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The Formation of Authoritarian Regime in Singapore: A Historical Approach

A project undertaken in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the B.Soc.Sc. in
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by

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List of Acronyms

BS	Barisan Sosialis
CEC	Central Executive Committee
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
GIC	Government Investment Corporation
GLCs	Government Linked Corporations
GPCs	Government Parliamentary Committees
GRCs	Group Representation Constituencies
HDB	Housing Development Board
IPS	Institute of Policy Studies
ISA	Internal Security Act
ISC	Internal Security Committee
LF	Labor Front
MDU	Malayan Democratic Union
MNCs	Multi-national corporations
MPs	Members of Parliament
PAP	People's Action Party
PPSO	Preservation of the Public Security Ordinance
SATU	Singapore Association of Trade Unions
SC	Single-constituency
SPP	Singapore Progressive Party
UMNO	United Malays National Organization
UN	United Nation

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Abstract

This research studied the formation of authoritarianism in Singapore. The contributing factors of the authoritarianism formation was deliberated through historical approach by including the political events, social events, economy, and international events. There are three research aims: (1) indicating the variables of the formation of Singapore authoritarian regime through a macro-historical perspective; (2) establishing a database on the Internet for Singapore political studies; (3) laying a foundation for future studies in authoritarianism of other countries.

The research showed: (1) that the political background and events contribute to the formation of authoritarian regime in Singapore, i.e., the British colonial rule, independence movement, and the threat of Communism and Communalism; (2) that the economy is complementary to the authoritarian regime, i.e., a virtuous cycle: the former legitimize the latter while the latter enhance the former; (3) that the social and the international events are both consolidating the authoritarian political system in Singapore.

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Introduction

“Now I Lee Kuan Yew Prime Minister of Singapore, do hereby proclaim and declare on behalf of the people and the Government of Singapore that as from today the ninth day August in the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five Singapore shall be forever sovereign democratic and independent nation, founded upon the principles of liberty and justice and ever seeking the welfare and happiness of her people in a more just and equal society” (Lee, 1965, p. 2). This is an extraction of speech given by Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, on 9 August 1965. This proclamation signified the official separation of Singapore from Malaysia and thus becoming an independent nation.

Once believed that the independence of Singapore was “foolish and absurd” (Drysedale, 1984, p. 249). It is because in the economic perspective, the resource deficiency and the industrial underdevelopment in Singapore resulted in the heavy reliance of commodities on export; politically, the British colonial government wished to keep Singapore under the British influence as to maximize its own profit generated by the special strategic value of Singapore. On the other hand, the victory of Chinese Communist Party in 1949 emboldened the communist expansion in Southeast Asian. Since Chinese population is the majority in Singapore, who were potential supporters

for communism, the neighbors of Singapore were not enjoy seeing an independent Singapore as it may become a hothouse for communism and the base for South-East Asian communist expansion. The combination of both unfavorable internal and external political environments lowered the possibility of an independent Singapore.

Despite all the disadvantages, Singapore was able to merge with Malaya and thus forming Malaysia. But due to the fact that the cooperation was based on political compromises, political and ethnic struggles between Singapore and the Kuala Lumpur resulted in the withdrawal of Singapore from Malaysia but also the materialization of the unimaginable independence of Singapore.

Research Significance

Although the independent Singapore faced a variety of political, economic, and social challenges, under the governance of the People's Action Party (PAP), the achievements of Singapore are obvious to all. In 1960-70, the annual GDP growth of 9% had drawn the global attention to Singapore (Google Public Data, 2016). In the same period, Singapore along with the rise of the other three Asian Tigers: Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, became the significant case studies of contemporary political-economic development. The similarities shared by the four Asian Tigers are the authoritarian governance and a relatively open economy. The political and social stability created by authoritarian ruling provided a favorable environment for rapid economic growth. However, in the 1990s, the emergence and consolidation of middle class in Taiwan and Japan along with economic advancement resulted in the democratization, i.e., Taiwan independence movement in 1980s and ruling party rotation in South Korea (Phillion, 2010, p. 152; Chubb, 2014, p. 120-121). Singapore became the only exception among the Asian Tigers, that able to preserve the strict control over society as well as the one-party political dominance; and such an astonishing regime is worth to ponder over.

Despite the international recognition of the economic achievement, Singapore is criticized by the Western democratic nations for the human right protection, opposition party development, political democracy and freedom of the press. Since the

independence of Singapore in 1965, the PAP led by Lee Kuan Yew, has been dominated the political arena in spite of the continuous but fruitless effort of opposition party to seize power. However, the continuous political suppression through tailored electoral system and other legal means, does not provoke the significant opposition from the majority of society and some individuals even stand up for the PAP government to legitimize the authoritarian ruling as the life style of Singaporean. Actually, the outstanding ruling performance of the PAP governance is undeniable, i.e., the efficiency and the transparency of the PAP government are at the world leading level. Also, in comparison to their neighbor countries, Singaporeans are enjoying a relatively higher living standard. Therefore, such a phenomenon unavoidably aroused the question: what are the factors contributing to the authoritarian regime in Singapore that leading to high political and social stability with continuous economic growth?

This research aims at analyzing the formation of the authoritarianism in Singapore by taking both historical, political, social, economic and international factors in account. Hopefully, this research can form a database of Singapore politics and lay a foundation for further study in the authoritarian regime in other countries. In addition, this research moved the spotlight from individualistic heroism, i.e., the emphasis on the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, as shown in the abundant work of scholars, e.g., *Lee Kuan Yew: the man and his ideas* by Kwang, H. F., Fernandez, W., and Tan, S.; *Lee Kuan Yew and the*

“*Asian values*” by Barr, M. D.; and *The Lee Kuan Yew Story as Singapore’s history* by Lysa, H., to the macro historical situation that combined both political, social, economic and international factors, in order to offer a distinctive perspective on the political development and the formation of authoritarian regime in Singapore.

Data Collection

This academic research was conducted using qualitative design which mainly involves the document and textual analysis with the assistance of figures and statistics if necessary. Triangulation will be adopted in this academic research as to maintain a high degree of reliability and validity, i.e., an investigation of the subject involves the collection of multiple sources of data for cross-checking (Babbie, 2013, p. 189). Whenever appropriate, both primary and secondary data will be collected from university library and World Wide Web for analysis.

As for the primary data, the official data provided by Singapore government institutions, e.g. *Constitution of Singapore* and *Parliamentary Elections Act* legislated by the Statutes of the Republic of Singapore; *Presidential and Parliamentary election results* recorded by the Elections Department; *Singapore in figures, 2015* published by the Department of Statistics, and so on. These official data are basically neutral and highly reliable. Therefore, unaltered message can be extracted out for further analysis. On the other hand, the publications and speech of Lee Kuan Yew can be gathered, e.g.,

The Singapore Story: memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew published by Prentice Hall; and different public speech given by Singapore government officials recorded by National Archive of Singapore. Although they cannot be regarded as the exact primary source of data, the original dictions and ideas can be conserved in a large extent. Therefore, they can still provide a similar effect resembling the primary data, namely, as a possibly objective and impartial source of data.

On the other hand, the secondary data will be gathered as to counteract the establishmentarian view of Singapore official documents in this academic research. Foreign think-tanks, e.g., *The key to the Asian Miracle* written by Root, H. L. and Campos, J. E. published by Brookings Institution; and productions of intellectuals, e.g., Mauzy D. K., Rodan, G., Pugalenth, S. R. and so on, can be gathered for information derived from authors exposed to different cultural backgrounds and thus acting as a distinct perspective from somehow unofficial and academic stance. As a result, by combining both the primary and secondary data with official and unofficial nature, a precise picture of the authoritarian regime formation in Singapore is hoped to be possibly obtained.

Literature review

Political Development

The definitions of political development varied with the study approach of scholars and their emphasis on each approach is different.

Marx (2008, p. 39) summarized the political development along with the history from at least the 17th century as a single process of “draws all nations, even the most barbarian, into civilization”.

Pye (1965, p. 4-6, 12-16) generalized the concept of political development as a nation-building activity, involving the relevant political forces in the society which contributes to the formation of authoritative and administrative structure. Pye (1965, p. 11) also emphasized the political development as the interpretation on the past, i.e., the formation of a political system, and the study of the future, i.e., the sustainability of a political system.

Almond and Powell (1966, p. 34) defined political development as the development of a political system. And there are five major factors for elevation in the progress of political development: (1) the stability of the system, e.g., the demand for political participation, national unity, economic betterment, law and order; (2) the political resources, e.g., public support, bureaucratic effectiveness, government legitimacy and so on; (3) the capability of other social systems, e.g., welfare system,

religious system, and international military and technical assistance, which may reduce the social demand and thus avoiding the overload for domestic political system; (4) the functioning pattern of the political system, e.g., an authoritative system can better control the media and publicity when comparing to a democratic system, therefore, different functioning pattern will directly affect the performance of a political system as well as the progress of political development; (5) the responsiveness of political elites, i.e., a low responsiveness may result in the overlooking of social demands and thus hindering the political development while a high responsiveness may either satisfy the growing social demand through political modification or may misjudge the seriousness of situation and wrongly modify the political system (Almond & Powell, 1966, p. 39-41).

Huntington combined and selected total four characteristics of modernization which are combined with the concept of institutionalization to define the political development: (1) rationalization, measured by the extent of functional differentiation in a political system, i.e., all political functions are assigned to a specific unit while enjoying an interdependence and independence simultaneously, for instance, the executive branch relies on the motion passed by the legislative branch (interdependence) but the former has no influence on the latter's decision making (independence); (2) national integration, namely, the delimitation of the ethnic participation in politics and

thus creating a strong sense of national belonging; (3) democratization, the movement towards a more electoral competitive political system achieving reciprocal counterbalance of power; (4) mobilization, the increase in mass participation in the core part of politics, e.g., general election for President and Parliament; (5) institutionalization including the extensiveness of support, e.g., limited support from the upper-class group versus majority support from the public of a political organization; and the level of institutionalization, evaluated by the adaptability, (the capability to adapt the external political environment), complexity, (the number of functional subunits), autonomy (the capability to overcome the extra-institutional political influence) and coherence (the degree of consensus on the dispute-resolving and decision-making).

By the integration of the above scholastic perspectives on political development, this research defined political development as ‘the development of a political system that involved the variate of political stability, political participation, and executive capacity’. Through the analysis of the political development in Singapore, the factors that contributing to the formation of the authoritarian regime of Singapore is studied as a political system.

Authoritarianism

Apart from the political development, the concept of authoritarianism is another focus in this research. As defined by Linz (2000, p. 159), authoritarian regime is a “political system with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones”.

Basically, there are four key concepts of Linz definition of authoritarianism. First, the “limited, not responsible political pluralism”. In contrast to the pluralistic politics in democratic system, the authoritarian system usually perform in a limited political pluralism. Pluralism is the essence of democracy as the democratic system only operate in full function when pluralistic values are respected; under totalitarianism, pluralism is replaced by monism, in which only one value proposed by the nation is acceptable, all other values are all heresy.

However, in authoritarian regime, the co-existence of authoritarian leadership and the Western capitalist concept – implying a negative sign for neither pluralism nor monism - which are contradictory in nature and resulted in the obscure boundaries between a nation and a society, for example, the large extent of ‘rule of man’ is adopted in authoritarian regime resulted in “semi-opposition” and “pseudo-opposition”

proposed by Linz. It is important to distinguish the nature of the opposition party within and without the political system as to accurately identify the authoritarian characteristic of a regime. According to Linz (2000, p. 168), the “semi-opposition” is the political opposition acquiesced by the authoritarian ruler. As long as the opposition is not officially defined as illegal, the “semi-opposition” may play a critical role in the democratization. Moreover, if the “semi-opposition” is continuously suppressed, it is possible to adopt violent or even revolutionary means to overthrow the current authoritarian regime.

On the other hand, the “pseudo-opposition” is the tool for authoritarian leader to keep the democratic appearance (Linz, 2000, p. 168-169). The authoritarian regimes allow the limited political participation of opposition party, but in the meanwhile, control the opposition through executive and legislative means to restrict its development as well as to avoid the opposition becoming the real political threat. The so-called opposition party is not able to electorally compete with the ruling party in the general election but its existence become the best instrument to construct a false impression of two-party competition.

“Without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities” is the second characteristic of authoritarianism proposed by Linz. He defined ideology as a set of interrelated and closed system of concepts including basic political, economic,

and social values as the basis of ideal life style. As suggested by Ranney (1996, p. 799), ideology is “a comprehensive and intensively held set of convictions” which are logically interrelated. Thereby, the ideology is a combination of various concepts which have been deepened in people’s heart and able to affect the thought and behavior. A unified ideology is essential to achieve national unity and such phenomenon can be observed in both Western democratic countries, i.e., the concept of liberality, equality, and democracy; and in totalitarian countries, i.e., the concept indoctrinated through top-down propaganda.

