likely base this "Asia correspondent" in Beijing, both for the newsworthiness of China and logistic concern—China imposes stricter regulations on foreign correspondents than most other countries in the region, thus it is sensible for a foreign correspondent to apply for a journalist visa of China and fly out to cover other neighbouring countries occasionally, rather than trying in vain to parachute in without a proper resident journalist visa here.

Hannerz (2004) contends foreign correspondents form a community, which is "segmented and loosely structured along various lines": nationality, physical proximity, types of beats (p.155), though "…in cities where there were few of them, and especially when they were living under tough conditions and perhaps in an adversarial or at least closely guarded relationship with the host society and especially its government, they were likely to stick together more closely" (Hannerz, 2004, p. 157). The concentration of foreign correspondents in Beijing creates such a community of foreign press corps where they closely watch each other as both competitors and accomplices, potentially leading to pack journalism, which will be elaborated later in chapter 4. Such cohesiveness is less strong among correspondents in Shanghai, which used to be the main base for foreign press during the war but is now loosing its appeal with news outlets generally withdrawing their overseas reporting team[34].

Such geographic layout of foreign media in China unavoidably affect their access to sources and understanding of China, even when they are physically *in* China, because China is a vast land with 1.4 billion populations, unevenly distributed between "east" and "west",

[34] The *LA Times*, *Washington Post* and many other major news outlets have closed their Shanghai office in recent couple of years.

between "rural" and "urban". Take the *Wall Street Journal's* China coverage as an example. Of all 44 articles filed by its China bureaus in January 2017[35], 30 are from Beijing bureau, whereas only 14 are from its Shanghai bureau. These 44 articles cover four beats: political/general (N=13), economy (N=14), market (N=5), and companies (N=10). Beijing bureau apparently covered most of the political/general news, ranging from foreign policy (e.g. China's new move in South China Sea), China's domestic politics (e.g. gun-related crimes in China), to social news in general (e.g. public discussion on which side to stand on escalator); Shanghai bureau contributed more than 40% of its 14 stories in company beat. Most of the datelines of these 44 articles were filed from either Beijing or Shanghai. Only one article on Facebook's China business was co-filed from Beijing, San Francisco, and Wuzhen, a small town in China's richest Zhejiang province near Shanghai, known for hosting the China's World Internet Conference in both 2015 and 2016.

Table 2-1. *Topical Distribution between BJ and SH Bureau of WSJ in January 2017*

bureau	N (%)	Political/general news	Economic news	Market news	Company news
Beijing	30 (68.2)	11 (36.7)	10 (33.3)	3 (10)	6 (20)
Shanghai	14 (31.8)	2 (14.3)	4 (28.6)	2 (14.3)	6 (42.9)
Total	44 (100)	13 (29.5)	14 (31.8)	5 (11.4)	10 (22.7)

It might be interesting to keep a note for why not choosing *the New York Times*' coverage as an analysis of the difference in topical distribution between Beijing and Shanghai: *the Times* had no correspondent in Shanghai between early 2015 and 2017, during the time of this study. It used to have one Shanghai Bureau Chief David Barboza, but he was

[35] The month of January was random selected to analyze one month's coverage on China. All samples are retrieved from Factiva.

threatened to leave China in early 2015 for an investigative article he wrote in 2012 on the family wealth of then China's Prime Minister Wen Jiabao (Chinoy, 2015). China has been denying visa to the *Times* correspondents since the story was published in 2012 (the *New York Times*, 2012).

Admittedly, such geographic constraint on news coverage could be more prominent for smaller news room with very limited staff correspondents, than in the case of the *Wall Street Journal*, which is in nature a financial newspaper. But even for the latter, the impact on news coverage is easily noticeable: the only story on social news filed by the whole China reporting team of *the Journal* is about the public debate on which side to stand while one is riding escalator in Beijing's subway[36]. This typical metropolis perspective well mirrors how geographic constraints on journalists can gravely narrow their scope of topic selection.

Staying in an expatriate community in a metropolis such as Beijing or Shanghai projects totally different image of China than, say, a county in northwestern China undergoing urbanization, or a minority ethnic village in southwestern China striving to maintain their traditional heritages. Instead, "expatriates" journalists are mostly narrowly focused on the discussion of foreign policy and national policies in Beijing, and monetary and business trend in Shanghai. Even when they consciously divert their attention to some "life style" areas, they see shared bicycles, unmanned retailer, mobile payment, all of which are only to be found in these limited urban areas with considerably higher economic indicators and more technology savvy residents; or they see the debate over which side to stand on an escalator, as in the case of *the Wall Street Journal*.

[36] full report: https://www.wsj.com/articles/rising-risk-china-reconsiders-stand-right-walk-left-on-escalators-1484029173

2.3.2 Imbalanced Landscape: National Context

Not only the geographic spread of foreign correspondents in China shows a clear-cut center-periphery structure between megacities and "less presentable" corners of China, the national distribution of the media with a presence in China also shows an imbalanced center-periphery relationship of the global structure.

The *McBride Report* in the 1970s knowingly addresses the imbalance in international communication and global news flow. Though the debate for a "new world information order" largely died out with the end of the Cold War in late 1980's, the overall structure of imbalance still lives on (Kopper & Bates, 2011). And it lives in the field of China correspondence as well.

In scrutinizing the global landscape of foreign correspondents, Hannerz (2004) writes that "there is a structure of center-periphery relationship" with the wide frame "the one of Western and Northern dominance" (p. 42). Brüggemann et al. (2016) suggest "foreign correspondents" not be treated as a homogeneous group, and an obvious diverging worlds of foreign correspondence, where Western correspondents arguably take the center in both presence and influence, with non-Western, non-Anglo correspondents positioning as periphery.

Though foreign correspondents are long argued to be cosmopolitan (Cohen, 1963; Hannerz, 2004), and many reporters and editors of "international" news outlets refuse to be labeled as American or British organizations or anything with an obvious nation-state stamp[37], they are nevertheless still "a prime source for integrating cultural frames and


[37] The ownership of news corporations is growingly cross-national, lending a stronger sense of "global media" or "international media" where correspondents are reluctant to identify themselves as "foreign correspondents" anymore. Reuters used to be easily categorized as "British". Not now, after it was purchased by American corporation; Financial Times is owned by Japanese company. Ted Turner, the founder of CNN, is widely quoted as strongly opposing to the use of the word "foreign" in "foreign correspondent"; no CNN correspondent reporting outside US should view him/herself as "foreigner" to the host country; a better label would be "international correspondents".

ideologies into news flows" (Kopper & Bates, 2011, p.53). National contexts are still essential differentiating variable that marks the lines segmenting the foreign press corps.

Foreign press corps in China is no exception. Of all the 47 countries with news outlets in China, the US and Japan clearly dominate the center. Figure 1 shows that, size wise, the US and Japan are the top two countries with the largest reporting teams in China, with the US ranking the first in newsroom number (N=37) and Japan the first in staff size (N=117). The U.S. has the biggest number of news outlets in China, which is consistent with U.S. media's dominant role in global news prism. Japan is not as prominent in global news prism as US or even Britain, but as one of the major developed countries and G7 member country, its leading presence in China still echoes what Van Ginneken (1998) asserts that a limited number of G7 media companies basically control the transnational flow of news.

After US and Japan, South Korea, Germany, France and UK can be categorized as the second tier in terms of their media presence in China, with more than 20 news outlets from each country. Apart from Japan and South Korea, both of which are prominent Asian neighbours of China, all others taking the lead in presence in China are major Western countries.

Figure 2-1. *Size of Foreign Reporting Teams in China by Country*



As to peer influence, again Anglo media are the most followed and highly rated by all foreign correspondents in China. Major international news agencies are still Western dominant. In the survey, a section asking correspondents which news outlets they follow regularly shows that, the most followed is Reuters (*M*=.89), without significant country-wise variance.

The imbalanced landscape, paired with the diverse media system of each country and their distinct national interest with China, highlight the complex dynamics of the field of foreign correspondence in nation-state context. As noted in previous chapter, following the analysis of comparing media systems by Hallin and Mancini (2004), the power relations situated at individual, routines, organizational and institutional levels shall be compared across media systems to better deconstruct the direction and degree of the national level influence.

The comparative context of national level influence is introduced in each of the following chapters (chapter 3 to chapter 6) tackling power relations observed in individual, routines, organizational and institutional levels, and chapter 7 looks into media discourse comparison across major countries with distinct national interests with China.

2.3.3 Big Organizations, Small Newsrooms

News organizations divide the labour in the newsroom along functional and geographic lines. For them, the outpost of foreign correspondents is by no means for financial reason. Pure economic calculation may suggest it's even a losing game to post foreign correspondents at huge expenses. However, the use of foreign correspondents may bring prestige to the news organization and even for the purpose of social or political influence, or "the building of ideology" (Kopper & Bates, 2011). Thus news organizations ambitious to

maintain or expand their prestige are still trying to keep overseas presence by posting correspondents, though probably in different ways.

As Roy Gutman, former foreign editor at *McClatchy*, sees it, there are two major impediments to foreign coverage: money and interest; and maintaining a bureau can be very costly. In the 2000's, it cost hundreds of thousands of dollars a year in correspondents' salaries, rent and supplies, money for local staff and $4,000 or $5,000 a month in travel expenses (Rieder, 2007). So for news organizations trying to have a presence in China, though China is of great interest to most of them, money can be a big problem against the idea of maintaining a bureau of reasonable size. Gutman's *McClatchy*, during the time of this study, has undergone another budget cut and calling back its China correspondent who was just sent to Beijing a year ago (personal communication). For American media, only wires (AP, Bloomberg), "big Four" (The *New York Times*, The *Washington Post*, The *Wall Street Journal*, The *Los Angeles Times*) and the national broadcaster NPR still have relatively affluent overseas presence.

Resource constraints decide only big news organizations with sufficient ambition, budget, and influence can afford maintaining overseas offices with a reasonable size. Most news organizations, when they manage to afford an overseas posting, only could base one or two fully-salaried correspondents for budget and staffing concern. Thus China correspondents in most cases work in very small newsrooms. Take the Chinese Foreign Ministry's registered number of foreign news organizations in 2015 for example, there are 636 registered foreign correspondents in China of 277 news organizations, on average two journalists in each newsroom. Affluent news organizations especially financial news wires do maintain a much bigger size of staff correspondents in China. For example, Reuters has a staff size of 36; major financial wire Bloomberg boasts a presence of 12 staff correspondents; the other two big news wires Associate Press and Agency France Press each registers more

than 10 correspondents in China, though it needs to be pointed out that these numbers include photographers, video journalists as well. News wires aside, the two established US newspapers *the New York Times* and *the Wall Street Journal* lead in terms of newsroom size in China, with seven correspondents registered with the former and 13 with the latter. The rest majority (more than 200 news organizations) have only one or two fully-salaried correspondent in China.

This pattern is apparently not unique in China. Van Ginneken (1998) in his thesis examining global news industry in general also notes that for larger American media, they usually have several correspondents with a small staff of assistants in a "real bureau", whereas some larger European media usually only base a single staff correspondent on a posting, in a "one-person bureau"; some other smaller European media even cannot afford a full-time staff correspondent, thus share one with another non-competing media. Not to mention less resourced non-Western news organizations.

Such organizational configuration echoes what Sambrook (2010) notes a more open and networked news operation of foreign correspondence, as "vertically integrated news operations break down". Organizational size and power structure are long argued to be an important influencer on organizational decision-making and editorial autonomy. Demers (1996, 1998) notes that larger news organizations with increased role specialization emphasize more on quality of news product rather than profit. Kim (2003) notes in a study on Korean newspapers' international news coverage that organizational resources of news organizations shape the spatio-temporal news net. Esser (1998), tapping on the difference in British and German newsroom structure, points out that journalists in a decentralized newsroom structure tend to be more strongly tied to their desks and thus less engaged in quality investigative reporting, and with higher journalistic autonomy in a decentralized newsroom structure journalists are more likely to inject "personal bias" into the news content.

Correspondingly, we assume correspondents working in small newsrooms are less subject to hierarchical bureaucratic constraints of their news organizations in daily practice, at least geographically so, thus enjoying higher editorial autonomy. It suggests we invest more scholarly attention on individual correspondents' perceptions and practices. Meanwhile, in order to compare with peers either for verification or ideation, they tend to reach out to fellow correspondents on a frequent basis, thus reinforcing the so-called "pack journalism". Small newsrooms also indicate less role specialization, which means most correspondents work on multiple beats; not only more diverse beats, they also have more responsibilities including non-journalistic ones, such as looking for an office space, hiring local helpers, processing paper-works. Influence from such organizational dynamics is to be discussed in detail in chapter 5.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter looks at field of China correspondence in general and maps out its historical trajectory, boundary, as well as configuration.

Admittedly, China correspondents are not in any risk of extinction, as the world is growingly in need of "sense makers" of China, to help to better understand this rising power, but the whole landscape is rather imbalanced, presenting a clear-cut center-periphery structure, both in the geographic spread in China and in the nation-state context of the news organizations these China correspondents work with, as well as in their newsroom size. Though China now has already risen to a more "center", less "periphery" news hotspot in global news prism, such center-periphery structure of the field of China correspondence largely echoes what scholars argue as a still imbalanced West-dominant transnational news flow (see, e.g. Chang, 1998; Hannerz, 2004; Van Ginneken, 1998).

Such a landscape of the field of foreign correspondence brings considerable impact to the practice of correspondents within the field. A typical example is Indian correspondents, apparently on the "periphery". There are altogether five Indian correspondents, all based in Beijing, each representing one English-language Indian media outlet, from a country with the second largest population in the world and China's biggest rival in the region. The long-term tense yet important bilateral relationship between the two countries is mutual-feeding with Indian media's coverage on China. During the tensest standoff between the two armies at the border in the summer of 2017, nothing else about China could be found in Indian media, apart from the standoff. One of the many reasons is that the five Indian correspondents who work solely have to fully devote their time to getting China foreign ministry's response on a daily basis. One of them complained that he had hit his own record for attending foreign ministry's daily press conference in a row for almost a month[38].

Such a field of foreign correspondence in China is a dynamic and complex one where tensions are never fading. The tensions are observed between foreign correspondents and their newsrooms, their home editors and management, between foreign correspondents and the restrictive institutional regulations as well as uncodified state coercion in China, also among China correspondents themselves. How they, as sense makers, interpret China is yet largely influenced by their personal and professional backgrounds (Chang & Lee, 1992), which are to be explored in detail in the following chapter 3.

[38] Personal communication, July 26, 2017.

Chapter 3. Habitus, Illusio: Morphology and Typologies of China Correspondents

"*I want a reporter, someone who doesn't know the difference between an 'ism' and a kangaroo!"*

This is a scene from Hitchcock's movie *Foreign Correspondent*. It was the eve of the World War II and the editor of an American newspaper is seeking to send someone as novice as a piece of blank paper to report from Europe. Fictional as the scene may be, yet familiar debate has lived in the field of foreign correspondence for decades: what individual qualities, be it expertise on the topic covered or language skills, make some journalists more preferred than others? A hidden assumption behind the debate is the argument that different qualities of individual journalists make a difference in journalistic practice. Starck and Villanueva (1992) have specifically focused on the "cultural framing" of foreign correspondence, noting that foreign correspondents' education, professional experience, language ability, familiarity with the history of the host country and its people, etc. all contribute to the framing of the foreign reality to home audience. In a similar vein, Hannerz (2004) avers that foreign correspondents tend to carry baggage from home to their overseas postings, and the baggage shape how they view and construct concurrences into foreign news.

These qualities, or *habitus*, as in Bourdieuian term, is "a sense of one's place" (Bourdieu, 1989), denoting the dispositions acquired in the position occupied by individual correspondent. It is exemplified by traits and thoughts such as their demographic characteristics, educational background, professional background and experience, personal and professional values and beliefs. These dispositions "organize practices and the perception of practices" (Bourdieu, 1984), thus are the starting points for understanding foreign correspondents' positions and practice in the field. Bourdieu (1989) defines habitus as "the

mental structures through which they (the agents) apprehend the social world" (p. 18), "a system of schemes of perception and appreciation of practices, cognitive and evaluative structures which are acquired through the lasting experience of a social position" (p. 19). It is "both a system of schemes of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices"; essentially it is "the product of the internalization of the structures of that world".

Journalists enter the field of China correspondence with different *habitus* and *illusio* (serious commitment into participating in the field), categorizing them into different positions in the field. This chapter explores the *habitus* of China correspondents shaped in priori socialization, unpacking them into demographic qualities, "journalistic *habitus*", and "Chinese *habitus*"; by so doing it tries to answer how *habitus* help shaping correspondents' positions and practice in the field of China correspondence. Data for this chapter are partly collected firsthand from interview and online survey, partly from secondhand literature of China correspondents' self accounts. Social media age provides convenience for this research in terms of data collection, as many journalists go online to brand their work or themselves proactively.

3.1 Morphology and Demographics

Individual morphological and demographic factors are defined by Benson (2005) as "number of agents entering the field in relation to available position, social characteristics, education and training, etc." (p. 100). Demographics of a group is more than demographics, as the picture of age, nationality, gender, education, etc. also tells much about the economic, social and cultural capitals the individuals carry. The demographic features of an agent also show the most likely perspective he/she takes, which largely defines his/her habitus. Van

Ginneken (1998) has convincingly shown how "mental frames" or "yardstick" can shape the way people construct reality.

The survey sample of 101 China-based correspondents demonstrates a basic demographic picture of the foreign press corps who are generally well-educated (97% of respondents hold a college degree or above) and professionally experienced (with an average of 15.8 years working experience as a professional journalist), but heavily male-dominated (only 23.2% of the respondents are female). They are mostly middle aged in their 30s or 40s. Almost two thirds of them do not have any connections to or living experience in China prior to their China postings, and more than half do not speak professional Chinese, meaning they are not able to conduct interviews or research in Chinese. This relative unfamiliarity with China is peculiarly true for correspondents from Social Corporatist countries, of whom only 20% speak fluent Chinese and 36.6% had lived or worked in China, or with other personal connections with China (such as born Chinese national, being married to a Chinese, or having family members in China), prior to their official China correspondent posting.

Table 3-1. Demographic Characteristics

Sample Composition	Liberal	Social Corporatist	Polarized Pluralist	Non-Western	total
Female	26.5%	25%	22.2%	18.5%	23.2%
Median Age	36-40	41-45	31-35	41-45	36-40
Years in journalism	14.2 yrs	19.9 yrs	12.7 yrs	16.9 yrs	15.8 yrs
Years in China correspondence	7.6 yrs	4.8 yrs	6.6 yrs	5.1 yrs	6.2 yrs
College educated or above	100%	95%	100%	92.6%	97%
Major in journalism	41.7%	30%	38.9%	25.9%	34.7%
Chinese fluent or above	58.3%	20%	22.2%	44.4%	40.6%
Prior FC experience	75%	95%	94.4%	96.3%	88.1%

Prior China experience	55.6%	25%	33.3%	22.2%	36.6%
N	36	20	18	27	101

3.1.1 Male Dominance

Consistent with almost any other research findings on the demographic characteristics of journalists (Hess, 1996, 2005; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996; Weaver et al., 2007; Wu & Hamilton, 2004; van Dalen, 2012; etc.), the foreign press corps in China is heavily male dominated, or even more so[39]. Though worldwide gender imbalance of journalism practitioners is improving (Hanitzsch & Hanusch, 2012; Gallagher, 2008), especially compared with, for example, only 15% of London-based foreign correspondents were women in 1980s (Morrison & Tumber, 1985), the overall picture of "male-as-norm and woman-as-interloper" (Ross, 2017, p. 37) is still a harsh reality.

This reality is harsher for female China correspondents from non-Western countries, as they take up only 18.5% of the whole non-Western press corps operating in China. The largest size of China reporting corps by country, Japanese correspondents, according to the "Foreign Press Directory 2015" issued by International Information Office, are almost all men.

This striking gender imbalance of China press corps is not surprising, as a post in China, though not as challenging as war zones, is still widely considered tough, with its notoriously restrictive media culture and worrying pollution; meanwhile, overseas posting usually involves a lot more than professional ambition: the moving of the whole family if the correspondent is married can discourage a wife or mother from taking the assignment. The only African correspondent Aina Julietta of Nigeria Television took the China correspondent position because her husband is working in China[40].

[39] Other studies report a percentage of female journalists at around 30% to 40%.
[40] Personal communication, November 2015

While gender of newspeople is widely held to have an impact on news making (Armstrong, 2004; Craft & Wanta, 2004), in this study it also shows an obvious impact on how foreign correspondents perceive powers in the field and how they cope up with external pressures on their work. A One-Way ANOVA comparing the score of each of the influencers identified earlier in introduction against gender variable shows that female correspondents perceive significantly stronger influence from institutional constraints in China: Chinese laws and regulations ($F(1,98)=4.550$, $p=.035$, $\eta^2=.044$), as well as harassment ($F(1,98)=15.606$, $p=.000$, $\eta^2=.137$). The difference of perceived impact is especially stronger from harassment, suggesting difference in gender does create different power struggle of the agent.

3.1.2 Formal Education

Formal education background is an indicator of social position. Van Ginneken (1998) notes that foreign correspondents are especially mostly from middle class with decent education background, as they are usually required certain foreign language skills and social networks. The field of foreign correspondence indeed demands more educational capital than many other fields of power such as what Bourdieu (1983) described in the field of French literature only a third of the samples had higher education.

In the case of China press corps, respondents from different national contexts are generally very well-educated, measured by formal education level. 98% of the respondents have a college degree or above; 46% have a master degree, and 7% have a doctoral degree. Decent formal education seems to be an indispensable disposition for a wannabe foreign correspondent, especially for those from Liberal and Polarized Pluralist countries, where all correspondents have a college degree or above, most likely gained from elite universities.

Some non-Western correspondents also obtained their degrees from elite US universities. Indian correspondent Ananth Krishnan, for example, holds a master degree from

University of Chicago. But overall, non-Western and Polarized Pluralist countries impose looser entry delimitation for foreign correspondents, though the difference is not significant.

Their formal education is not necessarily in journalism studies or related fields. In fact, a majority of China correspondents have not been professionally trained in colleges or graduate schools, as table 3-1 shows. Overall only one thirds of the respondents have received formal journalism education in college or graduate school. The ratio is even lower for non-Western correspondents: only 25.9% (N=27) of them have had formal journalism education. They are mostly trained in other related fields of political sciences, international relations, history, and China or Asian studies. Most China correspondents for elite U.S. media (such as the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*) receive advanced graduate training in China or Asian studies—rather than journalism studies--from prestigious universities.

The pattern resembles that of older foreign press corps described in earlier studies. Tunstall (1974) characterizes many British foreign correspondents as the product of Oxford or Cambridge in fields other than journalism, which did not make the curriculum of those elite institutions; Harding (1990) and Bennett (1990) recount that some of U.S.'s China correspondents who did not major in journalism or Chinese studies ranked among the most distinguished performers; Willnat and Weaver (2003) report in their study of foreign correspondents working in the U.S. that 34 percent have a university degree in journalism.

Yet for American journalists, coming from where formal journalism education was originated, a journalism education background does appear to be a more important quality to become a foreign correspondent. Many correspondents from U.S. news organizations hold a degree in journalism of elite universities. The elite formal journalism education of the profession is also strengthened through fellowships for further journalism training and teaching journalism in education institutions. The *New York Times'* former Beijing bureau chief Edward Wong, a UC Berkley graduate in journalism, joined the journalism faculty at

Princeton University teaching international reporting after eight years' China correspondent life; Julie Makinen, former China bureau chief of the *Los Angeles Times*, is on a one-year John S. Knight Journalism Fellowship at Stanford University at the time of this writing. Though the linkage between journalism as a profession and journalism education is to be found in many other countries, it comes in its strongest form in the setting of Anglo-American countries, echoing the widely held strong professionalism in Liberal media system.

Professional education has been found in some studies to have an impact on journalists' practice and eventually on the final news product. Pedelty (1995) for instance found among foreign correspondents in El Salvador that journalists "trained in fields other than journalism" tend to produce more in-depth, critical reporting. But does formal journalism education predict strong professional or "journalistic *habitus*"?

3.2 Journalistic *Habitus,* Journalistic Ideology and Role Perceptions

Willig (2012) proposes to examine journalists' professional *habitus*, or "journalistic *habitus*", as a mastering of a specific bodily knowledge based on practice and experience. As other sets of dispositions, journalistic *habitus*, such as professional norms and values, influence journalists' position and practice in the field (see, e.g. Benson & Hallin, 2007; Deuze, 2005; Donsbach, 2009; Esser, 2008; Hovden, 2008; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, 2013). These professional norms and values, as a conceptual package, is referred to as "journalistic ideology", a system of beliefs characteristic of professional journalism, which functions to self-legitimize journalists' position in the field and broader social space (Deuze, 2005; Schudson, 2001; Zelizer, 2004).

To operationalize the package of journalistic ideology at individual level, or journalistic *habitus*, we need to turn to the concept of journalistic role perceptions, which links journalism as an institution to journalists as individuals (Tandoc, Hellmueller & Vos,

2012). Journalistic role perceptions, which spread across a spectrum from detached neutral reporting adhering to objectivity to a more critical advocacy journalism, are shaped and are proved to be explained by cross-national variances in media systems, journalists' individual training, socialization, etc. (Donsbach, 2009; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011; Mellado et al., 2016; Preston, 2009; Servaes, 1989; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996; Weaver, 1998; Zhu et al., 1997).

At operational level, Hanitzsch (2007) identifies three measureable dimensions of journalistic role perception: interventionism spanning from the least interventionist "neutral disseminator" dedicated to objectivity and impartiality, to a more interventionist role of participation and promoting change; power distance addressing the journalists' position toward the power, spanning from critical watchdog to a propagandist mouthpiece role; and market orientation ranging from the least market-oriented public or civic journalism, to the most market-oriented journalism. Donsbach (2009) similarly notes the three dimensions as "participant-observational", "advocacy-neutral", and "commercial-educational". This section thus unpacks China correspondents' role perception in line with these dimensions and proposes a role typology accordingly.

3.2.1 Measuring Journalistic Role Perceptions

Following Hanitzsch (2011)'s interview design covering the three dimensions of journalistic role perceptions[41], I compiled a block of role perception including 11 statements in the survey, and invited respondents to note their agreement on each statement on a five-point scale (1 being least important, 5 being extremely important).

A comparison of the mean score of each item across the four media systems (Table 3-2) pictures an overall audience-oriented and objectivity-upheld foreign press corps who rated

[41] With slight modification to situate the questionnaire in the setting of foreign correspondence in China

'*provide home audience with accurate and objective knowledge about China'* and '*provide home audience with the most interesting information*' with the highest score. A general tendency toward detachment is also prominent. Thus, among China press corps, some journalistic values appear to be universal: pursuing detached, independent journalism with an emphasis on objectivity and the audience. China correspondents as a whole are not interested in cultivating citizenry in China, as shown by the uniformly low score of the item '*motivating citizens in China to participate in civic activity and political discussion*'; nor are they interested in '*supporting Chinese official policies*', indicating an expected uniformly high distance from the power center of host country.

Table 3-2. *Role Perception Across Countries*

	Mean (SD)	Liberal	Social Corporatist	Polarized Pluralist	Non-Western
Provide home audience with accurate and objective knowledge about China	4.59*** (.59)	4.83 (.38)	4.60 (.50)	4.78 (.43)	4.15 (.72)
Provide home audience with the information that is most interesting	4.10 (.83)	4.17 (.81)	4.30 (.57)	4.17 (.86)	3.82 (.96)
Be an absolutely detached China observer	3.51 (1.14)	3.33 (1.22)	3.65 (.93)	3.78 (1.22)	3.44 (1.12)
Provide home citizens with information they need to make political decisions related to China	3.07 (1.16)	3.36 (1.07)	2.90 (.97)	2.61 (1.38)	3.11 (1.19)
Act as watchdog of Chinese government	2.62** (1.22)	3.08 (1.27)	2.35 (1.04)	2.78 (1.11)	2.11 (1.15)
Act as watchdog of business elites in China	2.50** (1.10)	2.89 (1.14)	2.40 (.99)	2.72 (1.07)	1.89 (.89)
influence public opinion about China	2.45 (1.21)	2.58 (1.32)	2.20 (1.15)	2.22 (.88)	2.59 (1.31)
Advocate or help to advocate for social change in China	1.96* (1.10)	2.11 (1.14)	1.45 (.69)	2.50 (1.25)	1.78 (1.01)
Motivate citizens in China to participate in civic activity and political discussion	1.69 (.94)	1.83 (.97)	1.60 (1.05)	1.67 (.84)	1.59 (.89)
Support Chinese official policies to bring about prosperity and development	1.47 (.81)	1.31 (.75)	1.30 (.73)	1.61 (.85)	1.70 (.87)
Support home country official foreign policy with	1.59*** (.99)	1.28 (.74)	1.60 (.99)	1.22 (.55)	2.26 (1.20)

China					
N	101	36	20	18	27

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Meanwhile, statistically significant variance across media systems is detected in the monitorial role perception of serving as a watchdog ('*act as watchdog of Chinese government/business elites in China*'), an advocacy role for social change in China, and a loyal role to home government with low power distance ('*support home country official foreign policy with China*'), though the overall scores for the latter two items are considerably low.

Correspondents from Liberal Model countries clearly demonstrate a higher degree of identification with monitorial role (M = 3.08 for '*watchdog of Chinese government'*, M = 2.89 for '*watchdog for business elites in China'*) than their counterparts from non-Western countries (M=2.11 for '*watchdog of Chinese government*', M=1.89 for '*watchdog for business elites in China*').

Those from Polarized Pluralist Model countries are more likely to be advocacy oriented when covering China ('*advocate or help to advocate social change in China'*, M=2.5), whereas correspondents from Social Corporatist countries show the least interest in this regard (M=1.45). Non-Western correspondents are more likely to stay loyal to political power of their home government (M=2.26) compared with their Western counterparts.

A mixed picture of cross-national role perceptions unfolds: China correspondents universally accept the basic values of liberal journalistic professionalism such as objectivity, neutrality, and detachment; a strong audience orientation is also widely acknowledged by correspondents across national borders; however, the broader picture of role perception among China correspondents still diverges in key dimensions including watchdog role for host country, advocacy orientation, and power distance with home government.

Formal journalism education does not show a significant correlation with journalistic role perceptions, but professional experience (measured by '*years of working as a professional journalist*') does make a difference in some indicators, as a set of regression tests show. The longer a journalist is in the profession, the higher s/he rates the role of a detached observer[42], but the lower s/he rates a watchdog role[43] and an advocate role of promoting social change in China[44], both of which are typical of Anglophone journalism professional values.

