Comparing the transformation on
school education and citizenship development in
Hong Kong and Communist China

A project undertaken in partial fulfilment of the requirements
of the B.Soc.Sc. (Hons.) in Applied Sociology (East and Southeast Asia),
City University of Hong Kong

by

CHOI Ka Hin

Department of Asian and International Studies,
City University of Hong Kong

May, 2007
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF TABLES</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Background of this project</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Significance of this project</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 Uncovering the hidden curriculum of Civic or National Education in Hong Kong and Communist China</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2 Addressing the engagement of globalization on Civic or National Education in Hong Kong and Communist China</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 School education and social solidarity</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Values Education</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Moral Education</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Origins of the notion of “citizenship”</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Importance of Civic Education or National Education for “modern nation-states”</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.1 Formation of “modern nation-states”</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.2 “Modern nation-states”</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.3 State-society relations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.4 The notion of “citizenship” for the “modern nation-states”</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Conceptual Framework</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 The notion of “nation” and “nation-building”</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 School education and the construction of nationality</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2 Methodology

3.2.1 Research design

3.2.2 Research methods

3.2.3 Research questions

3.2.4 Hypotheses

CHAPTER 4: DATA AND FINDINGS

4.1 Civic Education and citizenship development in Hong Kong

4.1.1 Civic Education: A historical account

4.1.1.1 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Civic Education from the late 1940s to early 1980s

4.1.1.2 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Civic Education in the mid-1980s: Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools in 1985

4.1.1.3 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Civic Education in the mid-1990s: Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools in 1996

4.1.1.4 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Civic Education after 1997: Learning for Life, Learning through Life: Reform Proposals for the Education System in Hong Kong in 2000

4.1.2 Citizenship development in Hong Kong

4.2 National Education and citizenship development in Communist China

4.2.1 National Education: A historical account

4.2.1.1 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Political Education prior to 1978

4.2.1.2 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Patriotic Education beyond 1978

4.2.2 Citizenship development in Communist China
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Aims and objectives
5.1.1 Aims and objectives in Hong Kong
5.1.2 Aims and objectives in Communist China
5.1.3 Comparing aims and objectives in both societies

5.2 Teaching methods
5.2.1 Teaching methods in Hong Kong
5.2.2 Teaching methods in Communist China
5.2.3 Comparing teaching methods in both societies

5.3 Implementation approach
5.3.1 Implementation approach in Hong Kong
5.3.2 Implementation approach in Communist China
5.3.3 Comparing implementation approach in both societies

5.4 The outcome of Civic or National Education
5.4.1 The outcome of Civic Education in Hong Kong
5.4.2 The outcome of National Education in Communist China
5.4.3 Comparing the outcome of Civic or National Education in both societies

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS

6.1 Conclusion
6.2 Limitations of this project
6.2.1 Absence for primary research
6.2.2 Short of informal curriculum

REFERENCES
**LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1: The notion of “citizenship” in the ancient Greek polis and the “modern nation-states”................................................................................................................................. 13

Table 2: The characteristics of *Civic Education* in Hong Kong........................................ 42

Table 3: Candidates of the 1996 Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE)........................................................................................................................................ 44

Table 4: Candidates of the 1996 Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination (HKALE)........................................................................................................................................ 45

Table 5: Comparison of HKALE *Government and Public Affairs* syllabuses between 1988 and 1996.......................................................................................................................... 48

Table 6: Types of political culture.......................................................................................... 54

Table 7: Mean difference of sense of citizenship in general political attitude between the registered voters for Hong Kong *Legislative Council* between 1995 and 1998...................................................................................................................................... 56

Table 8: Satisfaction with the existing political system (Percentage)............................... 57

Table 9: *Rules of Conduct for all Middle Schools Students*................................................. 66

Table 10: Comparing the policy lines between “red” (i.e. represented by Mao) and “expert” (i.e. represented by Liu) in *Two Lines Struggle*................................................................. 71

Table 11: Comparative politics curriculum for junior secondary schools prior to and beyond 1978................................................................................................................................. 80

Table 12: Comparing GDP per capita for 30 provinces in Communist China between 1978 and 2004 (at 1978 constant prices)..................................................................................... 82
Table 13: Comparison of secondary school students’ views on the 1987 and 1989 demonstrations

Table 14: The growth of internet usage in Communist China (1997-2004)

Table 15: Courses on Ideopolitical Education in Junior Secondary Schools

Table 16: Political participation (i.e. voting behaviour) by gender and age group in Communist China

Table 17: Values orientation of Hong Kong youngsters

Table 18: Moral values held by early adolescents in Communist China

Table 19: Summary of mean scores for the thirteen qualities of “good citizenship” obtained in Guangzhou, Hangzhou and Hong Kong
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The undertaking and eventual completion of this directed research project has been a profoundly rewarding academic experience in the context of project-based learning. Throughout this year, this project learning does more or less help me cultivate a kind of self-directed, self-regulated and self-reflecting learning capacities. As far as I am concerned, the process of conducting research and writing of this project report in this year has actually shaped my scope on acquiring and constructing knowledge, which greatly allowed me to pursue the deeper knowledge on those inter-correlated political and socio-economic issues across both Chinese societies - Hong Kong and Communist China.

Being the supervisor for this research project, my uttermost gratitude goes to Dr. David Chan at the Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong. He has provided his untiring and instrumental guidance periodically for my production from an initial draft to a final paper over this project. To the best of my knowledge, his practical advice has not only offered me an informative insight into the changes on schools education and citizenship development in Hong Kong and Communist China, but also let me know how to design and carry out a research successfully.
To be the most important source of my emotional support, I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my parents, who have been patient and understanding of mine at large.
ABSTRACT

Across two distinctive Chinese societies, this project could be characterized as a comparative study of the changes on school education and citizenship development in Hong Kong and Communist China from the late 1940s, just after the end of Second World War. Since the school education has been always playing a crucial role on “civic cohesion” in both Chinese societies, the present research aims to explore whether there are any correlation between school education and citizenship development in the context of Government policies and the subsequent implementations at schools level. Where relevant, some statistical data and findings would be presented as well for further elaboration.