For emerging countries with short developmental history, one the one hand are influenced significantly by the Western colonial influence, on the other hand are developing their own domestic political culture; the wrestling between the traditional political culture and the Western ideology of democracy increases the difficulty of distinguishing the alleged ideology of the authoritarian ruler is not a rigorous ideology but only a “distinctive mentality” specialized for governance. And this is the reason for Linz to introduce the concept of “distinctive mentality” when studying authoritarian regime; Linz believed that the authoritarian governance is not completely for the sake of people, but also for the personal interest and preference of the leader and under this precondition, the authoritarian leader tend to develop a mentality to rationalize his governance. Therefore, when comparing the “distinctive mentality” of authoritarian

leader, that can be altered along with the policy objective, to the democratic ideology of freedom and liberality, and to the totalitarian ideology of Utopia, the authoritarian leaders indeed lack a meticulous ideology.

The third emphasis of Linz on the authoritarianism is "...without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development". According to Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, mobilization is "the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life." Tilly (1978, p. 10) defined mobilization as "the process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action". Hence, a political mobilization is the process of the action to exert control over the resources, e.g., repressing tools such as weapons, military, and technology; material resources including money and information, and morality like loyalty and responsibility, in order to strive for the political legitimacy as well as power. The reason for the nil or limited mobilization in authoritarian regime is that the mobilization is unnecessary as there is no significant political competition and therefore the executive and legislative power are already enough for maintain the political power and legitimacy.

The last characteristics of authoritarianism is the most understandable, i.e., "a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power". Literally, the political power of an authoritarian regime is controlled by a leader or a small group.

This research adopted Linz's definition of authoritarian regime and thus defining 'authoritarianism' as a limited political pluralistic regime with distinctive mentality and controlled by a single leader or a small group of key figures.

Conceptual framework

This research utilized a historical approach (Creswell, 2013, p. 8-9) that refining and combining Packenham's three approaches to political development including political, social, and economic approaches (Packenham, 1964, p. 108-115).

Political development of a nation is the evaluation in terms of its political, social, and economic factors. Since history is exactly comprised by the political, social, and economic development, this research was conducted under a macro approach by covering the critical factors including politics, social system and economy with rich historical support; in order to provide an impartial analysis on the formation of authoritarian regime in Singapore.




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework Diagram.

Chapter 1 Political Background

The Republic Singapore was independent in 1965. However, radical changes which may not happen in other countries can be observed in such a short history of 51 years. This section will focus on the political history of Singapore as the outset of the research. Substantially, the political history of Singapore can be divided in three periods: British colonial rule, independence movement, and People's Action Party rule.

British Colonial Rule (1819-1959)

The credit of Singapore development was given to Sir Stamford Raffles who was appointed by British government to search for an entrepot as a relay station for Sino-British trade. Raffles realized the brilliant geographical location of Singapore as well as the characteristic of being a deep-water port, he then decided to set up a trading post in Singapore and thus unlocking the development of Singapore (Brooke & Braddell, 1921, p. 377). In 1819, Raffles signed treaty with Sultan Ibrahim I and started 150-year of British governance in Singapore (Brooke & Braddell, 1921, p. 579).

The reason for British to develop Singapore was obviously due to the commercial benefits generated by trade and taxation, as Singapore had neither the natural resources for exploitation nor population for agricultural activities. Therefore, in order to increase the trade gains in Singapore, British colonial government establish Singapore as a free

port as to attract more merchant ships and hence transforming Singapore into an indispensable trading post for East-West trade (Seet, 1983, p. 1).

Along with the increasing commercial activities, the demand for labor in Singapore correspondingly inflated. In light of the rising man power demand, British government gradually opened up the immigration policy in order to attract foreign workers as the supplement of labor force. Because of the geographical location of Singapore, the immigrants were mainly from Eastern South in China and India. These immigrants and the indigenous Malays in Singapore then make up the main population structure in Singapore. Due to the growing ethnic diversity as well as the language barrier between British and the ethnic groups, British government intended to grant a large extent of power to various ethnic groups to handle their internal affairs, i.e., separate community for different ethnic groups as stated in Raffles Town Plan (Buckley, 1902, p. 36-38).

In the colonial period, Singapore is the center of British colonial power in Malay. The total political control of British over Singapore was expected, in other words, there were no political activities but only public administration in the colonial Singapore. British government transplanted their bureaucratic system to Singapore and established the Singapore City in 1856. It is noteworthy that all the senior officials were British as to fully control the politics in Singapore. However, the shortage of junior bureaucrats

urged the British government to recruit personnel with British education background (Yeoh, 2003, p. 63). The partially open of bureaucracy did not drive the open of politics as the political participation of Singaporean had not been allowed at that time.

The outbreak of the Second World War and the unexpected military advancement of Japan resulted in the defeat of Britain and the loss of control over Singapore. On 15 February 1942, Singapore was invaded by Japanese military and started the 3-year military rule until the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces on 15 August 1945. The strict social control during the Japanese military rule was impossible for any opening of political participation (Wong, 2001, p. 219-227).

Independence Movement (1945-1965)

After the unconditional surrender of Japan, Singapore was back to the hand of Britain. British government intended to recover the good old colonial days but under the anti-colonial slogan all over the world, colony became an abomination. Therefore, the initial stage of British government to regain control over Singapore, British military rule was temporarily adopted until March 1946 (Springhall, 2001, p. 636).

In January 1946, British government published the White Paper introducing the Malayan Union that including the Penang Island and Malacca. Singapore was excluded from the Union because of the extraordinary strategic significance and the consequent intention of British colonial government to maintain the control in Singapore. However, due to the financial pressure of British government as well as the global anti-colonial atmosphere, the independence of Singapore became increasingly likely to materialize.

In the post-war Singapore, political activities was blossoming, parties representing various ethnic interests were gradually established. Four months after the return of British colonial government, the first political party in Singapore, Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) in 1945 emerged and followed by Singapore Progressive Party (SPP) in 1947 and Singapore Labor Party in 1948 (Wah, 1969, p. 132-133; 1973, p. 88, 99;). From 1948-1955, two more major political parties were established, including Labor Front (LF) led by David Saul Marshall, and the PAP led by Lee Kuan Yew.

In February 1948, as a response to the growing demand of Singapore autonomy, the British colonial government organized the first election of Legislative Council (later renamed as Legislative Assembly). The members of Legislative Council was constituted by colonial government officials, officially appointed personnel, commercial union representatives, and elected personnel. In the first election of Legislative Council, 6 out of 22 seats were opened for public election; there are 15 persons participated and five of them were nominated by political parties. The result was that three seats were won by the SPP. A partial opening of political participation could be observed in the first election of Legislative Council, nonetheless, a large extent of limitation were still existed as said by the Malay governor Malcolm MacDonald: “Singapore’s new legislation would have many democratic features which would evolve steadily towards complete self-government and the new constitutions are only the beginning of a process and not the end. Every man and woman over 21 years can vote. The only qualification is that the voter shall be a British subject.”(Pugalenthi Sr, 1996, p. 1). Because of the limitation of voter qualification, the number of qualified and registered voters in Singapore at that time was only 23,000 (Parliament of Singapore, 2011). Accordingly, a majority of Singaporean were unable to participate in political activities. However, such a limitation, i.e., only British subjects were allowed to vote, provided the best campaign slogan for emerging political parties to fight for a border

base of voters and thus arousing Singaporeans' desire of active political participation.

As shown in figure 1, in 1951, British colonial government allowed three more seats (total nine seats) in Legislative Council for elected personnel and the SPP gained another victory for winning six seats in total (Hwee, 2002, p. 203-204).

	Elected	Commercial Union Representative	Government officials	Officially nominated	Unofficially nominated	Total
1948	6	3	4	5	4	22
1951	9	3	4	5	4	25

Figure 1. The distribution of member of Legislative Council in the colonial Singapore. Adapted and translated from 新加坡華人社會變遷 (p. 12), by Wen, C. I. 文崇一, 1969, *民族所集刊*, (28), 1-62.

In 1953, the British government appointed George Rendel to review the Constitution of Singapore. In 1955, the British government approved the amended the Constitution of Singapore as the legitimate basis of autonomous government in Singapore. The Constitution suggested that executive branch consisted of nine ministers and led by the majority party leader as the chief minister. The British appointed Singapore governor was responsible to deliberate political affairs with the chief minister, while the Legislative Council constituted by 32 members (7 seats more than in 1951); and this constitutional amendment was known as Rendel Constitution (Rodan, 1996, p. 63-64).

In 1955, the first general election was held under Rendel Constitution, without

limitation on the constituents, i.e., not only British subjects were qualified voters but all Singapore permanent residents over 21 years old. The election result was the victory of LF that winning 10 seats, People's Progressive Party with 4 seats, PAP with 3 seats, and Democratic Party with 2 seats. As the leader of the majority party, David Saul Marshall served the post of Chief Minister and materialized the campaign promise – to achieve complete autonomy in Singapore.

In 1966, Marshall led the first official delegation of constitutional negotiation to London (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 15). Unfortunately, the negotiations broke down and this implied the failure to materialize his election promise. In addition to Marshall's incapability of dealing with frequent industrial strikes, student movements, and the Communist instigation in Singapore, he resigned the post of Chief Minister and succeeded by Lim Yew Hock.

In 1967, Lim led the second delegation to London and this time was successful. According to the agreement, Singapore enjoyed complete autonomy on domestic affairs but excluding national defense and diplomacy (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 16).

Apart from the open election for Legislative Council that symbolized the central government of Singapore, in December 1957, the City Council of Singapore representing the local government was open to public election too. In this election, PAP was able to win 13 out of 32 seats and became the first public elected majority party in

City Council of Singapore (Comber, 2012). Ong Eng Guan served as the first and the only people-elected mayor and his first action was to abolish the mayor truncheon which symbolized the colonialism. The victory of the PAP in City Council laid a fine foundation of the future Legislative Council election in 1959 but also sowed the seeds of the infighting within the PAP.

The PAP Rule (1959-now)

According to the agreement between the delegation led by Lim Yew Hock and the British government, Singapore's status was elevated from a colony to an autonomous republic in 1959. In May 1959, the first genuine general election, i.e., without any significant British colonial government intervention, was held. All 51 seats of Legislative Council were opened to public election. There were total 16 political parties and 194 candidates contended in this election. Apart from breaking away from the British colonial control, the popularization of elector qualification was achieved in this election; 587,797 qualified electors were registered and among which 55% were their first time to have the right to elect (Pugalenthi, 1996, p. 27). The PAP was able to seize total victory in this election by winning 53.4% of the vote with 43 seats, the Singapore United Party won four seats, United Malays National Organization (UMNO) won three seats, and the independent candidate won one seat. On 5 June 1965, Lee Kuan Yew as the leader of the majority party, took an oath to serve as Singapore Prime Minister and

opened the ceaseless PAP administration up to the present (Singapore Elections Department, 2015c).

What waited for the PAP in the 1960s, was the high unemployment rate, the low education level, the lack of housing supply, and the underdeveloped industry in 1960s Singapore. Since the former rule did not leave an adequate national treasury nor a mature governing model, the social condition was poor and the destruction brought by the Second World War was no doubt as rubbing salt into the wound.

On the other hand, the power struggle within the PAP was inflamed. In 1961, Ong Eng Guan as the Minister of Ministry of national development, challenged the PAP leadership and resulted in demission and being expelled from the PAP but dramatically, he was reserved because of the victory in the by-election in Hong Lim constituency (Singapore Elections Department, 2015b). Besides, David Saul Marshall (the former leader of the LF), the leader of Worker's Party of Singapore defeated the PAP candidates in another by-election in Anson district and thus reentering the Parliament (Singapore Elections Department, 2015a). The PAP's setback in Anson district was due to the Left-wing within the PAP who threatening Lee Kuan Yew to compensate the previously suppressed leftists, e.g., the liberation of civil liberties, the restoration of citizenship of a portion of leftists, the release of political prisoners, the democracy within the PAP and so on (Rodan, 1989, p. 67), otherwise, the leftwing would transfer their support to David

Saul Marshall in Anson district. As a result of Lee Kuan Yew's tough attitude towards the leftists, the PAP lost the seat in Anson district but Lee Kuan Yew was able to use this opportunity to disclose the internal struggles in the PAP by organizing a motion of confidence. With the disclosed ballot, Lee Kuan Yew's Cabinet was able to get a breathtaking victory as eight leftists defected and five abstained from voting. More importantly, through this motion of confidence, Lee Kuan Yew was able to identify the leftists and thus expelling total 13 of them from the PAP; The 13 leftists led by Lee Siew Choh and Lim Chin Siong established Barisan Socialis and a large number of left-wing supporters, who were mainly Chinese, quitted the PAP; however, the two-way split of the PAP did not affect the power of Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore (Chua, 1995, p. 16-7).