3.2.2 Detached Disseminator, Populist Watchdog, and Facilitative Change Agent: A Role Typology

For pragmatic purposes, I further conducted a cluster analysis for a role typology of China correspondents, who are consequently grouped into three role types: *detached disseminator*, *populist watchdog*, and *facilitative change agent*[45]. (See Table 3-3)

Table 3-3. *Profile of Perceived Professional Roles of Foreign Correspondents in China*

	Mean/SD	F	Detached Disseminator	Populist Watchdog	Facilitative Change Agent
Provide home audience with accurate and objective knowledge about China	M=4.594, SD=.586	.472			
Provide home audience with the information that is most interesting	M=4.099, SD=.831)	4.687 *	-	+	
Be an absolutely detached China observer	M=3.505, SD=1.137	4.093 *	+	-	
Provide home citizens with information they need to make political decisions related to China	M=3.069, SD=1.160	11.013***	-		+++

[42] β=.22, F(1,99)=4.85, p=.030, with R^2=.05 for '*being an absolutely detached China observer*'
[43] β=-.25, F(1,99)=6.58, p=.012, with R^2=.06 for '*watchdog of Chinese government'*, and β=-.27, F(1,99)=7.53, p=.007, with R^2=.06 for '*watchdog of Chinese business elite*'
[44] β=-.29, F(1,99)=8.77, p=.004, with R^2=.07 for '*advocate or help to advocate for social change in China*'
[45] A hierarchical cluster test shows a 3-cluster solution is most preferable. Thus I further used a k-means clustering, assigning correspondents surveyed into three groups, each assigned to the cluster with the nearest means.

Act as watchdog of Chinese government	M=2.624, SD=1.224	54.040***	---	+	++++
Act as watchdog of business elites in China	M=2.495, SD=1.101	53.299***	---	+	++++
influence public opinion about China	M=2.446, SD=1.212	39.431***	---	+	++
Advocate or help to advocate for social change in China	M=1.960, SD=1.095	71.054***	---		++++
Motivate citizens in China to participate in civic activity and political discussion	M=1.693, SD=.935	18.376***	--		++++
Support Chinese official policies to bring about prosperity and development	M=1.465, SD=.807	28.262***	--		++++
Support home country official foreign policy with China	M=1.594, SD=.992	2.834	-		+
N			39	48	14

Content of cells indicates the clusters' mean deviations from the overall mean in standard deviations: ++++/---- = 1.0 SD or above, +++/- - - = 0.75 SD, ++/- - = 0.5 SD, +/- = 0.25 SD.
* p<.05, *** p<.001

The first cluster *detached disseminator* shows the weakest interventionism, scoring the highest in "*being an absolutely detached China observer*", and the lowest in "*watchdog of Chinese government/business elites*", "*influence public opinion*" and "*advocate for social change*". The second cluster *populist watchdog* features a relatively strong monitorial role identification and higher audience orientation. The third cluster shows the strongest interventionism and the strongest collaborative impetus to facilitate the home government's China policy, scoring the highest in all variables measuring the dimensions of interventionism and power distance; this cluster is thus labeled *facilitative change agent*.

Detached disseminators are the least appreciating the monitorial function of journalism, and are not likely to take any interventionist role when covering China. To them, being a China correspondent is all about being a detached observer providing their home audience with accurate and objective knowledge about China, but with relatively less impetus to pursue the market-oriented role of providing audience with interesting information. They do not see it their role to monitor Chinese government and business elites, or to facilitate

official policies of home government. They are close to what Weaver and Wilhoit (1996) categorize as "disseminator" in their study of American journalists.

Correspondents labeled as *populist watchdog* pay relatively high regard to the market tradition of journalism, showing relatively strong identification with monitorial role and a relatively high power distance. They see it important as China correspondents to provide interesting information to their home audience as well as to watchdog governments and business elites in China, but they are not interested in promoting social change in China, nor in collaborating with home government's official policies. Compared with "detached disseminators", they are firm believers of watchdog journalism, most similar to Hanitzsch (2011)'s categorization of "detached watchdog", in line with the tradition of Liberal journalism culture.

Facilitative Change Agents are very much driven by an interventionist impetus. They hold the most critical view towards Chinese government and business elites, more radical than their peers in "populist watchdog" cluster; meanwhile, characterized by very low power distance, or a strong facilitative approach, they are the most likely to collaborate with and support home governments' official policies.

With higher regard to an interventionist role in influencing public opinion about China, and in advocating for social change in China, they take the responsibility to provide both home audience and Chinese citizens adequate information for political decision and activities. They are similar to what Donsbach (2009) and Schudson (1999) mapped as pursuing "advocacy tradition", and what Cohen (1963, p. 36) calls "Advocate of Policy", or even "policy maker", who actively participate in advocating or getting involved in decision-making of foreign policy. Different from all the previously identified "advocate" role, "facilitative change agent" take critical interventionism toward Chinese government and business elites but a loyal collaborative role for their home governments. Their critical

watchdog role for Chinese government could be dictated by their home governments' China policy, suggesting an outweighing emphasis attached to political power and national interests than journalistic professionalism. They are more political actors in their mission of covering China.

The three groups vary in size, but there's no one dominant role. "Detached disseminator" and "populist watchdog" are the two majority role types among China correspondents, with each counting for 39 (38.6%) and 48 (47.5%). The "detached disseminator" group are the least interventionist; "popular watchdog" demonstrate relatively stronger interventionism, but only in a monitoring approach, not in value-injected advocate approach. Overall, 86.1% of foreign correspondents hold a non-facilitative, non-advocate approach with very high power distance when covering China. They do not see themselves as any "government agent", as often accused by China, but more of a typical liberal journalistic professionalism. Only 14 China correspondents (13.9%) are identified as "facilitative change agent", more likely to be heavily subjected to political power of home government.

These various role perceptions, as a major component of journalistic *habitus*, engage China correspondents in different power relations with the restrictive host regulations and cultures. Detached disseminator may find it easier to strike a balance in the power relations with host cultures, whereas for populist watchdog or facilitative change agent, the restrictiveness can be so discouraging and even frustrating that their position in the field of foreign correspondence in China gets often shaken and challenged by the power struggle between their innate interventionist inclination and the very binding reporting environment. Yet journalistic *habitus* is by no means the only decisive *habitus* to land a journalist into the field of China correspondence. In many cases, China correspondents enter the field for their knowledge and interest in China, such as language ability and understanding of Chinese culture and society, which are to to be packaged into the notion of "Chinese *habitus*".

3.3. Chinese Mind, Chinese *Habitus*

Fu (1990) argues that one needs a "Chinese mind" to do fair reporting and understanding of China. But this "Chinese mind", as Lee (1990) points out, is not "ascribed", rather, it should be an "achieved" status. China correspondents' previous life experience, such as education background in China (learning Chinese or China studies) and personal connections with China (having family in China, etc.), breed such "Chinese mind", or "*Chinese habitus*". Chinese language proficiency and how long a correspondent has stayed on his/her China posting are also important indicators for such Chinese *habitus*. Hence in the dataset, I computed a new composite variable "Chinese *habitus*" composed of Chinese language proficiency, Chinese education, personal connections with China[46], and years of working experience in China. The four variables are converted to their z-score respectively and added up to compose the new variable "Chinese habitus"[47].

Age is a found to be a significant predictor of correspondents' Chinese *habitus*, $F(7,63) = 3.59$, $p = .003$. Those aged between 46 to 50 on average score the highest in Chinese habitus ($M = 1.88$, $SD = .68$), while young correspondents below 30 and those between 41 to 45 score the lowest. Though media system alone does not show significant explanatory power for the variance of correspondents' Chinese *habitus*, a significant interaction between the effects of age and media system is observed[48].

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[46] In the questionnaire seven scenarios were provided for respondents to choose from to indicate the closest to their personal connection with China: 1. Born a Chinese national; 2. Ethnic Chinese or with Chinese origin; 3. Married to a Chinese; 4. In a relationship with a Chinese; 5. Having lived in China before China correspondent posting; 6. Other personal connections; 7. No personal connection with China. As "born as a Chinese national" may be taken as the strongest personal Chinese connection, while others can be labeled as "weak personal Chinese connection", for calculating purpose of the composite variable "Chinese habitus", the original variable "personal Chinese connection" was then recoded to indicate various depth of personal Chinese connection: 0. No personal connection with China; 1. Weak personal connection with China; 2. Strong personal connection with China.

[47] The internal reliability of these four variables is unsurprisingly only moderate ($\alpha = .52$), as they are not necessarily interrelated. Instead, sometimes they are complementary to each other. Personal China-related life experience can be totally different from formal education in China studies or alike, which can be acquired afar from China. For example, a journalist may know China and Chinese language quite well because of personal China-related experience, rather than formal education.

[48] $F(17,63) = 2.47$, $p = .005$

Figure 3-1. *Chinese Habitus by the Interaction between Age and Media Systems*




Figure 3-1 shows that, young entrants in their late 20s across all media systems start with some but quite limited *Chinese habitus*, but the cross-national variance grows prominent among the age group from 36 to 50, and this is the majority age group for correspondents of almost any country. In the following section, I will discuss the *Chinese habitus* of this "backbone group" aged between late 30s to early 50s, and "new wave" generation of young correspondents aged below 30 separately.

3.3.1 Backbone Generation

In this "backbone" age group—correspondents aged between late 30s and early 50s—of foreign press corps in China, those from Liberal Model countries excel others in their Chinese *habitus*. Overall, current generation of Anglo-American correspondents have a much better priori knowledge about China, compared with their predecessors who covered China in

the 1970s and 1980s, when China just opened its door to the world. New cohort of China correspondents has easier and more diverse access to either formal or informal China education, unlike their American peers doing embedded journalism in China in the 1970s as described in Song and Lee (2014)'s study.

Mostly born in the 1970s or late 1960s, having grown up and educated in a new social setting after China's opening up, they are representatives of "third wave" China correspondents as categorized by Bennett (1990): elite and liberal, with sharp interest in and direct experience with China. These "third-wave" differ from the first-wave predecessors who studied China afar in the 1960s and 1970s; and from the second-wave who were "professional journalists" assigned to China in the 1980s because of their journalistic *habitus* rather than Chinese *habitus*. They have the advantage of holding a "realistic" view of China (Bennett, 1990, p. 269) for more direct personal touch with the country and its people.

An exemplar is Anthony Kuhn, the U.S. National Public Radio Beijing correspondent. Born in the 1960s to the prestigious American China historian Philip Kuhn and his first Chinese wife Cheng Wu, Anthony Kuhn attended Nanjing University for graduate program in Chinese studies. His Chinese is good enough to make him an Internet star in China[49]. BBC's China editor Gracie Carrie, also born in the 1960s, is an Oxford graduate. She was teaching English in China before joining BBC in the 1980s. Carrie is married to a Chinese national, and speaks fluent Chinese herself. Chris Buckley of the *New York Times* earned his PhD in China studies in the 1990s and was working in China as a translator and teacher before becoming a China correspondent. American journalist Mike Forsythe, best known for his series of investigative stories on top Chinese leaders' hidden family wealth, is well respected for being highly China-attuned among his fellow peers. He studied Chinese at

[49] http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/03/18/519216823/for-years-ive-been-a-correspondent-in-china-this-month-i-became-a-viral-star

Tsinghua University in Beijing in the late 1990s and joined Bloomberg's Beijing office upon graduation[50]. The list goes on.

In the same age group, however, correspondents from Social Corporalist countries are less equipped with such "Chinese mind". Usually they are dispatched from home desks for a short China stint before a promotion to a senior position at home; they came to China with little preparation on "Chineseness", and are not motivated to acquire much Chinese *habitus* while on the job, as they know their position in the field is secured for the three or four years' term before heading back for a more comfortable senior position.

German broadcaster ARD Shanghai correspondent Steffen Wurzel, in his late 30s, has spent most of his career time in Germany and Turkey, before joining on a three-month cultural exchange program between Germany and China ("Media Ambassador" funded by Robert Bosch Foundation) in 2009, which eventually landed him in his current China posting. Finnish public broadcaster YLE Beijing correspondent Mika Mäkeläinen, in his late 40s, had just freshly landed in his China posting when I met him in Beijing in late 2015. He did not speak any Chinese; neither did he have substantial personal touch of China before embarking on the assignment. Yet less than two years later, while I am completing the book draft, he has already finished his China stint and headed back to the foreign news desk in Finland[51].

Correspondents from Polarized Pluralist and non-Western countries are not much different. This is mainly because news organizations of liberal countries are the most resourceful, possessing more economic and cultural capital, hence more competitive for individual correspondents to enter or stay; correspondents in this age group with better Chinese *habitus* are thus likely to be found in Anglo-American news organizations.

[50] Forsythe joined *the New York Times* in 2013, after a dramatic censorship scandal of Bloomberg.
[51] Mäkeläinen explains to me it's a company policy, though he personally thinks two years' term is too short especially for China posting.

3.3.2 New Wave

For younger correspondents in their early 30s or late 20s, their Chinese *habitus* is rather homogenous across all four media systems. Almost all have acquired some limited "Chinese mind" before joining the China press corps. Many had studied in China or worked in professions other than journalism in China. As they are mostly unestablished in journalism, their familiarity with Chinese language and Chinese culture understandably facilitate them entering the field, usually regardless of the organizational context.

Joanna Chiu's profile is a perfect example of this "new-wave". Born in Hong Kong, Chiu grew up in Canada and studied journalism at Columbia University. A native Chinese speaker, she has worked in both Hong Kong and Beijing for multiple English-language news organizations. She was China correspondent for Germany's DPA when I contacted her for this research in late 2015, and now she is AFP's China and Mongolia correspondent.

Johnathan Kaiman, the Beijing correspondent for *Los Angeles Times*, was doing his research work on Chinese folklore in China before stepping into the journalistic field. Matt Sheehan, a Stanford alumnus in his late 20s, had already lived in China for three years when he got the job as the *Huffington Post*'s ever first China correspondent in 2014. He speaks fluent Chinese, and had taught, studied, and worked in China as an ordinary *Laowai* (foreigner); an international relations major, he runs his own blog and newsletter writing about China, and Sino-US relations.

The young generation of China correspondents, mostly born in the 1980s or even 1990s, are educated in a changing global order where China is growing to unprecedented prominence. They may well be labeled as the "fourth wave". Their encounter with China is largely facilitated by the rapid economic development of China especially in metropolis, the social networks, and a growing number of Chinese millenniums who share more similarities

with their Western peers compared with older generation. As some of them told me, what attracted them to Beijing is "so much fun here".

They differ from their predecessors in many ways. Unlike well-established "senior" correspondents in their 40s or 50s who most likely live in an upscale compound in the most "expatriate" neighbourhood in Beijing or Shanghai, geographically isolating from "ordinary Chinese", young correspondents are more to be found in a shared *hutong* (small alley) house with several local housemates. This is not necessarily saying young correspondents are more entrepreneurial and readier making local connections. Marital status and financial concern also account for such disparity.

3.3.3 The Blessings of Chinese *Habitus*

Of all the dispositions in the package of "*Chinese habitus*", the most dominant might be journalists' "Chinese identity"— being ethnic Chinese or not—and their language ability. Ethnic Chinese journalists speaking fluent Chinese can always much better blend in the local settings either for research or for interview. In the restrictive journalistic environment of China, being "Chinese" also helps to evade unwanted attention and ensuing obstruction, thus lessening the tension (explicit tension, to say the least) between journalists and local coercion apparatuses.

But it is not always a blessing to be ethnic Chinese reporting in China. There are situations in which interviewees are distrustful of fellow Chinese. In one episode of *SupChina*, a popular podcast for China watchers, AP's Greater China News Director Gillian Wong, a Singaporean Chinese, recounts how in Muslim-majority Xinjiang local Uygur were

reluctant to talk to her because they thought she was Han Chinese—this occurred against the larger background of antagonism between Han Chinese and Uygur that was flared up[52].

Overall news organizations see the benefits of having ethnic Chinese reporting in China, but recruiting ethnic Chinese is difficult, as Chinese laws forbid Chinese nationals from working as journalists for foreign media in China. Yet resourceful Western media outlets, *the New York Times*, *AP, AFP, CNN, etc.,* always manage to keep several ethnic Chinese as China correspondents or stringers. Besides Chinese migrants in Anglophone countries, Chinese-majority city-state Singapore is another major source of such talents for China correspondence. *The New York Times'* Beijing correspondent Sui-lee Wee, AP's Gillian Wong, and *Wall Street Journal*'s Beijing correspondent Chun Han Wong are all Singaporean Chinese. Most of them speak native Chinese, which is an asset for entering the field and, in most cases, for consolidating their positions as well.

If ethnicity can sometimes be a double-edged sword, the asset of Chinese language proficiency is much less scenario-dependent. Being able to speak local language is always a much valued asset for foreign correspondents, and major Anglo-American news organizations such as Reuters, the *New York Times*, and the *Wall Street Journal*, set Chinese language ability as a "must-have" quality for new recruits.

Of the surveyed foreign correspondents, 40% speak fluent or above Chinese (8% are native Chinese speakers); 29% speak intermediate Chinese, while another 24% say they only speak basic Chinese. 7% of them do not speak any Chinese. Though the measurement only reflects the self-evaluation of their Chinese language ability, the overall picture is very telling in many ways. As in actual interview or research, "intermediate" proficiency is barely conductive, it can be said that a majority of China correspondents (60%) do not have sufficient Chinese proficiency.

[52] An audio file of the program can be found here: http://supchina.com/podcasts/gillian-wong-josh-chin-journalism-careers-china/?platform=hootsuite

Lacking the language ability undoubtedly frustrates foreign correspondents and impairs their work. Columbian correspondent Santiago Villa, who speaks little Chinese, does not hide his deep anxiety over language inability: “It’s very limiting to do report without knowing Chinese; you just scratch the surface.” Even with a capable translator, he doubts the quality of his work here: “when you use a translator for interview, you don’t get to know the full narratives… you don't get to have a dialogue with the interviewee. Usually the meaning of your question gets lost in translation.”

But institutionally, for many foreign correspondents, especially for those from Social Corporatist and Polarized Pluralist countries, lacking the language skill does not harm the chance of getting the job, as after all, it is still very challenging for news organizations to recruit talents with both language skills and journalistic literacy. Most news outlets in these countries do not offer incentive nor impose any requirement for their correspondents to learn Chinese. Some interviewees are taking Chinese courses on their own expense, but “it’s very difficult to hang on there”, as German correspondent Steffen Wurzel admits.

Familiarity with China and Chinese structurally facilitates understanding cultural messages, but it also breeds inattention to occurrences, thus such Chinese *habitus* are not always a strength. Veteran China correspondent Chris Buckley doubts the assumption that language skill is the essential skill for reporting in China, though Buckley himself speaks and reads fluent Chinese after decades studying and working in China. “Without any Chinese skills correspondents can still do a very good job with their fresh eyes and different perspectives,” Buckley brushed off my suggestion that local language skill comes into vital play for foreign correspondents. But Buckley is highly regarded by many of his fellow China correspondents, partly for his outstanding language proficiency which enables him to have a sharper eye and deeper understanding for turning occurrences into news stories. The fact that all his correspondent’s career has been with influential English news outlets including

Reuters and the *New York Times* also says the importance of knowing local language as an important component of *habitus* in fighting for an advantageous position in the field of foreign correspondence.

3.4 Spiralists, Sinophiles, Sinojournos, and Sporadics: An Alternative Typology

As repeatedly emphasized throughout this book, *habitus*, *illusio*, and *capitals* land agents into different positions, which in a profession are partly reflected in career pattern. Hannerz (2004) in discussing the career pattern of a China correspondent, quoting a veteran China correspondent, categorized three types: *spiralists* who come for a certain length of stint and leave for the next station after their China stint; *Sinophiles* whose priority is to live in China rather than to "report" in China and barely based somewhere else as a journalist; and national journalists purely on one stint of China assignments here.

However, Hannerz's typology does not cover all career patterns of current China correspondents. Besides *Sinophiles*, there is another group of veteran correspondents who try to balance staying in China and doing journalism both as their priorities. They are different from *Sinophiles* mainly in their *illusio*, or the subjective commitment they invest into the field. Unlike Sinophiles who holds rather weak *illusio* in journalism and practice it only as a conduit for their strong *illusio* in other China-related fields (academia, foreign policy, or even entertainment), this fourth category are heavily committed in both China and journalism; they stay in China for a considerable long time not just for merely staying in China, but to specifically stay in the field of China correspondence. Thus I name them *Sinojournos*.

In the field of foreign correspondence in China, there are, based on the career patterns, four types of China correspondents: *Spiralists*, *Sinophiles*, *Sinojournos*, and, for those national journalists only on one or two sporadic stints overseas, I call them *Sporadics*.

The four groups, distinctively differing in their *habitus* and *illusio*, represent four types of positions in the field, which unavoidably result in different practice.

For a clear empirical picture of these four types of China correspondents, I used a two-step clustering analysis to group the survey respondents based on their *Chinese habitus,* number of previous overseas postings, and years of working as China correspondent[53]. As discussed earlier, *Sinophiles* and *Sinojournos* should score the highest in Chinese *habitus* but *Sinojournos* have much more experience working as a China correspondent; *Spiralists* are the most experienced in previous overseas assignments, while *Sporadics* do not excel in either Chinese *habitus* or foreign correspondent experience.

The cluster result is satisfactory, with an average Silhouette at 0.6, and all three variables score a larger than 0.65 predictor importance.

Table 3-4. *Cluster Analysis Result of China Correspondents' Career Pattern*

types	N (%)	Chinese habitus M (SD)	Number of previous overseas postings M (SD)	Years of working as China correspondent M (SD)
Spiralists	11 (10.9)	-2.68 (.90)	3.00 (1.10)	3.27 (2.51)
Sporadics	36 (35.6)	-2.07 (1.01)	.42 (.50)	2.74 (1.78)
Sinophiles	44 (43.6)	1.32 (1.27)	.32 (.52)	6.65 (3.81)
Sinojournos	10 (9.9)	4.58 (1.42)	.70 (.67)	20.05 (4.86)
Total	101			

As Table 3-4 shows, the majority of China correspondents are *Sinophiles* (43.6%) and *Sporadics* (35.6%), who do not have much foreign correspondence experience. 10.9% of the respondents are *Spiralists*, or professional foreign correspondents, for whom China posting is only one passing chapter in their excitement-ridden journey of foreign correspondence around the globe; they do not have much connection with China, scoring the lowest in Chinese *habitus*. An even smaller proportion can be categorized as the most committed

[53] As *illusio* as subjective commitment is less direct to operationalize, I will discuss about the difference of *illusio* of the four types of China correspondents qualitatively.

Sinojournos, who score the highest in Chinese *habitus*, and have stayed in China as foreign correspondent for most, if not all, of their professional journalist life.

A common overseas assignment for most news outlets runs between three to five years[54]. From the statistics, both *Spiralists* and *Sporadics* stay in China for barely one term, and *Sinophiles* on average stay for one to two terms. Though *Sinophiles* and *Sinojournos* usually try to stay on longer after their term is done[55], most news organizations expect their foreign correspondents to come back to home desk, or switch bureaus in the case of global news outlets such as Reuters and AFP. The rationale behind such common practice of news organizations, as explained by Morrison and Tumber (1985) in their study on foreign correspondents in London, is that staying on an overseas posting too long may make the correspondents "go native" (p.461), which may blind the fresh eye of correspondents when reporting the over-familiar host country. As argued earlier, "Chinese *habitus*" is not always a merit. However, if the correspondent is unbeatable in his or her mastery of "Chinese mind", news organizations tend to extend the contract so to minimize organizational cost to train a new replacement.

A senior editor at Reuters said they encourage correspondents to stay longer: "Even if you are an experienced journalist (and) you speak Chinese, coming to China it takes at least a year to figure out what's going on. So if you are only here three years, that makes it two years, which is not very much." With the organizational flexibility, a number of *Sinojournos* managed to remain in the field.

[54] According to Paul Carsten, and senior editor at Reuters, Reuters correspondents usually get a three-to-five years' contract.

[55] In such scenario, correspondents usually can negotiate with their news companies for another term. But if the company policy is not as flexible, the correspondent would have to quit their job in order to stay on in China. An example is Australian ABC's Beijing correspondent Stephan McDonald. After his two terms with ABC was done, he left ABC to join BBC in order to stay on in China.

3.4.1 *Spiralists*: Globetrotting News Hotspots

Spiralists, or globetrotting foreign correspondents, make foreign correspondence their career, but not confined to one specific posting. In what Hess (1998) describes as the "second track", they cover different transitional and volatile regions in the world moving between stints normally ranging from three to five years, thus are most likely to possess "cosmopolitan" *habitus* (Hannerz, 2004). To some extent, they are "international correspondents" rather than "foreign correspondents". This is especially true for those working with "international" media such as Reuters, AFP, CNN, etc. A Reuters correspondent dismissed to be addressed as "foreign correspondents": "We are not foreign correspondents. At Reuters we only have correspondents. No country is 'foreign' to us." Of course such "stateless" quality is only ideal. "Cosmopolitan" international correspondents still carry baggage from home, from the social system and education system they completed their first two rounds of socialization. Thus, as Hannerz (2004) admits, "any claim to cosmopolitanism would seem to be weakened".

Though lacking local knowledge and connections, they are seen as contributing to China correspondence with the strongest *illusio* in the foreign correspondence field, by daring to "do stories that would offend the government, knowing that they are only staying for a short time" (Buckley, 2017, personal communication). A *Sinojourno* himself, Buckley notes that *Spiralists* create pressure on the whole China press corps to maintain alert and sensitive to topics which they might otherwise overlook or self censor.

Jane Perlez of *New York Times* in Beijing is one of such typical "globetrotting foreign correspondents". She covered the Afghan war, the famine in Somalia, the civil wars in Sudan and Somalia, and gold mining in Southeast Asia, before joining the *Times* Beijing bureau. Berhand Zand of *der Spiegel* has been based in Istanbul, Cairo and Dubai covering wars and conflicts before coming to China in 2012. Spanish correspondent Javier Espinosa of *El*

Mundo spent 12 years reporting from conflict-stricken Middle East before trying his hand in China since 2014.

Having been based in a number of other global news hotspots, they tend to believe that their professional ideology, namely how they perceive and practice journalism, is well applied into different social settings they cover. Thus this group of China correspondents would transfer their practice in other journalistic fields directly into the field of China correspondence, in many cases, challenging the power relations with institutional constraints.

When comparing China assignment to his previous postings, Bernhand Zand said: "I interviewed, in middle east, heads of the states, from the king of Jordan, president of Syria, to the prince of Dubai, the president of Turkey, etc. All these people spoke relatively freely to us…But [in China] I don't know why they [Chinese leaders] are so shy to speak to western press."

3.4.2 *Sinojournos*: lifetime commitment in both China and journalism

Sinojournos tend to stay for a considerable length in China, in some cases for their entire career life, strongly committed to China or the region of East Asia and sometimes Southeast Asia.

Veteran China correspondent Jaime FlorCruz, who has spent more than 40 years living and working in China as Time correspondent and then CNN China correspondent, was a student at Peking University before he started looking around for a news assistant position at some foreign media Beijing offices, and was eventually led to this life-long profession; Buckley started as a researcher for the *New York Times* Beijing office before becoming a professional journalist with the Reuters for seven years and then with the *Times* again. Both of them have spent their entire career life in China and are established as exemplary China

correspondents highly respected for their wide local connections and unbeatable knowledge of the country.

A major source of *Sinojournos* is international students with a strong interest in China. Award-winning American correspondent Michael Forsythe, a graduate in East Asian studies from Harvard, started his journalist career straight after graduating from Tsinghua University where he studied Chinese language. "I need a job in China, and being a journalist seems interesting." Such cases are seen growing among new generation of China correspondents especially for American news outlets. *Los Angeles Times* Beijing correspondent Jonathan Kaiman was on a Fulbright scholarship in China before having decided to try journalism as an intern with *New York Times*, which led his career way up to "LA Times Beijing Bureau Chief" at the age of 30 as of the time of the study.

But such jobs are high in demand and not always available. Some fresh graduates with a strong interest in China correspondence take freelancing as a way to get into the professional China correspondent career. But freelancers cannot get accreditation or journalist visa in China, thus some of them test the water from Hong Kong. For AFP Beijing video journalist Etienne Lammy, "China is always an interest… I was working my way towards China correspondent". To get prepared for a position in the foreign press corps in China, he freelanced for AFP video in Hong Kong for four years, before being offered a formal position in AFP's Beijing office.

Some staff correspondents, in order to stay in China, leave their home media outlets to join others with which they could continue reporting in China. Stephen McDonell, an Australian correspondent working for Australian Broadcasting Corporation for nine years in Beijing, after having overstayed the company's contract, joined BBC China reporting team[56]. When it came to a choice between his home employer and China, "China gets under your

[56] https://www.crikey.com.au/2015/12/11/stephen-mcdonell-on-why-beijing-will-be-the-last-bureau-standing/

skin — it's an unstoppable juggernaut of change, and I just wasn't ready to let it go," McDonell writes emotionally in his farewell piece on ABC website.[57]

3.4.3 *Sinophiles*: Give me China. I don't care much about journalism

Similarly China-committed are *Sinophiles*. But different from *Sinojournos*, *Sinophiles* hold very weak *illusio* in the field of China correspondence, or they do not deem the game of journalism as worth playing. They aim at a career as *China experts* rather than *China correspondents*, usually characterized by authoring books on China-related topics, very short stint as a professional journalist in China, followed by other posts outside journalism, either in academics or business, but always focusing on China. The job as a China correspondent offers them a means to stay in China as well as to establish Chinese connections.

Huffington Post's Matt Sheehan, though having lived in China for five years and passionate about Sino-US relations and Chinese culture, left one of America's largest digital-only news organizations only after two years as their China correspondent. When explaining to me why he resigned journalism, Sheehan simply said: "Well, it's interesting, but, not a sustainable career." Now, Sheehan joined a US think tank on China policy and also runs his blog and newsletter on Sino-US relations.

A Turkish journalist-turned-artist has been in China for more than a decade. He helped set up the China bureaus for Turkey's national news agency, national TV, and at the time of this study serves as the China correspondent for Turkish national newspaper *Yurt*. But he is not practicing much journalism now. "The income is very bad (practicing journalism)," he explains to me in a traditional Chinese teahouse in Beijing's 798 art district, popular among local as well as international art lovers. But it was a reporting trip to Japan that made him determined to distance himself from journalism. Sent to neighbouring Japan to cover the

[57] http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-12-14/china-correspondent-stephen-mcdonell-farewells-abc/7025736

devastating earthquake in 2011, he realized upon arrival that the situation on site was life-threatening. “I want to leave. Or I will die,” he recounts. But his then-employer insisted him to fly to the epicenter and stay for stories. Frustrated, he sneaked away with a rescue team from Australia. “I can still write something about China if the Turkish embassy or whoever approach me for stories. But now I’m mainly engaged in film making”.

These correspondents, or agents, do not bother to challenge the existing power relations in the field. Instead, they mostly follow the norms in the safest way, interact less with peer correspondents, and barely challenge authorities, as shown in following chapters. To them, journalism is just a transition to other fields.