In this research project, four hypotheses are selected as the possible correlations between school education and citizenship development in Hong Kong and Communist China. As originally expected, the data and findings collected ultimately confirm all hypotheses as valid that the school education has always been changing along with citizenship development in both places, which will be further expounded in the chapter of discussion and analysis. As usual, a number of limitations of this project have been also highlighted for those forthcoming researchers continuing to explore the role of education and the development of citizenship in the academic world.
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION

1.1  Background of this project

Along with the development of “citizenship”, it can primarily be understood as the relationship between individuals and the state. Yet, according to different interpretations on the concept of “citizenship”, various practices of Citizenship Education have been found across various space-time settings.

For the case in China, Chinese people in general have always paid a lot of attention on education for thousands of years. Throughout its historical development, not everyone could make use of education as a means to climb up the social ladder by entering into the bureaucratic system of most imperial dynasties. Even in a single country, such as in traditional China, the “ideology” of education varied differently from time to time by and large.

Back in the ancient past, China was recognized as a pristine state where altogether developed with Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Indus River Valley. One of the main tenets in such ancient civilizations could be attributed to its respect and honour on education and learning. Confucius, a famous scholar in ancient China, always called himself as a “transmitter” but not a “creator” of knowledge, as depicted by the Confucian Classics, in the pursuit of nurturing “junzi” (i.e. also

Later on during the Han Dynasty, the aim of education was just internalizing the Confucian morality for those male intellectuals through the transmission of knowledge. Instead of learning of any Confucian Classics, they were just required to perform their role according to the Three Obediences and Four Virtues (i.e. Three Obediences – first for father, then her husband and upon widowhood, her son(s); Four Virtues – women’s virtue, women’s speech, women’s appearance, and women’s task) (Ling, 1990), aiming at producing male offsprings for the perpetuation of the patrilineal family line in society.

Education in its advanced format in traditional China had usually associated with the examination system, but was later further developed into a more open and popular type of examination with the increasing number of “shuyuan” since the Song Dynasty. In the words of Pepper (1996: 51), “shuyuan” could be a centre of learning, debate and contemplation as an ideal venue for education.

However, from the 11th century onwards, the condition of “tunnel vision” (Cleverley, 1991: 20) was unfortunately getting worse under the imperial
examination system. Most students were mainly bounded by the single-minded
learning on the *Confucian Classics* aiming to pursuit their goal from the imperial
examinations, rather than the nurturing of independent thinking and study.

With the increasingly popularity of “shuyuan”, the Qing Government
had more or less exercised its strict control of supervision on “shuyuan”, such as
with the appointment of principals, regulations and the assessment examination of
the students (Ibid: 51). Worse still, since the “Eight-legged Essay” format had
firstly been introduced into the imperial examination system in the Manzhu
Dynasty, it further made the Chinese education to be “increasingly oriented
towards preparing students for examinations” (Rawski, 1979: 97).

Needless to say, under an examination-oriented education system
during the Manzhu Dynasty, most of the local elites, including those official gentry
and scholar-gentry who were produced under the *Civil Service Examination* had
been indoctrinated to the similar set of socio-cultural values. As a result, such elites
would perform the role of helping to shape the relationship between the individuals
and the state, and they were also playing as the “role-model for the general
populace”. Hence, scholars have agreed that such kind of education did contribute
to the formation of a centralized imperial state with both “steady-state structure”
and “Asian production model” under the agricultural-based economy (Jin and Liu, 1992).

Viewing from the dark side, Zhang described such kind of education as “[T]he constant drilling in traditional moral principles and the writing of formalized essays kept the minds of the gentry so occupied that they had little time for independent thought and study” (as cited in Franke, 1972: 27). This was another important reason to explain why China was ineffective in responding to the powerful and western encroachment during the second half of the 19th century.

Repeatedly suffering from those humiliating military defeats by various western countries, the exigency of educational reform started to grow in the minds of some officials. This military humiliation made such scholar-officials as Zhang Zhidong to believe in the training of talents to be “the fundamental basis for the planning of wealth and strength” (Zhang, as cited in Bailey, 1990: 29) for the national goal of “rich country, strong army”, in order to prevent further military defeats and national shame. In such kind of a scenario, the western style of education seemed to be much more important than traditional Confucian Classics in the modernization process of China.
Despite the family and peer group as the “major agents” as “highly personalized and relatively unstructured relationships” for political socialization, school education with its “formal and impersonal structure” has also proven itself as an efficient “secondary agent” (Langton, 1969: 100) of political socialization for “the internalization within the individual of another’s (i.e. the Government’s) view” (Entwistle, 1971: 12), which had been changing from time to time, as in the case of Confucian China.

As school education is more accessible to Government’s control, teachers, curriculum, classroom activities and general school life are all ways of conveying approved attitudes and behaviour to children in schools (Langton, 1969: 146-175). Clearly then, this is more likely for an authority taking school education as a means to promote its particular “political ideology” to counteract the socialization influence of the family and peer group at least one reason of the following.

1. Preserving the regime’s own power and legitimacy for political control and social order; and

2. Having a desire to make use of their power to achieve socio-economic objectives by mobilizing the population for
1.2 Significance of this project

1.2.1 Uncovering the hidden curriculum of Civic or National Education in Hong Kong and Communist China

As Hong Kong had been a British Crown Colony from 1842 to 1997 with the defeat of Anglo-Chinese War, its development had been separately with China ever since. In this way, the goal and policies on either Civic Education in Hong Kong or National Education in Communist China have been entirely different from each other. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily mean that their major concerns were mutually exclusive to each other. Quite the contrary, their major concerns are basically the nurturing of individuals to be the “good” citizens in their respective societies.

Without doubt, school education can be regarded as one of the most effective means for the Government to achieve its political ends at large. As Ridley et al. wrote, “[E]ducation systems are designed, in fact, to socialize their students – to teach them the values of the society and to teach them to accept these values” (1971: 3).