On 27 May 1961, Malaya's first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman gave a speech about the Malayan Union. Rahman addressed that at first he was unwilling to include Singapore into the Union; yet, because of the rapidly rising left-wing, he would accept Singapore's affiliation as to prevent Singapore from turning a South-east Asian version of Cuba (Jones, 2002, p. 61-2).

Rahman's speech stirred up the political situation in Singapore. Since Lee Kuan Yew was supportive towards the merger between Malaya and Singapore, the leftists feared that the coalition government after merger would wipe out the left-wing

existence. Therefore, started in 1961, the left-wing was committed to political struggle with the PAP in order to slow down the merger as well as to regain their power in Singapore.

However, the radical action of left-wing in Singapore was actually facilitating the merger between Malay and Singapore. It is because both Singapore, Malay and Britain did not want to see the Communist expansion under the shadow of Cold War. Later, Lee Kuan Yew and Rahman came to an agreement of the conditions regarding the merger, i.e., the central government possess the power on diplomacy, national defense, and internal security; while the local government enjoyed the administrative power on local affairs such as education and labor policy, and were ready for the merger in June 1963.

Owing to the fact that the internal security would be taken over by the central government, the Internal Security Council authorized the Operation Coldstore to arrest pro-Communist activists, worker union leaders, and student leaders. In order to further weaken the remaining power of left-wing, the PAP government hurriedly announced and organized the Parliament election in September 1963; the PAP took down 37 out of 51 seats and thus ensuring to hold the reins of government while the Barisan Sosialis (BS) won 13 seats and become the majority of opposition party (Singapore Elections Department, 2015d). This election result is possible to form a two-party system but during the oath-taking ceremony, three BS members of Parliament (MPs) were arrested.

The remaining BS MPs declared to withdraw from the Parliament and to start organizing radical street protest and demonstrations. The withdrawal of the BS allowed the PAP to seize complete control in the Parliament through later by-election and achieve the political dominance in Singapore to date.

After trilateral negotiation between Singapore, Malay and Britain, British government approved the establishment of Malaysia. But the honeymoon period of the merger between Malay and Singapore did not last long because of the ideological discrepancy regarding ethnic policy. The UMNO, the ruling party of Malay, advocate a Malaysia of Malays, i.e., retain all privileges enjoyed by Malays during British colonial period; while the PAP promote a Malaysia of Malaysian, i.e., a fair treatment for all Malaysians. Additionally, the anxiety of UMNO, resulted by the PAP for getting 3 seats in Malay Peninsula caused UMNO to further suspect that the PAP may threatening its own political status in Malaysia. The ideological struggle combined with the distrust among Malay and Singapore triggered the ethnic riots in July 1964 and the conflict did not show any alleviation and eventually resulted in the expulsion of Singapore from the Malayan Union. On 9 August 1965, in both Kuala Lumpur and Singapore announced Singapore as an independent and autonomous nation.

Summary

From 1849 to 1945, Singapore is largely apolitical. The bureaucracy developed by British was for trade demand and limited social services, without significant localizing effect in Singapore. However, the post-war period (1945-1965) after the return of the British colonial government, it can be regarded as one of the most politically active period in the development of Singapore, i.e., the emergence of various political parties, the gradual learning of the people about election and other forms of political participations. Within this period, Singapore transformed from a British colony to a domestically autonomous self-government. The third period signifying the independence of Singapore as well as the political dominance of the PAP.

By probing into the historical background of Singapore, one can witness an apolitical Singapore under the British colonial rule, was gradually heated up in terms of political diversity and participation due to the post-war anti-colonialism. However, good times don't last long, under the communist threat, the separation of Singapore from Malaysia was happened and thus providing the chance for a fully independent Singapore under the authoritarian leadership of the PAP.

Chapter 2 Political Events

The academics who are interested in Singapore, e.g., Gary Rodan and Chua Beng Huat, regard the internal struggle of the PAP as the principal cause of the emergence of authoritarianism in Singapore. According to Quah (1985, p. 186-188), the two major threats for Singapore in 1960s are Communism and Communalism respectively, the cooperation between the communists and communalists resulted in the precarious political situation in Singapore in 1950s and 60s. In the memoir of Lee Kuan Yew (Lee, 1998, p. 317-432), a considerable part is about his political wrestling with Communists.

In addition, scholars who study democratization, attribute the independence of Singapore to 'the second wave of democracy'. There are two characteristics of 'the second wave of democracy': (1) the emerging nations were independent from their colonial master; (2) and a majority of those nations were under the communist threat (Huntington, 1991, p. 12-14). As to stabilize the politics as well as to prevent the communist invasion, the first priority of the ruling party in emerging nations was to consolidate the political power. Therefore, political suppression will be utilized by the ruling party in order to avoid the opposition party and pro-communist from coming to power. Similarly, the suppression on social activities are common for ruling party to eliminate the supporters of opposition party and thus preventing the opposition party

from regathering public support. After achieving a unitary system, the ruling party is able to create relatively high political and social stability for economic development.

The coincidence of views suggests the communists played a significant role on the political development as well as on the formation of authoritarianism in Singapore. Therefore, the following paragraphs will probe into the development of Communist party in Singapore and thus indicating the communist influence on the formation of authoritarianism in Singapore.

The Growth of Communism in Singapore

The Communist activity in Singapore can be traced back to the Communist Youth League and Nanyang General Labor Union established in 1926 (Cheah, 1992, p. 13, 54). The two organizations were regarded as the earliest communist associations in Singapore with direct connections to the Chinese Communist Party. In order to comprehend the development of Communist party in Singapore, a rudimentary understanding of Malaysian Communist Party is necessary. It is because the Singaporean and Malaysian Communist Party were probably derived from the same origin, in spite of their different subsequent development.

Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was established in 1930, it opened the recruitment to all ethnic groups and thrived during the Great Depression 1930s by actively involving in labor affairs (Kheng, 2009, p. 132-133). The 6000-worker strike

at Selangor in 1935 had proved the communist influence (Cheah, 1987, p. 254-255). Afterwards, the action of Malaysian communists turn to underground as to dodge the brunt. The communist activists used various social associations, e.g., labor unions, music unions, and even alumni association, as disguise. In 1942, Malaya was invaded by Japan. The British colonial garrison surrendered after a month of resistance; however, instead of surrender, Malaysian Communists retreated to the forest area and combated with Japanese military by guerilla tactics; because of their contribution, the Communist military action was supported by British garrisons in India and Burma (Cheah, 1987, p. 77-79, 83).

However, the relationship between Malaysian Communist Party and the British colonial government were abruptly exacerbated in the post-war period. It was because during the Second World War, the mutual enemy – Japanese militarism, united the two ideologically antagonistic parties together. The combination of interest collapsed once the mutual enemy was eliminated, and the cooperation between British colonial government and the Malaysian Communists was restored to hostility. In the early 1940s, the CPM proposed a moderate suggestion to the colonial government for establishing a Parliament through public election (Jackson, 2008, p. 54-55). Therefore, the Communist Party appeared for the first time as a legal political party in Malaysia and was ready to be elected in the coming Parliament election. However, the radicals in

Malaysian Communist Party opposed to the moderate route and advocated the violent measures to strike the capitalists in Malaya. The radical orientation obtained the majority of support within the Party. The class struggle fermented by the Communist Party resulted in the murder of the owners of rubber estate and stannary (tine ores) and the consequent social disruption (Jackson, 2008, p. 55-56).

In 1948, Malayan government issued a decree to limit the membership of labor unions, i.e., the worker could only join the labor union according to the occupation, in order to eradicate the infiltration of Communists into labor unions; in the same year, Emergency Regulations Ordinance was introduced and thus defining Malaysian Communist Party as an illegal organization (Munir, 1993, p. 132-132). The Communists played the same old trick – retreating to forest area and resist the government army by guerilla combats. Thusly, the British colonial government enforced martial law in Malayan, and authorized the police to detain suspects without custody and to search in private space without warrant. At this stage, the Malaysian Communist Party was defined as terrorists.

Because of the geographical limitation, Communists in Singapore could not retreat into forest area. Instead, they turned their operation underground by manipulating the sympathy of Singaporean citizens as well as to infiltrate into various associations using pseudonym to hide their identity. In this way, the communists were able to disseminate

Communism under the cover of their fake identity in legal associations. In 1950s, the effort of underground communist finally paid, a plenty of labor unions and associations were controlled by the left-wing communists. In addition, the effective dissemination of Communism also attracted personnel with British education background. As mentioned by Lee Kuan Yew in his memoir (1998, p. 139), "In January 1951, the newspapers reported the detention of an English-educated group of communists. It included John Eber, who had been vice-president of the MDU, C. V. Devan Nair, secretary of the Singapore Teachers' Union, and Abdul Samad bin Ismail, chief sub-editor of the *Utusan Melayu*." The fact was obvious, the communist influence had already expanded to the English-education group in Singapore. The main reasons for the affiliation of people with British education background, who were regarded as elitists, to the Communism, (1) was due to the attractive concept of Utopia especially under the political and social unrest in the post-war period Singapore; (2) and because of the anti-colonialism advocated by Communists, matched the ambition of the majority of Singaporean, not except for the social elites.

Apart from the support from the local Singaporean, those who studied abroad, e.g., Lee Kuan Yew, Toh Chin Chye, and Goh Keng Swee, believed that there was no choice but Communist Party at that time in Singapore to overthrow the British colonial government and this might be the reason for the future cooperation with Communist

left-wing to form the PAP (Lee, 1998, p. 148). A widespread support for Communism could be observed in Singapore, especially for the Chinese population, and the left-wing influence gradually spread to all over labor unions, student associations, and even religious community.

The PAP's Accommodation with Communists

On 21 November in 1954, the PAP was established at Victoria Concert Hall with the mission of anti-colonialism. The attendees included people with British education background, such as Lee Kuan Yew; and political activists with Communist background; Samad Ismail and Devan Nair, the political prisoners accused as communist supporters and arrested by the British government (Leong, 2004, p. 12 as cited in Singapore National Library Board, 2014).

The cooperation with Communists was decided by Lee Kuan Yew and other PAP members according to their evaluation on other political parties. Apart from the Communist Party, other major political parties, such as SPP were formed by those with a vested interests and on the same side of the British colonial government: in the period when the 'right to vote' was not popularized, i.e., only British subjects were qualified constituents, Singapore Progress Party was once the majority party and monopolized all the people-elected seats in the Legislative Council, which was desired by the British colonial government for power transfer after the independence of Singapore.

On the contrary, the LF opposed the British colonial government, advocated the independence of Singapore through the merger with Malaya, and the liberalization of the right to be elected for Singaporean. The LF was established when Singapore Labor Party merged with the Singapore Socialist Party in 1954 and successfully obtained 10 out of 25 seats in the first Legislative Council election in 1955 and thus becoming the majority party. SLF leader, David Marshall served as the Chief Minister of Singapore while the PAP only won 3 seats in that election (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 15).

According to the above evaluation, the LF was also anti-colonial left-wing, the Communist Party should not be the only choice for Lee Kuan Yew regarding political cooperation. However, the main target of a political party is to be in power by getting maximized support from the public through the electoral system. Since Chinese accounted for the highest demographical proportion in Singapore, i.e., over 70% of total population, and Lee Kuan Yew and other founding PAP members understood their British education background may hinder the communication with the Chinese population in Singapore; therefore, the cooperation with communists would be the only method to obtain support from Chinese that was necessary for the PAP development in Singapore. And this belief was strengthened when Lee Kuan Yew and others realized the immense Communist influence from all kinds of labor and student strikes at that time.

Lee Kuan Yew decided that the PAP's collaborative partner must be fully committed to political career and handle any challenges with calm and wisdom (Han, Fernandez & Tan, 1998, p. 42). In this way, the ambitious Communist left-wing became the best partner for the PAP because of their unique public mobilizing power originated from the support from Chinese population. On the other hand, Lee Kuan Yew clearly knew the potential danger of the cooperation with communists. Thereby, Lee's target was not the core Communist enthusiasts but the sympathetic public, namely, the majority of Singaporeans.

As cooperation is two-way, there was a strong reason for Communists to not reject the offer from the PAP. At that time, communists' first consideration was their legitimate existence. Since the British colonial government had defined the Malaysian Communist Party as an illegal organization, such a firm official stance compelled the Communists in Singapore to operate secretly. Obviously, the price of underground operation is the ineffectiveness. Although infiltration of Communists to various associations had been achieved, the existence of communists was still limited to underground and far from legal. Hence, the offer from the PAP was at the best timing for the communists to regain legitimacy and thus regenerating their influence. Additionally, the PAP could be regarded as a moderate left-wing with anti-colonial propaganda, which were similar to the political stance of communists. Furthermore, the English proficiency and the

professional knowledge of the PAP members would lend a great help during the negotiation with the British colonial government. All the above factors combined to materialize the self-interest oriented cooperation with numerous calculations behind each party.