3.4.4 *Sporadics*: Journalism at Home, China just a Passing

Sporadics are not “professional foreign correspondents” as *Spiralists* are, and exhibit weaker *illusio* in the game of foreign correspondence than the latter. Their *Chinese habitus* is also weak. They are journalists back home for years and are brought to China on some sporadic assignment. Most of them have no plan to stay in China for long, or at least not planning to do so before embarking on the trip, and in most cases always expect to go back to home desks after a four or five years’ stint in China, ideally with a promotion. AFP Shanghai correspondent Bill Savadove echoes the widely shared notion that reporting experience in China for journalists is a big reward and earns them recognition in that “China’s a great story; you get a lot of attention” (Savadove, 2016). To many of them, China assignment, apart from its innate attractiveness, serves as a step-stone for higher positions back in home newsroom. Hess (1996)’s study on American correspondents posted overseas for example found a pattern that foreign posting experience can lead to fast promotion at leading newspapers such as the *Washington Post*.

Non-Western countries have the largest proportion of *Sporadics* China correspondents. Most Japanese journalists work in the Beijing bureau or Shanghai bureau of their news organizations for one or two terms, and then head back as, in some cases, senior editorial writers (論説委員). In the case of Indian journalists, *India Today* Beijing correspondent Ananth Krishnan, with a master degree in Indian history from the University of Chicago, was aiming at practicing journalism in India and came to China on "completely random" opportunity. When asked about his next plan after China, he said his primary interest is practicing journalism back in India or the U.S.

Similar path is found with many correspondents from Social Corporatist countries. German ARD's Shanghai correspondent Steffen Wurzel technically initiated his China assignment, first as a summer replacement of his colleague, the then Shanghai correspondent, for several months, then officializing the arrangement of a five-year China stint. His predecessor, after five years in China, went back in Berlin and opened a hipster café, never in journalism again. His colleague in ARD Beijing office, Axel Dorloff, who was sent to China in 2015, just months before we met in a café in Beijing, has been a journalist in Germany for more than 10 years but China is his first overseas posting. Another veteran newcomer I met in Beijing is the aforementioned Finnish correspondent Mika Mäkeläinen, a veteran journalist with more than 20 years' experience in his home country Finland and served a two-years China stint.

Sporadics, exhibiting very limited Chinese *habitus*, are more like what Hannerz (2007) distinguishes as "expatriates" who do not have strong commitment to host country and culture, often more affluent than average locals, engaging in a lifestyle most possibly close to home. A German correspondent based in Shanghai chose to bring everything from Germany to China—from olive oil to flour-- and live in a historic spacious apartment located in French Concession, the least Chinese neighbourhood one can find in China, where he could still live

as a European. When I was invited to snack a Jianbing (a popular Chinese street food similar to crepes) with him, he insisted having it properly in a plate, though it's almost a law in China to eat a Jianbing as it is—served in a shabby plastic bag from the vendor. "It's a German thing to eat whatever from a plate. I'm German," half-jokingly he claims.

3.5 Conclusion

Foreign correspondents as agents enter the field in China with different *habitus* and varying degree of *illusio*. They come from a not so diverse demographic background in terms of education level and social class, yet carrying various professional beliefs and values, or journalistic *habitus,* and varying degree of Chinese *habitus*. Such habitus are structured in their own histories prior to their China posting, and also are structuring the positions and power relations of each agent in the field of foreign correspondence in China.

This chapter looks into China correspondents' role perception as a window to their journalistic *habitus* and found a clear convergence among journalists from various national contexts towards detached, independent journalism with an emphasis on objectivity and the audience, especially non-Western correspondents showing strong incorporation of such values, confirming at least the element of commitment to objectivity in "a shared occupational ideology" among journalists (Deuze, 2005), or what Hallin and Mancini (2004) note as the doctrine of neutral professionalism based on the Anglo-American tradition prevalent among journalists around the world. In elective democracies, as Deuze (2005, p. 448) observes, objectivity is "an ideological cornerstone of journalism". This study suggests that this ideological cornerstone goes beyond the context of democracy. But variance across media systems is evidenced in key dimensions including a watchdog role for the host country, advocacy orientation and power distance with home government, largely consistent with the respective journalistic culture in each media system, suggests that national journalistic culture

still holds strong grip in foreign correspondence. Another interesting finding is the insignificant contribution of formal journalism education to journalists' role perception. It seems journalists acquired their journalistic *habitus* more from real work experience rather than a university degree in journalism.

Habitus and *illusio*, together with organizational bureaucracy, distinguish China correspondents into different career patterns. *Spiralists* are more committed to their profession as a "foreign correspondent" rather than "China correspondent", demonstrating strong commitment to journalism but weak Chinese *habitus*. The less cosmopolitan group *Sporadics* have little commitment to the host country; their China assignment is dispatched rather than self-initiated.

In contrast, *Sinojournos* and *Sinophiles* have gained strong Chinese *habitus* prior to their China postings. *Sinojournos* tend to secure a stable position as a China correspondent in a long run; with extensive local connections and rich knowledge about China, they often become the "reference group" among foreign press corps, for sources, story frames, etc.

The least committed group *Sinophiles* have strong Chinese *habitus* yet the weakest *illusio* in the game of journalism in general. They are most likely to leave journalism for other fields; while within the field, they do not intend to change or challenge the existing power relations in the field, either do they try to consolidate or elevate their positions.

Habitus from individual level set the basis of power relations in the field of foreign correspondence. But as much as Bourdieu is not a determinist, I am by no means suggesting *habitus* have the ominous power to structure or determine if an agent is to play a role of *Sinojourno*, *Spiralist*, *Sinophile* or *Sporadic*. *Habitus*, especially journalistic and Chinese *habitus*, does play a major role in setting an agent's position and shaping her/his practice in the field of China correspondence, yet *habitus* is always in a fluid state, shaped and

accumulated during the ever-stretching personal and social trajectory. The structuring of the position and field is a dynamic process, forever developing and evolving.

Besides *habitus* at individual level aside, other factors including newsroom norms, or routines, organizational constraints and institutional pressure, all contribute to the structure of the field of China correspondence and the position and practice of correspondents. The power of these factors and China correspondents' negotiation with these factors are discussed in the following chapters.

Chapter 4 Packaging China in a Pack? Routine Press Review Practice of China Correspondents

Pedelty (1995) bluntly summarized the daily routine of foreign correspondents as "Get the quotes, write the story, have a beer. Repeat the same routine tomorrow" (p. 124). This is undoubtedly an oversimplified picture, but journalists do work in a routinely fashion, with all the trappings of a discipline's constraints. After entering the journalistic field and having acquired certain positions, individual journalists cooperate and compete with each other to accumulate more capitals and to consolidate their own positions in the field. The safest way is to learn and follow routine practice. They follow certain news paradigm as a safe guide in newsroom practices. They learn and internalize the norms of the journalistic paradigm that is well established in their newsroom. These patterned and accepted norms are newsroom routines. Objectivity, for example, is a key element in the liberal tradition of journalistic professionalism. It serves as a defense which journalists conform to to protect themselves from public criticism and to legitimate the news organization (Gans, 1979; Hallin, 1989; Shoemaker & Reese, 2013; Tuchman, 1978).

"Position" is the key word here to understand journalists' routine practices. Both the position of a news organization in the field and the position of a journalist in the news organization determine the scale and power of routine practices. For example, as Bourdieu (1998) in *On Television* writes, journalists at *Le Monde* will almost certainly be constrained by the positional pressure which is translated into newsroom values such as what fits and what does not fit with the publication. "Quality papers" such as *Le Monde*, *the New York Times*, *the Guardian*, occupy more cultural capitals in a relatively autonomous position in the journalistic field. These newsrooms feel the pressure to uphold certain news values and newsroom routines such as objectivity and fact-checking, so to consolidate their positions. Within the newsroom, individual journalists in less autonomous position feel stronger

impetus to strictly follow the newsroom routines. This is mainly realized from what van Ginneken (1998) terms as the tertiary socialization (organizational socialization), and forming an "occupational ideology" (p. 81) or "rituals" (Tuchman, 1978).

These patterned, internalized norms and practices, or "disciplinary apparatuses" (Pedelty, 1995), are relatively static and unchanged. They could be easily learned, shared, and passed down, thus making the continuity of both organizations and the field possible. For example, Chang et al. (2012)'s study on American news rooms' criteria in selection foreign news found that the enduring values remain unchanged through 1988 to 2008.

This force of inertia leads the agents to "unwittingly reproduce the system, even as they struggle within it" (Benson, 1998, p. 477). These routines include news values, source routines, groupthink, defensive routines, all learned routinized strategies.

It is a journalistic doxa, the implicit yet taken-for-granted rules or norms of journalistic practice, that forms "a universe of tacit presuppositions that organize action within the field" (Benson & Neveu, 2005, p.3) that is "inherent in membership in a field" (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 37). News production is about positioning: the positioning of one story in relation to other stories; the positioning of one journalist in relation to other journalists; and the positioning of the news organization in relation to other news organizations (Schultz, 2012). This is where routine press review practice comes into the picture.

Press review both as a routine and as a form of "groupthink" (Janis, 1972, 1982) is the most prominent in foreign correspondence, where journalists cluster around the same news site, rely on each other for sources and local knowledge, and are much likely to be chasing the same stories. Thus this chapter takes routine press review practice as an example to discuss how positions and positional pressures result in doxic journalistic norms, and how these "journalistic doxa" influence agents' journalistic practice. On a pragmatic front, this

inquiry tries to redefine the notion of "pack journalism" and warn against the danger of over-generalizing it into an equation with press review.

4.1 Review as a Doxa

Press review practice is not "pack journalism", as denounced by some practitioners and scholars (see, e.g. Crouse, 1973; Frank, 2003; Matusitz & Breen, 2012). As Bourdieu (2005) and Champagne (1999) define "press review", it is the routine practice of journalists to constantly follow the coverage of peers, both colleagues and competitors, to situate themselves in a position that will distinguish them from their competitors. In a similar vein, Boczkowski (2010) calls it newspeople's "imitation" and "monitoring practice". Admittedly, it risks resulting in homogeneity in news content as a flock of jou

rnalists pursue the same news sources to cover the same story, and such practice undermines the diversity of a healthy journalism which is idealized as the cornerstone for a healthy democracy. However, a journalistic doxa, or a tacit, inherent understanding of norms, is the inevitable result of power struggle in the journalistic field where agents compete for limited resources on deadline (see, e.g. Schultz, 2012).

Bourdieu (1998) in *On Television* argues that in journalistic production, which is a "collective process", journalists are largely subjected to collective pressures, especially competitive pressures. Their daily routine, such as daily review of the press every morning, is "one of the mechanisms that renders journalistic products so similar" (p. 24). And "this is an effect typical of the field: you do things for competitors that you think you're doing for consumers." (p. 25) Deviating from the consensual line risks criticism from government, advertisers and peer news organizations, hence agents (journalists and news organizations) tend to avoid such deviation by closely watching others' practice, which usually results in inter-institutional conformity or so-called "pack journalism" (Crouse, 1973; Herman &

Chomsky, 1988; Pedelty, 1995; McCluskey, 2008; Sigal, 1973). As Zelizer (1993) insightfully taps on this shared collectivity in journalistic practice, journalism is an interpretative community, united through its shared discourse and collective interpretations. "The commonality of journalists is determined by a shared frame of reference for doing work" (Zelizer, 1993, p. 220).

Van Ginneken (1998) categorizes such press review practice as one thread of journalists' tertiary socialization on the job, after the primary socialization at culture level and the secondary socialization at profession level. Peer journalists, as van Ginneken (1998) argues, function as each other's prime reference group, hence the act of reviewing or monitoring each other's work. In this sense, members of the press corps are both competitors and accomplices. They may compete for resources and capitals, but also cooperate to fight against external pressures (criticism) that pose imminent threats to their autonomy. An "esprit de corps" does exist in the foreign press corps, especially when being pressured hard by Chinese authorities. This is when they feel the need to form a kind of collective help to keep maintaining the autonomy, if any, of the whole field of foreign correspondence.

4.2 Competition, Positional Pressures: Differentiation and De-differentiation

As aforementioned, the dynamic of such collective reference is the need to position oneself (either individual journalist or news organization) in relation with competitors, so to distinguish oneself or differentiate from others. Foreign correspondents face different national markets at home countries tend to subscribe to the dominant logic of the field and lose their autonomy, thus "de-differentiating" themselves to consolidate their positions and preserve the field (Tandoc, 2017). The strategies of differentiation or de-differentiation depend on the positional pressures to which agents are subjected. Either way, foreign correspondents watch closely on competitors, and sometimes non-competitors (for example,

many continental European or non-Western correspondents closely follow major Anglo media outlets, even though they are not "competitors"), in order to make sure that they didn't miss any "significant" story, and consolidate or even elevate their positions in the field.

A Shanghai-based veteran European correspondent's comment is typical of such routine "pack for competition" practice:

> *Everyone watches what everyone else's doing. There's [sic] definitely examples of competitive pressure to do it. … there's definitely "pack journalism", or "group journalism", where you see someone doing something and you do it because they are doing it. So the judgment is not necessarily news value. It's "they are doing it, so we do it".*

In China reportage during the past decade, the most high-profile example of such collective press review might be the wave of investigative stories during 2012 and 2013 on China's high ranking Party leaders' corruption and hidden family wealth. Chinese top leaders' families are traditionally a taboo topic for both Chinese domestic media and foreign media. But the year of 2012 witnessed an unusual "pack reportage" vying to investigate and reveal the long-held taboo topic, among leading Anglo media outlets including *the Wall Street Journal*, the Bloomberg, and *the New York Times*.

The stormy unprecedented "pack muckracking" started from early February when the police chief of Chongqing municipal fled to seek refuge in a US consulate in an astonishing move, amid escalated clashes with Bo Xilai, then Party chief of Chongqing Municipal and Politburo member, widely believed to be a potential appointee for the highest leadership. A week later a Hong Kong-based magazine *Next* first published a story revealing the secret family wealth connection of Bo's family (Coronel, 2012). The story of the most scandalous purge of Chinese top officials was followed up by major Western news organizations including *the Wall Street Journal*, *the New York Times* and Bloomberg. The *Wall Street*

Journal took the lead among others in uncovering the family corruption of this political star of China, having published a well-received profile on Bo's wife on April 7, 2012[58]. The article, referring to Bo's wife as "Jackie Kennedy of China", unveils her complex financial ties both in China and abroad, and how she is allegedly responsible for the death of a British businessman.

Other competitors, Bloomberg News and the *New York Times*, then had to divert their focus onto different individual top-level political figures, to distinguish themselves from *the Journal*'s scoop while not missing out in the thematic dirt-digging.

Then *New York Times'* Shanghai correspondent David Barboza later broke an investigative story on then outgoing Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's family business on October 25, 2012[59], which landed him the Pulitzer Prize for international reporting of 2013 for the *Times*. Bloomberg's Michael Forsythe and his colleagues worked on a series of the power and fortune of China's "Eight Immortals" or red nobility, including now China's President Xi Jinping's family[60], aiming for a Pulitzer Prize as well. A Bloomberg editor recalled how the investigation team decided to dig on Xi's family fortune: "We came to the conclusion that we should stop trying to look where *the Journal* and *the Times* were looking, Xi is fair game… That's why we started looking at Xi Jinping" (French, 2014).

In a salad house next to *the New York Times* Hong Kong office, Michael Forsythe explained to me how, as then Bloomberg's China correspondent leading the investigative stories, he and his colleagues set their mind on the topic. When *Wall Street Journal's* story on Bo Xilai broke out, they felt huge competitive pressure. "How do we distinguish ourselves

[58]The full story can be retrieved here: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303299604577327472813686432

[59] The full story can be retrieved here: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/business/global/family-of-wen-jiabao-holds-a-hidden-fortune-in-china.html

[60] Forsythe's story on Xi Jinping's family fortune was published on June 29, 2012, but the original accessible article was later made only available to subscribers in 2017: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-29/xi-jinping-millionaire-relations-reveal-fortunes-of-elite

from them?" Inspired or pressured by the *Journal*'s investigation on Bo, Forsythe and his colleagues followed up to investigate the wealth of Bo's wife and the family of his wife, and then all nine members of the highest Standing Committee of the Politburo. Soon they had some exciting findings on the enormous fortune of Xi's sister. "Bo Xilai scandal refocused everybody's attention. Suddenly Chinese politics, high politics, became interesting again… Suddenly, it became a priority (for news media)."

The *Wall Street Journal*'s senior China correspondent and columnist Andrew Browne echoes that competition leads to the "pack reportage": "That (the *Journal*'s report on Bo Xilai) was very closely followed by our rivals—the *New York Times*, Bloomberg, so they came after Wen Jiabao and Xi Jinping."

This wave of investigative reports targeting China's highest political leaders finally ebbed down due to huge political and economic pressures Chinese government exerted to these three news outlets and their China correspondents. Both the *Times* and the *Journal* had their business in China severely undermined. The *Times*' websites including its newly-launched Chinese-language website were blocked as a "punishment" and its incoming China correspondents have been denied visas for three years. Bloomberg conceded to such pressure, by killing another upcoming story on Xi Jinping's family connection with the richest business tycoon of China[61], but the company suffered in the way of journalistic integrity and reputation. Maybe critics can blame Bloomberg for not having behaved tougher in the negotiation with pressures from China, but it needs to be acknowledged that such investigative journalism requires considerably high autonomy of the news organizations in the field. But most news organizations, such as Bloomberg which has huge business stake in

[61] The story never appeared on Bloomberg, and its leading journalist for the piece Michael Forsythe later joined the New York Times, where he published a similar piece in 2015: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/asia/wang-jianlin-abillionaire-at-the-intersection-of-business-and-power-in-china.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1

China market, are evidently residing toward the heteronomous pole as to their position in the field of China correspondence.

This is a typical example of powerful agents acting to transform the dynamics in the field. Agents in the field struggle and compete for more capitals, both economic capital (competing for audience and advertisers) and cultural/symbolic capital (such as winning a Pulitzer). The case of the three US media outlets vying for scoops on China's elite corruption is a painstaking fight between journalistic autonomy (cultural/symbolic capital) and external power control from political and economic forces. Though media outlets such as *the New York Times* enjoy much higher autonomy in the field, yet after struggling with the external power control, the dynamics and norms within the field are rebalanced back to its original configuration, deviated little from the previous power structures. As some critics observe, after that breathtaking wave of scoops, the public haven't seen many more reports of such genre coming out. The foreign media coverage on China went back to staying away from muckracking the top leadership.

On more occasions, the competitive pressure is fueled and amplified by editors who are not in the field but are closely following competitors' content afar (Revers, 2017), and often journalists may find this compulsory pressure to join the pack repelling—stories they despise but are told by editors to cover simply because their competitors have carried the said stories. This is when correspondents have to "de-differentiate" for (the editors') fear of deviation, and undermine their autonomy. *India Today* Beijing correspondent Ananth Krishnan complains about the situation when he *had to* cover a "survey" launched by the Chinese jingoistic tabloid *Global Times* asking its readers to rank their favorite neighbouring countries. Against the backdrop of delicate relations among China, India and Pakistan, it was a sensational topic for Indian press as the *Global Times'* readers overwhelmingly favour

Pakistan over India[62]. Krishnan himself dismisses the so-called "survey" as "dubious" and "self-selecting", thus was at first reluctant to give it any media exposure. But when PTI, India's biggest news wire, covered the survey, followed by many other Indian media, he knew he *had to* cover it. "Unfortunately I couldn't ignore the story," Krishnan was obviously not proud of having filed the story on the *Global Times'* "survey". He explains the competitive pressures: "If your competitors are doing it, you can't be an ostrich; you can't bury your head in the sand and say it's beneath me. My newspaper can't miss a story if other newspapers are going to have it." Such cases in effect intertwine the routine press review of journalists and the reporter-editor relations, which will be discussed in next chapter.

4.3 Colocation and Pack

Apart from reading the coverage of competing news media and reacting under the pressure of competition, foreign correspondents also tend to huddle together to cooperate, to share resources and exchange ideas and information, which is made possible by colocation, or concentration in space. Boczkowski (2010) identifies colocation and content availability as the two salient factors in understanding the degree of imitation or monitoring practice in journalism. Crouse (1973)'s account of "notorious pack journalism" of election campaign reporters packing in the campaign bus is an extreme case of such colocation. Chapter 2 has sketched the geographic spread of China correspondents, who are not Crouse's "boys on the bus", but are definitely neither women and men sparsely scattered all around the vast land of China.

Hannerz (2004) in his study on foreign correspondents in a global scale records that their offices are more likely to concentrate in local space. China correspondents in Beijing follow a similar pattern. Before 1990s all foreign media operating in China were designated

[62] Krishnan's article on the survey can be retrieved here http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chinese-internet-users-prefer-pak-to-india-as-neighbour-says-survey/1/571436.html

to live and work in diplomatic compounds in the diplomatic district in east Beijing (Chen & Wang, 2009). Today most Western media still base their offices in the area where foreign embassies, expatriates, are concentrated. The building of China Foreign Ministry is also close by, making it logistically easier for correspondents to attend press conferences or visit International Press Center.

The six diplomatic compounds[63] are located within around four kilometers with each other, adjacent to the most vibrant and cosmopolitan area in Beijing filled with popular restaurants, cafes and bars, creating a convenient environment for foreign correspondents to socialize among themselves as well as with sources and connections. The *Bookworm* is a popular bookshop doubled up as a library and bar among locals and expatriates, where many cultures intersect. It has an unusually huge collection of English-language books on China and Asia studies[64]; it also regularly hosts literary and cultural events. Many English-speaking foreign correspondents often go for sources and connections, and sometimes as speakers share their knowledge of China to fellow correspondents and expatriates.[65] FCCC organizes almost all their events in this compact neighbouhood. All my interviews except one during a two-month field observation in Beijing were done in that area.

Reuters and Bloomberg, the two major financial news wires, are understandably located a bit outside the diplomatic district. Their Beijing bureaus, each with dozens of reporters and outnumbering most foreign news outlets, are set upon "Beijing Financial Street", to be close to activities of main financial regulatory commissions and banks.

[63] The six compounds are: Sanlitun Diplomatic Compound, Jianguomen Outer Diplomatic Compound, Qijiayuan Diplomatic Compound, Liangmaqiao Diplomatic Compound, Tayuan Diplomatic Compound, and Jindao Diplomatic Compound
[64] I read Peter Hessler's *Strange Stones* there.
[65] Examples of the events involving China correspondents: http://beijingbookworm.com/happenings/introducing-the-china-10-journalism-panel/

Most foreign correspondents only have small newsrooms which are geographically packed. All public broadcasting media from Scandinavia (Danish TV, Swedish TV, and Norwegian NRK) share the same office in one of the Diplomatic Compounds. German media are mostly based in the same compound or the same building, networking among themselves professionally and socially. For the daily press conference of the Foreign Ministry, they would share a taxi ride together. Some freelancers rent a workstation in a shared office with other staff correspondents. Such spatial arrangement makes sure they stay close to the positions they are aiming to acquire.

Colocation not only makes it possible for China correspondents to select news topics in pack but also risks homogenizing how they interpret events into news. Or, as Revers (2017) specifies, both collective agenda setting and collective interpretation of issues are basic forms of pack journalism. This is not restricted to media outlets of the same country or the same market. In other words, colocation risks leading to pack journalism not because of competitive pressures, but because of convenience in resource-sharing and cooperation. On December 2, 2015, when Beijing Municipal government issued the first ever red alert of pollution level, I was visiting some of the foreign media's offices at Dongzhimen Diplomatic Compound. On the street outside the compound, within a short distance of about 500 meters, three batches of foreign TV media staff, from both Asian and Western countries, were shooting for the smog story in the grey, choking air. Thus on that day, audience around the world saw similar shots on the same street about China's pollution issue from their TV sets. In this case, as the immediate social setting is shared, pack journalism in both forms (collective agenda setting and collective interpretation) is almost guaranteed.

Different from the scenario in Beijing, Shanghai-based foreign correspondents tend to work more on their own. Or in other words, it is less "packing" in Shanghai.

One reason is the much smaller size of correspondents in Shanghai, whose offices are spreaded all over the city. At the time of this study, only around 120 correspondents are based in Shanghai, in comparison to Beijing's 480 correspondents with their working space much more packing together. Shanghai-based correspondents, as previously explained, usually work on beats of business, corporations, or technology that are allowed greater leeway than topics of diplomacy and politics which are more reliant on routine official sources. Thus Shanghai correspondents do not have many opportunities of packing in the same information pool such as embassies' events or Chinese government's official press conferences.

Besides, the city of Shanghai itself offers more room for independency as an expatriate. Once the "Paris of the Orient" in the colonial period and the Asian hub for foreign correspondents till 1949, Shanghai still keeps its unique culture of relative openness and diversity. It is hailed as the most cosmopolitan city for expatriates in China (Hewitt, 2001). Thus foreign correspondents, who are expatriates themselves, may find it less necessary to pack together for non-professional reasons as well. Several Shanghai correspondents I talked to emphasized their "independency" in this regard.

But if we quantify such press review practice by measuring perceived influence from other China correspondents and competitors, there is no statistically significant variance in either of these items between Beijing and Shanghai correspondents. This lack of statistical variance might suggest the diminishing constraining power of geographic space in the collective reference, as Twitter and other social media platforms are becoming increasingly significant for correspondents to pack online.

4.4 Pack Online

Boczkowski (2010) notes an increase in technology-assisted means and a decrease in face-to-face encounters of journalists to follow stories their peers and competitors are working on. Likewise, this study found China correspondents are heavily reliant on online platforms such as social media to pack. Of all social media platforms, Twitter might be the most important and most widely used by journalists for professional work (Hedman, 2015). In this study, 59.4% of surveyed China correspondents actively use Twitter as one of the self-promotion platforms. This makes Twitter a convenient cannon for journalists to monitor their competitors. Anthony Kuhn, NPR Beijing correspondent, notes one of the ways for him to know what his peers are working on is to follow their posts on Twitter.

Apart from publishing their own articles, China correspondents discuss China's policies, social problems, novelties—almost all topics—on Twitter, and quite possibly they take on a story idea from their Twitter discussion. Former *HuffPost* China correspondent Matthew Sheehan, a new entrant, observes "a dangerous group think mentality on Twitter" among Western correspondents. A typical example is Western media's flocking coverage on a racist Chinese video targeting India.

China's state news agency Xinhua on August 16, 2017 released a video titled "Seven Sins of India", bashing India for the ongoing Doklam border standoff between the two countries. The video had a Chinese actor playing an Indian, dressed in traditional turban and mocking Indian accent. The video was soon branded "racist" and tweeted by *India Today* Beijing correspondent Ananth Krishnan who has more than 25 thousand followers on Twitter, among them China correspondents or China/India watchers. This tweet was retweeted more than 200 times and sparked wide criticism of Xinhua almost with no delay. Apart from Indian media, major Anglo media including *the New York Times*[66]*, BBC*[67]*,*

[66] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/world/asia/china-india-racist-video-border-standoff.html?_r=0

Financial Times[68], and *the Washington Post*[69] soon followed up, all quoting condemning Indian journalists' tweets as a source. Both the *New York Times* and BBC directly quoted from Krishnan's tweet.

Yet "pack on Twitter" is largely restricted to English-speaking journalists, especially Western journalists. Journalists from other countries and cultures are not avid users of Twitter for reasons of language, habits and company rules. For example, most Japanese media do not allow their staff to run their own personal social media accounts, Twitter accounts included.

4.5 Pack Sourcing

Journalists' practice of sourcing in pack can be understood in what Revers (2017) notes as "collective wisdom", the exchange or sharing of background knowledge and connections. Sources are what journalists rely on for the essence of a story. Gans (1979) poetically describes the relationship between sources and journalists as "a dance" (p. 116), as the access-seeking is reciprocal. It is a process of "mutual legitimation" (Carlson, 2009), which breeds the journalist-source relationship both symbiotic and symbolic.

Shoemaker and Reese (2013) identify three types of sources: official sources, expert sources and informal sources. Scholars have found that the news media overwhelmingly use official sources (see, e.g. Hallin, 1986; Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973). Journalists' source pool is limited, for an official source to meet the requirement of authority, credibility, and availability (van Ginneken, 1998) can be scarce. Working on deadline, they tend to turn to the same sources repeatedly, instead of investing time and resources to find other sources.

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[67] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-40957719
[68] https://www.ft.com/content/0dbfbb60-8300-11e7-a4ce-15b2513cb3ff
[69] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/17/chinese-state-media-made-a-racist-video-about-india-and-is-censoring-its-critics/?utm_term=.9f10acfc2dee

Soley (1992) calls the routine source "news shapers" who reinforce their own authority through repeat access.

In China correspondence, where Chinese official sources are even more limited to only formal press release or press conference, foreign correspondents' pack sourcing practice can be more prevalent. Beijing-based correspondents, as the campaign press corps described by Crouse (1973), routinely pack for the same sources from embassies, Foreign Ministry, press conferences, and state media such as Xinhua and *People's Daily*. Foreign Ministry, being the main official source venue for foreign correspondents, holds daily press conference on weekdays since 2011[70]. Even though the Ministry provides 24-hours contact number for press inquiry, foreign correspondents seldom find these numbers accessible in practice. A European correspondent complains: "even if you call the number, usually they don't answer your question until the [press] briefing is held." Such restrictive official sources only intensify journalists' pack sourcing practice.

Expert sources are also increasingly cramped under the tight ideology and speech control by the current leadership in China. Correspondents keep consulting the same small pool of experts on China policy, but few Chinese experts are included in this source pool. As van Ginneken (1998) observed decades ago, "an 'old China hand' is almost never a Chinese" (p. 100). Things remain unchanged today.

In covering a surprising removal of a top-level Party official Sun Zhengcai in July 2017, for example, major Anglo newspapers mostly cited Western *China experts* instead of *Chinese experts* on analyzing Chinese elite politics.

Table 4-1 shows the number of expert sources used by major newspapers covering this Sun story. (All stories are filed by China correspondents of each newspaper.) Though it seems correspondents are trying to balance between the Chinese and Western expert sources

[70] Foreign Ministry started regular weekly press briefing since 1982. The frequency of press briefing was changed to twice a week in 1995, and later changed to daily in 2011.

(for example, *New York Times* and *Financial Times* quoted the same number of Chinese and Western experts), Western sources yet take up the majority. Of all the ten expert sources, only two are China-based Chinese experts.