In Communist China, the goal of National Education is placed on
patriotism, nationalism, Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and so forth as hegemonic ideologies; whereas in the case of Colonial Hong Kong, the Civic Education could be seen as a counter force to such kind of political ideologies by placing its main goal on economic growth and was very pragmatic in nature. Since the reversion of sovereignty to Communist China took place in July 1997, however, the HKSAR Government has gradually shifted its focus to promote more contents about national awareness and consciousness on Civic Education in post-handover Hong Kong.

Therefore, for the later chapters in this project, I am going to uncover what are meant by “those hidden curriculum” as well as how they works behind both Civic Education and National Education by reviewing the curriculum of school education in both societies.

1.2.2 Addressing the engagement of globalization on Civic or National Education in Hong Kong and Communist China

According to Giddens, globalization could be known as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (2001: 51-52). Bauman explicitly clarified that globalization has led to
the “time-space compression”, which means a virtual disappearance of space through time, and eventually makes the information, economic goods with money and people mobilize more rapidly in the whole world (1998: 2).

Actually, the trend of globalization further undermined the capability of modern polity such as “nation-states” in terms of “state sovereignty” (Held, 1995: 100), with which the new political institution has started to pluralize the sovereignty and thus displaced “Westphalian order” (McGrew, 1997: 3-4) previously owned by the nation-states. As a result, Held further pointed out that “state sovereignty” is now being shared among national, international and regional authorities (1995: 135) in some cases.

In order to cope with the changes brought about by globalization, it is a must for nation-states or Governments to “re-position” themselves as to how to effectively nurture individuals to be “good” citizens in the future, and to upgrade themselves to be “competitive states” or “international cities” as their “new ends”.

More importantly, being “global citizens” under globalization, citizens across the world are not just required to receive the top-down education in
national or local levels as in the 20th century, but also to commit the interests of humankind by broadening one’s knowledge, namely in the learning the new concept of “citizenship” and *Citizenship Education*, in the purpose of increasing one’s “competitive power” in global village with life-long learning.

As addressed an extension of the experience of school education for “national citizenship” during the 21st century, we are now definitely reaching to a larger scope of school education for the notion of “global citizenship” in this regard. Like the school education serving as a “common foundation” to nurture its particular “citizenship” for a “nation-state” (Gellner, 1983: 27) as previously, where relevant in forthcoming chapters, I am also going to explore whether the school education is simultaneously a good instrument to effectively cultivate individuals’ attitudes in both societies.
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.1 School education and social solidarity

As discussed in chapter 1, school education has always been workable in various contexts of space-time settings, but one of their common goals is to nurture individuals to become “good” citizens. Then, what is the common goal for them? Durkeim, a French sociologist, provided an important answer for this question by saying that “[S]ociety can survive only there exists among its members of a sufficient degree of homogeneity; education perpetrates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child from the beginning the essential similarities which the collective life demands” (1961: 87-88). In other words, the major function of education can be regarded as the transmission of values and norms at large. Without education, commitment among individuals and social solidarity throughout the entire society seem to be impossible.

To achieve this common goal, most school have been required to endorse some basic components in the curriculum, known as “tripodic curricular philosophy”, which is considered as the three pillars for the school curriculum, namely the transmission of “knowledge and concepts”, “competencies and skills”, and “values and attitudes”, with the latter third category to be considered as the
“hidden curriculum” is playing a crucial role in the field of education (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Council, 2001).

2.2 **Values Education**

As the notion of “citizenship” is not a “pick-and-mix collection of attributes arbitrarily selected” (Heater, 1990: 336), so that such selective values can only socialize or even indoctrinate for the individuals successfully after a certain period of time. It goes without saying that education can do a nice job as such. But what is meant by values in this scenario? Halstead had offered a definition by claiming that “principles, fundamental convictions, ideals, standards or life stances which act as general guides to behaviour or as reference points in decision-making or the evaluation of belief or action” (1996: 5).

Put it simply, *Values Education* can be considered as the term in a broad-sense to cover distinctive forms of teaching values in school education (Downey and Kelly, 1986: 149), such as *Moral Education, Civic Education, National Education* and so forth. More relevant, Halstead also figured out its purpose as “the promotion and development of values in the context in education as a lifelong process, to help individuals develop as responsible and caring persons and lives participating members of a pluralist society” (1996: 8).
2.3 Moral Education

Being a form of teaching values in education, Moral Education has been attaching “three components of morality” in teaching, that is discipline, attachment to social groups and autonomy (Saha and Zubrzycki, 1994: 778), and its purpose can be known as “the respect for the rights of individuals, regard for law, voluntary participation in public life, and concern for the common good” (Lickona, 1991: 6), in order to achieving the goal of “character education” for individual morality.

With the emphasis of individual morality in education, in the context of “rights rather than responsibility, as well as freedom rather than commitment” (Ibid: 9) after the Second World War, the rise of individualism has resulted in the wavering or erosion on the respect for authority. Regarding the defects of Moral Education in governance, Moral Education has gradually been replaced by Civic Education or National Education in order to make a Government legitimate.

2.4 Origins of the notion of “citizenship”

The notion of “citizenship” has its origins in ancient Greek polis (i.e. city-state), notably in Athens from the 5th century to 4th century B.C. In ancient Athenian polis, only a small proportion of the male population, composing of 30,000 elite men, out of the 250,000 people would be classified as “citizens” in
exercising their political power (Cartledge, 2001).

As shown in Table 1 below, undeniable, the notion of “citizenship” in ancient Greek polis is extremely different from what the forms and functions of “citizenship” in the contemporary world. However, two implications have been shown in such a paradigm.

Table 1: The notion of “citizenship” in the ancient Greek polis and the “modern nation-states”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greek polis</th>
<th>“Modern nation-states”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of community</td>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>Legal or differentiated association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth of citizenship</td>
<td>Thick</td>
<td>Thin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of citizenship</td>
<td>Exclusive; Inequality naturalized</td>
<td>Progressive inclusive and theoretically egalitarian, but limited by statist context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content of citizenship</td>
<td>Extensive; Obligations</td>
<td>Rights and limited duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context of citizenship</td>
<td>Slave society; Agricultural production</td>
<td>Patriarchal, racialised, and capitalist state system; Industrial production</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Faulks, 2000: 15

Firstly, “citizenship” is not an absolute identity for all individuals, and that there were no equal rights for them at all. Only those being included could have the opportunity to exercise their political rights.