A cooperation based on manipulation will expectably resulted in internal struggles as shown in the early years of the PAP. In 1954, non-communist faction led by Lee Kuan Yew, exert full control over the PAP and was able to limit the pro-communist faction to only 3 seats in the Central Executive Committee (CEC); In 1956, the number of seats of communist faction in the CEC already increased from three, i.e., Fong Swee Suan, Chan Chiao Thor, and Devan Nair, to four, i.e., Devan Nair, Lim Chin Siong, Chia Ek Tian, and Goh Boon Toh, in which indicating a rapid development of the communist faction and their fierce action on power seizure was expectable (Ramcharan, 2002, p. 116-117; Singh, 2015, Chapter 5, n. p.). The communist faction tended to seize control over the basic level of party organization. Represented by James Puthuchear, the communist faction demanded for the autonomy for the party branches which enjoyed nominative power of the CEC members. Since the branch of the PAP was opened to public election, if this motion was passed, backed by the support of Chinese population, the whole PAP would fall into the hand of the communist faction. However, the amendment of the party constitution was unsuccessful because of the arrest of some

leftists who were accused for riot organization.

In 1957, the communist planned to take over the party power. At that time, the procedure of party enrollment was simple and did not distribute party membership credentials to every members. Since the CEC members were elected during the Annual Party Congress. The communist made use of this loophole and transmit the credentials to their supporters to create absolute advantage of vote (Ng, 2010, p. 244). As a result, six member of pro-communist faction were able to enter the CEC but Lee Kuan Yew and Toh Chin Chye and other members of non-communist faction, refused to take up the posts (Ramakrishna, 2015, p. 49-50). Therefore, Tan Chong Kin became the chairman of the PAP and T. T. Rajah served as the Secretary-General. But soon, dramatically, five CEC member in the communist faction was arrested by the Lim Yew Hock government according to Preservation of the Public Security Ordinance (PPSO) and thus allowed the non-communist faction led by Lee Kuan Yew, to regain the control over the PAP (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 16-17).

To draw a lesson from the two previous attempt of power seizure by the communist faction, Lee Kuan Yew (as suggested by Toh Chin Chye) decided to divide party member into two categories: (1) normal member that opened to public participation; (2) cadre member that only those who were proved to be loyal, i.e., with the recommendations from the multiple current CEC members, and allowed to vote in the

CEC election. In this way, the infiltration of members from communist fraction would be nearly impossible and thus preventing the future power seizure.

The Split of the PAP

Strong discontent accumulated by the continuous power struggles between the communist and non-communist, was detonated by their opposite stance on the merger with Malaya. The communist faction strongly opposed the merger because of the clear-cut anti-colonial stance of Malay government. The communists feared that once the merger is achieved, they will be eliminated by the cooperation between the Malay and Singaporean government. Comparatively, the non-communist faction conveyed substantial support for the merger as they believed that the merger with Malaya was the only way out for an independent Singapore.

The Ong Eng Guan incident in 1961 was the first sign of the split of the PAP. In 1957, Ong represented the PAP in the City Council election and because of his Chinese background, he was elected as the mayor of Singapore. In 1959, he won again in (Hong Lim district) the first Legislative Council election after the independence of Singapore and served as the Minister of Ministry of national development. But Ong was a very ambitious person and was not satisfied for being a Minister under Lee Kuan Yew's administration. The fact have proved that Ong was a qualified opponent and he lost in only one vote to Lee Kuan Yew when competed for Prime Minister in the CEC election

(Milne, 1971, p. 740).

Ong Eng Guan was unwilling to accept the failure and expect to seek for the support from the communist faction. In June 1960, Ong proposed 16 motions and among which there were 4 motions aiming at pursuing communist assistance (Lee Kuan Yew, 1997, p. 410). But the communist faction declared to not support Ong Eng Guan, because of Ong's unfavorable performance in the Ministry of National Development and the communist faction considered Lee Kuan Yew as the only choice of person to stabilize the current struggles in the PAP; on the other hand, the communists were not ready to openly break with the non-communist faction, and believed that the contemporary cooperation was favorable to their own further development (Lian, 1969, p. 148). Ong's opposite action resulted in the annulment of the PAP membership and he then voluntarily resigned from the Legislative Council (Nam, 1969, p. 471).

Ong's resignation caused the by-election in Hong Lim district and he decided to participate in the election as an independent candidates; while the PAP sent Jek Yeun Thong as representative (Pugalenthi Sr, 1996, p. 49). Since there were only two candidates, this by-election was regarded as the showdown between the pro-Lee Kuan Yew faction and the pro-Ong Eng Guan faction. Apart from the intense intra-party competition, the actions of other political parties were eye-catching too, i.e., the chairman of LF, Marshall openly supported Ong and expressed his sympathy towards

Ong's unfortunate experience in the PAP; while Singapore People's Alliance also was supportive for Ong. As a result, Ong won the election with 7,747 votes, i.e., 4927 more votes than the PAP candidate (Singapore Elections Department, 2015b).

The victory of Ong was a shock to the PAP. Since the constituency who supported Ong were mainly Chinese lower class and accounted for the significant proportion of the Singaporean Chinese population; this implied the incomplete grasp of votes among Chinese and the not yet secured foundation of the PAP in Singapore. Going bad from worse, Baharuddin Bin Mohamed died on 20 April in 1960 due to heart disease and resulted in by-election in Anson district, which was another defeat of the PAP in the election by the former Chief Minister and the current chairman of LF, Marshall (Lian, 1969, p. 150).

The two setbacks of the PAP weakened its internal cohesion and provided a signal for the communist faction to begin the separation. In response to the pro-communist faction, Lee Kuan Yew addressed the confidence motion in the Parliament on 20 July 1961 (Lian, 1969, p. 151). The result was the victory of non-communist faction with 27 MPs to support the confidence motion (26 were the PAP members and one was the member of Singapore People's Alliance) and thus successfully maintaining the control over the vast majority in Parliament. The opposing votes of the pro-communist faction undoubtedly implied its withdrawal from the PAP. On 26 July 1971, there were 13 MPs

withdrew from the PAP and later established the BS. The Chairman of the new party was Lee Siew Choh and the Secretary-General was Lim Chin Siong, and successfully dragged with 80.4% of the PAP members, i.e., 552 out of 677 withdrew; 35 out of 51 branch chairmen resigned; and 19 cadre members withdrew (Pang, 1971, p. 15).

Through the grim situation for the PAP, it was obvious that the pro-communist faction outnumbered the non-communist faction. Although Lee Kuan Yew grasped the core power in the PAP as well as the reins of government, the non-communist lost the most important public support, especially from the grass-root Chinese population. Therefore, Lee Kuan Yew decided to challenge the pro-communist by public criticism, i.e., 12 radio talks titled as 'the battle for merger' (Singapore National Library Board, 2014b). This showed the intention of Lee to put the last hope on the Singapore integration referendum in 1962. It is because the motion of the merger was beyond the ethnicity, i.e., the merger directly related to the future of Singapore and none of the ethnic groups could detach themselves from, therefore, the overdependence on the pro-communist faction for the Chinese population support was no longer exist. On the other hand, through the split of the PAP, Lee Kuan Yew fully proceeded to the frontline instead of relying on the pro-Communist faction for the interaction with Chinese population, and thus able to acquire and forge the techniques for public mobilization as well as to eventually rebuild and consolidate the PAP. As expected by Lee Kuan Yew,

the PAP's scheme on the merger was supported by over 70% of the votes on 1 September 1962 (Mathews, 2014, p. 28) and this proved that the merger actually aroused the national consensus well beyond the ethnic boundaries. And the attempt of BS to urge the cast of a blank vote was completely fail.

The Operation Coldstore

The confirmation of the merger between Malaya and Singapore stressed the communists in Singapore because of the fear of being eliminated by the Federal government in Kuala Lumpur. In fact, the Malaya government at that time was so eager to sweep the communist influence in Singapore as the Malay representative of the Internal Security Committee (ISC) demanded immediate action from the Singapore government. However, Toh Chin Chye and the British representative preferred a gradual manner on anti-communist actions (Ramakrishna, 2015, p. 103). However, in 1962, the BS made a pronouncement on public support for the armed revolt in Brunei in the end of the year, BS believed that the rebellion was anti-colonial popular movement and further criticized the Malaya government and intended to disrupt the merger. Such action was not tolerated by the British and Malay government and thus leading to the acceleration of the anti-communist progress (Ramakrishna, 2015, p. 86).

On 2 February 1962, the ISC ordered a large-scale arrest of the pro-communist and anti-merger activists, named as Operation Coldstore, i.e., there were 169 target on

the list, including the members of BS, Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU), Rural and Country People's Association in Nanyang University (Ganesan, 1996, p. 66).

The Withdrawal of BS from the Parliament

In order to further consolidate the political power, the PAP government decided to organize the general election before the merger. The nomination day of general election was 12 September 1963 and the election day was 21 September 1963; there was only 9 days of campaign period (the future campaign period of general election are all within 9 days). The result was the victory of the PAP with 46.46% votes and won 37 out of 51 seats in Parliament; while BS won 13 seats and United People's Party won a seat (Singapore Elections Department, 2015e).

During the oath-taking ceremony, three members of BS MPs were arrested and 2 members evaded, the remaining eight MPs of BS resigned and plunged into street protests (Bloodworth, 1986, p. 287).

Summary

The factional struggles eventually led to the split of the PAP. Although the pro-communist faction grasped a significant proportion of political resources, its miscalculation on the merger of Singapore and Malaya forfeited the most valuable resources – the support from the majority Chinese population – and handed it over to the non-communist faction led by Lee Kuan Yew. In addition, during a series of broadcasted speech, Lee Kuan Yew defined the pro-communist and the BS as anti-nationalist. Under the dominant motive of independence and anti-colonialism in Singapore, the stance of Barisna Sosialis on the merger was intolerable and thus being labelled as the saboteur. On the other hand, Lee Kuan Yew emphasized the political legitimacy and constitutionality of the PAP. In this point, the BS lost its previous advantage of support from the Chinese population.

The Operation Coldstore pummeled the legitimacy of BS. Although it is not officially defined as an illegal political party, the public opinion already regarded it as the saboteur in Singapore and thus believed that it already lost the legitimacy for being the ruling party anymore. In this way, Lee Kuan Yew and the non-communist faction successfully manipulated the anti-colonial and nationalistic belief as well as the strong desire of the independence among the Singaporean, to push back the PAP's biggest political opponent – BS.

Also, the fatal mistake for the BS was the withdrawal from the Parliament in 1965.

At that time, even though the merger was confirmed, the BS was still the largest opposition party within the Parliament; while the PAP did not officially illegalized its existence, it should remain in the Parliament and monitor the PAP governance as well as to regain the public trust and eventually challenge the PAP's political status. However, the withdrawal of BS caused the possible two-party competition in Singapore to end in naught and resulted in its total collapse. As a result, the PAP was able to dominate the political system in Singapore through complete control over the Parliament – legislative branch, and the government – executive branch.

Chapter 3 Social Background

Geographical Environment

The Republic of Singapore is the second smallest country in terms of territorial size in East Asian countries. The land area is 718.3 square kilometer in 2014 (648.1 before reclamation) and constituted by 63 islands (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2015, p. 1). Singapore is located in the southernmost part of Malay Peninsula and is connected to Johor State in Malaysia through the Johor-Singapore Causeway; and linked to Sumatra in Indonesia across the Singapore Strait (Foo, 2002). Singapore locates in the opening of Strait of Malacca where is the main artery connected to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. As an enormous number of merchant ships and oilers are passing through Singapore every year, this water way is regarded as the economic lifeblood of Asian countries.

Singapore has a flat and even topography, i.e., the highest mountain, Bukit Timah is 164 meter high only (Singapore National Parks Board, 2016). The climate is wet and hot throughout the year, i.e., the wet season is from December to March, and the dry season is from June to September.

Natural Resources

Due to the limited geographical area, agriculture is not favorable in Singapore, and let alone satisfying the food supply in Singapore. In addition, Singapore does not contain any economic natural resources. The extraordinary geographical location as well as a deep-water port, are the only advantages for the national development in Singapore.

Demography

In the early stage of Singapore, the immigration policy was relaxed because the British colonial government aimed at increasing the labor power in Singapore. The immigrants to Singapore were mainly Chinese, Malays, and Indian.

According to Figure 2, the total population of Singapore in 1824 was 10,683, Chinese and Indian population accounted for 31% and 43% respectively (Buckley, 1984, p. 154). The status of Malay as the majority of population in Singapore was replaced by the rocketing Chinese population in 1871. After 1910, Chinese population stabilized at accounting for 70% of total population while Malay and Indian population accounted for 14% and 7% of the total population in Singapore.