Table 4-1. *Number of Expert Sources Cited in Mainstream Anglo Newspaper*

Newspaper	date	No. of Expert sources	No. of Chinese expert sources (China-based)	No. of Non-Chinese expert sources
New York Times	July 24	4	2 (1)	2
Wall Street Journal	July 17	0	0 (0)	0
The Guardian	July 25	3	1 (0)	2
Financial Times	July 25	2	1 (1)	1
Daily Telegraph	July 25	1	0 (0)	1
Total		10	4 (2)	6

The three expert sources *The Guardian* cited are US expert Susan Shirk, Brookings Institute's China Center director Cheng Li, and Bill Bishop, a veteran China watcher and US-based publisher of the Sinocism newsletter on China affairs. All three sources are in effect US experts (Cheng Li is a Chinese American). Susan Shirk, a former high-ranking official, is also one of the two non-Chinese expert sources cited in the *New York Times* article on the same topic published one day earlier. Similarly, Bill Bishop is a repeatedly cited routine source by major Anglo media outlets including Reuters, *Financial Times*, and *Washington Post*. He is seen, for example, talking about North Korea crisis and US-China relations on the *Washington Post*[71], China's artificial intelligence technology on *the Times*[72] , and China's

[71] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chocolate-cake-and-chemistry-repair-us-china-ties-but-will-north-korea-spoil-the-party/2017/04/14/5cf5a950-206e-11e7-bb59-a74ccaf1d02f_story.html?utm_term=.9e1149d24532

[72] MacLeod, C. (June 20, 2017). China's pursuit of artificial intelligence worries America, the Times.

policy change toward US consulting companies on *Financial Times*[73]. Maybe his biography on his Sinocism website is more intuitively telling: "[I] am often quoted in major media such as Bloomberg, *Financial Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, Reuters, *New York Times*, *The Guardian*, etc."[74] This is also an illustrative example of the symbiotic relationship between journalists and sources. While legitimizing certain frame for the media, the routine source also gets legitimized for his/her/its own status and capital accumulation.

Veteran China correspondents have established their own connections with sources, including official sources and expert sources. New entrants, lacking such resources and capitals and under positional pressures, tend to pack with veteran correspondents in sourcing. Former *HuffPost* China correspondent Matthew Sheehan candidly admits that he did not have much local connection in China; what he did is contact those routinely quoted in other correspondents' stories and thus develop them into his own sources. "They are usually happy to talk on record," Sheehan notes. Thus by pack sourcing, the elite status of those routine sources are reproduced and consolidated, so is the symbiotic and symbolic journalist-source relationship. Or, in a nutshell, the power structure in the field is reproduced and enhanced. Routine sources have their cultural power reinforced and augmented through constant media access.

4.6 National Variance in Press Review

Usually media outlets from the same country tend to cluster together and monitor each other more closely, because of close competition for the same national market as well as cultural affinity. As aforementioned, journalists of Scandinavian media even share the same office; Korean journalists have their own professional and social club in China, and huddle

[73] Anderlini, J. (May 26, 2014). China clamps down on US consulting groups, Financial Times. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/310d29ea-e263-11e3-89fd-00144feabdc0
[74] https://sinocism.com/about-2/

together in a Korean-majority community in northeast Beijing. They attend events at the embassy together; they celebrate their national festivals together; they, on many occasions, gossip and joke together over meals and drinks.

But the degree of such collective practice varies across countries. Statistics argue for a more "pack-minded" press corps from Liberal countries and Social Corporatist countries. In the survey, one question asks respondents to rate the perceived impact of "other China correspondents" on their daily reporting work on a five-point scale. Significant cross-national variance is found: $F(3,97) = 5.09$, $p = .003$. A Tukey HSD Post Hoc test further suggests that correspondents from Social Corporatist countries perceive significantly higher influence from other China correspondents ($M = 3.00$) compared with those from Polarized Pluralist ($M = 2.22$) and non-Western countries ($M = 2.00$). The aforementioned story on China's Xinhua racist video against India, for example, is not covered by any of the three mainstream Japanese newspapers[75]. Neither was the ousted Sun Zhengcai story.

The variance is largely consistent with the development of mass media market and journalistic professionalism level in each media system. As Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2012) show, both media market and journalistic professionalism are better developed in countries of Liberal Model and Democratic Corporatist Model, compared with those of Polarized Pluralist Model. Non-Western countries are mostly seen with less-developed mass media market, with the exception of Japan, thus journalists of these countries are subjected to less competitive pressure, which is the main driving force for "pack" practice.

Working together with market pressure is the level of professionalism. Countries of Liberal Model and Democratic Corporatist Model are known for higher level of journalistic professionalism. In other words, correspondents from countries of these two media system

[75] The three mainstream Japanese newspapers (English language version) are: *Japan News*, *Asia & Japan Watch (AJW)* and *the Mainichi.* The finding is based on a search on Factiva.

models form a more cohesive "interpretive community". This variance in professionalism is empirically echoed by the significant difference in respondents' identity of membership of professional associations. In a question asking respondents to indicate their membership of any professional association, although 42% of the respondents report no affiliation with any professional association, national variance is significant: $\chi 2$ (3, N=101)=18.57, p=.000, with large effect size (Cramer's V=.43, p=.000). 80% of those from Democratic Corporatist countries are members of at least one professional association, whereas among correspondents from Polarized Pluralist and non-Western countries, the percentage is only 44% and 30% respectively. This random finding of a significant correlation between media system and perceived degree of collective reference practice suggests journalists' identity with "professional community" might attribute to a more salient "pack mind", in which the journalists emphasize the autonomy of the profession, or the whole journalistic field, over individual autonomy within the field.

4.6.1 "The *New York Times* Disease"?

The press review practice among foreign correspondents is patterned in a hierarchy. Those news organization or correspondents with more capitals, especially cultural/symbolic capitals, often take the lead setting the frame of reference. Other agents, feeling the positional pressure against those powerful agents, closely follow these leading agents. Again, Anglo-American media are the powerful ones with huge capitals and thus possess more autonomous positions. A German correspondent I interviewed in Beijing admits that "international leading news organizations are mostly American plus BBC".


Of all the Anglo-American media, *the New York Times,* self-professed "newspaper of the record", is widely acknowledged as on the top of the professional hierarchy (see, e.g.

Gitlin, 1980). Golan (2006) found that *the New York Times* set the agenda of international news for the three major networks of the US; Pedelty (1995) even uses "*the New York Times* disease" to refer to the self-referential and agenda-setting tendencies of *the New York Times*' correspondents in their coverage of the Salvadoran War. As Pedelty explains, *New York Times* correspondents "play an institutional role in defining the national, and sometimes international, news agenda" (p. 73). Such agenda setting capability of the New York Times is also noted by Rosenblum (1979). Thus news narratives become what Pedelty calls "Times-sanctioned truth". Is *the New York Times* leading China coverage as well?

One question in the survey asks respondents if there is a hierarchy among foreign media based in China, and which news organization takes the lead if they think a hierarchy exists. Of all 101 respondents, only 36 provided their answer, and two disagree on the notion of hierarchy in foreign press corps in China.

Of the 34 responses acknowledging the existence of a hierarchy, the most mentioned is *the New York Times* (N=24), followed by Reuters (N=17), *the Wall Street Journal* (N=12), and BBC (N=10).

Figure 4-1. *Hierarchy of News Organizations as Rated by China Correspondents.*



Most respondents are reluctant to name any individual correspondents whom they consider "more influential than others". Among those names popping up, *New York Times*' Chris Buckley obviously stands out. But it is worth noting that all respondents who named Buckley are from Liberal countries, namely, sharing similar audience and market.

Traditionally journalists in print news are less salient than their colleagues in television news (Hannerz, 2004, p. 147), and Buckley is even not an award-winning journalist; but he represents the *New York Times.* The fact that Buckley is voted as the influential "tone-setter" suggests institutional prestige and power may transfer to its representatives. In fact, Buckley is a typical Sinophile, with outstanding local knowledge and connections. Former China correspondent Michael Forsythe recalls that former China Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu used to address Buckley by his first name Chris. "On a formal press conference, no one else is addressed by the first name," Forsythe added. This subtly special treatment from Chinese top-level officials signals the high symbolic capital of an individual journalist in the setting of China correspondence, where journalists compete for such "official recognition". His institutional affiliation with the *New York Times* of course is another asset of symbolic capital, which helps to place him in a higher and more autonomous position.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter scrutinizes the routine press review practice of China correspondents to show how positional pressures shape journalistic doxa, or routines, and how such doxic practices shape news product and the structure of the field. Agents in a field are struggling either to transform or preserve the field (Bourdieu, 1985, 2005). The study shows that agents in different positions with varying capitals take different differentiating or de-differentiating

strategies and negotiation strategies with external power pressures. They either differentiate or de-differentiate themselves from peer journalists as their important reference group, in an effort to consolidate or elevate their positions.

Examples in this study echo previous scholarship's specification of basic forms of so-called "pack journalism": collective agenda-setting, collective interpretation, and collective wisdom. Colocation has been a basic attribute to collective reference practice or pack journalism, but amid the new media ecology the spatial influence is not vital anymore, as online pack is increasingly facilitating journalists' peer reference especially on sources. This finding echoes Boczkowski (2010)'s argument of technology intensifying imitation among journalists. But China's restrictive journalistic culture even further encourages the online pack practice, especially "Twitter pack", of China correspondents. In other words, we may suggest, technology, together with political control, intensify pack practice.

As repeatedly emphasized throughout this chapter, positional pressure is the key pack dynamic. News organizations with more economic and symbolic capitals occupy a much more autonomous position, and this advantage can transfer to individual journalists of the organization. Such journalists often lead, rather than follow, the pack. Organization's autonomy also enables them to take a more aggressive or transforming strategy in negotiating with external pressures, such as the case of *the New York Times*. This is what Bourdieu (2005) says about powerful agents in the field can "distort the whole space". But in the case of *the New York Times*, Bloomberg, and *Wall Street Journal*'s coverage on top official corruption in 2012, though these leading agents' practice shook up the Chinese authorities and appeared to transform the power relations between them, the ensuing harsh countermeasure taken by Chinese government largely silenced down the distortive forces of these powerful agents. The field of foreign correspondence in China is, thus, overall heteronomous rather than autonomous.

However, ironically, China is constantly blaming foreign media's China coverage for "biased" and "hostile", meaning the existing power structure of the field of China correspondence is, at least, not to the interest of China. Yet the efforts taken by Chinese authorities to constrain accessible sources, especially expert sources, are in effect helping to reproduce and reinforcing the existing power structure of the field. More evidence of China's censoring practice which result in reproducing the existing power structure is to be presented and discussed in Chapter 6.

Last but not the least, this chapter cautions to draw an equation between collective reference practices and "pack journalism", as the former is a journalistic doxa due to positional pressure, or power structure, in the journalistic field, whereas the latter, as in its widely employed critical connotation, is the negative yet not necessary result of the former. Even for "pack journalism" which is criticized for harboring "unethical consequences" and "eliminating independent reporting" (Matusitz & Breen, 2007, 2012), it is worth asking: should journalists be independent of what? The correlation between level of professionalism and degree of "pack" practice found in this chapter provides a potential direction to reconsider the alleged sin of "unethical elimination of independent reporting" especially in the case of China correspondence with huge external pressure: should foreign correspondents pursue individual autonomy or professional autonomy of the whole foreign press corps?

Chapter 5 Organizational Pressures: Professionalism and Editorial Autonomy

News events are defined organizationally (Tuchman, 1978). Journalists work within hierarchical bureaucracies of their news organizations, which occupy different positions in the journalistic field. A news organization's position in the journalistic field and the capitals it possesses decide the logic, or norms and policy of the news organization. Elite news organizations with massive cultural capitals embrace a more salient journalistic logic, whereas more media organizations, especially those in many Western democracies, operate mostly on economic logic. Bureaucratic structure of the news organization is to ensure the conformity of its members to its norms and policy. As the most common means of social control, organizational pressures exert critical influence on individual journalists and their news production in varying capacity.

Breed's (1955) classical study on the social control in the newsroom has brilliantly explored the vertical organizational structure and power relations in news production; Sigelman (1973) identifies organizational socialization and organizational control as some of the key mechanisms in reporter-organization relationship, to maintain balance between organizational goals and journalists' pursuit of "institutional myth". Sigal (1973) argues that economic constraints of news organizations shape newsmakers' "gatekeeping" practice which is bureaucratically structured within the organization, though professional and social objectives can sometimes take precedence over economic ones. These studies, including the seminal newsroom studies of Tuchman (1978) and Gans (1979) have laid out key dimensions of organizational pressures on news production.

In more recent decades, traditional news organizations are increasingly facing huge economic pressures as the new media ecology is changing the way people consume news and consequently advertisers' preference over which venues to invest money to promote their products to the changing news consumers. Conglomeration of international news media is

complicating the hybrid ownership of news outlets across journalism and non-journalism sectors, across different media formats, and across national borders. Of those with a prominent presence in international journalism, *Financial Times*, for example, is now owned by Japan's Nikkei; Reuters has become part of Thomson Reuters, owned by the Canadian Thomson family with its headquarter in New York. The increasing global, international or transnational media conglomerates promise to complicate the external pressures news organizations face. It becomes increasingly urgent and relevant to understand the degree of autonomy of news organizations in the field, and how much autonomy individual foreign correspondents enjoy in the sophisticated organizational structure.

As Tuchman (1978) points out, the internal negotiation within the news organization forms daily occurrences as news events. Such negotiation is shaped by the position of the journalist and that of the organization in the field. But in the field of foreign correspondence, journalists are mostly working in extremely small-sized bureaus, distant from their home organizations, let alone the management which represents ownership and colleagues who represent newsroom labour division. Foreign correspondents are considered as the "special species" and elite of the profession enjoying high autonomy (Aldridge, 1998; Erickson & Hamilton, 2006; Tunstall, 1971). How these "elite" journalists are constrained by bureaucratic and editorial control of the news organization is a realm insufficiently explored.

This study identifies four potential sources of organizational pressures onto correspondents' work: management, newsroom peers, editors, and organizational resource constraint (such as human resource and travel budgets). Survey respondents are invited to score the perceived influence from these four organizational factors, on a scale from 1 (not influential at all) to 5 (extremely influential). The respondents rate "management" (M=2.41, SD=1.16) and "newsroom peers" (M=2.59, SD=1.14) with only mild influence, whereas "editors" (M=2.99, SD=1.17) and "resource constraints" (M=3.22, SD=1.08) are scored

much higher. It suggests China correspondents are also under constraints from conflicts with editors, newsroom peers, management, and organizational resource allocation, though with variant perceived pressure.

As early as 1960s and 1970s, organizational theorists and media scholars have already noted that management influence news production more on local topics, but less on international topics (Bowers, 1967; Siegle, 1973). Soloski (1989) notes in analyzing the organizational constraints on journalists' practice that, journalists seldom perceive direct influence from the management. It is the same with pressures from newsroom peers, as most overseas newsrooms are only one-person. Instead, they tend to be subjected to more pressures from editors in the most immediate setting. It is especially true for foreign correspondents who are staying overseas distant from the management.

Thus this chapter mainly looks into the pressures from resource allocation and editor-reporter relations on China correspondents' daily news production, and how China correspondents negotiate with these organizational pressures.

5.1 Organizational Structure: Resource Allocation and Socialization

Shoemaker and Reese (1996) rightly point out that organizational structure "acts as a barrier or filter between the larger organization's economic requirements and the routines of newswork" (p. 139). To understand the organizational mechanisms in bridging the organizational logic and the professional routines of individual journalists, one needs to first scrutinize the newsroom socialization and resource allocation within the news organization.

5.1.1 Organizational Ideology: Socialization in Newsroom

Van Ginneken (1998) notes three sources of journalistic socialization: cultural assumptions as the primary layer, professional ideology as the second layer, and norms of

news organizations as the tertiary layer. Through the tertiary layer of socialization, journalists are expected to be familiarized with the rules and goals (both written and unwritten) of the organization and behave accordingly. The expected conformity also lies in what Chan and Lee (1988) call "press ideology", "one of the most important aspects of a news media organization's control" and helps to construct the journalistic paradigm (p. 194).

While van Ginneken analyzed socialization in a broader context, Breed (1955) concentrated on social control in newsroom through norms, policies and routines. Back in the 1950s, few news organizations had training program for newcomers, and socialization was largely achieved through informal day-to-day contacts (Breed, 1955). Many news organizations represented in this study, however, reportedly provide various forms of training to better familiarize their new recruits with the organizational goals and norms, as well as to enable their assimilation of news professionalism. Tuchman (1978) asserts that "professionalism serves organizational interests" (p. 12) and that journalistic professionalism is in essence "knowing how to get a story that meets organizational needs and standards" (p. 66). AP's stylebook and Reuters' "Reuters Handbook of Journalism" are exemplars of such organizational control via "professionalism training".

Both AP and Reuters are examples of "international media" or "transnational media" (see, e.g. Murrell, 2014; Volkmer, 2002). To make social control possible in their wide-spread newsrooms, these organizations have to ensure that their correspondents observe professional norms and values with less reference to national context. As Soloski (1989) correctly points out, "professionalism" is an efficient method for social control in bureaucratic organizations, by making "the use of discretion predictable" (Larson, 1977, p. 168, cited by Soloski).

Reuters Handbook of Journalism makes this point explicit: "There's no room in our bureaus for reporters who do not accept constructive ideas, guidance and feedback". Apart

from the handbook, Reuters has a routine program "Reuters Journalist Training" to train new recruits directly out of graduate school. It is a year-long intensive training on Reuters' editorial procedure and practice, by rotating new recruits onto different desks in its bureaus located worldwide. Its Beijing correspondent Paul Carsten, upon joining Reuters from the UK where he completed college, was first a trainee in bureaus in Bangkok and Singapore. Afterwards, he was appointed as a technology correspondent at Beijing bureau.

For national media organizations, familiarity with home editorial values and policies is more important than codified "professionalism training". China correspondents of such news organizations usually had sufficiently assimilated professional values after years of working at national or metro desks. It could be assured that they, though working solo overseas, would largely abide by the editorial policy of the news organization.

German national public radio network ARD puts their overseas correspondents on a month long orientation trip, called "ARD-Senderrundreise". All journalists sent on overseas postings are required to hop on the orientation trip twice throughout their five-year contract: at the beginning of the posting and after two-and-half years into the posting. Correspondents would bounce between different stations from city to city throughout Germany, meeting editors and program producers at ARD's more than 60 local stations. This is expected to help the correspondents to set up and maintain both professional and personal connections with editors who are the effective "gate keepers" of correspondents' filed stories, or "to figure out what the different radio stations are expecting from their China correspondents", as ARD Beijing correspondent Axel Dorloff explains. The aforementioned policy of many European news organizations to limit the length of overseas postings (see in Chapter 3) is also a means of maintaining foreign correspondents' adherence to organizational policy.

Such function of organizational control is more prominent for training a journalist switching between different news organizations. When Jaime Flocruz joined CNN's Beijing

bureau from Time magazine, he was put through a six-month voice training. While picking up new skills for a different kind of media, he also came to learn about CNN's policy and norms. Flocruz recounts the difficulty for him to adjust to a new organizational culture:

> *I remember in the first few months working for CNN, we would interview people, experts, [and] farmers in field. I would be sitting down with them, with a camera, [and] the producer. I would spend 30 minutes or 45 minutes with them, just as I would do for Time. Later my crew members told me you don't need to spend that much time with them. They [CNN] are used to talking to them [interviewees] for 10 minutes to get the sound bite they are looking for, and then move on. I didn't understand it at the beginning. So it is a different style of doing things.*

Such on-the-job training is more important than formal professional education.

Recruitment and promotion pattern also socialize journalists to organizational goals and norms. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) observe that in television stations promotion path to station management traditionally came through sales rather than editorial positions. This would condition the management to think in line with the economic logic. On the contrary, in some elite newspapers, editorial staff could be promoted to the top management. For example, the *New York Times*' managing editor Joe Kahn had been the paper's China correspondent and international deputy editor. Such an appointment is widely understood as the paper's commitment to expanding its international coverage capacity (Ember, 2016). It sends a strong signal to its overseas correspondents regarding the organizational priority, which may influence the *illusio* in their work.

5.1.2 Organizational Structure: Beats, Resources Allocation

Organizational structure represents the playing field upon which employees contend for scarce resources (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 147). Of the bureaucratic routines of a

news organization, the most basic arrangement of newswork is the dispersion of reporters and editors in time and space (Tuchman, 1978, p. 12). The organizational allocation of resources is the foremost definer of power relations at the organizational level in news production. As in Tuchman's famous analogy of "news net", only with resources allocated can the occurrence be woven within the reach of the news net, thus has the chance to get selected to become news events. By allocating personnel and resources in a bureaucratic structure, the news organization also defines individual journalists' autonomy. A flat structure or a hierarchical structure leads to different degree of autonomy for individual journalists and their news practice.

Take *the Wall Street Journal* for example: under Beijing bureau chief (Charles Hutzler at the time of this writing), there are several teams working on different beats, each led by a "team leader". To pitch for a front page story, journalists send the idea to the bureau chief, who then submits it to the New York editor, for the final decision[76].

News wires usually have a more hierarchical structure, in which the correspondents enjoy less autonomy. *New York Times* China correspondent Michael Forsythe was with Bloomberg before joining the *Times*. When asked to compare his editorial autonomy at the two news organizations, he did not hesitate to credit *the Times* "absolutely" for more freedom to "do pretty much any story you want to do". Transitioning from seven-years reporting at the Reuters to *the New York Times*, veteran China correspondent Chris Buckley also admits that he now enjoys more autonomy compared with the time at the Reuters.

The structure of Reuters Beijing bureau is an exemplar of the organizational bureaucracy. In its Beijing office, management and editorial staff with perplexing titles including "managing editor of Asia", "North Asia general manager", "Greater China bureau chief", share a huge open working space with dozens of senior and junior correspondents.

[76] Based on interview with the *Journal*'s senior correspondent Andrew Browne.

Editorial meetings may not directly involve each individual reporter, but such meetings are held throughout the day. Quite often Asian editors in Hong Kong also engage in daily discussion; occasionally, the Editor-in-Chief in New York is consulted to make the final decision. “The idea is to get things coordinated inside the bureau and globally,” said one senior editor at Reuters’ Beijing office.

Similar to *the Wall Street Journal*, Reuters Beijing bureau assigns correspondents to different beats ranging from general news, company news, economics, markets to commodity, in the form of teams; each team has a senior correspondent as the leader, coordinating story selection and frames. The topical division among China correspondents is not rigid. What Morrison and Tumber (1985) observed decades ago that London correspondents were “specialists in terms of journalistic labelling but generalists in practice” remains unchanged. For example, Sui-Lee Wee, a former political and general news correspondent with Reuters Beijing bureau, turned to cover business in China for the *New York Times*. Within the news organization there is no rigid “specialization” either. “Most reporters do a bit of everything,” notes the Reuters senior editor.

Reuters technology correspondent Paul Carsten’s assigned beat is technology report of Chinese IT companies. But from time to time he also covers various topics ranging from censorship, cyber security, to geopolitics. Correspondents can volunteer to ask for a certain assignment beyond their assigned beat. “Reporters will often put up their hands for assignments. If you want to produce a story that’s not on your beat, as long as you don't step on anyone’s toes, that's fine,” Carsten said. It is interesting to note that journalists in the newsrooms sense the boundary so as not to “stepping on other’s toes”. It is a kind of newsroom negotiation in which journalists balance their pursuit for opportunity to work on more “interesting” and career-rewarding stories and the existing power structure within the news organization.

Most news organizations have only one single correspondent, who has to cover all topics. NPR Beijing correspondent Anthony Kuhn is one of such kind; with another colleague based in Shanghai, he feels short of staffing. The resource constraints prevented him from covering the Taiwan presidential election in early 2016, even though he "would very much like to go." Even as resource-rich as *the New York Times*, Michael Forsythe said that staff shortage made it difficult to do more on time-consuming investigative stories.

Smaller news organizations feel acutely pinched to cover vast China, but their correspondents are satisfied with their functional autonomy. Indian correspondent Ananth Krishnan candidly said that autonomy is one of the biggest attractions for being a foreign correspondent: (I am) "just completely independent"; "I can do whatever I want".

5.2 Autonomy in Action: Fighting with Editors

Journalists negotiate with social control in the newsroom, to struggle for bigger room of editorial autonomy. Autonomy, as Tuchman (1978) defines it, provides journalists "room to claim professionalism and to both modify and ignore organizational rules" (p. 212). The most immediate actor they negotiate with every day is the editors, who function as the intermediate between management and journalists (Soloski, 1989). Pedelty (1995) describes them as "the most obvious and immediate symbol of institutional discipline" to "facilitate the assimilation of institutional ideology into the individual journalist's regimen" (p. 90).

The role conflict between journalists and editors is inevitable as journalists are more source-oriented whereas editors are concerned about audience interest and organization goals (Gans, 1979; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tunstall, 1971). These two divisions of labours in a news organization operate on different logics, with different priority.

Foreign correspondents nonetheless face on everyday basis direct monitor and pressure from home editors. As in the investigative story on Chinese leaders' alleged

financial scandals (cited in Chapter 4), the correspondents and editors jointly decided to invest a huge amount of human and financial resources into it. As the *New York Times*' Chris Buckley summarizes the editor-reporter covenant: "They (editors) are my bosses; I have to take their viewpoints seriously; that's the starting point…but it's more complicated process than either ignoring the editors or doing exactly what they say. It's a dialogue."

5.2.1 Tell me *What* to Do, not *How* to Do it

As early as 1980s, Underwood (1988) has already observed that editors do more than editing tasks but also manage people and resources, by assigning reporters to different stories. Gans (1979) also notes among the U.S. national networks and newsmagazines, journalists may only "play a consulting role in story selection", but they quite have "some autonomy in story production" (Gans, 1979, p. 101). To put it simply: editors are effective in telling journalists what to do (story selection), but not in controlling them how to do a story (story production).

Big news organizations usually work out a detailed "news plan" for a week, a month, or even a whole year. The senior editor of Reuters Beijing office said they would set priorities of the whole year at the beginning of each year. Speaking of their "news plan" for the year of 2016, he said: "themes for this year we want to focus on may be: (for example) China's environment, or economic reforms." In these big news wires, with relatively rigid plan implementation, journalists get assignments from the editors on a regular basis. The assignment requests are usually sent in formal business email, not individual email, avoiding individual dialogues and negotiation. "You just have to do it. It's not a request. It's an order," said one AFP correspondent.

When asked about the percentage of self-initiated stories versus editor-assigned stories, CNN's Jaime Flocruz said though in general about 80% or even more stories are

pitched from the Beijing office rather than editors in Atlanta (CNN's headquarter), live stories, mostly driven by breaking news, are largely decided by editors in Atlanta or Hong Kong, "even if sometimes we think it's not that important". Similarly, Axel Dorloff of German ARD radio estimated half of his stories are initiated from editors in Germany.

On rare occasions, the editors may go further to specifically ask for certain story elements such as a street interview, some graphics, or even certain quotes. This is usually for big "page one" stories, supplemented with contributions from correspondents in several overseas bureaus. When China was to modify its decades-old notorious One-Child policy in late October 2015, *Hindustan Times* Beijing correspondent Patranobis was asked directly by his top editor to write a feature on the new policy. "Usually he doesn't directly tell me what to do," Patranobis recalls, but in this case the request came with very detailed outline.

But during story production, correspondents enjoy considerable freedom. The unnamed senior editor from Reuters said that at Reuters "often it's the bureaus and reporters who figure out exactly what to say", rather than editors in Hong Kong or New York. Yet often this freedom during story production requires negotiation between journalists and editors.

5.2.2 Negotiating "*How*" with "Ignorant" Editors

China correspondents' editorial autonomy during story production is supported by the fact that once the journalist and editor reach the agreement on WHAT to write, the final story is rarely "killed" by the editor for disapproving HOW it is written.

This study asked the 101 respondents the percentage of the stories they file that finally get published/broadcast. 70.3% of the respondents (N=71) said their stories are 100% published/broadcast; another 21.8% of the respondents (N=22) said around 90% of their stories are finally published/broadcast. Altogether 92.2% of the respondents observe their

filed stories rarely being turned down by the editors. China correspondents are generally trusted with considerable editorial autonomy for specific news production. With such autonomy, some "powerful" correspondents can even overturn the editors' pre-staged perspective.

An AFP correspondent told me that in the wake of Paris Climate Talk in late 2015, the editor in Paris asked him to file a story on the carbon consumption of a typical Chinese "second generation rich"; this would be part of AFP's series of reports on global carbon consumption. The assigned China story was supposed to be "negative", but the correspondent, having exchanged emails with his editor, managed to interview a Chinese "new rich" who embraced the idea of low carbon living. This "new rich" drives a luxury car but aims to change for an energy-saving electric car; he runs three factories near Shanghai but claims all his factories meet the goal of "zero emission". The editor was not impressed by this "not-as-negative-as-expected" perspective but still ran the story. The correspondent's excuse was that it was difficult to find someone who would fit the editor's pre-staged sketch.

In this case, the AFP China correspondent has the leverage to negotiate for a different perspective from the editor's assignment because he is posted in the field whereas the editor is far-away from China and quite probably has never been to China. Thus the correspondent, citing home editors' unfamiliarity with China, could make use of his (presumed) Chinese *habitus* and capital to gain editorial autonomy, with which he can take over the power to frame a specific story.

During my field interview with China correspondents in Beijing and Shanghai, the loudest complaints pointed to the editors' "sitting at the desk in New York, Paris, London, etc., they do not know anything about China, yet they are telling us what to do!" This echoes Shoemaker and Reese (1996)'s conclusion that "reporters can counterbalance the power of

the editor to the extent they have the support of their peers and greater firsthand knowledge of the subject matter than the editor" (p. 162).

Even in news outlets from Asian countries presumably with cultural proximity to China, correspondents are not impressed by their home editors' knowledge of China. Even for big global media with editors stationed in Hong Kong, correspondents in Beijing and Shanghai still complain and argue with them for their editing "without knowing the context". Here, Chinese *habitus* and capitals serve to provide strong leverage for China correspondent to negotiate with editors on how to produce a news story and to by-pass some organizational controls.

NPR's Anthony Kuhn complains his program editors (or show producers, as what they are called at NPR) always ask for English-speaking interviewees to speak to achieve better broadcasting effect, while Kuhn always tries to have interesting, authentic voices that are not necessarily spoken in the best English. "If you always look for good English, you end up getting the same people all the time."

Columbian journalist Villa spoke of China's grand military parade in September 2015 as an example of how the disagreement between him and his editors on the significance of the event may mess up his news work: "I called them before the parade about its importance and they were not interested. Only a day after the parade they called me asking me to write a piece immediately. I could have done a good job with preparation, but not like that… They would be interested in that only when it became a big topic, all covered in the developed countries, then they will call me saying oh we want a story about it. But they won't take my suggestion to do the story before it proves to be a really big one."

5.2.3 Star Journalists

Aforementioned "powerful" correspondents enjoy more autonomy, thus possessing the adequate capitals and power to counterbalance editors or other sources of pressure. They are called "star journalists" by Breed (1955) and Sigelman (1973), referring to the special autonomy "star" reporters enjoy or exploit to deviate from newsroom norms. The notion of "star journalists" echoes what Bourdieu means by "powerful agents". Star journalists possess more capitals, thus occupy a more autonomous position both in the organization and in the field. They are the "powerful agents" with the capacity to challenge the norms or the power structures.

The Wall Street Journal's senior correspondent and columnist Andrew Browne, for example, does not see his editorial autonomy constrained by any organizational pressures, especially not from editors. A veteran China correspondent with more than 30 years' experience of reporting in Asia, he is also a Pulitzer Prize and Overseas Press Club winner. These achievements bestow him enough cultural capital to be a "star journalist" in his organization and a "powerful agent" in the field. "No one tells me what to write," Browne said. Unlike other *Wall Street Journal* China correspondent who are described as "China tech correspondent" or "covering real estate in China", Browne's Twitter profile is: "I write about how China is changing your world."