What is more important, the second implication is that “citizenship”
should be regarded as a political concept always attached with city-states in ancient Greek polis, and was later contributing to the strong binding with “modern nation-states”.

2.5 Importance of Civic Education or National Education for “modern nation-states”

2.5.1 Formation of “modern nation-states”

After the Second World War, a new wave of decolonization eventually came after colonization in the “fall” of those European empires. Occurring in the mid-20th century, the process of decolonization could be considered as the counterforce with colonization since the age of Great Discoveries during 15th and 16th centuries started to begin in both Asia and Africa. In the words of Chamberlain, it should be “a process by which the people of the Third World gained their independence from their colonial rulers” (1985: 1). In fact, this could probably be explained by the fact that the old colonial powers were extremely exhausted by the war, and were lacking sufficient financial resources in order to run their vast overseas empires anymore.

More importantly, the swift defeat of the colonial powers had also proven that the white Europeans were not invincible. In the case of Asia, all
colonies controlled by those white European powers during the Second World War were actually being “re-colonized” by Japan, a new rising nation-state positioning itself as the “light of Asia, protector of Asia and leader of Asia”, in pursuit of her goal of establishing a Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (Ansprenger, 1989: 146).

With the additional support of United States, another superpower in post-war world, in putting great pressures on such colonial powers, independent movements among European colonies were very popular. As a result, more than a hundred colonies gained independence from 1950s to 1960s by forming various “modern nation-states” in the contemporary world.

2.5.2 “Modern nation-states”

In the beginning, the concept of “modern nation-states” can be understood as a political community formed by a territorially defined population which is subject to one Government. The Montevideo Convention of 1933 viewed the “sovereignty” of a “modern nation-state” to have the capability to enter relations with other states, while there are four core features to describe the “modern nation-states”, including “a permanent population”, “a defined territorial boundary”, “a strong Central Government” and “the ability to conduct with other
“sovereignty” comes true which makes those “nation-states” become the sole political institution to exercise its force by authority. As Weber wrote, “[A] state is a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory ... ... (In other words,) the state is considered as the sole source of the rights to use violence” (1946: 78).

In spite of exercise its authority given by “sovereignty”, it is also essential for “nation-states” to justify their authority, which is called “political legitimacy”. Otherwise, the ultimate authority for the whole society has just been relations between the rulers and those being ruled, rather than making laws and decisions authoritative as a whole. In the explanation of Alagappa, it should be the “right to rule” in the maximization of political obligation (1995: 2). Therefore, the possession of “political legitimacy” is always significant for all “nation-states” that can provide effective governance by lowering the ruling cost internally, in addition to grant the international conduct externally.

Basically, Diamond had classified a six part categorization of regimes to
differentiate the “modern nation-states” according to their political authority all around the world. It was estimated that 73 out of 192 countries in 38 percent could be regarded as “liberal democracies” while 25 countries in 13 percent were regarded as “politically-closed authoritarian regimes”. Between two ends of the spectrum, there were another 94 countries in 49 percent as the biggest proportion among all regimes’ categories in the world (2002: 21-35).

2.5.3 State-society relations

It goes without saying that the attention has always been put on the relations between a state and its society at large. For different regimes, states will treat their individuals totally different.

As written by Locke, individuals were primarily born from “free and equal”, governed by “reason” and endowed with certain inalienable rights and liberties (1963). As time goes on, Mills even believed that all individuals were capable of self-development and being civilized by receiving education, and resulting to achieve autonomy for their own action and sole judgment (as cited in Pateman, 1970).

Obviously in this way, states have been usually paying a lot of respect
for individuals in the whole society but such respect is seldom found with
reference to most state-society relations in Asia. Instead, as the research
conducted by Diamond, most liberal democracies are now just locating in
Western Europe and North America but they do play a minor role among the
entire regimes worldwide.

In turn, Hobbes asserted that those individuals could be seen as
self-sufficient, possessive and self-interested units all the time (as cited in
Parsons et al., 1965: 869-870). As a result, a state has always required a “social
contract” between consenting individuals by making the government legitimate.
Put it in clear, such state-society relations are largely built on the “trade-off
basis” or “performance-based” in nature and it can sometimes be found in Asia
according to the regime categories classified by Diamond between two ends of
spectrum but not a truth all the time.

Though the Hobbes’s explanation towards individuals could be seen as
a negative interpretation, the “politically-closed authoritarian regimes” are even
getting worse than what Hobbes suggested. Instead of having a “social contract”
with the society and making the government legitimate, a large number of
“politically-closed authoritarian regimes” have greatly relied on their military
force to maintain their power for survival after the Second World War.

2.5.4 The notion of “citizenship” for the “modern nation-states”

Whatever the categories of regime that Diamond can figure out around the world, what is worth of our attention is the fact that individuals do play a significant role for state-society relations. Then the second question is how the “nation-states” can successfully nurture the “individuals” to be loyal and submissive to the authority all the time.

For this part, Bendix did provide a good answer for the second question. To begin with, he claimed people are treated themselves as individuals in “state of nature” before the formation of “nation-states”. So as if the states can move people’s identity from individuals to “citizens” by giving “the codification of rights and duties to all adults” (Bendix, 1964: 90), people will always tend to bind by the authority, and the government can also make laws and decision-making in return.

The classic for “citizenship” discussion is the historical-sociological analysis by Marshall Thomas Humphrey. In referring to the welfare states as in post-war Britain, Marshall had analyzed citizenship as consisting of three types of
“citizenship rights”, which included “civil rights”, “political rights” and “social rights”.

Above other “rights”, “civil rights” has already developed during the 18th century with the “liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the rights to justice” (Marshall, 1992: 8).

In terms of the “political rights”, it was fully developed by the 19th century, which allow people “to participate in the exercise of political power as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body” (Ibid), such as universal suffrage was extended to all adults.