The three ethnic groups formed the ethnic structure of Singapore. However, they speak different languages, hold different religious beliefs, and follow distinctive cultural practices, such ethnic differences required high political wisdom to avoid inter-

ethnic struggles. The British colonial government adopted non-interventionism, i.e., allow the ethnic groups to hand their own internal affairs; on the contrary, the PAP picked a much active attitude towards ethnic policy in order to develop national identity. In the principle of maintaining the ethnic characteristics of each group and avoid forced ethnic integration, the PAP government intended to maintain an ethnic harmony for the sake of national development. In the following paragraphs, the social structure, religious culture, and political status of three ethnic groups will be discussed as to demonstrate the ethnic influence on the formation of authoritarianism in Singapore.

Year	Chinese	Malays	Indians	Others	Total
1824	31.0	60.2	7.1	1.7	100.0
1830	39.4	45.9	11.5	3.2	100.0
1836	45.9	41.9	9.9	2.6	100.0
1849	52.9	32.2	11.9	3.0	100.0
1871	56.8	27.1	11.9	4.0	100.0
1891	67.1	19.7	8.8	4.3	100.0
1911	72.4	13.8	9.2	4.7	100.0
1931	75.1	11.7	9.1	4.2	100.0
1947	77.8	12.1	7.4	2.8	100.0
1967	74.4	14.5	8.1	3.0	100.0
2000	76.8	13.9	7.9	1.4	100.0
2010	74.1	13.4	9.2	3.3	100.0

*Figure 2. Percent distribution of population by race, 1824-2010. Adapted from Population trends in Singapore, 1819-1967 by S. H. Saw, 1969, *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, 10(01), 41; *Census of Population 2010 statistical release 1: demographic characteristics, education, language and religion* by Singapore Department of Statistics, 2013, retrieved from http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/publications/publications_and_papers/cop2010/census_2010_release1/cop2010sr1.pdf.*

Chinese Singaporean.*Social structure.*

According to Census of Population 2010 Statistical Release 1 (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2013, p. 10), Chinese population accounted for 2,794,000 and 74.1% of the total population in Singapore. The Chinese immigrants can be categorized to two groups, (1) the contract worker (coolies) and (2) the volunteer immigrants. In the middle period of 19th century, the Chinese immigrants are attracted or abducted (for the case of coolies) to the rubber estates in Singapore and in the inland area of Malaya (Lye & Wong, 2016, p. 241).

A portion of Chinese immigrants settled down in Singapore and formed the Chinese community around Singapore River (Chinatown nowadays). Along with the rapidly increasing Chinese population, the Chinese association correspondingly developed, which handled the funeral affairs for those friendless and helpless Chinese workers in the early stage, and later played a significant role in education of next generation of Chinese immigrants (Hu, 2016, p. 3-4). In the early period, the Chinese-medium schools was financed by the Chinese chambers of commerce and Chinese associations. In order to avoid ethnic struggles, the British colonial government initially did not intervene any Chinese activity until the increasing power of Chinese associations, e.g., controlling coolies trafficking, prostitution and gambling, endangered the social security in Singapore; the Chinese Protectorate was established

to monitor and intervene the activity of Chinese population when necessary (Yoong, 1961, p. 77-79).

A noteworthy characteristic of Chinese population is the Baba (male) and nyonya (female) Chinese or Straits-born Chinese. They played a significant role in national development in Singapore, e.g, Lee Kuan Yew and Toh Chin Chye. The Straits-born Chinese regarded as the Chinese whom's father is Chinese and mother is the second generation of Chinese immigrants, with Malay blood ties (Lee, 2008, p. 162). Therefore, the Straits-born Chinese integrated both Chinese and Malay cultural practices and used both Malay, English, and Hokkien as daily communication. Also, they received colonial British education, and some elites, e.g., Lee Kuan Yew were sent to Britain for further education.

Religious culture.

The Chinese population in Singapore were culturally and religiously influenced by China, especially by the southern provinces along the coast. Most of the Chinese immigrants were peasants and workers who were mainly from the southern China. The south of China developed a distinctive culture when comparing to the north. For instance, the high religious diversity is shared among the southerners. Similarly, the Chinese Singaporeans developed their own folk religion by combining certain characteristics of both Buddhism and Taoism. One of the most popular religious building is the Tua Pek Kong Temple in Loyang. This shows that the religious belief of Chinese population in Singapore was not completely inherited from China but developed and evolved in the new environment. Therefore, it is arguable that Singapore was totally influenced by the Confucian culture originated from China. Especially when Singapore economic miracle was so glaring, many scholars who study East Asian economic development tend to categorize the Four Asian Tigers, including Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan as within the Confucian Sinosphere. In author's opinion, the culture of Chinese Singaporean is not necessarily equivalent to the Confucian culture in China as reflected in the religious culture.

Political status.

The political status of Chinese immigrants in Singapore was not as high as the present time. During the pre-war British colonial period, the political participation was discouraged; while under the post-war British colonial ruling, the political participation was limited to Singaporeans with British citizenship. At that time, Chinese population was mainly lower class and they had no political rights because of the lack of British citizenship. According to the official census data, Singapore population in 1947 was 938,144, among which the Chinese population accounted for 729,473, 77% of the total population; and the number of qualified constituents was approximately 23,000; thereby, Chinese with the right to vote were only the tiny minority.

After the century of humiliation, Communist power expanded rapidly in China. Since Chinese immigrants are the majority population in Singapore, Singapore naturally became the base of Chinese Communist to export revolution to the South-East Asia. The vast majority of Chinese immigrants were inspired to stand up against the British colonial government. In the 1950s, the Chinese leftists cooperated with Strait-born Chinese to form PAP and strive for the fair political status of Chinese in Singapore through frequent social movement such as workers and students' strikes. As the result of different parties' and Chinese political leaders' efforts on negotiation as well as resistance, Singapore was able to establish self-government under the approval of Britain. In other words, Chinese efforts were inseparable from the achievement of an

independent Singapore.

Malaysian Singaporean.

Social structure.

Malays were the aborigine in Singapore but accounted for only 14% of the total population. In the competitive commercial center like Singapore, there is no lack of political and commercial achiever, such as Abdullah Tarmugi, the former Minister for Community Development in Singapore, and Suhaimi Salleh, the Chief Executive Office of SSA Consulting group (Mutalib, 1996, p. 28, 30). Due to the relative small proportion of population when comparing to Chinese, Malay was not always the focus on the policy regarding education and economic development. In order to promote mutual help within Malay community, some non-government organizations had established, e.g., The Malaysian Association in Singapore in 2014.

Religious culture.

The majority of Malays are Sunni Muslim. According to the restrictive Islamic doctrines, the apparel and behavior of Malays tend to be conservative (Koenig & Al Shohaib, 2014, p. 28). Therefore, when comparing to the Chinese population, the cultural heterogeneity is lower because of the strict Islamic doctrines.

Political status.

The PAP government showed the respect to Malays because of their prolonged contribution to Singapore as the indigenous people, by specifying Malay as the national

language, composing and sing the national anthem in Malay, as well as to nominate a Malay, Yusof bin Ishak, as the first President of Singapore in 1962.

The geographical proximity between Singapore and Malay facilitated significant political interchange. In the British colonial period, the politics of Malay and Singapore could be treated as a unity because of the politically and economically interdependent relationship (Narumi Naruse & Gui, 2016, p. 2). This was the reason for Lee Kuan Yew to endeavor after the affiliation with the Malayan Union instead of the independence of Singapore in the first place. Surprisingly, in the PAP's Cabinet, Malays did not occupy an extraordinary high status as expected in the long historical kinship between Malay and Singapore; the PAP government even required to introduce Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs) to maintain the seats in Parliament in order to ensure significant participation of Malay in Singaporean politics (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 145-146.).

Indian Singaporean.

Social structure.

Indian population is the smallest among the three ethnic groups in Singapore, which accounted for 7% of the total population. Indian immigrants to Singapore were mainly from Tamil and Malayali in the South Indian, and a few were Indians from Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Under the British colonial rule, Indian immigrants were employed as labor intensive worker with low income (Soon-Beng & Chew, p. 192). But in the post-war period, Indian immigrants gradually participate in the political affairs more actively, there is no lack of famous politicians, for instance, Sellapan Ramanathan, the sixth President of Singapore; Balaji Sadasivan, the former senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; and Tharman Shanmugaratnam, the former Deputy Prime Minister (Datta-Ray, 2009, p. 312-313).

Religion.

A high religious heterogeneity can be observed because of the plentiful ethnic minority groups in India. For instance, Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, Islam, Sai Babism, and Christian are all possible religious belief for the Indian immigrants (Yang & Ebaugh, 2001, p. 272).

Political status.

The political influence of Indian on Singaporean politics was not limited to their smaller population. During the period of independence movement, Indians actively

participated in the political activities, no matter in the PAP or pro-Communist leftwing, they could be easily noticed and acted as the buffer between the Chinese and the Malay population in Singapore (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 145-146).

Summary

The significant ethnic diversity implied a highly diversified culture in Singapore. Although a high cultural diversity strengthened the pluralistic element within a society, it also brought about conflicts of interest among ethnic groups. Therefore, a permissive management on the ethnic groups adopted by the British colonial government was equivalent to the connivance of ethnic struggles and thus hindering the national integration.

Contrarily, the PAP adopted an active intervention in ethnic affairs under the principle of ethnic harmony. The PAP ensured the political participation of the ethnic minority, i.e., Malaysian and Indian Singaporeans in the Parliament by introducing the GRCs, in order to balance the interest between the minority and the Chinese population in Singapore. In terms of language policy, although the PAP government recognized Malay as the national language of Singapore, as to avoid ethnic struggle as well as to encourage ethnic harmony, both Mandarin Chinese, English, Tamil, Malay are recognized as official language in Singapore (The Statutes of the Republic of Singapore, 1999, p. 144). Regarding the education policy, bilingual education is stipulated by the

Ministry of Education in order to encourage the new generation to learn their mother tongue instead of English only, and thus being beneficial to the ethnic culture inheritance. Apart from language and education policy, the PAP government uphold the principle of ethnic harmony when handling religious affairs. On the premise of not threatening internal security and ethnic harmony, the Singapore government will not intervene the religious activities. In addition, the PAP government will assist the building of the temple of major religion of each ethnic group, for example, building mosques for Malaysian Singaporean.

Chapter 4 Social events

Referring to Quah, the largest two threats for the independent Singapore are communism and communalism. Since the threat of communists was discussed in Chapter 3, this section will focus on the communalism. The threat of communalism was closely related to the ethnic diversity in Singapore. Because of the non-interventionist British colonial policy, the Singaporean society split in the 1950s and 60s, including the split in terms of class (capitalists versus proletariats); the split in terms of language (English-medium versus Chinese-medium); and also the split in terms of ethnicity (Chinese versus Malay). The splitting phenomenon was interrelated to the communist activities and thus wobble the society in the early stage of independent Singapore.

Labor Movement

The labor movement in Singapore was closely associated with the communist infiltration into labor unions. Before 1950s, the labor-capital relation was inharmonious and the strike of workers frequently happened as to strive for a fair remuneration. At that time, not only the private employees participate in the strike, but also the public servants such as postmen will supportively respond to the strike. The communists realized the discrimination suffered by the Chinese working class under the British colonial rule and thus promoted Communism by criticizing the capitalist exploitation

in Singapore. Due to the poor labor conditions, e.g., low remuneration and long working hour, the communist's advocate of labor protection gained massive support from the working class. The communists were then able to enter labor unions and exerted control over worker movements.

Although facing the radical labor movements, the British colonial government usually had the same standpoint as the capitalists; also, the colonial government had no intention to be a benevolent leader but to increase the profit gained from the colony; therefore, the colonial government tend to hold a passive attitude towards the labor movement and such an indifference was also the major reason for the active cooperation between the working class and the communists.

The two major leader of labor movements in Singapore are Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan. They were both with Chinese education background and the leaders of Singapore left-wing and pro-communist. Because of their Chinese background, they were highly advantageous on mobilization of Chinese population.