A veteran China correspondent of a European news agency says if he could not totally agree with his editors on how to report a story, he would just go the way he wants. "I decide how to write it. … If you've been with a company for a while, there's a certain trust. They trust you in presenting the story in a proper way." These powerful agents are not as constrained by organizational norms and pressures to conform; but to what degree they deviate to challenge the existing power structure, as Bourdieu expects, is a question to further probe.

5.3 One-Person Bureau: *Sojos*?

Organizational control may vary with newsroom size. Overseas newsroom can be as small as a one-person bureau. Fleeson (2003) names them as *Sojos*: solo journalists. One-person bureau has been common among print media. In broadcasting industry, thanks to the development of new ICTs, "Sojos" have become possible, replacing the old three-person crews (Gans, 2003). A solo broadcast journalist now can use a portable set of lightweight video camera and microphone to shoot most stories; with handy editing programs and transmission tools, he/she can easily edit on various versions of news report, based on the specific length requirement from the program editors, and file them to the headquarter in seconds.

Among China correspondents, 34.1% (N=206) belong to one-person bureaus[77]. 45.5% of the survey respondents (N=46) report working alone in one-person bureau in China. The ratio is especially high among correspondents of Social Corporatist countries and Polarized Pluralist countries. Cross-national variance is significant, X2 (3) =13.86, p=.003, Cramer's V=.37. This is mainly because of resource constraints. News organizations of Liberal countries are still the most resourced to have a larger staff.

Table 5-1. *No. of Sojos across Media Systems*

	Liberal	Social Corporatist	Polarized Pluralist	non-Western	Total
not one-person bureau	27	5	8	15	55
one-person bureau	9	15	10	12	46
Total	36	20	18	27	101

[77] Based on Foreign Press Directory (2015) issued by Foreign Ministry

Are Sojos enjoying higher editorial autonomy? A One-Way ANOVA analysis shows that being Sojos does not affect perceived editorial pressures, as no significant variance is found in perceiving influence from home editors between correspondents working solo in one-person bureaus and those working in larger newsroom in China. However, correspondents working in different sizes of newsrooms do show significant difference in perceiving influence from management ($F(1, 99) = 6.77$, $p = .011$), newsroom peers ($F(1, 99) = 8.80$, $p = .004$), and organizational resources ($F(1, 99) = 4.24$, $p = .042$). Sojos perceive much weaker influence from management ($M=2.09$, $SD=1.13$) and newsroom peers ($M=2.24$, $SD=1.12$) than those working in larger sized newsrooms ($M=2.67$, $SD=1.12$ for management and $M=2.89$, $SD=1.08$ for newsroom peers); but they are subjected to stronger resource constraints ($M=3.46$, $SD=1.19$) than those working in larger sized newsrooms ($M=3.02$, $SD=.95$). This variance suggests that Sojos are bureaucratically freer but such freedom is traded for more pinched resources, which may eventually undermine journalists' editorial autonomy.

Due to heavy resource constraints, Sojos do not only need to be "generalists" covering all beats in China, but to stretch themselves and cover the whole Asia from time to time. NPR Beijing correspondent Anthony Kuhn frequently travels in Greater China region and even Southeast Asia. "It's just too much to do. I'm spread very thin to a big number of countries," Kuhn told me in a Starbucks in Beijing, just days after a reporting trip in Hong Kong. Thus with the tradeoff between resources constraints and a seemingly independent work mode, Sojos may not actually enjoy significantly higher autonomy as they anecdotally do.

5.3.1 How Solo are Sojos? News Assistants and Translators

How autonomous are Sojos? Do they really work alone?

Most China correspondents work with the assistance from local staff, "fixers" or "news assistants", either on a full time or part time basis. Solo correspondents are no exception. By providing and facilitating local knowledge, translation, contacts and access to people and places that are otherwise inaccessible, these local staff influence the vision scope of the foreign correspondents they are assisting (Murrell, 2014).

Foreign media hired news assistants, also called "researchers", "analysts" or "producers" in different news outlets, who are Chinese nationals to help with journalistic work. By Chinese law, Chinese nationals working for foreign media cannot be accredited as "journalists", hence the title "news assistants". Their duties range from "auxiliary work" as stated in *Regulations on Foreign Media and Foreign Journalists*, to real journalistic work including looking for story ideas, researching, and interviewing. Typical of hiring ads by Canadian newspaper *the Globe and Mail* reads: "The successful applicant will have a keen eye for the people and places that define this country to overseas audience, the tenacity to pursue difficult interviews, a talent for sifting out important information and a willingness to do a small amount of basic office management work"[78].

Foreign correspondents heavily rely on these local talents to overcome language and culture barriers. Andrew Browne of *Wall Street Journal* said that restrictions on hiring local Chinese as journalists makes China the most difficult place to cover: "Local journalists have the language, connections; they understand the culture, so it makes more sense to hire local journalists."

For Chris Buckley of *New York Times*, news assistants contribute ideas and perspectives that might be easily overlooked by non-Chinese correspondents. Many foreign correspondents rely on news assistants for far more than translation and research, as they help

[78] from the *Globe and Mail* Beijing correspondent Nathan VanderKlippe

to “illuminate the conditions in the country, the public mood, and political attitudes” (Oskenberg, 1994, p. 217).

News assistants also facilitate access for foreign correspondents in restrictive China. An AFP Beijing correspondent says it’s easier for Chinese news assistants to get access to interviewees and information. “Many Chinese would agree to talk to a young Chinese, rather than some old foreign man,” says the male correspondent half-jokingly.

Some news assistants work with the same foreign news outlet for decades, having accumulated invaluable connections and resources. The correspondents themselves, on the contrary, come and go. This makes new correspondent even more heavily reliant on the veteran news assistants. ARD Shanghai bureau’s news assistant is a local Shanghainese working with ARD for more than 10 years. His experience and rich connections contribute to ARD’s China reportage significantly. When China’s stock market plunge in January 2016 was seen by many as a signal of the slowdown of economic growth, ARD Shanghai correspondent was assigned by his editor in Germany to file a feature story about “someone in the stock market”. He had to completely depend on his news assistant to locate “someone” for interview. His news assistant found them a young Chinese woman who profited, rather than lost, from the stock market. The choice of interviewee, to a large extent, framed China’s economy slowdown somewhat positively.

For budgetary concern, some non-Western correspondents do not have a full-time news assistant. An Indian correspondent says usually he works on his own and only hires a translator on the site when he has to. On a story of a Chinese writer Feng Tang’s controversial translation of the famed Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore's *Stray Birds*, he had a translator to go through Tang’s version and tell him whether the translation was as “vulgar” as many critics accused. Here, the translator became the key “gatekeeper” for the correspondent in framing the essence of the story.

5.4 National and Positional Variance in Organizational Constraints

It is difficult to quantify the broader power of national journalistic field onto the actual organizational pressures China correspondents face. But a look at the cross-national variance in their self-reportedly perceived influence from the identified organizational constraints may provide some insights in understanding the power at the macro level of national journalistic field onto how individual journalists negotiate with pressures from organizational level. Similarly, as analyzed earlier in Chapter 3, China correspondents take different positions in the field (Spiralists, Sporadics, Sinophiles, and Sinojournos) based on the variance in their *habitus* (both Chinese and journalistic) and *illusion*, and as it is hypothesized that their positions dictate their negotiation strategies with the pressures both within and outside the field, if they perceive different degree of pressures from organizational constraints is worth to be explored.

5.4.1 Media System and Organizational Constraints

Cross-national variance of China correspondents' perceived organizational pressures is found significant in "peers in the newsroom" ($F(3,97)=2.91$, $p=.038$), management ($F(3,97)=4.133$, $p=.008$, $\eta^2=.222$) and resource ($F(3,97)=4.293$, $p=.007$, $\eta^2=.270$). A further Tukey HSD Post Hoc test suggests that non-Western correspondents ($M=2.81$, $SD=1.18$) perceive significantly stronger influence from management than those from Polarized Pluralist countries do ($M=1.83$, $SD=1.10$); for *resource limits*, correspondents from Polarized Pluralist countries perceive statistically higher pressure ($M=4.00$, $SD=.69$) than all other correspondents. Only on "home editors", correspondents across the four media systems unanimously perceive relatively high pressure ($M=2.99$, $SD=1.17$).

The results suggest that in non-Western news organizations, the problem of the blurring separation between "church and state", or what Hanitzsch et al. (2010) call "the eroding wall between newsrooms and boardrooms", is graver than those in Polarized Pluralist countries. Or at least journalists from non-Western countries perceive more hard-to-negotiate pressures from management. This is an interesting finding worth further exploration, as many non-Western countries, though 'hybrid' in terms of media systems and journalistic cultures (Mancini, 2015; Voltmer, 2012), are believed to share some similarities in high clientelism, weak journalistic professionalism, and strong state intervention (Mancini, 2015; Vartanova, 2012; Voltmer, 2008), which explains the less independent journalistic culture in these countries, similar to Polarized Pluralist model. But the significant difference in perceived pressure from management between these two media systems goes against the common tendency to approximate the media systems of non-Western countries to that of Polarized Pluralist model. The discrepancy could be explained by the selective players from Polarized Pluralist countries in the field of China correspondence. Only somehow elite national or even international news organizations of Southern European countries have a presence in China correspondence, and these news organizations can be regarded as more inclined to operate on a journalistic logic, such as in the case of AFP. On the contrary, many non-Western countries still uphold a rather independent journalistic culture, even in democracies such as Japan[79].

5.4.2 Positions and Organizational Autonomy

A one-way ANOVA shows that of the perceived influence from management and editors, significant difference is detected in perceived influence from management, among the four types of China correspondents, $F(3, 97) = 3.18$, $p = .028$. A Post Hoc Tukey test further suggests that of the four types of China correspondents, Sporadics perceive

[79] The strong "company culture" of Japanese journalism is discussed in Chapter 1.

significantly higher pressure from management (M=2.72, SD=1.30) compared with Spiralists (M=1.55, SD=.69).

As explained earlier, Sporadics usually spend most of their career life at national or metro desks, where they are closely attuned to organizational norms and bureaucracy. Thus compared with other China correspondents, they tend to have a sharper sense of bureaucratic structure of their news organizations and perceive more significant pressures from the management, whom they might even be personally connected to.

In contrast, Spiralists barely spent considerable time in home newsrooms, thus they are understandably the least sensitive to organizational bureaucracies. But it needs to be noted that the four types of China correspondents do not significantly vary in perceiving the influence from home editors, and the pressures from editors are in average perceived much higher than those from management, suggesting a more relevant perspective to understand the organizational constraints on China correspondents.

5.5 Conclusion

Foreign correspondents are subjected to bureaucratic and editorial control in the news organization, with newsroom socialization, resource allocation, and reporter-editor covenant as main means of organizational control. They do, to certain degree, negotiate with organizational power players (management and editors) for autonomy; but, as Breed (1955) has rightly pointed out, their "mobility aspiration" drives them to conform to the organizational constraints through newsroom socialization, resource allocation and editorial control from the editors, though "star journalists" may feel less pressure to conform.

It has to be acknowledged that foreign correspondents do enjoy relatively high autonomy. In analyzing the editor-reporter relationship in China correspondence, this chapter

found that editors usually have more control in story selection, but China correspondents have considerable autonomy in story production.

Meanwhile, working solo in one-person bureau does not necessarily guarantee more autonomy than working in bigger newsrooms with wider labour division. Foreign correspondents' autonomy is more shaped by their position in the news organization and in the field (such as in the case of "star" journalist of elite news outlet, or Spiralists who perceive significantly weaker pressure from management). In fact, in some cases, foreign correspondents psychologically suffer from "too much freedom" as they find themselves lacking direction (Hannerz, 2004; Morrison & Tumber, 1985). A solo German correspondent in Shanghai complained about not having enough feedback from his editors: "I was sometimes even frustrated".

This chapter mainly looks into organizational structure and editor-reporter covenant as the main sources of organizational pressures for China correspondents. Yet it has to be acknowledged that these two factors are by no means the sole source of pressures at organizational level. Ownership, for example, also influences correspondents' practice in a noticeable way. NPR Beijing correspondent Anthony Kuhn notes that compared with other journalists he has more freedom to work on "unorthodox" topics such as folk music in China, because NPR is public broadcaster, "not government, not commercial…not as corporatized as other media."

News organizations have their own organizational goals and logic, varying based on the quantity of all sorts of capitals they possess, and the heteronomous pressures outside the organizations. For example, this chapter found that non-Western correspondents perceive higher pressures from the management in their news organizations, suggesting a more visible eroding power from business on editorial operation in many non-Western newsrooms. But in general, especially for the increasing complexity of media conglomerates, news organizations

are sliding further towards heteronomous pole. In the setting of China correspondence, foreign news organizations face more constraining external power to try to "tame" the news content to the preference of Chinese government. The next chapter discusses these external power mainly exerted by Chinese government and how China correspondents negotiate with these external pressures.

Chapter 6 "The Anaconda in the Chandelier": Institutional Pressures from China's Uncodified State Coercion

As discussed in the introduction, institutional pressures on foreign correspondents' news production come from both within and outside the field of foreign correspondence. Among common institutional pressures, state coercion by the Chinese government is a distinctive heteronomous power over foreign correspondents' practice and the field. As a repressive practice imposed by the authorities to information producer, state coercion or censorship on media entails an eternal tug of war with the concepts of press freedom and the rights to know, yet a "structural necessity" in the "field of symbolic production" (Bourdieu, 1994; Freshwater, 2003).

An authoritarian host country, China is known for having one of the most repressive media environments in the world, with its press freedom rated as "not free" by Freedom House and ranks 176 out of 180 countries in RSF's 2016 World Press Freedom Index. It is also rated as the worst jailer for journalists, and the eighth most censored country, by a leading independent non-governmental organization in advocating press freedom globally Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) in 2015. Although China's Constitution of 1982 promises the basic rights to freedom of speech and freedom of press, such basic rights are never substantiated in reality in China. In exerting pressures on foreign correspondence, China is known for long embracing the most sophisticated and omnidirectional coercive strategies, ranging from surveillance by means of the infamous massive internet censorship project "Great Firewall" to old-fashioned physical harassment and assault on journalists and their sources, and what Herman and Chomsky (1988) call "flak".

These uncodified coercive practices, without explicit reference to laws and regulations, are institutionalized into a consensual confrontation between the political

pressure from China and foreign press corps who are reluctantly well informed about the censorship they would face. American China scholar Perry Link (2002) names this uncodified coercion or censorship as "the anaconda in the chandelier": a hidden devil with devastating power, and the devastating power lies more in people's fear or anticipation than its real damage. This metaphor parallels what Lee (2000) calls "imagined external pressure" which can be more intimidating than the real pressures because of the ambiguousness and uncertainty. The uncertainty associated with these uncodified coercive practices tends to lead journalists to take countermeasures to circumvent and negotiate with the interventions. Self-censorship is one of such reactions (Chalaby, 2000).

This chapter examines the external pressures on China correspondents from such looming "anaconda", and how they perceive and negotiate with the disruptive pressures. It has to be noted that China's control over foreign media is sophisticated and pervasive, including both explicitly codifed rules and regulations, and uncodified coercive strategies. Chapter 2 has discussed the boundary of the field of China correspondence set by codified rules and regulations, thus the focus of this chapter is on uncodified state coercion.

6.1 State Coercion as Heteronomous Power

State intervention in media is a major heteronomous power influencing journalistic field. In democracies, state intervention is mainly realized through ownership, funding and regulations (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), but in authoritarian states "an elaborate system of censorship and coercion" is institutionalized in an effort to control the media (Lee, 2001). No matter in what form, such intervention is the power struggle between the journalistic field and its immediate and larger political field, and "one important task then for a generalizable theory of journalistic-political field relations is to classify and analyze the various forms of state coercive power over the media" (Benson, 2005, p. 93).

Coercive power can be exerted through both reward and punishment (Lee, 1998), as well as through what Bourdieu calls "symbolic violence", a process of hegemony that is accepted by the dominated as assumed de facto, which can be translated into unconscious self-censorship. Hassid (2008) in his study on China's control over domestic media proposes the notion of "regime of uncertainty", referring to Chinese government using uncodified set of media control mechanisms to effectively coerce Chinese journalists into practicing self-censorship. Pedelty (1995) also notes that feelings of disorientation make foreign correspondents more vulnerable to the propaganda of the host country. Thus uncodified coercion, with the looming of its perceived or "imagined pressures", is more likely to incite journalists' self-censorship (Lee, 2001). This is a typical result of the negotiation between agents and institutional pressure, or between the journalistic field and the political field. Journalistic autonomy is compromised trading for individual agents' positions unchallenged and capitals not undermined.

6.2 Coercing Foreign Correspondents in China

Major foreign news organizations and correspondents, including their news assistants, are closely monitored and coerced in an effort to rein in on their coverage unfavourable to Chinese government. As discussed earlier, such coercive measures targeting on foreign correspondents include both "carrot" and "stick". "Stick" may include interrogation, physical assault, physical and online surveillance, denying or threatening to deny reporters' visas, restricting reporters' information access, and harassment of sources and news assistants. "Carrot" on the contrary ranges from honor, offering scoops, exclusive interviews, and access to government officials (Chan & Lee, 1991; Lee, 1998).

Based on interviews with China correspondents and the abundant recorded accounts of China correspondents' experience with Chinese coercion, I categorize the most commonly used strategies of coercion into harassment, direct access blockage, flak, and reward.

6.2.1 Harassment

State-initiated harassment on foreign correspondents' reporting activities is not uncommon in many regimes. As documented in previous studies, foreign correspondents based in South Africa, Singapore, Russia, and Latin America all reported having been contained or harassed in similar, rather than different, ways (Hannerz, 2004; Waisbord, 2002). Yet China correspondents report the most notable frequency and scale of being harassed while taking on journalistic duty.

Harassment as a repressive social control in non-democratic regimes, includes surveillance, low-intensity physical harassment and intimidation (Gerschewski, 2013; Pearce, 2015). It is the most common daily state-initiated coercive practice foreign correspondents have to face in China. Previous studies suggest that the level of government-initiated harassment against the media and journalists is correlated with the threats the governments perceive and the contrary ideological positions the governments, especially the top leaders, hold (see, e.g. Kellam & Stein, 2016; VonDoepp & Young, 2012). Following this vein, it can be assumed that in an increasingly totalitarian China upholding Leninist press theory, harassment against foreign media and journalists, especially those from liberal Western countries, is more intense.

PEN America documented in a 2016 report that "sometimes, provincial-level officials harass or attack foreign journalists in contravention of China's own national laws and even the central government's directives." Foreign Correspondents Club China (FCCC) reports in 2015 that 72 percent of the surveyed foreign correspondents have self-reportedly experienced

interference or obstruction during reporting activities, including being "shoved roughly and repeatedly", being snatched away reporting equipment and being pointed at by assault rifles and shotguns (FCCC, 2015).

Former China correspondent for *Al Jazeera English* Melissa Chan, who saw her press card discontinued by China's Foreign Ministry in 2012, recounts that "local officials or thugs" are the main direct source of harassment (Chan, 2017). The thugs, hired by local authority, serve as "proxy amateur police", and "the cadres would then offer to 'help,' only to frustrate us in bureaucratic red tape and endless rounds of meetings instead—an effective ploy for any news team on deadline" (Chan, 2017).

Delaying tactics are widely used, and work effectively for obstructing time-sensitive reporting work. NPR Beijing correspondent Anthony Kuhn said for most of the harassments that happen to him, local authorities are "just wasting my time and trying to stop me from doing my job" (personal communication).

The degree of harassment can be accelerated to physical confrontation, confiscation of recording equipment, and even detention and death threat. Bernhand Zand of German magazine *der Spiegel* recalls that on his last day of a field reporting in Guiyang, a provincial capital city in Southwest China, where he was doing an investigative story on the death of five street children in a neighbouring city, their hotel room was broken into and recording digital equipment was destroyed. The incident happened only months into Zand's stint in China, and he sarcastically laughs it off: "It's good to know from the beginning the relation with the state here" (personal communication). Canadian correspondent Nathan VanderKlippe of the *Globe and Mail* traveled to Elishku in Xinjiang in August 2017 and was briefly detained by local authorities before he could even start to work. His laptop was also seized, though later returned to him at the airport (VanderKlippe, 2017). In the case of Bloomberg and *New York Times*' investigative stories on China's elite politics, the leading

correspondents Michael Forsythe and David Barboza were respectively threatened to leave China. Forsythe received death threat which was passed via informal personal communication (personal communication in January 2016); Barboza reported threats and stalking by Chinese officials, and had to finally flee China.[80]

Foreign correspondents' online activities and phones are closely monitored by officials, or, at least this is what many correspondents perceive to be happening. FCCC's report (2016) shows as many as 89% of the surveyed correspondents are concerned about the privacy and safety communicating online. The *New York Times* reported that since 2008, "Chinese hackers began targeting American news organizations as part of an effort to monitor coverage of Chinese issues" (Perlroth, 2013). The low response rate of the online survey of this study adds evidence that how foreign correspondents distrust online safety. Some correspondents asked for a hardcopy of the survey to fill out, as they deem online survey highly risky. Barboza for example explained to me he was confident that his email exchange is monitored so he could not complete the survey online.[81]

On most daily occasions, harassment takes the form of *uncovered* surveillance, which is deliberately made known to the targeted correspondents as a warning of the "hidden anaconda". Several correspondents I talked to had similar experiences that during reporting trips checking in a hotel room is always followed by police interrogation at the door. "Just to tell us: we know you are here so you'd better behave," a correspondent with a European news agency explains[82]. A German correspondent recalls when he was applying for residency with

[80] Relevant accounts could be found in PEN America's report (p16.)
also see http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/i-dont-want-think-about-activating-change-nyts-david-barboza-reporting-china
http://keckjournal.com/2015/10/interview-with-mr-david-barboza-new-york-times-correspondent-2/
[81] Email exchange with David Barboza from end 2015 to January 2016.
[82] Personal communication with the correspondent on 3 February, 2016

local police, he was shocked at the police's revelation that they knew almost everyone whom he met, even for personal reasons, in the brief period he had been in China[83].

Harassment on foreign press corps in China is institutional, not only targeting on foreign correspondents but also going to extra length to annoy their sources and news assistants, as the reach of Chinese government to constrain foreign nationals working for foreign media is rather limited compared to coercing its own nationals. An Indian correspondent describes as "unbelievable" the harassment his source had experienced when he went on a reporting trip in Ningxia, a Muslim autonomous region in northwest China, for a story on local carpet business. His source, a carpet businessman, was interrogated and threatened by six local policemen after the correspondent visited him. "Please don't write the story; please don't name me," the businessman pleaded to the correspondent, apparently scared by the police[84].

Chinese news assistants are another target of institutional harassment. FCCC (2016) reports 33% of foreign correspondents said their news assistants had been harassed by Chinese officials in the past year. It received at least 79 reports of such cases in 2015 (FCCC, 2015). Chinese news assistants with Western news outlets are from time to time summoned for "meeting" or "dinner" with officials, who would ask them to spy on their foreign colleagues or simply lecture them to be "patriotic"[85]. In extreme cases, news assistants are detained[86].

[83] Personal communication with the correspondent on 24 February, 2016
[84] Personal communication with the correspondent on 2 February, 2016
[85] personal communication with several Chinese news assistants; also see from PEN America report p. 30
[86] In 2014, the news assistant to German journalist Angela Köckritz of *Die Zeit* was detained for nine months, for helping Köckritz reporting on Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement in October 2014.

6.2.2 Blocking Access

China applies strict licensing system and limited press release to control foreign press' information access; besides, it also employs uncodified coercion to block or restrict foreign correspondents' information access.

One of the mechanisms is the world's largest and the most sophisticated Internet filtering system, "Golden Shield Project", with its methods including bandwidth throttling, keyword filtering, blocking the whole Web sites, and "hand censoring" -- manual efforts to remove "improper content" (King, Pan & Roberts, 2013). It blocks certain entire Web sites from being accessible in China[87].

Besides this technical censoring effort to control online information access, China also restricts foreign correspondents' access into certain regions which are deemed sensitive, though there is no law or regulation explicitly forbidding foreign journalists from entering and reporting these regions.

Due to historical, ethnical and religious reasons, Tibet and Xinjiang, two highly unstable regions, are, in the term of David Shambaugh (2016), China's "volatile periphery", with actual clashes and unrests happening. Thus the Chinese government has been trying to keep these volatile regions under control, employing, apart from economic incentives, heavy surveillance and "heavy-handed coercion by paramilitary forces" (Shambaugh, 2016).

These two minority populated autonomous regions, especially Tibet, are in effect off limit to foreign correspondents. Since 2007, foreign journalists have been required to obtain prior permission for entering Tibet[88]. And the restrictions grew tenser after the outburst of a riot in March 2008. In practice, only a scarcely small number of correspondents granted with

[87] *New York Times*, Reuters, BBC, and Hong Kong based *South China Morning Post* are among the news outlets having their websites blocked in China.

[88] Foreign journalists wishing to conduct news coverage and reporting activities in Tibet Autonomous Region should apply to the FAO of Tibet Autonomous Region for the Approval Letter on Entering Tibet first. Only with the approval letter can they go to Tibet to make interviews and reporting. As written in "Conducting News Coverage and Reporting Activities around China", which is retrieved on Sept. 28, 2016 from http://ipc.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/jbwzlm/wgjzzhznx/xwcf2009/t538294.htm

the permit by the Chinese government in organized reporting trips are allowed into Tibet. A recent FCCC survey shows that in 2015 only one out of 142 surveyed journalists was approved for an individual reporting trip to Tibet, and roughly three-quarters of the journalists who sought permission to visit Tibet were rejected[89].

Each year, China's Foreign Ministry organizes several reporting trips to various regions of China, occasionally including Tibet. In November 2015 for example 14 foreign journalists participated in an organized reporting trip to Tibet[90]. For foreign correspondents, it could be the only way to get a manipulated glimpse into the region. But usually the notice is issued only around ten days ahead of the trip, or with even shorter notice, catching journalists unprepared. The selection process is also obscure. For the 2015 reporting trip, the invitation notice posted on Foreign Ministry's website reads: "The IPC (International Press Center) will determine the final list of participants in an appropriate way…"[91]. But this "appropriate way" of selection is never made known to the journalists. A German correspondent complains: "It's not transparent. They will not tell you why you are qualified or not qualified."[92] Another correspondent with a European news agency echoes that no one knows how they pick.

During such trips, schedule and journalistic activities are carefully arranged and strictly limited. Journalists are required to stay with the group throughout the trip, not allowed to exit halfway[93]. "No opportunities for independent reporting," said some correspondents who have joined such reporting trips. Australian correspondent Angus Grigg, lucky enough to be on the 2016 reporting trip to Tibet, describes the whole trip as "a propaganda war" (Grigg, 2016).

Compared to Tibet, Xinjing is more accessible to foreign press by law. Foreign journalists are not required to obtain official permission to enter the region. But provincial

[89] FCCC (2016) Tibet Survey
[90] http://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/zwbd_673032/ywfc_673029/t1318328.shtml
[91] http://ipc.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/hdtz/t1305401.htm
[92] Personal communication with the correspondent on 15 January, 2016
[93] http://ipc.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/hdtz/t1305401.htm

level coercion manages to keep certain parts of the region effectively inaccessible for foreign press, as in the aforementioned case of Canadian journalist VanderKlippe testifies.

6.2.3 Flak: "Hostile Foreign Forces"

Herman and Chomsky (1988) in their seminal book *Manufacturing Consent* define flak as one of the "filters" employed by money and power to control the media, "negative responses to a media statement or a program" in order to discipline and discredit the media organization or reporters (p. 26). It is similar to what Bourdieu refers to as "symbolic violence", a means of social control to legitimize the power relations.

Chinese authorities often appeal to flak as a preferred form of coercion on foreign press, accusing foreign press of "biased reporting" by "hostile foreign forces". It usually occurs at the end of news making process, as a post-report retaliation to generate a chilling effect among the whole foreign press corps. When used in a more general denouncing scenario (i.e., not specifically targeting on individual story or journalist), it is also deemed as a long-term strategy to cultivate a perceived climate that pointed to the foreign press's hostility toward China.

Discredit individual correspondent.

Accreditation and visa have been a passive-aggressive way to control, or to punish, foreign correspondents if their stories upset the authorities. Correspondents can be denied or discontinued accreditation, thus effectively being disqualified from playing in the field, though more often journalists' visa and accreditation renewals are delayed or threatened not to renew, as a serious warning.

A most recent case of discontinuing foreign correspondent's accreditation was in December, 2015. French journalist Ursula Gauthier's application to renew her press card was

rejected, citing her article in the French newsmagazine, *L'Obs*, on November 18, 2015 "blatantly championed acts of terrorism and slaughter of innocent civilians, igniting indignation among the Chinese people", and she is "is no longer suitable to continue working in China".[94] An earlier case of discrediting a foreign correspondent was in 2012, when Al Jazeera English China correspondent Melissa Chan's application of visa renewal was denied and she was consequently expelled from China.

Most of these expulsion or declination cases are provided with very vague reasons. For the case of Chan, Chinese Foreign Ministry offered the reason as: "…I think relevant media and journalists are clear about that" (Earp, 2012). Vague rhetoric works in a powerful way, in that it expands the possibility of "crossing the line" into maximum, thus scaring other journalists away from as many sensitive lines as possible.

Discrediting individual correspondents is not limited to visa and accreditation measures. Chinese state media are also used to discredit the reputation of foreign correspondents by verbally attacking them, when their stories are "negative" about China, especially about Chinese top leaders. Aforementioned Australian correspondent Grigg was singled out by China's state tabloid *Global Times* for "ignoring the development and progress in Tibet" and "distorted and biased reporting"[95]. *Wall Street Journal*, whose Beijing correspondent Jeremy Page broke the news on the alleged corruption case of Bo Xilai, a high-ranking power contender, in March 2012, was accused of bribing Chinese officials for access to information for stories. Dow Jones, WSJ's parent company, denied the charge, and attributed the accusation to Chinese authorities' rage with the Journal's story on Bo (Young, 2013). Dow Jones officials called the accusation "part of a broader attack on the paper" (Barrett & Perez, 2013).

[94] http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1328156.shtml
[95] http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160925/50021477_0.shtml

Punish news organization.

More often than bashing individual correspondents, the flak takes the news organization as a target; organizational flak can cause personal sufferings, if the top management should decide to comply with the demand.

Resulting from the aforementioned investigative report on China's top leaders' family wealth, Bloomberg News website in China has been blocked since June 29, 2012. The company's most lucrative business, financial information terminal service, has been banned in China since then. All incoming correspondents' visa applications were denied. The organizational pressure finally led to an open spat with relevant journalists' professionalism claim, amid which its leading journalist Forsythe was suspended.[96] *New York Times* experienced similar punishment for its story on the alleged corruption of Wen Jiabao family. Access to its web sites and applications online still remains blocked at the time of this writing.