For the last century, “social rights” had additionally been included as one of the components in “citizenship” as “the right to share in a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being” (Ibid).

Since then, it is obvious that Marshall had linked the historical development of citizenship rights in Britain and the development of capitalist
system together. Nonetheless, there are still two significant criticisms of Marshall's “citizenship rights” when applying to the post-war Asia.

In the first place, as suggested by Barbalet, Marshall's explanation for “citizenship rights” did incline his model according to universalism (1988: 30-31). With the different durations for the formation of “nation-states” between Europe and Asia, this is less likely for Asian countries to achieve the similar progress in developing their “citizenship rights” with European countries.

Besides, in referring to Marshall's model of “citizenship rights” that was analyzed on the basis of British development, it might not be suitable for entire Asian countries to put into practice because of the over-generalization on the development of human societies.

In supplementary to it, on the basis of Marshall's model on “citizenship rights”, “participation rights” was chipped in as the “fourth rights”, which was the state-assured private power of action in both market and Government organizations in views of Janoski (1998: 32) also. Same as the first critic above, different starting points of “nation-states” between Europe and Asia can explain why this “participation rights” cannot be developed among Asian countries to a
large extent.
3.1 Conceptual Framework

3.1.1 The notion of “nation” and “nation-building”

For the notion of “nation”, Greenfeld had provided a zigzag pattern of semantic change on this. In Roman Empire, nation means a group of foreigners. In Medieval universities, nation means a community of opinion. In Church Council, nation means an elite. In England, nation means a sovereign people. In other countries, nation means an unique people. With regard to what was written by Greenfeld, nation’s meaning is always changing according to both temporal and spatial factors (1992: 9).

Mentioning previously, decolonization underwent its process after the Second World War and “nation-building” was an essential feature for those newly-established modern nation-states. In the perspective of Greenfeld, the basic principle for “nation-building” can be from individualistic to collectivistic basis whereas the unit is varying from civical to ethnical in nature.

In referring to those “nation-building” models among Asian countries, in fact, Hong Kong is just going to the process of civical unit under the principle of individualism. By contrast, the Communist China has largely been regarded as
an ethnical unit based on collectivism.

With the principle and unit can vary differently subject to the location of geographical region, rather than “all the individual kinds of sentiments of group membership and solidarity in their generic conditions and in their consequence for the social action of the participant” (Weber, 1968: 925), a “nation” is no longer to be defined as a “socially-constructed reality” to a large extent.

As already noted by Anderson, the concept of nation is just “an imagined political and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (1991: 6). Undoubtedly, the process of “nation-building” can desirably be a means for the states to achieve their political ends, which is called “political legitimacy”.

3.1.2 School education and the construction of nationality

By familiar with the concept of “nation” is just an “imagined political community” which is always manipulated by the state, what I am now going to deal with is how the state can construct such “imagined political community” for those individuals to become “good citizens” effectively.

According to Berger and Luckmann, the idea of “social construction of
reality" always put emphasis on “human factor”, that are “externalization”, “objectivation” and “internalization”, behind the “uncover structure data”, in order to build up a “dialectical relation between the structural realities (i.e. social reality) and human enterprise of constructing reality (i.e. individual existence) in history” (1967: 207-211).

Still in this way, the newcomers (i.e. children) are impossible to “automatically” know about the abstract notion of “nation” and prepare to be the “good citizens” in future, Ramiez and Boli thus asserted that state-sponsored mass education could be a good means for “nation-states” to mobilize mass to into the “national responsible citizens”, and hence achieve political ends as “nation-building” by enhancing national unity and success at the same time (1987: 13).

Regarding the European model of a national society, on one hand, mass education aimed to socialize individuals’ childhood experience throughout the “life cycle” by constructing an “achieved nationality”; and on the other hand, mass education still performed the role of narration with the past, in order to construct an “ascribed nationality” for all population (Ibid: 10).
As a British Crown Colony prior to 1997, the situation of Hong Kong was very distinctive from that of Communist China. Avoiding any “imperium in imperio” (England and Rear, 1975: 209) took place in Hong Kong, the Colonial Government pretended to provide and sponsor a kind of “ahistorical and apolitical education”, which could also be characterized as *Civic Education* in short of any discussion of politics (Lee, 2005: 221), particular of that before the early 1980s, in the pursuit of constructing an “achieved status”. Of course, since its “sovereignty” was reversed to Communist China in 1997, the components of *National Education* has become more important in permeating for school education aiming to construct an “ascribed nationality” in line with Communist China in a meantime.

Yet in the case of Communist China, the People’s Republic of China has just been established after the fled of Kuomintang to Taiwan since 1949 under the western idea known as *Marxist-Leninism*, with several new coming hegemonic ideologies, regarding *Mao Zedong Thought*, *Deng Xiaoping Theory*, Jiang Zemin’s *Three Represents* and Hu Jintao’s *Socialist Harmonious Society* (as cited in Ng, 2006: 21-25). No longer performing the role of historical narration from the past to construct an “ascribed nationality” with the linkage of Confucian
China, it is solely available for the Chinese Communist Party to nurture its population by such new ideologies from time to time and to construct an “achieved nationality”. Lacking those historical ties with Confucian China as the case of Taiwan, what can be promoted by Communist China was only a kind of National Education based on achievement for the first generation as a whole.

Obviously then, school education on the concept of “citizenship” is never “politically neutral” but only performing the legitimate function for a Government (Gunsteren, 1998: 82) in terms of “cultural reproduction”. As a result, most Governments have been eligible to promote the idea of “education in values” but not “values in education” (Halstead, 1996: 201) throughout the school-settings.

Borrowing the words from Dewey, school education could also be known as “the sum total of the process by means of which a society transmits its acquired power and aims with a view to sustaining its own continuous existence and growth” (as cited in Brennan, 1981: 4). At this point, the transmission values in school education to the newcomers (i.e. children) as “future citizens” has no longer been detached anymore, but only a tool driven by a Government to ensure the existence of the society, which will ever be changing to serve their
political ends as time moves on.