Year	Number of strike	Workers involved	Man-day's lost
1954	8	11,191	135,206
1955	275	57,433	946,354
1956	29	12,373	454,455
1957	27	8,233	109,349
1958	22	2,679	78,166
1959	40	1,939	26,588
1960	45	5,939	152,005
1961	116	43,584	410,889
1962	88	6,647	165,124
1963	47	33,004	388,219
1964	39	2,535	35,908
1965	30	3,374	45,800
1966	14	1,288	44,762
1967	10	4,491	41,322
1968	4	172	11,447
1969	0	0	0
1970	5	1,749	2,514
1971	2	1,380	5,449
1972	10	3,168	18,233
1973	5	1,312	2,295
1974	10	1,901	5,380
1975	7	1,865	4,835
1976	4	1,576	3,193
1977	1	406	1,011
1978	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0

*Figure 3. Singapore labor strikes, 1954-1980. Adapted from *The economic growth of Singapore: trade and development in the twentieth century* (p. 295), by W. G. Huff, 1994, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.*

Labor strike is a measure for expressing employees' requirements and should be regarded as one of the basic rights of the workers. However, in the Figure 3, in 1955 and 1961, the number of labor strikes were 275 and 116 respectively. Such a shocking statistic indicates an extremely high social costs, i.e., man-day's lost because of the major shutdown of social and economic activities. However, this unbelievably high number of strikes raise the doubt whether the strikes were genuine for labor interest or political influenced. One more notable point is that the labor strikes in Singapore usually out of control easily, one possible reason was that the indifferent attitude of the British colonial government infuriated the mass, but another important cause was the communist intervention and even incitement that resulted in the politicalized labor movements. The first Chief Minister of Singapore, Marshall was criticized not only because of his failure in materializing his campaign promise, i.e., an autonomous Singapore, but also was due to the ineffective handling of the frequent labor movements.

Student Movement

The participants of student movements in Singapore was mainly the students from Chinese-medium school which financed by the Chinese chambers of commerce and associations. Since the British colonial government had established English-medium schools but the enrollment target was offspring of British subjects in Singapore. Therefore, there was basically no choice for the majority of Chinese other than sending

their children into Chinese-medium school. However, the professions, such as lawyer, doctor, and civil services, required high English proficiency. In other words, the Chinese-medium school graduates with less fluent English were excluded in the professions and thus losing the only entry into middle-class. As a result, the social inequity generated the resentment among Chinese population. The leftists and communists grasped this opportunity and labelled the inequality as colonialism and imperialism in order to infiltrate into Chinese-medium schools in the form of study clubs. And the success of leftists was indicated by the establishment of Chinese-medium School Union (華文中學生聯合會), at the bases of The Chinese High School (華僑中學) and the Chung Cheng High School (中正中學)(Sin Pao, 1955, p. 1).

The explosion of resentment was triggered by the adoption of Compulsory National Service including both forced labor and military service for the youth (Gillis, 2005, p. 158). The students were aversive to the policy because of the lack of the sense of national identity towards the British colonial government let along the fact that they were never enjoyed the proper civil rights. On 13 May 1954, 500 students in Chung Cheng High School clashed with the police force on the way to the government office, resulted in the bloodshed conflict (Singh & Arasu, 1984, p. 151). The situation was aggravated because of the communist intervention and called for occupation in the campus. The unyielding attitude of the British colonial government eventuated in the

unity among different factions in the Chinese-medium schools (sponsored by different Chinese associations) and pushed a large proportion of students into the arms of communist party.

Ethnic struggles

In the colonial period, Singapore as an ethnic-diverse nation without effective inter-ethnicity communication channel, had occurred four serious ethnic struggles, including Maria Hertogh Riot in December 1950, racial riots in July and September 1964, and 513 Incident in 1969. In 1950, a 13 years-old Dutch girl called Maria who was previously adopted by a Muslim couple, was found by her biological parents who were captured by the Japanese during the invasion. Since Maria was already a Muslim, and her biological parents were Catholics, if Maria was brought back to Holland, she would probably be converted to Catholicism. This was totally unacceptable for the Muslim population in Singapore. Since most of the Malay population believed in Islam and the majority of Singapore police force were Muslim, the sympathy among the police resulted in ineffective law enforcement and thus resulted in the riot (Aljunied, 2009, p. 15-17). The two riots in 1964 and 513 Incident in 1969 were mainly resulted by the disharmony between Malay and Chinese population (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 21).

Summary

The clash triggered by the ethnic struggles inspired the PAP leaders with the

complicity in the Singaporean society. The labor and student strike was not only revealed the ethnic struggles between population using Chinese and English, but more importantly disclosed the problem of discrimination and social mobility, i.e., the chronic suppression of Chinese population by the colonial government limited the resources and opportunity for the non-British youth to strive for higher socio-economic status. According to the system theory proposed by David Easton (1957, p. 384), the Chinese population were exactly the one who were unsatisfied from the input of colonial government. On the other hand, the defect of non-interventionist ethnic policy was exposed in the student strike. Since all Chinese-medium schools were established and operated by the non-government organization, the colonial government could find no way to begin the intervention during the student strike.

Similarly, the initial cause of the racial riots revealed the fragile ethnic relations in Singapore, i.e., the dissatisfaction among ethnic minority. Therefore, any ethnic affairs handled with the slightest fault might result in serious ethnic struggles.

In consideration of the labor and student strike, the PAP government was able to satisfy the social upward mobility of the Chinese students in Singapore, e.g., allow the enrollment of graduates from Chinese medium school to Universities, in order to protect the legitimacy of the ruling party; and also retrieved the control over education as a safeguard against any future student riots. On the other hand, the PAP government

realized the seriousness of the ethnic problems and adopted all policy under the principle of ethnic harmony by taking all ethnic groups into account. As a result, the authoritarian regime of PAP government is essential to adopt ethnic policy under the principle of ethnic harmony without overemphasis or oversight on any ethnic group.

The authoritarian governance allows the isolated policy making, i.e., unaffected by the advocates of different ethnic groups, and thus maintaining limited pluralistic element in the politics, i.e., limited but significant political participation of ethnic minority, as to maintain the ethnic balance among the Chinese, Malaysian, Indian Singaporeans.

Chapter 5 Economy

As a country with depleted natural resources and limited population, the unemployment hit hard the post-WWII Singapore. The unemployment rate of Singapore in 1965 was at about 10%; the situation went from bad to worse because of the withdrawal of British military base in 1967 (formerly employed around 40,000 workers), which aggravated the already shaky economy (Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2011). Such circumstances left the PAP with no choice but industrialization. Favoring by the political and social stability achieved and maintained by the political dominance of the PAP government, Singapore was able to indulge in economic development.

Since the access to Malaysian market is rejected by the fear of communism in Strait Malacca, the PAP government spotlighted the opportunity hidden within multinational corporations (MNCs). Through the preferential taxes and generous subsidies, combining with the cheap land, assiduous labor and well-developed infrastructure, Singapore became a paradise for the MNCs' Asian headquarters (Hu, 2004, p. 781-783).

Apart from active steering of foreign capital, the PAP government also actively participate in the economic market in the form of Statutory Board. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) is widely applied to the strategic industry including petroleum,

telecommunications, electricity, water, steel and so on, as to avoid private monopoly that hindering people's livelihood as well as the national development.

On the other hand, the social infrastructure was significantly improved with thorough consideration of future, e.g., the increasing population and consuming power will probably exacerbate the traffic congestion; as to prevent this, "peak-load pricing" – charging the road user during the peak hour in the main arteries and "certificate of entitlement" – a fixed quota for vehicle which is valid for ten year only, were introduced (Lingle & Wickman, 1999, p. 56 cited in Wong & Huang, 2011, p. 131). Other examples are public housing – Housing Development Board (HDB) flats (Singapore Housing & Development Board, 2015, p. 4-5), and infrastructural improvement, e.g., the percentage of roads paved increased to 95.8% in 1986 (Campos & Root, 1996, p. 26), which largely contributing to the social harmony.

The synergy between the economic and social policy was proved to be extraordinarily successful. The unemployment rate was restrained below 3.6% in 1978 and 1.9% in 2015 (Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2011; Singapore Ministry of Manpower, 2016); the national growth rate were maintained in the double digits from 1965-1978 (Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2011).

However, the PAP was not satisfied by the temporary economic success and was ambitious to embark further economic shift from labor intensive industry to capital and

skilled intensive business in the 1980s as well as to settle life sciences as the fourth economic pillar among engineering, electronics, and chemicals. In addition, government-linked company, Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation was established and actively involving the project cooperation out of the border, e.g., industrial township in Suzhou and Wuxi in China, Bangalore in India, and Indonesia (Lingle & Wickman, 1999, p. 57). Even during the hardest period started by the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Singapore government was able to convert the clutch into an opportunity by innovating the Government Linked Corporations (GLCs) and establishing the Government Investment Corporation (GIC) aiming at the external economic expansion and thus reenergizing the delicate domestic economy by attracting foreign capital (Wong & Huang, 2011, p. 131).

In the 21st century, the PAP government realize the demand for social liberalization and successfully achieved it as to attract more foreign talents without any political compromise on the PAP dominance, e.g., the creation of an open-minded government image by setting up various consulting committees (details will be provided in Chapter 7). Apart from the economic advantage brought by the imported talent, the superficial softening of the authoritarian image of Singapore government improved the domestic legitimacy of the PAP governance along with the international reputation.

Overall, under the PAP administration and its provident economy-leading policy

combined with social adjustment, the GDP per capita in Singapore rocketed for 39 fold from \$1320 in 1960 to \$53143 in 2009 (Verweji & Pelizzo 2009, p. 20) which surpassing its former colonial master, Britain in 1994; except the recessions in 1964 and 1985, Singapore achieved an average annual GDP growth of 8.5%, namely, implying more than a doubling of GDP in a decade (Lingle & Wickman, 1999, p. 55) and thus achieved one of the rarest economic miracle in the postwar period.

Summary

The authoritarian regime in Singapore provided the required social and political stability for stable economic development as well as to maintain the control over economy by active participation as well as supervision to guide the market to the preferable direction. In return, the committed economic prosperity legitimized the authoritarian governance of the PAP. Therefore, the main source of its authoritarian legitimacy is from the socioeconomic advancement while the socioeconomic development is facilitated under the authoritarian regime. Therefore, in the case of Singapore, the relationship between the authoritarianism and the economic development is complementary, i.e., the consolidation of either one is actually strengthening each other.

Chapter 6 International Factors

Malay-Singapore Relationship

No matter in politics, economy, social culture, or even geography, the relationship between Singapore and Malaya was close together. In terms of economy, the commodity of Singapore relied heavily on Malay; in terms of social culture, the second largest ethnic group – Malay – in Singapore, accounted for the highest ethnic composition in Malaya and, as a matter of course, the Malaysian Singaporean were culturally influenced by the Malaya; geographically, Singapore was connected to Johor state of Malaya through a causeway; and politically, during the colonial period, Singaporean usually regarded themselves as a part of Malaya as they shared the same colonial master – the British government. However, the political development after the independence of Singapore gradually resulted in the conflicts between the two nations with kinship previously.

In 1959, the self-government in Singapore led by Lee Kuan Yew, actively drove the merger between Singapore and Malaya. It was because in the post-war period, the demand for decolonization was prevailed but the British colonial purposely handled the independence of Singapore and Malaya in a separated manner, i.e., the postponement of independence of Singapore as to retain the geographical and economic advantages due to the special strategic significance of Singapore. Therefore, when the PAP

considered the hidden motive of the colonial government, it believed that the merger with Malaya would be the best choice for an autonomous Singapore.

But Malaya government at first was not willing to accept the merger of Singapore. Under the leadership of Tunku Abudu Rahman, Malay government realized that the large Chinese population in Singapore may threaten the political status by outnumbering the Malay population. However, in 1961, the British approval for bringing Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei into the merger, could ensure the Malay population remaining as the majority of ethnic group as well as to maintain its privileged status; accordingly, Rahman welcomed the affiliation of Singapore (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 3). Apart from the consideration of Chinese population, the rapidly growing communist activities in Singapore was also an incentive for Rahman's approval as to directly control Singapore to stop the communism from spreading further into Malaya (Lee, 2008, p. 100-1).

Under such a fragile basis of cooperation, a series of racial riots was sufficient enough to break it. On 9 August 1965, Singapore was withdrawn from Malaysia and became an independent nation. There were three major reasons for the withdrawal of Singapore: firstly, Brunei refused to affiliate to the Federation of Malaya (Lee, 2008, p. 228). This resulted in the outnumbering of Malay population by the Chinese Singaporean and this disadvantage would be magnified because of the 'one man, one

vote' principle of universal suffrage. Malays could not risk to lose the political predominance when they could already hardly breathe due to the dominant economic advantage of Chinese in Malaya so the only choice to regain the privilege of Malay was to get rid of Singapore.

Secondly, the politically active performance of Singaporean got on the nerves of the Central government in Kuala Lumpur. Singaporean politicians led by Lee Kuan Yew actively interacted with other federal members to promote the concept of 'Malaysian Malaysia' and successfully established the Malaysian Solidarity Convention including the PAP itself, the People's Progressive Party and United Democratic Party in Malaya, and United People's Party in Sarawak (Lee, 1998, p. 37). The Kuala Lumpur government believed that the PAP led by Lee Kuan Yew was not only targeted to rule Singapore but also to encroach the whole Malaysia and thus causing serious potential threat to the ruling party in Malaya – UMNO. As a Malaysia controlled by Chinese population was the last thing Malay population want to see, the Singapore withdrawal was necessary.