The Guardian, BBC, *the Economist*, Reuters and many other news outlets all have their websites partially or fully blocked in the past four years. All Reuters's news websites, including both English language and Chinese language sites, have been blocked since March 2015. When asked about the reason for the censorship, a senior editor of Reuters said, "Yes, we know the specific reason. But I probably cannot share that with you. Let's just simply say it's about a story they [Chinese government] are not happy with."[97]

[96] Story on the link between China's richest businessman Wang Jianlin and top political leaders including Xi, which was never run. After Mike Forsythe joined the New York Times, the paper ran a story on Wang. See: Michael Forsythe, Wang Jianlin, a Billionaire at the Intersection of Business and Power in China, The New York Times (April 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/asia/ wang-jianlin-abillionaire-at-the-intersection-of-business-and-power-in-china.html?_r=0

[97] Personal communication with the editor on 12 November, 2015

Such punishment extends to traditional media formats. Many foreign newspapers and magazines are not allowed to be imported into China. Certain pages of news magazines have been ripped before released. Satellite televisions have been blacked out[98].

Discredit foreign press.

Apart from the case-based flak against individual journalists or news organizations as punishment, China has been long attacking foreign media, especially Western media, as if they were monolithic. As a Reuters correspondent puts it:

> *People in China, for a very long time, do not trust foreign media. We are often portrayed as "hostile forces", as "anti-Chinese", which we are not. I would say the vast majority of us are not. The vast majority are here because we care about the country. Many of us love this country. But the government is very good at convincing people that we are hostile.* [99]

China has traditionally been nationalistic (Townsend, 1992; Unger, 2016). Chinese society has long resisted foreign penetration (see, e.g. Farmer, 1990; Rand, 1990), and the sentiment of nationalism has surged to new heights in recent years. Government seeks to promote a more xenophobic atmosphere among the public. School history textbooks and the whole educational system emphasize the evils of Western imperialism and the past history of victimhood suffering as a result of "national humiliations" by foreign powers (Kaufman, 2010). A nationwide campaign against "foreign spies" is relentlessly carried on, warning Chinese nationals to be alert of foreigners who are highly likely to be spies (Reuters, 2017).

A Global Attitudes Survey by Pew Research Center in 2016 shows that 77% of the respondents surveyed in China believe "our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence". And such sentiment is stable in recent years according to Pew Research Center

[98] Example see http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29630910
[99] Personal communication with the correspondent on 3 February, 2015

(Pew, 2016). Mass protests against Japan, America, and the Philippines are not uncommon in the past decade in China, with some escalating into violent clashes.[100]

There has been a common suspicion and dislike among Chinese public towards foreign media. The feeling was escalated especially after a Tibet riot that occurred in March 2008, in which Tibetans and Han Chinese clashed and caused huge casualties, and in which Western media reported that China's police used excessive force.

After imposing bans on foreign media's access to Tibet, China launched a campaign accusing them of being biased (*South China Morning Post*, 2008). College students organized an "anti-CNN" campaign to condemn its "the lies and distortions of facts"[101]. Their activities were supported by state media with considerable coverage, which agitated another nationwide wave of sentiment against Western media. In discrediting foreign media, Chinese media asked rhetorically, "how has China provoked Western media?" while Foreign Ministry urged foreign media to "write objective and impartial reports" (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2016).

Efforts to discredit foreign media never cease, with domestic news media playing a significant role. *Global Times*, a nationalist tabloid owned by the Party's mouthpiece *People's Daily*, is at the forefront of such endeavor, constantly branding western media as "badmouthing" China[102], "distorting the history" and "smearing China"[103]. Today, even young rappers bash in English for the "prejudices fabricated by foreign media" (Li, 2016).

Foreign correspondents, especially those who are not ethnically Chinese and thus are easily identifiable, are most likely to "encounter suspicion, hesitancy, and avoidance on a daily basis" (Farmer, 1990, p. 253). They are almost destined to be labeled "foreign hostile forces" as part of Western conspiracy to contain China's rise (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2016). When NPR correspondent Frank Langfitt was researching for a story on a bridge collapse

[100] During an anti-Japan protest in September 2012 in Xi'an, a local man had his skull smashed in, for "driving a Japanese car".
[101] http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/02/content_6587120_2.htm
[102] http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1051343.shtml
[103] http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1045739.shtml

incident in a small town, the mother of his interviewee "repeatedly told him not to speak with me because she thought my sole motive was to malign China and the Communist Party" (Langfitt, 2017).

6.2.4 Currying Reward

Coercive strategies are by no means confined to only punishment. Similar to what Lee (1998) has found in his study on how Beijing coopted Hong Kong media, China has developed a sophisticated set of co-optative mechanisms to tame foreign press, by means of establishing friendship ties through gifts and banquets, and favoring pro-China journalists or media with scoops, exclusive interviews, and access to government officials.

Every year, Foreign Ministry hosts New Year Reception exclusively for foreign correspondents, though many correspondents are not keen to participate. Less "hostile" correspondents are more likely to raise questions and get answers in the managed press conferences.

Before China's president Xi Jinping visited the UK in 2015, Reuters was granted an exclusive interview with Xi[104]; likewise, later in the same year, before Xi's setoff for a visit to the US, the *Wall Street Journal* got the exclusive interview[105]. Even though they may not be usually seen as "friendly to China", Reuters and the *Journal* were influential enough to be handed with exclusive interview as "carrots".

6.3 Negotiating with Coercive Pressures

Though the disruption censorship infuses upon democracy and citizenry has been extensively studied (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Keane, 1998; etc.), less attention has been paid to the censorship or coercion to which foreign correspondents are subjected under an

[104] Script of the Reuters interview: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-britain-xi-q-a/exclusive-qa-with-chinese-president-xi-jinping-idUSKCN0SC03920151018

[105] A full transcript of the interview seen here https://www.wsj.com/articles/full-transcript-interview-with-chinese-president-xi-jinping-1442894700?mg=prod/accounts-wsj

authoritarian regime. Nor are many studies on journalists' measures and countermeasures against censorship. Burt (1994), Freshwater (2003) and Holquist (1994) respectively propose an approach of "constitutive censorship", which includes the responsiveness of the censored into the discussion and definition of a dynamic and multidirectional censorship or coercion.

I asked the respondents in my survey to rate the extent to which they thought the regime's efforts at *harassment* and *access blockage* influenced their work. As "flak" is usually post hoc, it is not included in the survey. On a five-point scale (from 1 indicating no influence at all, to 5 indicating extremely influential), 101 respondents rated *harassment* at an average score of 2.80 (SD=1.11), suggesting only a rather mild degree of perceived influence. But *access blockage* is rated fairly high (M=4.16, SD=.86). No cross-national variance is detected in perceiving the pressure from these two variables. Harassment is invariably perceived with mild influence, contrary to the notion that correspondents from liberal Western countries are more subject to government-initiated harassment. This discrepancy is to be interpreted by addressing journalists' negotiation with these coercive pressures.

Gans (1979) lists three ways of journalists dealing with pressure: fighting back; giving in; anticipatory avoidance. It might be methodologically difficult to identify cases of "giving in" to pressures, as journalists all wish to keep their professional autonomy intact. But rather than choosing a frontal battle to fight back, foreign correspondents in China tend to develop a set of "anticipatory avoidance mechanism", whereby they anticipate possible forms of pressure and take measures to circumvent it.

6.3.1 Anticipatory Avoidance

As press censorship in China has become a familiar narrative for foreign correspondents, they generally have gained adequate knowledge of the possibility of harassment and retaliation, and of "taboo topics" which could invite trouble. A *Wall Street*

Journal correspondent observes: "I think the Chinese government is following the Singapore model. You can be here, but don't get much into Singaporean politics. There's severe penalty if you do: fines, bans, expulsion, prosecutions."[106]

Circumventing harassment.

Correspondents have reportedly developed strategies of routines to avoid harassment. They are quick in spotting plaintiff policemen tailing them. They know spending the night in a car is safer than checking into a local hotel. They speed up and finish interviews before drawing unwanted attention from local authorities. They avoid talking over the phone or exchanging emails over topics that might irritate Chinese government. They usually choose to follow official directives to avoid having their passports taken away for "checking". An AFP correspondent finds authorities always use "check your visa" as a way to detain correspondents for hours. "This is the moment correspondents have to leave (the spot), or maybe just hide away for some minutes."[107]

When Australian correspondent Angus Grigg joined an organized reporting trip to Tibet, he had anticipated the whole arrangement would be staged. He and other correspondents ignored local officials' objection and sneaked out in a taxi driving towards a monastery, which the officials tried to prevent them from visiting. When they saw another car tailing them, as expected, they aptly changed cars, played hide-and-seek, "like any well-trained operative in the movies" (Grigg, 2016).

Safety routines to avoid flak.

Foreign correspondents are cautious about stories that might bring flaks from the Chinese government. They seek to follow the technical principles of what Tuchman (1978)

[106] Personal communication with the correspondent on 26 April, 2016.
[107] Personal communication with the correspondent on 3 February, 2016.

would call "the strategic ritual of objectivity" in news reporting: balance, fairness, and objectivity. A *New York Times* correspondent comments: "Those stories need to be accurate [to avoid being picked on]… We're dealing with a very powerful government [in China]…We would be very careful and fair."[108]

When asked to comment on why some media face less flak and threats on accreditations, all of the correspondents I interviewed thought "balance" made a difference. "Our reports are balanced," a *Wall Street Journal* correspondent said. "I think we are more balanced," claimed another American correspondent.

6.3.2 Fighting back

Only sporadically do foreign correspondents fight back to protect journalistic autonomy. This fight can take place at individual level. When correspondents expect organizational and institutional power for support, they may be disappointed if management prefer to comply with China's demands for considerations of financial or national interest.

You harass; I record.

For journalists, the most convenient and powerful weapon to fight against state coercion is by the use of the tricks of their trade: to record the incident of harassment and make it news, or as Waisbord (2002) calls, "deterrence by publicity". A dramatic case of harassing journalists could hype up the original story and enrich its salience in the news pool. This is called by Gans (1979) as "heating effect", in contrary to "chilling effect" which aims to muzzle the press.

[108] Personal communication with the correspondent on 21 January, 2016.

Take the case of Australian correspondent Grigg on the Tibet reporting trip. He failed to visit the monastery in the end, but he recorded the whole adventure in a story that revealed the intrigues of police scrutiny:

> *So, we never did speak to the monks of Lamaling, but a sign board outside the temple indicated the type of ideological conformity demanded by China's Communist Party.* (Grigg, 2016)

Another correspondent on the same reporting trip, Simon Denyer from *Washington Post*, adopted similar anticipatory avoidance mechanism. He writes:

> *We had to be careful we were not being watched or followed, and wouldn't get people into trouble… Two Tibetan people were supplied for us to talk to, both of whose homes were decorated with posters of Communist China's past and current leaders — one was a party member and former soldier in the Chinese army, the other a woman whose real feelings we would never really know.* (Denyer, 2016)

Similarly, Nathan VanderKlippe of the *Globe and Mail* wrote down the experience of his brief detention in Xinjiang and published an account of roughly 2,000-words on the paper[109]. VanderKlippe also live tweeted the whole incident in several Twitter posts, which soon entered the news arena even before VanderKlippe's paper covered it. News outlets including the *HuffPost* reported the incident, based on VanderKlippe's tweets[110]; global

[109] VanderKlippe, N. (2017, August 25). Detained in 'the safest place' on Earth. *The Globe and Mail,* pp A16.
[110] http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2017/08/23/globe-and-mail-correspondent-nathan-vanderklippe-briefly-detained-in-china_a_23159351/

journalists' associations and organizations such as CPJ, RSF, FCCC and IFJ issued notice condemning the incident.

Broadcasting media are, through sound and sight, more effective in hyping up stories on authority harassment of journalists. In November 2016, BBC Shanghai correspondent John Sudworth tried to interview an independent candidate for local level election at the candidate's home in the outskirt of Beijing, but only to find himself shoved and his interviews terminated by a group of unidentified local men. A video footage[111] from BBC shows that more than ten men in plaintiff stood as human shield in front of the door of the candidate's home, preventing the candidate from even opening her own door, before the police gathered in larger number and got aggressive, hushing the BBC reporting team away. "So this is democracy of Chinese style: a large group of thugs are pushing us away… the woman inside hoping to stand for the election won't be able to do the interview," Sudworth explains in the video, with the scene of his being hushed away. The video soon exploded and was escalated into the arena of public discourse showcasing "China's censoring of the press" and "Chinese fake democracy". On YouTube alone the clip attracted more than 115,000 views; on Facebook it hit 69,742 shares and more than 6,600,000 views[112].

Similarly, Sun (2015) in her study of foreign correspondents as "antagonistic" with China's public diplomacy efforts, also points out that "incidents of foreign correspondents' expulsion from China themselves become newsworthy." This "foreign correspondent versus an oppressive regime" narrative has its outweighing appeal.

Organizational fight and home state intervene.

Journalists, when confronted with external pressure on their journalistic work, would first turn to their news organizations for support. Media organizations would negotiate with

[111] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38005603
[112] As to January 15, 2017.

the Chinese government, but journalists do not necessarily have strong institutional support on their back. In the case of Melissa Chan's expulsion, Al Jazeera headquarter explained the incident as an "accident", saying it could have been avoided should the bureau and the management lobby in a more efficient way[113].

In some extreme cases, the home government gets involved in the negotiation process. When a *Washington Post* reporter broke a sensitive story, he was expelled. In a effort to get him back to Beijing, the *Washington Post* executives reportedly invited the Chinese ambassador to the US for tea and even asked Henry Kissinger to bring the case to then vice premier of China (Pen America, 2016). Other management even raised the issue with the visiting president Jiang Zemin during an interview session with him. After all these efforts, the expelled correspondent found his way back to China.

Having exposed the alleged corruption and family wealth of Chinese leaders, nine *New York Times* journalists and 14 Bloomberg journalists faced similar situation of having their visas discontinued (Nakamura & Wan, 2013). The US government made several public efforts to intervene. Vice President Joseph Biden raised the issue in his meeting with Xi Jinping, harshly warning "there would be consequences for China if they proceeded to oust the reporters" (Shear, 2014). After Biden's public effort, China restored accreditations to some, but not all, of the journalists involved.

Foreign press corps are divided on whether state intervention should be evoked in dealing with strict censorship in China, especially to lessen harassment and flak. In 2012, 26 German correspondents in China wrote to Merkel asking her to intervene on their behalf to stop the harassment they've been experiencing.[114] But several American correspondents interviewed expressed disapproval of asking for government intervention on grounds of "independent press". One of them makes a straightforward statement: "I don't think US

[113] Personal communication with Al Jazeera English executive producer Owen Watson, March 5, 2015.
[114] http://www.dw.com/en/german-journalists-in-china-ask-for-merkels-help/a-16207637

government should get involved in any kind of media policy at all." Though lacking statistics to prove, correspondents from Liberal Model countries appear to uphold stronger professional autonomy, reluctant to be interfered by political power from either home country or host country.

6.3.3 Surrender

Worn out by unsuccessful fighting-back, foreign correspondents do sometimes give in to pressure. When asked if he would file a complaint to Foreign Ministry or FCCC after being harassed, an American correspondent replied in a cavalier tone: "No. Filing a complaint will not help us. It will just take us more time and won't get any results." The correspondent himself is a member of the FCCC Media Freedom Committee, which fights against harassment and surveillance targeting foreign press corps in China.

For access blockage, correspondents, mostly constrained by pressing deadline and limited resources, would give up pushing for an undefinable gray zone and drop certain stories. In the case of Xinjiang, Julie Makinen of The *Los Angeles Times* says difficulty to gain access to that region has led to a decrease in coverage of the area after 2014, according to PEN America's report. For organized reporting trips to Tibet, many foreign journalists do not apply for permission to go, saying they either believe they would not be granted permission, or regard the organized trip would be too limited for any journalistic purpose (PEN America, 2016).

Serious threat or witnessing such threat does prevent correspondents from working on certain sensitive topics. As recorded in PEN's report, American correspondent Paul Mooney decided to drop a story on a mass protest in Beijing in 2011, where "a dozen journalists" were assaulted by security officers. "It was really scary," Mooney told PEN America. "To see this, I myself became afraid. I told myself there were no real protesters, no news, nothing to write about. Maybe I justified to myself that there was no story" (PEN America, 2016, p.18).

More often, foreign correspondents give in to such censorship for safety concern of sources. The Indian correspondent, after his source for a story on carpet business in a Muslim autonomous region was harassed, decided to give up the story, but "can't help thinking where is a safe zone for China story"[115].

6.3.4 Build-in Anticipatory Avoidance: Self-censorship

A large number of the above cases of negotiating with censorship, be it "anticipatory avoidance" or "surrender", are in effect voluntary act journalists take to ward off foreseeable coercion by Chinese authorities. Over time, journalists have developed a set of "build-in anticipatory avoidance mechanism" (Gans, 1979, p. 276). Self-censorship is a set of editorial actions "in anticipation of currying reward and avoiding punishments from the power structure" (Lee, 1998, p. 57). It is more than reward and punishment, and the most powerful and insidious form of censorship is unrecognized submission to the assumptions of reality as defined by the authorities. This "thought compliance", however, is less prominent in China correspondence than the forces of reward and punishment. It is a voluntary practice of censorship by information producer on his/her own symbolic work in order to avoid external censorship, seen as a compromise between expressive interest and social forces (Bourdieu, 1991; Brownlie, 2014; Gans, 1979; etc.).

Journalists would resist the term "self-censorship", as in lay usage it suggests conscious self-censorship giving in journalistic autonomy to the heteronomous powers. However, in practice self-censorship is most often exercised unconsciously. And as Lee (1998) notes, there is a "third-person effect" in journalists' perceiving external pressures on editorial autonomy, journalists usually downplay their own tendency of self-censorship but see their colleagues more prone to practices of self-censorship. As censorship is a "structural

[115] Personal communication with the Indian correspondent on February 2, 2016.

necessity" (Bourdieu, 1994), so is self-censorship. In an open democracy the two for most of the time balance in power relations. But in authoritarian states where the press is denied the rights to monitor, the balance between censorship and self-censorship might break lose.

Extreme cases of censorship, such as expelling a correspondent for an uncharged crime, do intensify the tendency toward self-censorship among foreign press corps, to certain extent. In commenting on the expelled French correspondent Ursula Gauthier, a Colombian correspondent emphasized the notion of "limitation" for several times: "I know the *limitation*…I think once you know you work in a state with censorship, it's better to work within the *limitation*… I've chosen to work within *limitations*." A German correspondent foresees no such risk for himself, because "I don't touch those topics".

But for other journalists, extreme censorship may produce an opposite effect, especially when "extreme censorship" itself is a perfect fit for the "authoritarian China" narrative in international news arena. On the case of Gauthier's expulsion, *The Guardian* alone ran seven stories (including one editorial), criticizing China's "crackdown on foreign media", and maintaining that "any attempt to impose self-censorship on the foreign press in China should be strongly resisted".[116] As explained earlier, such "chilling effect" may end up as "heating effect", adding to embarrassment for the Chinese authorities on contrary to their expectations.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter looks into state coercion as a major source of external pressure on the field of foreign correspondence, and how journalists negotiate with these pressures. China uses both "carrot and stick" to tame foreign press in its own interest. Harassment, access blockage, and flak are widely used "stick". Besides being denied access to certain areas and

[116] Editorial retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/01/the-guardian-view-on-the-foreign-press-in-china-expelling-the-messenger

information channels, China correspondents report being under both online and offline surveillance, physical harassment, and intimidation.

Between harassment and access blockage, China correspondents unanimously perceive much more influence from the latter, though anecdotally harassment is a major source of external pressure on China correspondents' news production. Correspondents from liberal Western countries do not report significantly higher pressure from harassment, though they are assumed to experience more cases of state-initiated harassment in China. These discrepancies are to be interpreted by addressing the journalists' negotiation with coercive pressures.

With harassment, China correspondents negotiate using a set of "anticipatory avoidance mechanism" to circumvent or downplay these man-made obstacles. Compared with harassment, little room is allowed to negotiate with access blockage. But access blockage does not necessarily lead the journalists to entirely drop the topic; instead, journalists may negotiate with such pressure by means of exposing censorship and turning to other available but one-sided sources. Thus these coercive measures often fail to tame the field of China correspondence towards what China wants. For example, on the off-limit topic of Tibet, foreign correspondents admit that "a lack of access to Tibet increases their reliance on exile sources and overseas academics, who may have particular agenda and lack up-to-date information" (FCCC, 2016).

Similarly unsuccessful is the practice of flaks to retaliate individual correspondents and their news organizations, as well as to deliver a chilling effect among foreign press corps. As foreign press corps, or the censored, is not monolithic, they respond to such censorship differently. A more conscious self-censorship, as expected by the censors, is not guaranteed. On the contrary, flak itself is most likely to find its way into the news narrative. In the same vein, excessive harassment may result in similar "heating effect"; mild harassment, on the

other hand, could have its censorship effect compromised, with journalists aptly adopting anticipatory avoidance mechanism.

Amid the massive-scaled omnipresent state coercion by China, foreign correspondents often find themselves struggling in a difficult situation, as the political power from China is supported by and intertwined with power from other fields such as economic benefits. Jocelyn Ford, former Beijing Bureau Chief for *Marketplace* describes the situation as: "How do you fight against a bully is the question—a rich bully" (PEN America, 2016, p. 33). The rich bully here is a powerful state player meshing both political and economic coercion, promising tense power struggles between the journalistic field on its own logic and the external pressures exerted by this rich bully. Foreign news organizations have to carefully balance journalistic autonomy and the chance of not being able to report from China, and also financial consequences should they be barred from China both as a reporting object and as a vast market, especially for the financial media. For non-commercial news organizations, financial loss may not be a big concern, but they are not exempt from a tug of war in the field either, as they face the same political coercion, to say the least.

This chapter explores from institutional level the tight state coercion and journalists' negotiation against the coercion, suggesting that the field of China correspondence, though functioning on its own journalistic logic, is heavily subjected to heteronomous pressures from state coercion in the host country of China. Though foreign correspondents take countermeasures including exposing harassment and anticipatory avoidance, none of these measures address the structural conditions. The power structure is hardly challenged, with the "anaconda in the chandelier" continuing to be felt by every agent in the field.

Chapter 7. Multiple Chinas: National Interest in China Correspondence

Pedelty (1995) recorded that an experienced European correspondent who covered the war in El Salvador, filed two stories of an event, one for an American newspaper and the other for a European news outlet, and the two stories turned out to be very different, even contradictory to each other. Pedelty explains, "Every journalist must conform to the criteria of her clients. A system of sanctions and rewards---employment policies, prestige endowments, and monetary compensation---facilitate this disciplinary training process."

But another news-shaping force, more potent than salient organizational norms would be that of national interest. Even a bilateral meeting between state leaders can find its various narratives from media of different national contexts. When the *Hindu* China correspondent Atul Aneja writes on the meeting between China's Premier Li Keqiang and Japan's Prime Minister Abe amid the Asia Europe Meeting in 2016, he finds contradicting reports from Kyodo of Japan and Xinhua of China. Kyodo reports Abe urges Li to respect a "rules-based international order", while Xinhua writes Li told Abe to "stop hyping up and interfering" (*The Hindu*, July 16). Both are facts from the meeting, but framed in completely different ways, thus producing different narratives with strong national print.

This chapter looks into the macro level of national interest as a source of influence onto foreign correspondents' news production. China's territorial claim on the disputed islands in South China Sea is selected as a case study to comparatively examine the narratives of US, British, Japanese and Indian media.

7.1 National Interest and Foreign Correspondence

The relation between press and state has been extensively studied, and scholars argue that news media internalize the premises of state power and act on behalf of state foreign policy interests (Curran & Park, 2000; Hallin, 1986; Handley & Rutigliano, 2012; Herman

and Chomsky, 2002; Lee et al. 2012; Nossek, 2004; Reese, 2004). The press-state partnership that forms a "national narrative" (Handley & Rutigliano, 2012) is the essential driving force in foreign reporting. In analyzing global media's coverage of Hong Kong handover in 1997, Lee et al. (2012) point out that international news about distant events must be "'brought home' via discursive means", and different media discourses "invoke their cultural symbols on behalf of their national interests" (p.4).

Though Gans (1979) focused on domestic news making, he also notes that most foreign news covered in American news media are closely relevant to the national interest of US, or common themes which could also be found in domestic news such as disasters and conflicts, or those violating American values, such as "excesses of dictatorship" (Gans, 1979, p. 36).

As the world enters a new century with drastic changes brought about by new technologies, it has been argued that an unprecedented level of interconnected and globalized economy, culture, and people may overshadow the import of national narrative. But as Handley and Rutigliano (2012) note, the state-journalistic partnership is actually strengthened because establishment journalism continues to be, if not more committed to national narrative, in order to maintain their "elite" positions in the field and ward off competitive pressures from new or alternative media. The imperative of "national narrative" is stronger in foreign correspondence as the media domesticate or "index" foreign news through national lenses and thus impose their own norms and state-defined national interest onto the foreign occurrences (Bennett, 1990; Cohen et al. 1996; Lee et al., 2002; Lee, Li & Lee, 2011).

Aalberg et al. (2013), in their study of TV's foreign news coverage in 11 countries across five continents, concluded that foreign news coverage is still largely driven by national interests. Longitudinal studies also argue for the driving force of national interest in media coverage of foreign news. Lee, Li and Lee (2011) for example looked into two US elite

newspapers' editorial coverage of Tiananmen crackdown over a period of two decades and found that the change in the editorial discourse is affiliated with the China policy of different US administrations.

7.2 South China Sea Dispute

The South China Sea dispute is selected because of its international prominence and regional tension which fits in a "China's rise" framework with varying implications for the interest of the US, Britain, Japan, and India. As an editorial of the *New York Times* maintains, the issue is "as much about China's rise into a major world power as it is about this one sea"[117].

With China's asserted presence in the region—by reclaiming lands to build artificial islands and deploying military staffing or patrols —the world is highly concerned about China's move and attitudes on the issue. Global concerns abound as to what kind of a major power China is becoming. Will it be a "responsible global leader" who respects and abides by the Western-orchestrated global order since the end of WWII, or will it be a more "aggressive" superpower seeking to overturn the status quo and to establish a new order? Mainstream newspapers from the four countries are selected for a qualitative content and discourse analysis.

South China Sea is considered as "the most strategically important maritime territory on earth" (*New York Times*, July 15, 2016). As a strategic area with rich maritime resources, also geographically significant as the second most used sea lane in the world, it is claimed by China and other six Southeast Asian countries including the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. The overlapping claims over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights generate endless disputes and conflict, with US and other non-claimants trying to vigilantly watching China's expansion. Of all the claimants, China is doubtlessly the

[117] Fisher, M. July 15, 2016. South China Sea: Explaining A Dispute with Global Impact. The New York Times.

most assertive one, with its "nine-dash line" claiming 80-90% of the SCS area (Yahuda, 2013). Its claim and ensuing moves in the disputed areas, including deploying assertive military and diplomatic means in the region, draws increasing global concern, in the midst of global narrative about "China rise" that has risen since the mid-2000s (Fravel, 2011).

The most recent highlight of South China Sea dispute is the court of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea at The Hague on July 12, 2016 ruled against China's "nine dash line claim" in a case brought by the Philippines three years ago. The ruling is legally binding, as both China and Philippines are signatories of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). But it lacks enforcing power. China dismissed the arbitration award as "illegal", "null and void", and actively sought international support on its dismissal. The current Philippines government, after an electoral victory by president Duterte, takes a different approach, showing its willingness to negotiate with China, and even dropping the ruling award.

The ruling and China's ensuing defiance of the ruling draw anxieties from the international community. The US, Australia, and European countries called on the relevant parties to follow the international laws. In the region, Japan and India are not direct claimants of the disputed sea but nonetheless saw strategic interest in it, and thus teamed up with each other and with the US to form a "trilateral coalition", which seeks to pressure China into accepting the ruling. ASEAN members, of which only half are South China Sea claimants, could not reach agreement on whether to urge China to accept the ruling. The US and Britain are traditional close allies. US, Japan and India hold Malabar naval exercises every year, symbolizing what the *Times of India* calls "trilateral interoperability in the Asia-Pacific region".

South China Sea issue is an ongoing contest between China and its Asian neighbours, between China and the US, for geopolitical power play, with a large quantity of ongoing

media coverage. The tribunal ruling of July 12, 2016 serves as an excellent opportunity to understand how media of various national contexts are framing the issue differently. Thus this chapter selects relevant media coverage around the time of the ruling for analysis.

7.3 Methods

The frame analysis approach developed by Gamson and his colleagues (Gamson, 1992; Gamson et al, 1992; Gamson and Lasch, 1983; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Gamson and Stuart, 1992; Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993) is employed in this study. This model holds that news consists of socially constructed discourses, structured by different sets of "interpretive packages" with "frame" as its core; a "package" offers "a number of different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and positions in shorthand, making it possible to display the package as a whole with a deft metaphor, catchphrase, or other symbolic device" including exemplars, depictions, visual images, roots, consequences, and appeals to principle (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). As O'Regan (2007) notes, "'deep' readings, guided by a signature matrix, or list of frame indices, are capable of uncovering the various frames, or symbolic and reasoning devices that 'package' news discourses".

The US, Britain, and India are English-speaking countries, whose elite papers are being selected for analysis. Included in the sample are the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal* and *Washington Post* from the US; *The Guardian*, *Financial Times*, and *Daily Telegraph* from the UK; and *Times of India*, *the Hindu*, and *Hindustan Times* from India. In the case of Japan, three biggest national newspapers, *Asahi Shimbun*, *Yomiuri Shimbun* and *Mainichi Shimbun*, all publish an English version, under the names of *Japan News*, *Asia & Japan Watch (AJW)* and *the Mainichi,* respectively. These three English versions of the three biggest national newspapers are thus selected.

Time frame for analysis is set between June 12, 2016 and August 12, 2016, a month before and after the Tribunal ruling. This time frame covers the occurrence of June 29 when

the court in the Hague released the date of announcing the ruling, and China's further statement of rejecting the ruling later the same day.

"South China Sea" is used as the keyword search in Factiva database. Only relevant articles (with "South China Sea" or equivalent key words such as "South Sea", "Spratly islands", "Paracel islands", "Scarborough Shoal" appearing in the first paragraph) are kept for further analysis. After an initial screening to filter out irrelevant articles or sponsored content (*Daily Telegraph*'s "*China Watch"* sponsored by Chinese state newspaper *China Daily*), altogether 151 articles were retrieved for discourse analysis. A total of 65 articles are filed by China correspondents from the sampled media organizations. Table 7-1 shows the number of articles in the sample.