In this scenario, Giroux had summarized three approaches in school education, namely “transmission approach”, “reflective-inquiry approach” and “critical approach” (1983: 176-192), which he observed in most modern societies.

1. “Transmission approach”: The construction of “good citizens” is through the transmission of well-defined knowledge and values, mostly relies on textbooks, classroom instruction, and examination as tools of implementation.

2. “Reflective-inquiry approach”: The construction of “good citizens” is through the classroom discussion and participation in public affairs to nurture individual abilities and individual roles in society.

3. “Critical approach”: The construction of “good citizens” is to emancipate them from constraints among social, economic and political arena, by nurturing a critical spirit in students.

Being categorized as modern authoritarian polities at least, sometimes like Mao’s China can even be governed under totalitarianism, both Hong Kong and Communist China have mostly been practicing “Transmission approach” in
the field of school education, also characterized as “top-down education” for both the students and whole community in common.

3.2 Methodology

3.2.1 Research design

As for the conceptual framework in this project, it is noted that applied research has been implemented for “solving practical educational problems” (Gay and Airasian, 2003: 7). However, with regard to the method of data collection for further analysis and discussion later on, historical research has been selected among numerous methods for this research project.

The first reason should be historical research as the most appropriate method to adopt in this project. As Cohen and Manion wrote, “[H]istorical research in education can show how and why educational theories and practices developed and it can contribute to a fuller understanding of the relationship between politics and education, between school and society, between local and central Government, and between teacher and pupil” (1994: 45-46).

The second reason was because historical research has given sufficient secondary data for further analysis and discussion later on. Certainly, this goes
without saying that it is better to conduct both quantitative and qualitative research to collect primary data from the relevant ministries or bureau of both Beijing and HKSAR Governments, but due to certain limitations, it would be almost impossible for me to do so on this.

3.2.2 Research methods

As this research project is set to conduct historical research in dealing with the secondary data that already existed, both library research and online research are thus the major methods in collecting the data.

Under the library and online research, both quantitative and qualitative data can be drawn at the same time. Though the sources of data are different, it does not mean that both of them are oppositional or mutually exclusive; conversely, they can complement each other by their own uniqueness, in order to represent a full range of educational research methods (Gay and Airasian, 2003: 9).

3.2.3 Research questions

For the case of Hong Kong, four research questions are written and expected to be answered in the forthcoming chapters.
HQ1: Will the nature of *Civic Education* be ever changing in Hong Kong as time goes on?

HQ2: What is the nature of Government’s policies related to *Civic Education* throughout the school education in Hong Kong?

HQ3: What are the implications behind the nature of *Civic Education* in Hong Kong?

HQ4: Whether the outcome of *Civic Education* will fall into the original expectation of Hong Kong Government?

Similarly, there are also four research questions listed for the study on Communist China in this research project.

CQ1: Will the nature of *National Education* be ever changing in Communist China as time goes on?

CQ2: What is the nature of Government’s policies related to *National Education* throughout the school education in Communist China?

CQ3: What are the implications behind the nature of *National Education* in Communist China?

CQ4: Whether the outcome of *National Education* will fall into the original expectation of Central Government?
3.2.4 Hypotheses

For the situation of Hong Kong, whether as a British Crown Colony as in the past or being “Special Administrative Region” from 1997 onwards, four hypotheses are set as follows for rectification later on.

**HH₁:** Political transition would lead to the change of nature for *Civic Education* in Hong Kong.

**HH₂:** Government is influential on *Civic Education* throughout the school education in Hong Kong.

**HH₃:** Hidden curriculum always exists from the *Civic Education* in Hong Kong.

**HH₄:** The outcome of *Civic Education* is in line with the original expectations of Hong Kong Government.

Aside from that, there are four more hypotheses to prove whether the scenario regarding the condition for Communist China in a meantime.

**CH₁:** Political transition would lead to the change of nature in *National Education* in Communist China.

**CH₂:** Government is influential on *National Education* throughout the school education in Communist China.
CH$_3$: Hidden curriculum always exists from the *National Education* in Communist China.

CH$_4$: The outcome of *National Education* is in line with the original expectations of Central Government.
4.1 Civic Education and citizenship development in Hong Kong

Hong Kong, the “fragrant harbour” situated on the south-eastern edge of China, has been “a borrowed place” surviving on its “borrowed time” (Hughes, 1976) for the target of maximum materialistic consumption under the British colonial rule. Before the early 1980s, Civic Education could be seen as an alternative to both pro-Communist and pro-Kuomintang ideologies, which had a strong interest to maintain social order and economic prosperity in minimal political awareness that might question the legitimacy of colonial authority.

After the signing of Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, however, this indicated “a borrowed place” surviving on its “borrowed time” (Ibid) has come to an end under the reversion of sovereignty since 1997 and Hong Kong should shape itself into a “Manhattan of China” in post-handover period. To achieve its goals, there is necessarily to strengthen the role of Civic Education in political transition and after the re-unification at large.

Clearly then, as Chun suggested, a Government can usually naturalize the cultural discourse through Civic Education as time goes on (1996: 115-116). So for the first half of this chapter, a brief historical account to the development of
Civic Education in Hong Kong would be traced as the basis for further discussion and analysis in chapter 5.

4.1.1 Civic Education: A historical account

4.1.1.1 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Civic Education from the late 1940s to early 1980s

From the late 1940s to early 1980s, Civic Education did not really play a significant role in the formal curriculum among those secondary schools. More importantly, the curriculum of Civic Education in Hong Kong could just be characterized as a kind of depoliticization (Bray and Lee, 1993: 548-550) in line with the pre-handover Government policies.