Thirdly, Malaysia was relieved to allow the withdrawal of Singapore from the federation because it was certain that Singapore was unable to become a fully independent republic because of the resource deficiency, the lack of national defense, and the harsh political environment (Soon, 1969, p. 164-165). Therefore, it was the

unilateral willingness of Malaysia that Singapore's request to rejoin the Federation was just a matter of time and the Kuala Lumpur government would have much more bargaining chips during the negotiation of re-merger.

Indonesia-Singapore Relationship

In 1950s and 60s, the South-East Asia was shrouded in the communist threat. The victory of Chinese Communist Party in 1949 heartened the communists in South-East Asian regions, especially arousing to Singapore with major Chinese population. However, with respect to other Malayan regions, the communist expansion in South-East Asia was regarded as dangerous. Under the anti-communist stance shared by the majority of Malayan nations, Singapore became a target to take precautions against or even of international criticism.

Apart from antagonism generally derived from the communist activities, Singapore was especially subjected to the unfriendly attitude of Indonesia. It was because the supportive stance on the merger with Malaya, implied that Singapore agreed that Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei in Borneo were belonged to the Federation of Malaysia. As India and Philippines both claimed to possess the sovereignty of Borneo, they were irritated with the merger (van der Kroef, 1963, p. 173). Indonesian government had required the British government to survey the wish of Borneo residents regarding the merger with Malaya. The report provided by the Cobbold Commission in

August 1962 revealed that a majority of Borneo residents supported the merger (Cobbold Commission, 1962, p. 67-8). But this result was not accepted by both Indonesia and Philippines and they request the intervention by the United Nation (UN). In June 1963, another investigation conducted by the UN was unanimous with the Cobbold Commission (United Nation, 1963). Again, the result was not accepted by Indonesia and Philippines.

After the establishment of the Federation of Malaya, Indonesian government broke off diplomatic relations with the Federation. A large quantities of protesters gathered in front of the Malaysian Embassy and British Embassy in Jakarta; in revenge, the Malaysian protesters assembled at the Indonesia Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. The confrontation between Malaya and Indonesia was intensified by several bombings, the most serious one was the MacDonald House bombing in Singapore causing three casualties and 33 injuries (Singapore National Library Board, 2014).

Summary

The separation of Singapore from Malaysia indicates the old day kinship is now converting to the present competitive relationship. An independent Singapore can no longer rely on Malaysia on both political and economic aspects. For instance, before the withdrawal of Singapore from Malaysia, the central government was responsible for the diplomatic affairs including the serious confrontation with Indonesia, Singapore had no need to directly cope with the problem. But after the independence of Singapore, the Federation could no longer exist as a shield and the PAP government was required to take care of the edgy international relations. Additionally, due to the precarious political struggle within the PAP and the suffocated economic situation in Singapore after the withdrawal of British colonial government and the denial of access to Malaysian market, the emergence of authoritarian regime seemed to be the only and the best solution for Singapore. Because only one-party political dominance could create a politically stable society and thus leading the post-war Singapore out of the economic stagnation.

Chapter 7 Authoritarian Political System

Facing the internal destabilizing factors, i.e., the attempt of power seizure by communists, and the potential ethnic struggles, as well as the external inhospitable international environment resulted by the withdrawal from Malaysia, i.e., the cooling kinship with Malaysia and the sovereignty discord with Indonesia and Philippines, the PAP adopt the authoritarian governance to consolidate its ruling power. This chapter identified the main characteristics of the tailored political system under the PAP governance and related the characteristics with the political, social, and international events as well as the economy mentioned in the previous chapters.

Parliamentary System

The political system of Singapore is a legacy from the British colonial government, namely, the parliamentary democracy. However, the practical operation of Singaporean political system is profoundly different from that of British parliamentary system. To be more precise, the parliamentary system of Singapore retained only the framework, i.e., the Cabinet system is organized by the majority party leader; the Prime Minister is served by the majority party leader and is legally accountable to Parliament; Parliament is constitutionally responsible for organizing election every five years, but without the essence of the British version.

The British parliamentary system is established on the basis of two-party competition and thus named as parliamentary democratic system. Through the supervision by the opposition party, the probability of ineffective decision-making by the ruling party can be theoretically lowered; and once the government in office performed unsatisfactorily, citizens are able to vote out the ruling party. Therefore, apart from playing the role of supervisor, opposition party is required to be ready for immediate functioning right after the power transfer and that is the reason for the emergence of shadow cabinet within the opposition party. In contrast with British system, Parliamentary system of Singapore lacked the two-party competition, the PAP has stayed in power since 1959, and achieved single-party dominant system after a series of by-elections in 1968; from that moment, and the political development of Singapore was fully grasped in the hand of the PAP.

Because of the absence of two-party competition, the first Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew is able to maintain its political influence for an extremely long time. Lee Kuan Yew served as Prime Minister of Singapore from 1959 in the period of self-government administration and the Prime Minister of Singapore from 1965 after the independence, until November of 1990. He had ruled for 31 year and five months and being one of the longest in power political leader in Asia. After Lee's step down as Prime Minister, he was appointed as Senior Minister by his successor Goh

Chok Tong, and this implied the continuous political influence of Lee Kuan Yew on Singapore even after his resignation.

Unlike the British political system, i.e., the President is a symbolic political leader who does not enjoy any executive and legislative power, Singapore intentionally increased the power of President. According to the amendment of constitution on 3 January 1991 and the President Elections Act approved by Parliament on 29 July 1991, President of Singapore was directly elected by people instead of nominated by the Parliament, and regain a part of executive power. Such an innovative constitutional design was Lee Kuan Yew's idea. According to Cotton (1993, p. 8), Lee Kuan Yew first considered the possibility for power enhancement of President in 1982 and brought up this idea in 1984. Until 1988, Goh Chok Tong suggested to resolve this motion by public vote and Lee Kuan Yew emphasized to Goh, that he had no intention to be the first democratically elected President. The reason for Lee Kuan Yew's idea was due to his uncertainty to ensure all Prime Minister will be just and incorruptible, hence, a President with more power will hopefully restrain the governance in a greater extent. However, Lee's intention to expand President's power was not recognize the democratic trend, instead was to avoid future leader from introducing extravagant populist policy in exchange for the public support and eventually destroy the foundation of Singapore. In other words, the increase of President authority is another mechanism

for monitoring the authoritarian regime in Singapore in response to the previous communist attempts of power seizure.

Institution and Leadership

In the early governance of the PAP, a frequent communication between the Party and the common people was maintained, for instance, the MP in each local branch will regularly grant an interview to the town representative, in order to raise the reputation of the MPs as well as to consolidate the support for the PAP in the future election. But later due to the fact that the PAP had already dominated the Parliament, the communication mechanism was gradually converted to a mere formality.

Transforming from a responsive government to an authoritarian regime, one of the important steps is the party-nation amalgamation, i.e., the policy decision of the party is the policy decision of the nation. The nation becomes a mere legitimacy-provider as all the planning and decision-making process are finished within the party. Since the party decision model only involved a handful of elites, those participated in the final decision-making must be the best of the best. The same elitist decision model can be identified in Singapore where the PAP is the final decision-maker.

The decision model of the PAP is characterized by the top-down technical-instrumental basis of decision making. The policy decision of the PAP is regarded as the technical solution of problem; the solution is then distributed to the corresponding

instrumental institution and executed by the technical personnel (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 37). This decision model implies that the leaders of PAP do not regard the voters as a good choice of decision-maker as the individuals do not possess the professional knowledge of policy making and the information required for decision-making. Under this assumption, the PAP government minimizes the public participation in the policy-making process; thereby, ordinary people have no chance to participate in any process of policy-making let along the decision-making. The insulation of policy-making from the public is to ensure the policy coherence especially for the ethnic policy, i.e., under the principle of ethnic harmony and fairness. Through the elimination of public participation in policy-making, the self-interest represented by different interest group can be removed; in this way, the policy maker can attempt to balance the interests of all the stakeholders without the resistance from the vested interests.

Apart from the decision model, the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew played a significant role on the PAP governance. Lee Kuan Yew's leadership can be described as a patriarchy. The concept of patriarchy is originated from the traditional Chinese family relationship, it is characterized by the absolute obedience and total respect to the decision of father as well as other senior family members. Politically, the PAP, or more accurately, Lee Kuan Yew plays a role of father by taking care all citizens like children within a large family called Singapore. Therefore, any decision-making of the PAP is

beyond doubt and argument of Singaporeans. Superficially, the patriarchal decision model is unfeasible in a modern society, but due to the unfamiliarity of democratic system and political participation of Singaporean, the brilliant achievement of the PAP by bringing independence as well as economic advancement in Singapore becomes the most legitimate reason for the continue political dominance of the PAP in Singapore.

The meritocratic decision model of the PAP as well as the patriarchal leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, on one hand avoided the emergence of populism by almost eliminating public political participation, on the other hand also remove the active role of individual in national development. For an authoritarian regime, it is reasonable for minimize the political participation in order to suppress the excessive development of pluralism. But wrong policy decision is still possible in such a rigorous decision model of the PAP, for instance, the Graduate Mothers Scheme in 1980s (Lazar, 2001, p. 70-71). This policy was based on Lee Kuan Yew's eugenic view on the population policy, the government provided incentives like preferential tax rate and education subsidies for children, as to encourage educated mother to have three to four children. This aroused public criticism due to the discrimination behind the policy, i.e., mothers with less education level should not give birth.

The arousing public opinion on policy was resulted as the new generation of Singaporean who demand more political participation, became the backbone of society.

At the same time, the founding member of the PAP, including Lee Kuan Yew, Lim Kim San, Goh Keng Swee and Toh Chin Chye, gradually faded out from the political stage. The second generation of the PAP leaders, Goh Chok Tong and Tan Keng Yam then adopted the consultative mode of decision-making as to respond to the growing demand of political participation by the new generation of Singaporean as surveyed by the Ministry of Community Development in 1988. In addition to the increasing popularity of opposition party, Goh expressed that the government will be open and consultative in the future by setting up Feedback Unit in 1985 (later restructured to REACH, 'reaching everyone for active citizenry' in 2006), Government Parliamentary Committees (GPCs) in 1987 (People's Action Party, 2015), and Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), an independent think-tank of public policy in 1988.

The second generation of the PAP government no longer insisted to the slogan: 'Government is always right'. The Government was more willing to accept the public opinion and criticism on policy making and even abandoned some controversial policy like the Graduate Mothers Scheme. In 1997, 'Singapore 21' scheme was introduced to encourage public opinion on the development of Singapore in the 21st century (Singapore National Library Board, 1997). This implied that the PAP's recognition to the significance of public participation to the political legitimacy of governance, but the baseline is to get everything under the PAP's control during the liberalization. This

principle could be observed in the establishment of Speaker's Conner in Hong Lim Park.

It was to allow free opinion in Singapore society as to eradicate the 'myth' of limited freedom of speech in Singapore. However, the content of speech was not able to include political sensitive topic, such as religion and ethnicity, and the whole process will be recorded to ensure not violating the Internal Security Act (ICA).

Electoral System

Regular election is often included in authoritarian regime. It is because an open election that allows the participation of opposition party can create a politically pluralistic image to dodge the criticism from the Western democratic nations. In reality, the ruling party will utilize its executive and legislative power to dispel the opposition party through the redesigned electoral system, e.g., electoral district rearrangement, limitations on candidates, limited campaign period, and so on. As a result, the winning rate of candidates from opposition party will be significantly declined and thus compressing the opposite political influence; therefore, the election result will be under the control of ruling party.

The general election in Singapore demonstrated the similar pattern. According to Figure 4.1, in 1968-1997, the average percentage of votes for the opposition party was 30.81%. But among the eight elections, opposition party could not get any seat in four elections, i.e., 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1980. After 1984, the average number of seats won by the opposition party was 2.25, not even reaching 2% of the total seats in Parliament. This shows the ratio between the average percentage of votes and the number of seats in Parliament was disproportioned.

Referring to Figure 4.2, in the elections which the opposition party won no seats, i.e., 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, the contested seats accounted for 57.99% of the total Parliament seats. And later in 1984, the percentage was further increased to 62.03%.

Thus it can be seen the opposition party was committed to the election, but what is the reason for the disproportion between the percentage of votes and the number of Parliament seats? This section will analysis this phenomenon through electoral system and campaign strategy of the PAP in Singapore.

Year		1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1991	1997	2001	2006	2011	2015
% of vote	PAP	84.43	69.02	72.4	75.55	62.94	63.2	60.97	64.98	75.3	66.6	60.14	69.86
	Opposition party	15.57	30.98	27.6	24.45	37.06	36.8	39.03	35.02	24.7	33.4	39.86	30.14
No. of seat	PAP	58	65	69	75	77	80	77	81	82	82	81	83
	Opposition party	0	0	0	0	2	1	4	2	2	2	6	6
	Total	58	65	69	75	79	81	81	83	84	84	87	89

Figure 4.1. Percentage of vote and number of Parliament seats of the PAP and opposition party, 1968-2015. Adapted from Parliamentary elections results, by Singapore Elections Department, n.d., Retrieved from http://www.eld.gov.sg/elections_past_parliamentary.html. Collated and coordinated by the author.