Table 7-1. *the Sample of Articles for Analysis*

Country	Newspaper	Total Article	Articles by China FCs*	N. of China FCs**
U.S.	*The New York Times*	13	10	8
	The Washington Post	10	3	2
	The Wall Street Journal	17	10	13
	total	40	23	23
U.K.	*The Guardian*	8	1	1
	The Daily Telegraph	6	4	1
	Financial Times	12	7	7
	total	26	12	9
India	*the Hindu*	19	8	1
	Times of India	14	5	1
	Hindustan Times	21	12	1
	total	54	25	3
Japan	*The Japan News*	16	4	8
	Mainichi	5	1	6
	AJW	10	0	7
	total	31	5	21
Total		151	65	56

*articles with the news organization's China correspondent(s) in the byline.
**the number of China-based journalists of the sampled news organizations at the selected time frame of this analysis.

It needs to be pointed out that *Daily Telegraph* is in partnership with China's state newspaper *China Daily*, in the form of a special page called "China Watch". Articles that appear on "China Watch" are mostly propaganda pieces produced by China-commissioned reporters or columnists. These articles, though retrieved from Factiva database as "news report", are thus removed from the sample.

7.4 A Quantitative Glance: China Correspondents' Input

A glance at the quantity of coverage on South China Sea during the selected time frame discloses that India leads the pack with a total of 54 articles, followed by the US (N=40) and Japan (N=31), while Britain only has 26 articles on the topic.

Most of the US and British media coverage are mainly produced by their China correspondents, except for the *Washington Post* and the *Guardian*. This might be explained by the relatively small presence of these two newspapers in China. Japanese media largely cover the issue by journalists or columnists outside China, with only five articles filed by their China correspondents.

Newsroom size might be accountable for the different portion of contribution by China correspondents, as smaller staff size in China poses heavier resource restrictions. Of the six US and British newspapers analyzed here, the *Washington Post, the Guardian* and *the Daily Telegraph* have only one or two China correspondents.

For length of coverage, India (N=30,131) and the US (N=29,645) still take the lead in terms of word count in total. The US and British papers tend to run lengthier pieces. On average they have 741 and 681 words per article. Anglo-American newspapers have the tradition of offering interpretive accounts to explain the contexts of events (see, e.g. Song &

Lee, 2017). For example, the average length of articles in the *Washington Post* is 734 words, but those produced by its China correspondents are much longer (N=1,151)[118].

Table 7-2. *Length of Articles*

Country	Newspaper	Word count	Word count avg.	Word count by China FCs	Word count by China FCs avg.
U.S.	*The New York Times*	12,310	945	9,452	945
	The Washington Post	7,341	734	3,454	1,151
	The Wall Street Journal	9,994	588	6,042	604
	total	29,645	741	18,948	824
U.K.	*The Guardian*	6,712	839	1,364	1,364
	The Daily Telegraph	2,249	375	1,520	380
	Financial Times	8,735	728	5,657	808
	total	17,696	681	8,541	712
India	*the Hindu*	9,143	481	3,236	405
	Times of India	8,276	591	2,555	511
	Hindustan Times	12,712	605	7,158	596
	total	30,131	558	12,949	518
Japan	*The Japan News*	9,247	578	1,867	467
	Mainichi	2,863	573	707	707
	AJW	4,471	447	0	0
	total	16,581	535	2,574	515

To break down the number of articles of each newspaper into the selected two months, as shown in graphs below, one can observe a constant attention on the issue from the US and Japanese media throughout the period. Indian media coverage is more concentrated during and after the tribunal ruling of July 12, 2016, with scarce coverage before the ruling. British media only show sporadic interest in the issue, with their coverage almost all concentrated in the week of the ruling.

Figure 7-1. *Number of SCS Articles in US Newspapers*

[118] Apart from China correspondents, national journalists and editors (both internal and external) also contributed to the sampled articles on the South China Sea issue.




Figure 7-2. *Number of SCS Articles in British Newspapers*




Figure 7-3. *Number of SCS Articles in Indian Newspapers*





Figure 7-4. *Number of SCS Articles in Japanese Newspapers*



7.5 Global Occurrence, National Narratives

As argued previously, news media present a local narrative of the same global event or occurrence "through employment of unique discursive means of rhetoric, frames, metaphors, and logic" (Lee et al. 2002, p. 5). As Lee et al. (2002) found in their study on global media narratives on Hong Kong's handover, media organizations of the same national context "operate within the same institutional relationship to the power structure and share the broadly similar ideological and cultural prisms", thus the media narrative is a "nationally defined" one (p. 91). This study similarly identifies the pattern of national narratives for the

contested South China Sea issue. A discursive frame analysis of the four countries' news coverage on the South China Sea issue during the selected time frame results in the following findings.

7.5.1 US: Superpower Facing a Rising Challenger

As the only Superpower in the world, the US is guarded against challenge from China as a rising power to the global order. Hilary Clinton, Secretary of State under the Obama administration, advocates in her *Foreign Policy* Op-Ed, a "Pivot" to Asia policy. She warned that new global realities "require[d] us to innovate, to compete and to lead in new ways… We need to press forward and renew our leadership" (Clinton, 2011). With a foreign policy focus shift to Asia-Pacific region, the US is aiming at securing and sustaining its global leadership. By contras, China has been advocating a multipolar world order in lieu of the status quo. It has been observed that the "apparent shift in the direction of the balance of power [was] in China's favor" (Yahuda, 2013).

I identify three "ideological packages" in the U.S. media narratives as shown in Table 7-3. First, the U.S. sees itself as the world police safeguarding the post-war global order, worried about being challenged by a rising new power. China is depicted by US media as a bully that upsets regional stability. For the US, South China Sea is not only a potential of rich resources that involves the Philippines with which Washington has treaty obligations; it is also a contest over geopolitical control. The issue of South China Sea is "a dynamic that has permeated Sino-American relations throughout China's rise over the past two decades" (*the New York Times*, July 15, 2016). To show its commitment, the US has strengthened its military presence in the area since 2010 in the name of protecting "freedom of navigation." It also conducts joint military exercises with Indian and Japanese naval forces.

The second frame is China-US contest. The tension in the bilateral relationship is framed both as the tug of war between an existing superpower and a rising power, both

contending for interests in Asia as well as globally. The third frame is "guardian of nationalism", emphasizing the card of victimhood China in the dispute plays, which fans up anti-imperialist nationalism. The three packages are internally consistent, and oftentimes intertwined in a single article. "International outlaw" package and nationalism package are often found hand in hand, as one of the driving forces for China's aggressiveness is nationalist sentiment. As A *Wall Street Journal* editorial warns China: "Regional stability or revanchist dream…It can't have both" (July 13, 2016).

Table 7-3. *Ideological Packages of the U.S. Media Coverage*

	International Outlaw	*China-US Contest*	*Guardian of nationalism*
Frame	China's dismissal of the ruling risks itself being an international outlaw and dangerous bully	China and US contest for naval power and control of global economy in the region.	China's victimhood thinking boosts nationalism against the ruling
Metaphors	"lassoing a locomotive with a cobweb"; the world failed to contain "a rising, restless, assertive Germany"	"hold the global economy hostage"; "a rising Asian challenger"	"China portrays itself not as predator but prey"
Exemplars	Yang's "big country vs. small countries" remarks; compare the case to the dispute between US and Nicaragua in the 1980s	US "freedom of navigation" operations; US was accused by China of "threatening Chinese territory and personnel"	Chinese nationalism education; anti-Japan protests; 1919 Japan boycott; "China Dream"
Catchphrases	Global leader or superpower; "The world is watching"; "an international outlaw"; regional bully	"challenge Washington's military dominance";	"revanchist dreams"
Depictions	China dismisses the ruling; using diplomacy to garner international support; military air patrols of	China to "push the United States out of the Western Pacific"; US could "rally world opinion against	Chinese state media publicize maps of China with the claimed waters marked as its territory;

	China and drills with Russia; China suspects the current world order and international institutions.	Beijing's behavior"; US and China had close-to-clash in the region ; National security advisor Rice met with Xi, and "played up interdependency"	protest against KFC in multiple Chinese cities;
Principles	Postwar World order	Preponderance of power	Post-colonial nationalism
N. of articles*	26	19	9

*An article may use more than one frames.

Dangerous International Outlaw.

US media extensively frame China's denial of the ruling as a dangerous challenge to the postwar global status quo. The new Defense Secretary James Mattis of the Trump administration claims that Chinese aggressiveness in South China Sea is one of the major reasons that put the world under its biggest attack since WWII (*LA Times,* Jan 12, 2017). All three newspapers ask, some repeatedly, if China is a responsible global leader as "it professes itself to be" (*Wall Street Journal*, July 13), or risking to be an international outlaw (*Wall Street Journal*, July 13; *New York Times*, July 10, July 15; *Washington Post*, July 13).

The *New York Times* (July 15) points out, the biggest concern over China's rise is "whether China will work within what scholars call the liberal order—the postwar system of international laws and institutions—or seek to overturn it". The dispute over South China Sea, especially over the ruling, is "a test case for whether China becomes the kind of power that works within that system, or against it".

International laws and norms in dealing with disputes and conflicts are much weighted in this package. All three newspapers offered extensive analysis on relevant laws, precedents, and the court itself. These emphases on laws and norms sharply contrast with China's utter dismissal of the ruling. *Wall Street Journal* points out that China trashing the

ruling would "risk casting Beijing as an international outlaw" (July 13). Similarly, the *Washington Post* ran an explanatory piece on July 13 saying that "the court (Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague) is part of a long-established system that governments use to settle disputes with each other", and that "when a government doesn't like a ruling, it usually seeks to overturn it rather than ignoring it altogether", while China is exactly "ignoring it altogether".

But US media occasionally bashed the U.S. for holding "double standard" for it has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (*Washington Post*, June 20). The case of the U.S. ignoring a 1986 ruling from the same court against US's support for rebels in Nicaragua is compared to China's denial in the South China Sea case. Both *the New York Times* (July 16) and in the *Wall Street Journal* (July 8) note the similarities in that the cases were brought by a small country, but the giant power ignored the unfavorable ruling. Though this seems a page China can borrow "from the U.S. playbook" (*Wall Street Journal*, July 8) to justify its own dismissal of the ruling, both articles also point out the differences between the two cases: in the Nicaraguan case, the U.S. participated in the ruling at the initial stage, and managed to resolve the dispute between the two countries later. *The New York Times* concludes that "the current behavior of China is more extreme than the United States in the 1980s" (July 16). Yet, *Wall Street Journal* quotes Paul Reichler, the lead lawyer for both the Philippines and Nicaragua, as admitting that the Nicaragua case was "a blemish on the US moral posture and its ability to project itself as a promoter of a rules-based international order".

Still, the US is praised for "admirable search for law-and-rules-based answers to foreign policy disputes" (*Washington Post*, July 13). The core narrative applauds America's leadership. As an American law expert writes in an Op-Ed in *Washington Post*, "diplomacy

backed by power and law is still our best means of helping to shape the future of the Asia-Pacific".

Washington Post's conservative columnist George Will writes that trying to use laws and norms to restrain China is like "lassoing a locomotive with a cobweb" (July 17). He even compared today's China to Germany in early last century, arguing that failure to integrate China to the global status quo would leave out an aggressive China, like a rising, restless, assertive Germany in early last century, posing potentially grave threats to the world order.

Within regional relations, China is portrayed as the bully for its Asian neighbours. *New York Times* phrases it as "a naked power grab by China" for other claimants (July 15). In an ASEAN ministers conference in 2010, China's then Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reportedly told his Singaporean counterpart that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact". This quote, after six years, still finds its resonance in the US newspapers. *Wall Street Journal* argues in an editorial on August 7 that China is committed to "the path of bullying and revanchism". To support this view, it further notes: "After all, its top diplomat boasted in 2010 that 'China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact'". The new world order China is pursuing, as Andrew Browne notes, is one in which China is the "new regional master" and the Philippines and other neighbours have to "accept their places in a Chinese-ordered hierarchy" (*Wall Street Journal*, July 13).

Contest between Two Major Powers.

As the most important bilateral relationship in the world, China-US relationship is seriously tested by South China Sea issue. Obama administration has been pushing forward its "Pivot to Asia" policy, by increasingly retching up American military presence in the region and strengthening coalitions with its traditional Asian allies in trade, military and diplomacy. China views the "Pivot" as part of the US's China containment policy, and

accuses the ruling in a familiar frame of "U.S. conspiracy to contain China's rise", publicly denouncing the case as a "farce directed by Washington" (*Wall Street Journal*, July 13).

As a traditional dominant power in the region, the US is resisting being pushed out by a rising and assertive China. A *Wall Street Journal* article on the day of the ruling points out that the verdict "alters the dynamics of a contest between China and the U.S.", as China's assertive move in the region "challenge[s] Washington's military dominance" (July 13). In his weekly column, Andrew Browne candidly phrases the row as a contest "between the American superpower and a rising Asian challenger" and that it shows "China's commitment to challenge American primacy in Asia" (*Wall Street Journal*, June 15). As to the claimant the Philippines, Browne writes: "He (Duterte) is in the middle of a contest between China and the U.S. for regional supremacy" (*Wall Street Journal*, July 20). The *Washington Post* also writes that "the ruling could lead to more friction between China and the United States, with the issue seen as a key test of Washington's ability to maintain its leading role in Asian security in the face of China's rising power" (July 13). In a *Washington Post* Op-Ed, a law scholar from Yale Law School urges the US to "continue regular freedom-of-navigation operations" to maintain its military presence in the region (July 13).

In singling out the significance of maintaining a dominance in the region, *New York Times* notes that South China Sea is strategic because it is not only heavily resourceful but also crucial for global trade, thus the US "would rather not allow Beijing even the ability to hold the global economy hostage" (July 15). A *Washington Post* Op-Ed warns that "if the next president does not conduct such operations with steady, measured skill, the result could be the collapse of the United States' position in the world's most populous, dynamic and perhaps dangerous region, or war" (July 17).

Nationalism Fanning up.

China's increasing assertiveness in South China Sea issue is also framed as benefiting from its fanned-up nationalism at home. Memories of invasion and humiliation at the hands of imperialism can be easily activated to spark nationalistic protests. Under Xi's leadership, China envisions "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" in pursuit of the "China dream". China covets the kind of international influence commensurate with its rising economic power. It draws a "rhetorical line from its past 'humiliation' at the hands of Western colonial powers and Japan to his vision of a strong, proud China under Communist Party rule" (*Washington Post*, July 13). The starting point of Xi's "China dream", as the *Wall Street Journal*'s Andrew Browne argues, is the victimhood narrative, which is "a conviction that the West, led by the US, is out to thwart its rise and once again enslave its people", and China uses it to portray itself "not as predator but prey" (*Wall Street Journal*, June 15).

In Chinese narrative, the postwar world order was established to the maximum interests of major Western countries, and China has gone through Western imperialism, the memory of which keeps haunting on China for decades. *New York Times* on July 15 writes that "the Chinese suspect that the global status quo is engineered to serve Western interests first", and sees its presence in the contested region as rightful, "just as Western powers have done for centuries". Thus it could be seen as a defensive tactic to extend control on the Chinese side, "a way to starve off perceived threats".

Washington Post's China bureau chief Simon Denyer writes ahead of the ruling that through vehement propaganda, China portrays itself "as the victim of a 'vicious' and deceptive legal case" (June, 20). And the evil behind the conspiracy is no one else but the US. As a *Wall Street Journal* article begins with this statement: "Beijing has a consistent explanation for the rising tensions in the South China Sea: it's America's fault" and in China's narrative, it is "the victim of a US bullying campaign designed to keep China down

by uniting Asian states against it" (August 6). In an analysis interpreting the case and the ruling, the *New York Times* explains the "nine-dash line" claimed by China in the victimhood frame: "For China, the line represents long-lost historical claims that the country, after two centuries of weakness, is finally strong enough to recover" (July 15).

Nationalist Chinese see the Philippines as the "American pawn" (*Wall Street Journal*, July 20). Browne of *Wall Street Journal* unapologetically refers to this nationalism as "revanchist dreams", warning China that it has to carefully balance with regional stability (July 13).

Symbolizing "victimized nationalism" are the protests that erupted in several Chinese cities after the ruling, targeting American fast food giant KFC outlets. But of the three mainstream newspapers, only *New York Times* carries a short story of 694 words on the KFC protests. The article draws historical analogies of student protest against Japan in 1919 and several recent ones, some of which violent, to explain China's fevered nationalism. The same article also notices the government's efforts to downplay the protests. *Washington Post* writes on July 13 that "Chinese government has whipped up nationalist sentiment in recent years to support its 'indisputable sovereignty'".

7.5.2 Britain: Keep Global Status Quo but…Let's "Golden Era"!

As the U.S.'s most important and closest ally, Britain follows the U.S. stance on maintaining the global status quo and warning China of risking being an outlaw. But Britain is not a Superpower; it values trade partnership with China, and defied Washington to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as one of its founding members. Song and Lee (2017) also note that British press is generally "readier than the Americans to acknowledge China's rise" (p. 17).

US scholars and officials have publicly criticized Britain for only eying for economic benefits in their relationship with China (*Financial Times*, October 20, 2015). Britain takes a

more measured response to the South China Sea dispute. It officially became a "neutral observer" of the Philippines-China case over their South China Sea dispute since November 2015, and only warned China ahead of the ruling to abide by the outcome based on international laws and norms.

The British media carry the fewest stories on the South China Sea row during the sampled two months (N=26). *The Guardian* does not carry any story specific on South China Sea four weeks before the ruling. Half of the eight articles it carried after the ruling are about Australia's response to the ruling, filed by its Australia correspondents. Another two are readers' comments on the issue, leaving only two articles on the dispute. *Daily Telegraph* carries six articles on the dispute, but it also carries 11 pro-China Op-Ed pieces sponsored by *China Daily*.

Of the 26 articles retrieved from the three British newspapers, I identify three ideological packages, as shown in Table 7-4. First, similar to the US media, British media interpret the dispute from the frame of laws and rules, emphasizing the import of maintaining the global status quo. Evidently unsatisfied with the limited engagement by the US, British media largely shifts to the row between US and China. Framing the issue not only as a bilateral tug-of-war, it hinted at the possibility of military confrontation. The last package is "reined nationalism", emphasizing the cunning use of nationalism by Chinese government to garner domestic support.

Table 7-4. *Ideological Packages of British Media Coverage*

	International Outlaw	*China-US Contest*	*Reined Nationalism*
Frame	China's dismissal of the ruling risks itself being an	China and US are on high tension over the row in SCS	China's nationalism is carefully reined to

	international outlaw and dangerous bully		garner domestic support
Metaphors	"the bully thumbing its nose at international laws"	"Washington the real bully thumbing its nose at international laws"	Panda vs. Tarsier
Exemplars	China-Vietnam row; Yang's "big country vs. small countries" remarks; Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea	Eve of World War II	Vietnam clamp down nationalist sentiment
Catchphrases	"a 21st century rules-based order over China's 19th-century plans for its own sphere of influence"; "Great Wall of self-isolation"	Volatile commitment	"injured national pride"
Depictions	China dismisses the ruling; building up military presence; China "insults" ASEAN members	Defence spending sours up; threats of going to war	Censored KFC protests; nationalist cartoon; patriotic cruise
Principles	Postwar World order	buck passing	Xenophobic nationalism
N. of articles*	13	9	4

*An article may use more than one frames.

International Outlaw, Regional Bully.

China's assertiveness in the disputed waters and dismissal of the ruling are above all framed as "a bully that thumbs its nose at international rules" (*Financial Times*, June 20). Similar to the US media, British media frame the South China Sea row as a big test for China: is it to be a rule breaker/bully or a "world leader with responsibilities" (*Financial Times*, July 16)? The US denfence secretary is quoted saying China could "end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation" (*Financial Times*, July 13). In an in-depth analysis by *Financial*

Times China correspondent and US correspondent[119], the authors quote "some US officials" to refer to the contest as "a 21st century rules-based order over China's 19th-century plans for its own sphere of influence" (July 16).

This "international outlaw" frame also justifies the engagement of other distant powers such as Europe as "defending international law" (*Financial Times*, July 16). In an editorial *Financial Times* warns that "the West must press China to reaffirm its fealty to international law", and that "failure to do so would damage its credibility in a host of international forums that use treaty agreements to govern behavior in commerce, the environment, politics and defence", as it sends "a signal to the world that it regards power as the prima arbiter in international affairs" (July 13).

The containment of China's challenge to the global order also falls into the duty of regional Asian allies, yet which, at least in the case of responding to the South China Sea ruling, has turned out disappointing. On July 14, in a lengthy piece *Financial Times* expressed such disappointment toward ASEAN countries' failing to present a united front. It cites a diplomat who attended the ASEAN meeting that "adding insult to injury", the diplomats of ASEAN countries were subjected to "an angry lecture" by Chinese vice foreign minister.

The "regional bully" frame is also found in *the Guardian's* effort to invite its readers living in Asia to comment on the tribunal decision. Among the 12 pieces of readers' comments, three are from the Philippines, three from China, one from Malaysia, one from Vietnam, one from Singapore, one from Cambodia, one from Indonesia, one Hongkonger, and one Japanese. Though the selection of representatives of countries and sides of attitude seems carefully balanced, the headline for the whole section comprised of the 12 readers' responses reads: "'We won't have to live in fear anymore': readers on the South China Sea

[119] The US correspondent served as China bureau chief before.

ruling". In a similar vein, former China's foreign minister's remarks of six years ago that "China is a big country and you are all small countries" is again reminisced (*Financial Times*, July 14).

The reminiscence of China's row with Vietnam, one of the other five claimants over the disputed waters, and even Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, also relives an image of a regional bully (*Financial Times*, July 16, August 11; *the Guardian*, July 12).

Row with the US.

The South China Sea dispute as the geopolitics between the US and China is framed by British media as looming danger of aggressive clashes between the two major powers. *Financial Times* former China bureau chief, now Washington correspondent Geoff Dyer, on July 13 defines the clash as "with profound implications for how the Asia-Pacific region will be managed". The paper in an editorial on the same day did not shy away from the word "war": "War between the current and future superpowers is a real danger".

Daily Telegraph China correspondent picks up a proactive editorial from China's *Global Times* before the ruling, which denounces America's military presence in the region and threatens to "be prepared for any military confrontation" (July 6). The same line is picked up again by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, the *Daily Telegraph*'s international business editor, in an analysis which starts with "Beijing and Washington are on a collision course" (July 13). Evans-Pritchard emphasizes the imminent tension-going-war situation in the region by noting that "global investment funds are actively betting on defence stocks and technology companies linked to military expansion" flared up by the rearmament race between China and the US, and compares it to the global rearmament race in the late 1930s and the soaring defence spending during Russia's invasion of Crimea.

The rhetoric of the prospect of war keeps reoccurring in British media. *Financial Times* quotes a US navy official saying "we should be prepared to take military action" (July

16). In another report a week after the ruling, the *Daily Telegraph* notes the exchange between the heads of the navies of China and the US, and quotes an earlier warning from a navy admiral of China that "its (the US) patrols in the disputed waters would end in 'disaster'" (July 19). In contrast, US media, though covering the same meeting between the two navy heads, did not pick up this proactive warning. The US-China tension frame is so overarching that even in the regular report on the outcome of the ruling, the *Daily Telegraph*, after stating the ruling and China's response, quotes America's response, before quoting the Philippines'.

Amid the "bilateral row" frame, British media acknowledge the "police role" of the US in the disputed waters while expressing concerns over America's volatile commitment in the region, especially during the transition of powers of the US. In an editorial titled "China looks like a bully in South China Sea row; But the US must ratify international rules if it is to exert pressure" on June 20, *Financial Times* harshly criticizes the U.S. that "apart from soundbites and the odd 'freedom of navigation' patrol in the region, Washington has struggled to look anything other than impotent and reactive"; it further warns the US that not ratifying the UNCLOS "allows Beijing to quite easily turn the tables and portray Washington as the real bully thumbing its nose at international laws".

Reined Nationalism.

Similar to US media's "anti-imperialism nationalism" package, British media also include the narrative of Chinese nationalist sentiment, though the number of articles is small and nationalist sentiment not as strong as in the US media. Compared with their US counterparts, British media emphasize less on the Chinese official narrative of "victimhood" in the historical context of anti-imperialism. In fact, none of the three newspapers mentioned either "imperialism" or "China dream", which could be explained by Britain's leading role in the history of imperialists invading China. Instead, British media highlight a state-reined

nationalism with more diverse presentation in this package, similar to what Shambaugh (1999) calls "xenophobic nationalism". Unlike US or Indian media's focus on the Chinese state media's nationalistic narratives, British media pick on non-state actors such as Chinese cartoonists, tourists and travel agencies, to depict a cunningly implemented strategy of nationalism manipulated by Chinese government aiming to garner domestic support.

The *Guardian* quotes an American expert that "… the Chinese think that they are being bullied, they are being victimized and that the party must defend China's sovereignty and every inch of China's territory" (July 12); yet the same article cites another expert from Australia that "it is very difficult for China to play the victim card when you look at the scale and speed and content of what it has built and put on the islands". While the "victim card" might not be as effective, China uses other ways to boost "national pride". *Financial Times* on June 22 reports that "Chinese patriot(s)" now can enjoy cruises to the disputed Paracel Islands, though such "patriotic cruises" was launched as early as 2013. "Tourists, who must all be mainland citizens with no history of subversive activities, are encouraged to take part in a flag-raising ceremony, where they pledge their love for the motherland and the Xisha Islands, as the Paracels are known in Chinese," the article details (*Financial Times*, June 22). The same paper also writes about nationalist Chinese cartoonists who "saved their poison for print" by taking to slash the Philippines and the US through derogatory depictions of the two countries. In one case, the former Philippine president Aquino who initiated the case was portrayed as a monkey (*Financial Times*, July 14).

In light with the protests targeting KFC outlets in several Chinese cities, *Financial Times* reports on July 19 how Beijing tries to avoid nationalist protests by tightening online censorship and deploying police around the Philippine embassy, only referring to the KFC protests as "a small protest", in sharp contrast with the coverage by its American counterpart, who reports the protests in "about a dozen cities" before mentioning the online censorship

(*New York Times*, July 20). The same *Financial Times* article also draws reference from the clamp-down on domestic nationalist sentiment in Vietnam, suggesting a restrained regional reaction to the ruling.

7.5.3 Japan: United Front Urgent

Japan is not a claimant of the disputed South China Sea, but it relies on the region as a vital channel for almost 80% of crude oil imports (Koda, 2016), and shares its own direct disputes with China over the Senkaku Islands, or Diaoyu Island as China calls them, in the East China Sea, for which Japan has been trying to make the South China Sea dispute a reference. It is concerned that the complete loss in the South China Sea ruling might provoke China to "ramp up activities in the East China Sea to send a signal…that it does not negotiate over maritime interests" (*Japan News*, July 14).

However, restricted by its pacifist constitution since the end of WWII, Japan has to rely on the presence of its most important ally, the US, as a core component of its security strategy in the region (Koda, 2016). Regional coalition is also of vital importance for Japan to maintain its national interests in the region. Thus it has been actively supporting US "freedom of navigation" operations in the disputed waters and teaming up with the US and other allies to exert pressure onto China. Its media coverage also differs from the US and British media in an apparent effort emphasizing regional coalition.

Three ideological packages in Japanese media coverage on the South China Sea are identified: China's isolation from the international community; Japan leading regional coalition and international cooperation to "rein in China"; and bilateral antagonism package of China taking on Japan as the blame.

Table 7-5. *Ideological Packages of Japanese Media Coverage*

	Isolation	*Leading Coalition*	*Blame Japan*
Frame	Antagonism between China and the law-based international community	Japan leads regional and international cooperation to restrain China	Bilateral antagonism between China and Japan
Metaphors	Domino effect	"to rein in China"	"adding fuel to the flame"
Exemplars	Russia in Europe; Japan before WWII	ASEAN's unity role in reflecting on regional conflicts	China FM: "Japan invaded China's South China Sea"
Catchphrases	"Cool heads"	"keep China in check"	"smear tactic"
Depictions	China dismisses the ruling; building up military presence;	Japan-India cooperation; ASEAN/ASEM	China blames Japanese judge;
Principles	International community	Balance of threat	Sino-Japan antagonism
N. of articles*	11	17	8

*An article may use more than one frames.

Isolation.

In framing how China risk breaking the rule-based global status quo, Japanese media put more emphasis on depicting a China antagonizing the rest of the world, or an "isolation from the international community" package.

An editorial in *Japan News* before the ruling points out the South China Sea row is "the struggle between China and the international community over the 'rule of law'" and optimistically predicts the ruling "will be the first step in bringing China, which seeks to unilaterally change the status quo, into an order based on law" (June 27). An AJW editorial on July 13 asserts that "Beijing must honor court's verdict", to wisely choose the way to proceed at the crossroads of "becoming a responsible nation that abides by international law to contribute to the global order" and "a nation that defies that order"; "accepting it is the only obvious choice if China considers itself a member of the international community", it

emphasizes repeatedly. The article puts the dispute into a historical framework, through a brief account of the history of sea control, from Roman Empire to the Age of Discovery, from Western of Spain, Portugal to recent Britain and the US, all the way to today, when "China is stridently asserting its sovereignty" (July 13). The *Mainichi* on the same day urges China to accept the ruling for "the rule of law could collapse and put international order at risk if a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council rejects a legally binding ruling by an international judicial authority", and criticizing China's dismissal of the ruling as "dishonorable and irresponsible".

"Isolation" is also a strategy Japan uses to restrain China. An AJW editorial quotes "a high-ranking government official" in saying that Japan aims to cooperate with the US "to give the impression that China is a 'major power that rejects international rules' in order to isolate it in the international community" (July 13).

Meanwhile, Japanese newspapers are using "international community" to justify Japan's involvement in the issue. Refuting China's claim that Japan should stay away because it is "not a party concerned", a *Japan News* editorial argues that it is for "the common interest of the international community to maintain order in the South China Sea based on the rule of law, and ensure freedom of navigation" (July 28).

Noting that China is trying to garner support as "there is a sense of crisis in China about becoming isolated in the international community" as the ruling might have a "Domino effect" (*Japan News*, July 14, July 17), AJW harshly writes that "no matter how many supporters Beijing may get, the course of justice will not waver" (July 13).

To further emphasize the danger of isolating from international community, the AJW editorial reminds China that "the nation owes its present prosperity and rise in global stature to adapting itself to international rules in various fields". "There can be no long-term development for any country that deviates from the framework of international order," the

editorial warns. Echoing this warning, *Japan News* quotes a Japanese expert and former diplomat, that "just like Japan before World War II, no country that has challenged the concept of the rule of law has survived" (July 23).

Leading Coalition.

Japanese newspapers stand out in embracing a "coalition" frame which emphasizes the importance of having a united front through international cooperation to deter China, and to be more precise, a coalition led by Japan. Japan has been actively seeking coalition with both Western and Asian countries to press China to accept the ruling. When G7 nations were not united in such a move, the news coverage still read confident: "though some countries have taken a cautious stance…, the government has been working with them to reach a common view on the issue" (*Japan News*, July 4).

On the meeting between Japanese defense minister and his Indian counterpart on July 17, *Japan News* in an editorial notes that "we want to see Japan-India cooperation in maritime security steadily bolstered" to respond to "China's active expansion of its maritime presence". "Beefing up multilayered defense cooperation with South Asian nations will help establish peace and stability in the Indian Ocean and also serve the strategic interest of Japan," writes the editorial. The same paper continues calling for countries to "work together to continue to urge Beijing to follow the ruling" and "beef up pressure on China" in several other articles (July 18, July 28).