In 1948, two amendments of Education Ordinances were drafted and enacted, and the second one which would largely strengthen the powers of the Director of Education in refusing or cancelling the registration of school teachers, closing the schools, and controlling the curricula (Sweeting, 2004: 162) to prohibit any political propaganda within all school-settings. In the words of Governor Sir Alexander Grantham, “[T]he special powers conferred by Sections 37 and 38 of the Ordinance are considered necessary to safeguard the interests of individual pupils and of the community as a whole against the use
of schools for political indoctrination. During the past four years this danger has arisen chiefly from Chinese Communist Party sympathizers” (Grantham, as cited in Sweeting, 1993: 201). Without any doubt, the intention behind this justification made by Governor Sir Alexander Grantham was to prohibit nationalistic content, whether it was pro-Communist or pro-Kuomintang throughout the education in Hong Kong.

At the same year, the Education Department further unified the Textbook and Curriculum Committee to organize the writing of depoliticized texts. Differing from the Civics which was introduced in Hong Kong’s curriculum during the early 1930s, the Civics being offered in 1952 was alternatively characterized as decontextual and depolitical (Morris and Sweeting, 1991: 249), in the purpose to “show children how communities and individuals depend upon each other for their common good” (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Committee, 1985: 2).

Without the popularity among the secondary schools, Civics was being replaced by Economics and Public Affairs (Tang and Morris, 1989: 41) in 1965 to “enable students to be well-informed and to become civic-minded enough to act as good citizens” (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Committee, 1985:
3). However, following the Government policies on community building during the 1970s, its emphasis just on active participation in public affairs rather than involvement of politics since 1975 (Wong, 1983: 57-59) did invite criticisms on solely describing the institutions and processes of Hong Kong Government, instead of teaching any civic consciousness (Morris, 1990: 117-118) for the secondary school students in nature.

Apart from the *Economics and Public Affairs*, not only “neither the annual Education Department report nor various White Papers on secondary school education mentioned *Civics* during the 1970s (Bray and Lee, 1993: 550), but also the Education Regulations further empowered the Director of Education to prohibit students to engage political activities among all secondary schools. For example, “[N]o salutes, songs, dances, slogans, uniforms or symbols which, in opinion of the Director, in any way of a political or partly political nature should be used, displayed or worn, as the case may be, upon any school premises or upon the occasion of any school activity except with the permission of the Director and in accordance with such conditions as he may see fit to impose” (as cited in Lee, 1997: 3).

Indicated above, *Civic Education* in Hong Kong manifests many
characteristics of depoliticization. Borrowing the words from Bray and Lee, “[I]n the context of non-participant polity, from 1945 to 1974 the Civic Education curriculum emphasized the passive, obedient and law-abiding role of citizens. It was not until 1975 that the curriculum began to include topics on citizens’ participation, the cultivation of a sense of belonging, and the encouragement of the participation of the younger generation” (1993: 549).

4.1.1.2 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Civic Education in the mid-1980s: Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools in 1985

After the visit of Lord MacLehose, the former Governor of Hong Kong, with Beijing officials in 1979, Britain and China eventually initialed the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 to settle the future question of Hong Kong. According to the agreement, Hong Kong would reverse its sovereignty to China and become a “Special Administrative Region” to enjoy a high degree of autonomy after 1st July 1997 under the principle of “One country, Two systems” for 50 years. (Wong, 1997: 26-28)

One year after the signing of Sino-British Joint Declaration, Hong Kong Curriculum Development Committee issued a set of Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools in 1985 to strengthen the role of political education
among all secondary schools, in the purpose of ensuring the capability of future citizens to defend a high degree of autonomy in post-handover Hong Kong (Chan and Morris, 1994).

In referring to the Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, there were four general aims as stated in the following terms.

1. To promote a growing understanding of the nature and workings of our community-based institutions and organizations and an appreciation of the values, dispositions and principles which are characteristic of a democratic community.

2. To shape the attitudes and behaviour of young people in preparation for an effective participating role in adult life.

3. To develop the social and political skills necessary for a rational appraisal of the basic issues which affect the life of the community and to encourage the formulation of opinions and judgments rooted in a respect for reason and individual autonomy.

4. To offer all pupils the opportunity to gain experience and skill in discussion, debate and decision-making through participation in a variety of formal and informal situations and structures.
Aside from that, *Civic Education* “should be merged into the widest possible programme of interdisciplinary or integrated studies” (Ibid: 25) written in the Guidelines still deserves to be mentioned here. From 1985 onwards, *Civic Education* was going to be taught in all secondary school subjects as well as other extra-curricular activities to “utilize all the learning opportunities available in both the formal and informal curriculum and the ethos of the school or the hidden curriculum” (Ibid: 4-5) to the students.

Paralleling with the *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* published in 1985, there were subsequent revisions of syllabuses among various secondary school subjects, including more content related to China. In 1988, there was an amendment on the syllabus of *History* in HKCEE to indicate that Hong Kong was just a part of China instead of Britain before the 19th century. Certainly, the most obvious example was a new AS-level subject, known as *Liberal Studies*, has been introduced in HKALE since 1992. Topic like “China Today” was covered as one out of the six modules in the curriculum (Lee and Bray, 1995: 363-364).
To support the teaching and learning on *Civic Education* in secondary schools, during the late 1980s, the Curriculum Development Committee also set up the Central Civic Education Resource Centre at that time for all teachers to “utilize different teaching materials and aids in order to help with their own *Civic Education* courses and programmes” (Chan, 1993: 58) in further.

To keep an eye on this, the Education Department had conducted three successive reviews about the actual implementation of *Guidelines* to all secondary schools and the first two ones were supportive as listed in the following.

“The findings were encouraging as an overwhelming majority of schools reported that they had found the *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* useful. These findings were supported by the fact that many of the recommendations in the *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* had been adopted by the majority of schools” (Hong Kong Education Department, 1986: 26).

“It is observed that many secondary school teachers have made efforts to promote *Civic Education* through the teaching of their respective subjects. Civic points are often brought out naturally in the course of teaching and/ or
activities” (Hong Kong Education Department, 1987: 36).

Nevertheless, conspicuous criticisms against the objectives of Guidelines and subsequent implementations at school level were alternatively offensive towards the Hong Kong Government. Further discussion with its implications behind will be offered in details on the forthcoming chapter.