Year	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1991	1997	2001	2006	2011	2015
Total seats	58	65	69	75	79	81	81	83	84	84	87	89
Contested seats	7	57	53	38	49	70	40	36	29	47	82	89
% of contested seats	12.07	87.69	81.54	50.67	62.03	86.42	49.38	43.37	34.52	55.95	94.25	100%

Figure 4.2. Number of total Parliament seats and the number of contested seats of opposition party, 1968-2015. Adapted from Parliamentary elections results, by Singapore Elections Department, n.d., Retrieved from http://www.eld.gov.sg/elections_past_parliamentary.html. Collated and coordinated by the author.

There were two period of the electoral system in Singapore: single-constituency (SC) before 1988, and both SCS co-exists with group representation constituency (GRC) after 1988.

Single-constituency (SC).

This system stipulated that regardless of the number of candidates, a constituency only allowed for one elect produced by first-past-the-post (FPTP) voting, i.e., the candidate with the highest vote (even below 50% of the total vote) becomes the elect (Ahmed, 2012, p. 67-69). Normally, SC system is more favorable to large-scale political party that can provide better support to the candidate in terms of reputation and other campaign resources. Additionally, under SC, the median voters are the key to success in election so it is infeasible to seek for support through radical manifesto. According to the four elections from 1968-1980, the PAP as the largest political party in Singapore experienced no threat from the small opposition party.

Also, the average percentage of vote of opposition party was not low but the number of seats obtained was disproportionately little. It was because another characteristic of SC – the winner takes all – even a candidate with one more vote than his opponent, he is eligible to be the elect. This well explained the disproportion of the support rate and the number of parliament seats obtained by the opposition party and thus resulting in the political dominance of the PAP.

Group representation constituency (GRC).

Apart from SC, Singapore also adopted the tailored electoral system – group representation constituency (GRC). This system was designed to balance the ethnic representativeness in the Parliament, in order to avoid the damage to the political right of minor Malay and Indonesia population in Singapore (Fetzer, 2008, p. 142-144). After the election in 1984, the PAP government discovered the involvement of ethnic factor in the election, i.e., the voters tend to select the candidate with the same ethnic background. However, because of the development of public housing, the previously compact ethnic community was divided. As a result, the ethnic minority could not support the candidate with the same ethnic background in the single constituency. In order to protect the political right of the ethnic minority and as to avoid the consequent ethnic dissatisfaction, the PAP government introduced the GRC which was passed in the parliament on 18 May 1988 (Fetzer, 2008, p. 135).

The main characteristic of GRC is the grouping of candidates, i.e., four to six candidates as one group; at least one candidate is from the ethnic minority (Malay or Indian); and all candidates must be from the same political party or a whole group of individual candidates. The vote is for the group instead for the individual candidates inside the group. In the eyes of opposition party, the GRC is another form of political suppression. Due to the small scale of opposition party, it is already rough to send a candidate in a single constituency and not to mention assigning four to six candidates

in one group representation constituency. But the PAP government respond by emphasizing the possibility of the victory of opposition party in one group representation constituency implied a valuable chance to increase the Parliament seats of opposition party.

In 1988, the first election started to adopt the GRC. The opposition party participate in 6 GRC and being annihilated. In 1991 and 1997 elections, the PAP government further increased the number of GRC and decreased that of the single constituency because of the effectiveness of GRC, i.e., the ethnic minority accounted for 19.75% of the MPs in 1988, the number increased to 23.46% in 1997 (Weng, 1999, p. 15-6). But it is noteworthy that most of the ethnic minority Parliament members were from the PAP. Since it is impossible that only the ethnic minority with the PAP membership can represent the Malay and Indian population. Therefore, the unfairness in the electoral system was clear but this also implied that forming political party based on the ethnicity is undesirable; and only the inter-ethnic basis of political party can adopt in both SC and GRC. In this way, GRC fulfilled the purpose for protecting the political right of ethnic minority, but on the other hand, it greatly suppressed the lebensraum of the political party.

Electoral strategy.

Apart from the electoral system, the PAP manipulated its electoral procedural and strategic advantage to further suppress the development of opposition party.

Uncontested candidates.

According to the Parliamentary Election Act (The Statutes of the Republic of Singapore, 2011, p. 49), “only one candidate or a group of candidates stands nominated for that division, the Returning Officer shall immediately - (a) declare the nominated candidate or the group of candidates to be elected; and (b) cause the name or names of the Member or Members so elected to be published in the Gazette”. As shown in the Figure 4.3, the opposition party is feeble in terms of political resources, it is not able to assign candidates to all constituencies, especially for the GRCs that required 4-6 candidates as the basic unit of election (the candidate shortage is improved after the 1980s). Additionally, for those who possess the double identity of the Cabinet members and the member of Parliament (MP) enjoy the higher reputation and the media exposure as a government officials and therefore there is no comparison for the opposition party candidates.

Short campaign period.

As shown in Figure 4.4, the campaign period of Parliamentary election is maximized in 10 days. The 10-day period is more than enough for the scale of election in Singapore. However, the opposition party criticized the date of the poll is decided by the ruling party. Since Singapore is under a Parliamentary system that constitutionally allowed the dissolution of Parliament by the ruling party. In this way, the PAP is able to decide the date of general election as well as the date of the poll; therefore, the PAP is able to deploy the political resources and plan the campaign event beforehand in order to earn more time for the promotion of the PAP candidates. On the other hand, in the non-electoral campaign period, the opposition party is not allowed to organize any election-related events, and even if the opposition party planned to gather the crowd for other purpose, the complicated application procedure and the possible deny from the PAP government lead to the unprepared or at least not-fully prepared election for the opposition party. As a result, the PAP is able to beat the exhausted enemy every time in the general election.

Year	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1991	1997	2001	2006	2011	2015
No. of Uncontested Seats	51	8	16	37	29	5	11	9	10	7	1	0

Figure 4.3. The number of uncontested seats in Parliamentary elections, 1968-2015. Adapted from Parliamentary elections results, by Singapore Elections Department, n.d., Retrieved from http://www.eld.gov.sg/elections_past_parliamentary.html. Collated and coordinated by the author.

Year	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1991	1997	2001	2006	2011	2015
Campaign Period	23 Aug – 2 Sept	13 Dec – 23 Dec	13 Dec – 23 Dec	12 Dec – 22 Dec	24 Aug – 3 Sept	21 Aug – 31 Aug	23 Dec – 2 Jan	25 Oct – 3 Nov	27 Apr – 6 May	27 Apr – 7 May	1 Sept – 11 Sept
Duration (Days)	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	10	10

Figure 4.4. The duration of campaign period in Parliamentary elections, 1972-2015. Adapted from Parliamentary elections results, by Singapore Elections Department, n.d., Retrieved from http://www.eld.gov.sg/elections_past_parliamentary.html. Collated and coordinated by the author.

Favorable policy in exchange for vote.

Reasonably, the PAP as the ruling party has utilized the executive power to promote favorable policy in the general election as to draw the public support. In 1997 election, the Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tung and the Minister for Defense, Tan Keng Yam publicly stated if the opposition party candidate is elected, the public housing renovation in the constituency will be postponed. Expectably, the election result will be inclined to the PAP candidate as the voters are tend to focus on the immediate benefits from the public policy instead of breaking the long-term political dominance of the PAP.

Political suppression instruments

The instruments included the Internal Security Act (ISA), i.e., authorization of the government to detain any suspects of indefinite duration without custody (The Statutes of the Republic of Singapore, 1987, p. 37) and the surveillance network of preceding Special Branch. The two instruments were designed for anti-communist operations. However, after the elimination of Singaporean communists, the PAP government still retain the ISA in the Constitution. And the existence of ISA is still regarded as the main cause of unachievable democratization as well as the survival of authoritarianism in Singapore nowadays.

Leninist political system

After several attempts of power seizure by the pro-communist faction in the PAP, Lee Kuan Yew and other key figures restructured the rigid party structure, strengthened the control over party member, and centralized the party power in the cadre party. The core of the PAP is the CEC which is constituted by 18 executive members who mostly share identity as the cabinet members. Before entering the CEC, one must be promoted to cadre member. A cadre member candidate is required to have at least two years of party service, and significantly contribution to the party development, the recommendation from at least one executive member in CEC, and finally decided by vote in the CEC (Mauzy & Milne, 2002, p. 40-41). In this way, the power within PAP is highly centralized and thus preventing the future external attempt of power seizure.

Summary

When facing the challenge of opposition party, the PAP fully utilized the executive advantage based on the collaboration between the executive and the legislative branch as well as the control over Parliament to optimize the electoral system for predominant general election. Since the Parliamentary election is opened to public election and constitutionally organized in every five years, in other words, the electoral system is legitimized by the Parliament as well as the people's approval; therefore, the democratic concept of 'rule of law' is manipulated by the PAP as to maintain its authoritarian regime. In contrast to other authoritarian regimes which utilize Emergency Act to block

the general election as to remain in power, the legal and legitimized means of PAP is more brilliant.

The development of Singaporean political system correspond to the definition of political development stated in the section of *Literature Review* (p. 11), including: (1) increasing “political stability”, i.e., the continuous and complete PAP political dominance since 1968; increasing “political participation”, i.e., the GRCs escalate the representativeness of ethnic minority in Parliament; and increasing “executive capacity”, i.e., the complete control of PAP on the Parliament as well as the bureaucracy.

The Singaporean political system also demonstrated the typical characteristics of authoritarianism as stated in the section of *Literature Review* (p. 13), including: (1) “the limited political pluralistic regime”, i.e., a strict political and social control with a relatively opened economy; (2) “distinctive mentality”, the insulating policy-making and patriarchal leadership; and (3) “controlled by a single leader or a small group of key figures”, i.e., the PAP is controlled by Lee Kuan Yew and other PAP founding members, e.g., Lim Kim San, Goh Keng Swee and Toh Chin Chye before 1990s and later controlled by Goh Chok Tong in 2000s and Lee Hsien Loong in the present.

Conclusion

The political development of a nation depends on a plenty of variables. In order to

comprehend a nation's political development, variables should be selected and deliberated and thus searching for the interrelationship and their combined effect on the political development.

Along with the seven previous chapters, the conclusion of the political development of authoritarian regime in Singapore can now be drawn.

Political Aspect

The political background and events of Singapore contributed significantly to the formation of authoritarianism in Singapore. Under the British colonial rule, although the political participation of Singaporean was highly discouraged, the British framework of bureaucracy still contributed to the development of Parliamentary system for Singapore. Consequently, the collaboration between the legislative and executive branches within the Cabinet system allows the complete domination of the PAP by simply controlling the Parliament since 1968.

In the post-war period, Singapore entered the active political stage that teeming with political party competitions and elections. The inter- and intra-party power struggles forged the PAP party system into a much more secure institution, i.e., a cadre system, to resist internal as well as external power seizure. The centralized party power and the consequent stability within the PAP allowed the exclusive focus on the suppression of opposition party as well as the consolidation of PAP's political

dominance.

The collapse of the communist faction and later the BS also contributed to the authoritarian governance of the PAP. The BS's volunteer retreat from the Parliament and abandonment of being the majority opposition party, resulted in the disillusion of two-party competition in the Parliament of Singapore. As a result, there was no more resistance against the PAP to take full control over the Parliament and the whole Singapore.

Social and International Aspect

The social background and events of Singapore demonstrated the necessity for the PAP authoritarian rule. The cultural diversified demography in Singapore required extremely high policy coherence as to maintain the subtle balance between the ethnic groups, Chinese, Malaysian, and Indian Singaporeans. Therefore, an authoritarian government can easier achieve the maximized balance of manifold interests by isolating the policy-making process and decision-making from the public, i.e., regardless of the interest of a specific stakeholders and the vested interests. Additionally, the cultural diversity provided the best incentive for the PAP government to establish the GRCs by both increasing the political participation among ethnic majority while further demolishing the odds of success of the opposition party and thus further strengthening the authoritarian regime in Singapore.

Economic Aspect

The successful economic achievement of Singapore is complementary to the authoritarian governance in Singapore. The one-party political dominance of the PAP generated the prerequisites of stable economic growth, namely, the high political and social stability. Reciprocally, the economic advancement brings about the social development enjoyed by the Singaporeans, and thus legitimizing the political dominance of the PAP. As a result, a virtuous circle is formed, i.e., as long as the authoritarian governance of the PAP is able to sustain the economic development in Singapore, the Singaporean will in return approve and accept the political dominance of the PAP as a necessity for economic growth.

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