For the only directly concerned party, the Philippines, Japan praises it as "the first country to challenge China" (*The Mainichi*, July 13). *Japan News* in an editorial on July 30 calls on it to work with Japan, the US, and "other relevant countries", and especially warns Duterte not to "dive hastily into negotiation with China", which, much to the disappointment of Japan and its allies, is exactly what Duterte did soon after the ruling.

In regard to regional multilateralism, Japan is obviously disappointed by the split of ASEAN countries in pushing China to accept the ruling, especially after Japan "has stepped up efforts to talk ASEAN nations into teaming up against China by mentioning the … ruling, and reminding them of the aid that Japan had already pledged to the region" (AJW, July 27). The editorial points out that it is "a surprise", "a blow to Japanese diplomacy". The *Mainichi* echoed the disappointment, emphasizing the key role of a unified ASEAN in reflecting on historical regional wars (July 28). The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) also failed to explicitly mention the ruling, and Japanese media expressed blatant disappointment (*Japan News*, July 17). *Japan News* calls the ambiguous wording of the ASEM statement "a diplomatic draw" of Japan-China tug-of-war, after Abe tried both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic strategy to woo participating nations (July 18).

Japan the Scapegoat.

The bilateral antagonism between China and Japan is another prevailing package in Japanese media narrative of the South China Sea ruling. As *Japan Times* notes in an editorial, China is trying to "deflect domestic criticism of its leadership over the legal defeat to Japan" (July 16).

Soon after the ruling, Japan responded fast to press China to accept the ruling and seeks every occasion to advocate for support in international community. These remarks and moves received harsh criticism from China. As the *Mainichi* notes, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials are "singling out Japan as adding fuel to the flame".

Prime Ministers of the two countries had a brief meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Meeting summit (ASEM) days after the ruling. Japan was not expecting China would accept their request for the meeting, but China did. *Japan News* on July 17 interprets China having agreed to meet with Japanese Prime Minister as "to warn Japan, as the instigator of international efforts to restrain China". Further depicting this tension, the same paper even

quotes unnamed sources saying “Li (Chinese Prime Minister) glared at Abe with a displeased expression” (*Japan News*, July 18).

This “China blaming Japan” frame is also substantiated by focusing on China’s “bias” accusation of the former president of the tribunal, Shunji Yanai, a Japanese national who served to pick panel judges for the case. In an AJW interview, Yanai dismisses the accusation and introduces the detailed procedure behind the scene. The *Mainichi* calls the accusation “baseless”, “almost a smear tactic” (July 16).

7.5.4 India: The Avenger

India weighs much on the South China Sea dispute, considering itself deeply involved in geopolitical and geoeconomic terms, though not geographically (Scott, 2013). Different from Britain and Japan, India is not a traditional ally of the US. In fact, it to a certain degree engages in “common multipolar cooperation” with China to balance the only Superpower, the US (Scott, 2013). Meanwhile, both as major powers in the region, China and India share their own unsettled territorial disputes along the Himalayan-Tibetan area and constant clashes. The two nations are competing in military, diplomacy and many other strategic fields. In maritime rivalry, India has its huge economic interests in the heavily resourceful sea lanes; what especially concerns India is China increasingly active engagement in the Indian Ocean, India’s backyard. In the most recent wrestle between the two Asian powers, China opposes India’s bid in joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

These concerns shape India’s strategy, almost from an avenger perspective, to engage in the South China Sea dispute. Indian media also follow this “avenger” perspective, framing China’s loss in the ruling as what they deserve after a series of clashes with India. Another three ideological packages identified are: a “rule breaker” package which emphasizes the “rule of law” and the danger of China risking being an outlaw; setting coalition to balance the

threat of a growingly assertive China; the last one is emphasizing nationalist sentiment at home in China.

Table 7-6. *Ideological Packages of Indian Media Coverage*

	Rule Breaker	*Avenge*	*Discreet coalition*	*Anti-US Nationalism*
Frame	China the rule breaker; India the role model	In the rivalry relationship, China's loss is India's gain	Coalition and cooperation are needed to balance the threat posed by China	China's nationalism hyping up against the ruling and the US
Metaphors	"the precursor to a new edition of a cold war", "falling prey to adventurist action"	"in shot in the arm for India"	"lesson for Southeast Asia"	US and Japan called 'eunuchs'
Exemplars	US-Nicaragua; UK-Argentina; India-Bangladesh; Yang's "big country vs. small countries" remark	China denied India's NSG bid; China's naval presence in Indian Ocean		US in the Caribbean; anti-Japanese protests
Catchphrases	"Indian template"; "unipolar moment"	"sweet verdict"; "double standards"	"trilateral engagement"	"US hatched conspiracy"
Depictions	China dismisses the ruling; deepens naval presence;		India-US-Japan coalition; US diplomat's strong remarks in India;	KFC protests; mango boycott; Chinese media bashing the US.
Principles	Status quo	India-China rivalry	Balance of threat	Political nationalism
N. of articles*	22	6	13	6

*An article may use more than one frames.

China the Rule Breaker, India the Role Model.

The Hindu notes in an editorial: "China's assertiveness, which has been amplified by the South China Sea arbitral award, is a sign that Beijing now feels constrained by post-war

international regimes put in place by the US" (August 12). A *Hindustan Times* editorial describes such assertiveness in South China Sea as "snatch and grab policy", and warns that "China is taking a cavalier approach to international law and, more broadly, the nebulous idea of the rules-based international order" (July 12). A former India diplomat writes in *The Hindu* that China's dismissal of the ruling might be "the precursor to a new edition of a cold war", and that "by following the US and UK playbook on Nicaragua and Malvinas, China has shown it is no different from other imperial powers" (August 1). A *Hindustan Times* editorial warns "the continent's unipolar moment has arrived".

Positing both nations as rising powers in the Western-led global order, India tries to convince China and the world that non-Western rising power can observe the status quo, or as Indian media name it, to follow "Indian template". India itself has gone through a similar maritime disputes in the same court with Bangladesh, in which it accepts the unfavorable ruling. This is a proud exemplar Indian media embrace. As a *Hindustan Times* editorial points out: "Beijing's rejectionism stands in obvious contrast to New Delhi's dignified acceptance of its defeat to Bangladesh at the hands of the same Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2014".

The *Times of India* quotes an unnamed Indian official placing India and China as two contrasting examples in dealing with international disputes: "…they may have to decide whether they want to follow the Indian template… or the one offered by China", and further boasting for serving as a positive role model by quoting "a top US defence official" who "urged China to follow the example of India and the manner in which it handles its own maritime dispute with Bangladesh" (July 12).

With such efforts emphasizing "Indian template", the frame of China as rule breaker gets reinforced through contrast. "It's faltering, or falling prey to adventurist action in the

South China Sea", warns *the Hindu*, "will not be good for itself, the region, or the world, including India" (August 1).

Avenge.

Amid the agony over being denied Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership by China, Indian media take the court's utter dismissal of China's claim over SCS issue as a revenge. China's forcing military presence in Indian Ocean and longtime strategic partnership with India's adversary Pakistan have also contributed to this avenge package. Here, in a China-India rivalry, the South China Sea dispute is framed as a gaffe for China which it deserves.

The disappointment for the NSG defeat is strongly fermented in Indian media especially after India chose to distance itself from speaking out on the dispute before the NSG plenary, in an apparent effort to trade for China's support on its NSG bid, which, "however, did not prevent China from publicly working to deny India NSG membership" (*Times of India*, July 12).

This NSG defeat context keeps reoccurring in Indian media's coverage on South China Sea dispute. The *Times of India* writes shortly before the ruling that "India is hoping that Beijing will soon feel the moral high ground it occupied in wrecking India's NSG membership bid slipping from below its feet", and "coming as it does soon after the loss of face at NSG, it also provides India an opportunity to expose China's dubious commitment to international law and institutions" (July 12). *Hindustan Times* also accuses China of "double standard" with international rules: using rules as an excuse to deny India's membership bid into the NSG, while trashing rules in its own tribunal ruling (July 13).

After the ruling came out, the *Times of India* gleefully writes: "for India, it was a sweet verdict, because it was recently stifled by China at the Nuclear Suppliers Group." It is a "shot in the arm for India", as the headline acclaims (July 13). On a more composed note, a

Hindustan Times editorial calls on negotiation and cooperation between the two "Asian giants" amid the "bilateral turbulence" mainly caused by China rejecting India's NSG bid and China's harsh stance in South China Sea. It warns that "the Chinese notion of a weak India is not a reality in 2016" (July 20).

Coalition.

Acknowledging the limits of enforcement of international law and China's ongoing assertiveness, India is calling for resolution of international diplomacy. An editorial of *the Hindu* (July 14) weighed the pros and cons of law approach and diplomacy approach, and concludes that the latter is a more possible and desired approach. It refers to the US-Nicaragua case in 1986, as an example of "a more constructive play of diplomatic forces in similar high-stakes inter-state disputes".

But Indian media see China as a threatening rising power that need to be checked through other nations' coalition, apart from bilateral diplomatic efforts. *Hindustan Times* began their explanatory article on the dispute with the famous but years-old quote of China's former foreign minister: "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact" (July 12), suggesting a time-tested frame of coalition for balance of power.

Similar to Japan, India is keen in teaming up with major powers to balance China's dominance in the contested areas, but with much more discreet, as it is aware of the difficulty in forming a united front both regionally and globally, with reference to the failure of both Asian and European countries at ASEAN, ASEM meeting. For India, the primary responsibility to balance China lies with the US. *Hindustan Times* quotes an old metaphor from ASEAN diplomats: "If a Chinese carrier comes our way we will look to the US. If it does not send a carrier in response, then we will welcome the Chinese carrier with open arms" (July 12). When US House Speaker Paul Ryan woos India as "a great ally" for the US, Indian media invested considerable passion in the quote.

India's balancing role is welcomed by fellow Asian countries. The *Times of India* interviewed a high official from the Philippines, who "says India will have a role in ensuring China adheres to the rule of law" (July 15). *Hindustan Times* quotes a Philippine expert who "expects India to be involved": "India has been playing its part to influence Asian neighbours to resolve their maritime differences peacefully. As a naval power itself, India has the moral responsibility to push for 'freedom of navigation' as a global interest in the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region" (July 10). Another *Hindustan Times* report on July 13 quotes a Philippine scholar in saying that "although not directly related, Indian presence in the region would… provide leverage in the future diplomatic relations/negotiations with China over any issue".

Anti-US Nationalism.

The nationalist protests in China are also picked up by Indian media, which frame the South China Sea dispute as being hyped up by China's nationalist sentiment, especially anti-US nationalism, mainly targeting the US and the US-backed Philippines.

The Hindu notices the "defiance and strong nationalistic overtones" that "resonated" on Chinese state media (July 14). In covering the KFC protests, its China correspondent notes "the Chinese government's intent to separate the economic and political tracks in its dealings with the US and its allies" (July 20). *Hindustan Times* reports the Chinese calling for Philippine mango boycott, with an exemplary reference to one of its anti-Japan protests in 2012-13 when nationalist protesters smashed Japanese cars owned by Chinese citizens, and in the worst case, a local Chinese man was hit paralyzed with a bicycle lock on the head for driving a Japanese car. It is also the only newspaper of all the four countries to report on this mango boycott, which actually never developed into a real boycott.

China's nationalist stance for its defiance towards the ruling is framed in Indian media as largely blaming the US for "a formulation meant to contain China's rise" (*The Hindu*, July

12). Both *The Hindu* and *Hindustan Times* notice Chinese media's argument of a US-led conspiracy. A *Hindustan Times* article quotes Chinese state media in saying that "The US motives are apparent to the world, especially to the Chinese people. The current China is nothing like the country it was one hundred years ago. Any act that tries to violate China's territorial sovereignty will fail" (July 13). Indian media also look out for Chinese government officials' US-bashing remarks. When responding to a question about the US and its allies' maritime presence, in a regular press conference Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang attributed the current South China Sea crisis mainly to the US, and the *Hindu* China correspondent quotes: "Before the implementation of the so-called rebalance of the Asia-Pacific by the U.S., the South China sea was very tranquil and peaceful. But then here come the Americans and their policy of rebalance to Asia; and things have changed" (July 13).

In what might be the most proactive quote from the ultra-nationalist tabloid *Global Times*, US and Japan are bashed as "worrying eunuchs" in the context of "eunuch" referring to "outsider" who worries for matters he is not directly the concerned party. *Hindustan Times* China correspondent picks up on this near vulgar expression with the headline "Chinese media calls US and Japan 'eunuchs'" (July 15). None of these anti-US/Japan nationalist comments by China are covered by the US newspapers or Japanese newspapers.

7.6 Conclusion

The cross-national discourse analysis demonstrates strong features of "national narratives" in the coverage of the South China Sea issue. The US is the only Superpower in the status quo and thus foremost emphasizes a "world order" frame; Britain, more concerned about its economic ties with China, found its media narrative more cautious and "passing buck" to the US, playing up the tension between China and the US and attaching more emphasis to the duty of the US and China's Asian neighbours; Japan as China's significant

regional rival with a history of invading China, is sensitive to a frame of "China blaming Japan as the scapegoat" and hails a "Japan-led coalition" frame; India, also a regional rival with territorial disputes and grudges China for constantly voting against a bigger international role of India, highlights a "revenge" frame.

Both as the Allies in the WWII, US and Britain depict the significance of the South China Sea tension as the unpleasant memory of war. US media even compare China to Germany in the war. But Britain, similar to Japan, with an imperialist history of invading China, acts in a more cautious fashion in warning against a threatening China in rise. Newspapers in both countries discreetly picture a dim near future with an unchecked China, meanwhile actively justifying the two countries' involvement in the dispute respectively.

For the same frame of nationalism, national variation focusing on different national interests in each country is evident. The US embraces the "anti-imperialism nationalism" package, emphasizing China's victimhood sentiment fermented from its humiliating past, and a modern China striving for rejuvenation through assertiveness. British media take a less victimized nationalism frame which emphasizes on "manipulation".

In Indian media, the specific genre of nationalism is anti-US nationalism sentiment. India aspires for a more influential role as Asian power and the biggest democracy. But weighing its current capability to rival with China in military, economy and diplomatic influence, it chooses to stick together with the US, trying to rely on the US in containing and balance the threat of China. It's more convenient to frame the China-India opposition into a broader China-US opposition. Thus Indian media extensively quote anti-US remarks from Chinese officials and state media, unapologetically emphasizing the anti-US sentiment in its narrative of Chinese nationalism.

Only Japanese media did not incorporate a salient nationalism frame, though a couple of articles did take on a perspective of prophetic nationalism, dimly predicting a conflict-

ridden future for the region and the world amid the growing Chinese nationalistic sentiment. This could be explained by the historical antagonism between the two nations and current tensions such as disputes over East China Sea, which led to anti-Japan sentiment the most prominent among nationalist Chinese. Thus Japanese media are largely cautious to frame the South China Sea dispute from a nationalism perspective.

Not all of the articles examined are produced by China correspondents, but the national variance is evident in China correspondents' articles as well. Of the above identified packages, China correspondents show a clearly higher contribution to the package of nationalism, regardless of national contexts, as they have easier access to Chinese media commentary and official news release which are the main generator of nationalistic tones. In fact, nearly all articles of nationalism frame are filed by China correspondents, mostly depicting the KFC protests, mango boycott, or quote from nationalistic Chinese media lines. Even for *the Guardian* which has one of the smallest coverage on the dispute among all the 12 newspapers, the only two pieces with nationalism frame are from its China correspondent and Beijing-based freelancer respectively (July 12, July 31). *Daily Telegraph*'s report on China's nationalistic tabloid *Global Times'* proactive editorial which hints on war is also filed by its China correspondent (July 6). The same is found for Indian, Japanese and US newspapers. Meanwhile, Japan's *AJW*, where nationalism frame is missing, does not carry any piece from its China correspondent.

It has to be noted that all four countries selected in this chapter are democracies with free press. The selection of newspapers may not represent a unified national media discourse, but in the arenas of foreign policy, the media discourse does not deviate much from the official line, especially in the case of corporatist Japanese media (Lee & Yang, 1996). Even the seemingly diverse US media discourse is characterized as "established pluralism",

producing an orchestra of "diversity within unity" (Lee, 2001). Thus the generality of discourse analysis on these selected news articles can be broader than selected elite media.

Overall, this chapter suggests that China correspondents, while easily tending to pack on press review and official sources in China, as analyzed earlier in Chapter 4, still retain a national prism. Their variant emphasis in the same nationalism frame serves as a strong argument. In covering the South China Sea dispute, none of the four countries are directly involved, but their different national interests shape the distinct national narratives on the same global occurrence, domesticating it into their own versions of "South China Sea story".

The field of foreign correspondence is largely dictated by the external power of national interest, even if China correspondents are geographically distant from home countries and are widely believed "highly autonomous". This macro-level shaping force overshadows influencers from micro and mezzo levels via shaping norms and logic of the field in a long run.

Chapter 8 Conclusion and Discussion

In the age of globalization amid a changing global order, the field of foreign correspondence in China is of significant relevance to the construction of China as the major rising global power for policy makers and publics around the global. China correspondents are key agents in the process of reality construction, but such construction is structured by various power relations acting at different levels, from *habitus* at the individual level, "strategic rituals" at routines level, newsroom social control at the organizational level, and state coercion at institutional level, eventually national interest and media system at societal level.

This study, based on the case of foreign press corps in contemporary China, explores the conceptualization of a "field of foreign correspondence" and looks into the structure and dynamics of this field, in relation to the power exerted from the broader field (especially the political field). While further exploring the journalistic field paradigm in foreign correspondence studies, this study also proposes a hierarchical model for analyzing field of foreign correspondence, in the hope that a hierarchical model would serve to facilitate future studies on journalistic field in a trans-national context.

The biggest benefit of studying foreign correspondence from a field perspective is that it puts foreign correspondents' news production in a relational set of power relations both within and outside the field of foreign correspondence, arguing that the news production is about "positioning". We are thus not just examining individual journalists, or a certain newsroom; nor are we resting our intellectual curiosity only on macro national systems; instead, we take a what Bourdieu calls structuralist-constructivist field perspective to scrutinize the relationship between agency and structure in foreign correspondence. Journalists as agents have their individual habitus structured during what van Ginneken notes as the three levels of socialization, and the various habitus and capitals these agents possess

in turn structure their different positions in the field. Journalists are subjected to pressures coming from routines, organizational social control, and institutional constraints such as audience and state coercion. But they do not just passively submit to these pressures, nor do they defy pressures in full swing; they negotiate with them, while actively seeking to secure their position in the field and accumulating more capitals, both economic and cultural. Their various positions and the national journalistic field where they came from structure their different negotiation strategies, and affect how they perceive various pressures on their work.

This final concluding-cum-reflecting chapter will firstly pinpoint key findings of this study and put together all key influencers identified at different levels in previous chapters for a comparative glance; then it will reflect on the limitations of this study and the outlook for the nexus between media and China's role in the globe.

8.1. Hierarchical Influencers

In the first term of President Xi Jinping, state coercive pressures are increasingly cramping the field of China correspondence; together with the challenge brought by globalization and new technology, the configuration of the field of China correspondence is changing. Chapter 2 summarized the new phase of China correspondence as reporting "a rising and assertive China", with new generation of China correspondents entering the field while still retaining a West-dominated national landscape.

With such a national landscape of the current foreign press corps in China, this study classified the correspondents studied into four groups of media system: three typical media systems of Western democracies, as proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2012), and one "non-Western" group. National variance stemming from each national journalistic field as embedded in the measurement of media system is detected in China correspondents' perceived influence from individual level (journalistic *habitus* in the form of "professional value"), routine level (pressures from other China correspondents and other news

organizations in the process of press review), and organizational level (management and resource constraints).

Chapter 3 to Chapter 6 tried to map the pressures, and journalists' negotiating with these pressures at the said levels respectively. Chapter 3 analyzed the *habitus* (dispositions) of China correspondents as untangled into "Chinese *habitus*" and "journalistic *habitus*" at individual level, and proposes two typologies respectively based on their professional role perception and positions in the field. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focused on how mezzo-organizational level pressures impact China correspondents' news production: Chapter 4 discussed press review among China correspondents as a source of pressure from news routines; Chapter 5 examined the organizational structure and professional autonomy of China correspondents. Chapter 6 focused on China's uncodified state coercion as major institutional interruptive forces to control and cramp the practice of foreign press, arguing that both real and imagined pressures of the "anaconda in the chandelier" lead to China correspondents taking avoidance countermeasures including self-censorship.

It might be convenient to compare the influencing power of all identified sources of pressure at the four levels (refer to Figure 1-1), as can be perceived by journalists themselves, altogether in one glance. Table 8-1 shows a T-Test result of China correspondents' perceived influence from various constraints.

Table 8-1. *Perceived Influence from Constraints at Four Levels*

Level	Influencer	M	SD	t
Individual	Personal value	2.89	.98	-1.12
	Professional value	4.16	.91	12.74***
	China-related experience	4.35	.83	16.31***
Routines (press review)	Competitors	2.88	1.04	-1.15
	Other FCs	2.43	.96	-5.99***

Organizational	Resource	3.22	1.08	2.02*
	Home editor	2.99	1.17	-.09
	management	2.41	1.16	-5.15***
	Newsroom peers	2.59	1.14	-3.57***
Institutional (within field)	Press release	2.25	1.05	-7.18***
	Information access	4.16	.86	13.58***
	Chinese law/regulations	3.40	1.20	3.32***
	Home law /regulations	1.56	.90	-16.05***
	Chinese government	2.51	1.31	-3.80***
	Home government	1.58	.94	-15.12***
Institutional (outside field)	Audience	3.14	1.16	1.20
	Advertise	1.23	.61	-28.98***
	State coercion (harassment)	2.80	1.11	-1.79

** p<.01 *** p<.001

In general, China correspondents do perceive a hierarchical levels of influence, as shown in the above table. Individual *habitus*, both journalistic ("professional value") and Chinese ("China-related experience), and information access at institutional level are perceived as the most influential among all identified forces shaping their news production. Individual *habitus* is important not only in that they directly influence journalists' practice in the field, but also in that *habitus* land journalists into different positions, which in turn structure their negotiation strategies. As laid out in Chapter 3, the four types of positions of China correspondents, namely Sinophiles, Sinojournos, Spiralists, and Sporadics, act differently in the field, due to their variance in *habitus* (both Chinese and journalistic) and *illusio*. For example, Sinophiles and Sporadics may have less interest in challenging or changing the existing power structures in the field of China correspondence.

Information access at institutional level is perceived as another influential constraint for journalists working in China, echoing the general assumption of difficulties of reporting in a highly restrictive authoritarian state, where journalists' access to information and sources

is strictly controlled. The restrictive laws and regulations in China are also an important constraint, but not as highly rated as information access. As the discussion in Chapter 2 shows, codified regulations in the field of China correspondence are strict yet thin: there is not much room for foreign journalists' negotiation with codified control exerted via credentials regulations, for which every journalist ready to step in the field of China correspondence has been much prepared; and not a law-based society, China coerce foreign press mainly through uncodified means rather than codified laws. Interestingly enough, harassment as a pervasive uncodified coercive control is only reported as mildly influential, as journalists have developed various countermeasures to circumvent or negotiated with harassment and other coercive means, as discussed in Chapter 6.

Competitive pressure and organizational constraints at mezzo-organizational level are mildly influential, as perceived by foreign press corps in China. Organizational resources, home editors, and audience are still major concerns for correspondents geographically faraway in China. It suggests even in today's technology and globalization facilitated trans-national journalistic practice, news organizations still function as the basic institutional unit of news production.

Though this study did not specifically look at pressure from advertising and other economic constraints, the fact that advertising is rated as the least influential source of pressure indicates the distinct (or relatively distinct) separation between editorial and advertising in most news organizations.

The hierarchical importance of influencers at various levels as perceived by China correspondents shows individual and institutional constraints are seen as the major influencers on journalists' news production. These are what journalists complain the most: home editors lacking 'Chineseness', difficult information access and harsh state coercion. Influence from newsrooms and home countries is overall disregarded.

8.2. A Heteronomous Field of China Correspondence

On the spectrum between autonomy and heteronomy, the field of China correspondence is evidently situated towards the heteronomous pole, as the study shows. In other words, the field of China correspondence is subjected to strong external pressures, coming from national journalistic fields of home countries, the political and economic fields in China as the host country, and the power relations between home countries and host country, i.e. national interest.

This study uses Hallin and Mancini's notion of media system to measure the influence from each national journalistic field, by clustering all national journalistic fields of China correspondents into four media systems: Liberal, Democratic Corporatist, Polarized Pluralist, and non-Western. Throughout the discussion of influencing constraints at different levels, national media system proves to be shaping how journalists perceive and negotiate with pressures within the field. For example, Chapter 4 found distinct national variance in the routine press review practice among China correspondents; similarly, Chapter 5 identified cross-media-system differences in perceiving and negotiating with organizational pressures from bureaucratic structure and editor-reporter relationships. Besides media system, the role of national interest is also found prominent in shaping the media coverage of China, as is illustrated in the case of covering South China Sea spat in Chapter 7.

The strong shaping force from media system and national interests, on both how China correspondents negotiate with influencing factors at various levels and their final news product, suggests that the field of China correspondence is highly heteronomous. China correspondents, while operating on a journalistic logic, are considerably influenced by heteronomous pressures typically in the forms of state coercion and national interests. These pressures are mainly from the national journalistic fields of their home countries, and the

political and economic power of China. As shown in previous chapters, the national journalistic culture in each media systems still holds strong grip over the power relations in the field of China correspondents and how journalists negotiate with and respond to these power relations.

As to the state coercion exerted from the political field in China, the findings of this study show that both real and imagined pressures of the "anaconda in the chandelier" are felt by journalists in the field, and drive them to take avoidance or fighting-back strategies, which inevitably leave a mark on their news production. Cases such as completely dropping a story happen on a regular basis, adding further evidence that China correspondents do not, or cannot, make editorial decision purely on journalistic logic.

Journalistic pressures, such as routine press review, resource allocation in the newsroom, and editor-reporter covenant, are also largely dictated by the power relations with heteronomous pressures. Chapter 4 in discussing routine press review practice has shown that agents under stronger market pressure tend to be more "pack-minded" and those with an advantageous position in the power relation often lead the pack, whereas those with less advantageous position follow the pack.

8.3. Limitations

This study focused on the dynamics within the field of China correspondence under the strict political coercion in a rising China with the "rejuvenation" ambition. As an explorative attempt to understand the configuration and structure of trans-national news production in authoritarian China, it did not aim at a comprehensive scrutiny on the field. Foremost, it did not specifically look into the heteronomous pressures from the economic field (such as those from advertisers and audience), especially the techno-economic factors, in shaping the field of China correspondence. Some transformative forces such as the

adoption of social media among China correspondents have significantly restructured the boundary and dynamics of the field of China correspondence. Though the discussion in previous chapters is situated in the change of business models of many news organizations, and Chapter 4 briefly tapped on how technology is intensifying imitation among journalists especially in a restrictive host country of China, more detailed scrutiny on how techno-economic pressures shape the highly heteronomous field of China correspondence is needed in future studies.

The largely qualitative nature of this study also limits generality of the analysis of the linkage between various influencing factors and final news product. Given more quantitative attempt to correlate individual China correspondent and their bylined news stories, currently identified patterns could be further generalized. Though it is not the purpose of this exploratory study to claim a guaranteed generalization, such efforts in future studies are certainly preferred.

The sensitivity and consequent huge challenges of this topic in authoritarian China is one of the major drawbacks that led to such limitation. Similar challenges can be anticipated in other authoritarian societies. To compensate such innate limitations of studying foreign press in highly restrictive societies, further studies could explore a multi-context perspective where fields of foreign correspondence in different societies are compared.

Another limitation of this study is its relatively narrow definition of "foreign correspondents". This study chose the official definition of foreign correspondents by PRC China, thus excluding correspondents from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, which are either autonomous or semi-autonomous Chinese societies different from PRC China. Coming from similar Chinese cultural background, they are bestowed with advantageous Chinese habitus and are subjected to different sets of power relations compared with their foreign counterparts. News produced by correspondents from this part of the world provides other

foreign correspondents important sources of reference. *South China Morning Post* of Hong Kong, for example, is a closely watched source for news ideas for many English speaking correspondents working in greater China. Future studies could explore more in this regard.

8.4. Outlook of China Correspondence and Final Note

As China is in full momentum to take a leading role in the changing global order and pressing global issues (such as climate change), timely and trusted journalistic accounts and interpretation of this rising power is in high demand in the international community. The field of China correspondence has all impetus to thrive. But its heteronomous nature is not to be ignored, as external non-journalistic pressures are cramping the autonomous space of China correspondence, rendering it into what many would exclaim as "unreportable".

How "unreportable" is an authoritarian China, especially under the current President Xi Jinping's reign? For one thing, in foreign correspondence the social and cultural gap between the host and home countries poses innate difficulties for any foreign correspondents to sufficiently understand and report a host country, thus independent researching and reporting is almost impossible for many foreign correspondents without the basic language skills and cultural understanding. Such innate "unreportability" is further worsened by a series of China's restrictive regulations such as forbidding Chinese nationals from working for foreign media. Though this study found that the current foreign press corps in China in average are more China-attuned than their predecessors, the mild change in the configuration of the field is still far from a "positive addition" to combat the "unreportability".

Adding to the blow to the field's autonomy is the uncodified state coercion. These restrictive external forces are not expected to be lessened to any degree in the near future, given the current leadership's ruling style. But their backlashes have already spoken their volume. As aforementioned, lack of access forces and justifies journalists to pack more under the same frame, using the same sources (most probably unfavorable to China); harassing

journalists and their sources prompts journalists, or at least some of them with considerable symbolic capitals (such as those working for reputational and resourced news organizations), expose and thus play up the harassment, which only works to embarrass China in the international community. The unpleasant image of an "oppressive regime", China gained since Tiananmen, is never to be cast off, should the reminiscence of coercion and oppression keep as a reoccurring theme in mainstream international news coverage.

Yet most of the journalists' countermeasurements to cope with the external pressure do not in effect challenge the existing power relations, as this study shows. On most occasions, the power struggles during the news production are only reproducing the power structure. This is a damning vicious cycle for both China and the international community. China needs a less hostile international environment for its smooth rise and domestic stability; the world needs more diverse media frames to access to less monotonous China stories, for the sake of their own policies at home as well as cooperating with China in tackling global problems.

It has to be acknowledged that aside from the restrictive journalistic environment in China, heteronomous pressures are still prominent as national interests and national journalistic culture of the home countries of China correspondents will continue to hold a strong grip over the news production. But as we can observe a tendency, even though only partial and mild, towards a globalized journalistic culture within the globalization in the broader social space, there is reason to believe that given a change to less restrictive coercion on press and civil society in China, the theme of "unreportable" fades in reporting China, and both China and the international community benefit.

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