With reference what was said by Lee as in Table 2 below, the Guidelines in 1985 proposed “Civic Education is political education” (1987: 246-247) which just held a neutral position in ideological debates for the “tolerance of political action” (Ibid: 248). The Guidelines claimed “[D]emocracy means different things to different people. ... ... There are many brands of democracy in the political arena - some pluralistic, some centralist and various combinations of both. So education for democracy per se would be difficult to interpret” (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Committee, 1985: 8).

Table 2: The characteristics of Civic Education in Hong Kong

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Non-academic in nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Moral exhortations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Constitutional and institutional conception of politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Macro-politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>About management of public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Consensus and harmony model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Maintaining status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Action-shy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Stressing knowledge acquiring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Ethnic and national elements present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lee, 1987: 248
Besides, what was most ironical point was that both the four numbers of general aims and then the ten aims/ objectives of Civic Education at secondary level, none of the component related to China necessarily mentioned for the Hong Kong’s political transition. In this scenario, the Guidelines to develop political-sensitive skills (Ibid: 10) for secondary school students were mostly window-dressing with little redeeming qualities and “not different from those of the previous Civic Education, and Economic and Public Affairs curricula, which at the most raised the students’ social awareness and concern about social services rather than politics” (Bray and Lee, 1993: 556) to “avoid sensitizing the issue in the transitional stage of returning Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China in 1997” (Lee, 1987: 247).

Worse still, Tse (1997: 16-20) further negatively appraised that “the Guidelines were taken not so much as a guiding document but as a reference, and at worst it was neglected completely” for actual implementations at school level. Similarly, after conducting a survey among nearly hundred of secondary schools, Tang and Morris also concluded “[T]he picture that emerges is that the majority of History teachers in secondary schools were not aware of, or were unclear about the Guidelines and their school policy toward Civic Education.
The overall situation evidenced in this study is that 65 percent of the sample of History teachers had not attempted to implement the Guidelines. Of those 35 percent who had attempted implementation the level of use was low” (1989: 48). Eight years later, not only the criticism about actual implementation made by around two third school teachers, but Morris also figured out that the unpopularity of Guidelines to implement in all secondary schools by writing “Economic and Public Affairs declined rapidly in popularity following the introduction of Economics in 1975. Government and Public Affairs is studied by a handful of pupils. Social Studies is officially part of the core curriculum but is offered in less than 20 percent of schools, whilst Liberal Studies is offered in less than 10 percent of schools” (1997: 113; also referred to Table 3 and Table 4 below).

Table 3: Candidates of the 1996 Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of candidates (% of the total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Public Affairs</td>
<td>1,014 (0.83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and Public Affairs</td>
<td>945  (0.78%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Studies</td>
<td>749  (0.62%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hong Kong Examinations Authority, 1996a
Table 4: Candidates of the 1996 Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination (HKALE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Number of candidates (% of the total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government and Public Affairs (AS-level)</td>
<td>170  (0.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and Public Affairs (A-level)</td>
<td>190  (0.63%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Studies (AS-Level)</td>
<td>1,030  (3.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hong Kong Examinations Authority, 1996b

4.1.1.3 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Civic Education in the mid-1990s: Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools in 1996

Even as late as 1995, most Hong Kong secondary school’s textbooks were still rather “Hong Kong centred” without sufficient nationalistic and patriotic components for the 1997 transfer of sovereignty. According to the Preliminary Working Committee for the future “Special Administrative Region”, “Civic Education in Hong Kong has been under-emphasized, and is weak in nationalism and patriotism. Following the resumption of Chinese sovereignty, Civic Education in Hong Kong should be aiming at building nationalism and patriotism, and at strengthening the teaching of the Basic Law and the concept of “one country, two systems”. Education in the transitional period should strengthen learning in Geography and Chinese History, as well as the Basic Law. The Education Department should facilitate the development of Civic Education as a formal subject in primary and secondary schools” (as cited in Lee, 1996:
In responding the concern on the strengthening of Civic Education, Hong Kong Education Department resulted to form a working group in 1995 in reviewing the Guidelines on Civic Education on Schools published ten years ago. In referring to the Guidelines on Civic Education on Schools in 1996, three aims of school Civic Education were written as follows.

1. To enable students to understand how the individual, as a citizen, relates to the family, the neighboring community, the national community and the world; and to develop in them positive attitudes and values conducive to the development of a sense of belonging to Hong Kong and China, so that they are ready to contribute to the betterment of society, the state, and the world;

2. To help students understand the characteristics of Hong Kong society, and the importance, and the importance of democracy, liberty, equality, human rights and rule of law;

3. To develop in students critical thinking dispositions and problem solving skills that would allow them to analyze social and political issues objectively and to arrive at a rational appraisal of these issues.
Differing from the *Guidelines on Civic Education on Schools* published in 1985, the 1996 one was obviously putting “[W]ith the resumption of the exercise of sovereignty by China over 1997, there is a special need for schools to strengthen Civic Education, with a view to preparing students to become rational, active and responsible citizens” (Ibid: 1), in the reason of “[T]o be participative and contributive to bring about smooth transitions, to sustain prosperity and stability to further improve the Hong Kong society” (Ibid: 21), rather than the previous version just described what was currently happening in Hong Kong.

In the words of Ip, “[T]he recently published draft of the revised *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* has made obvious advancement in comparison with the 1985 version. This is not an accidental at all, as it has an intimate relationship to how the Government absorbs public interests” (1996) also illustrated that the Hong Kong Government has been opening up for the public to discuss “controversial issues, on developing critical thinking, reflection and action” (Morris and Chan, 1997b: 254).
Following the suggestions of *Guidelines* in 1996, the most convincing evidence could be regarded as the amendment of HKALE *Government and Public Affairs* syllabus in the same year. Comparing the previous version in 1988, the new one has put more content on political concepts and related theories, including those parts on “contemporary China”, “relationship between China and United States” in addition to “the transition period of Hong Kong” as indicated in *Table 5* as follows.

**Table 5: Comparison of HKALE *Government and Public Affairs* syllabuses between 1988 and 1996**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1988 syllabus</th>
<th>1996 syllabus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understand a number of salient terms in the political vocabulary</td>
<td>Understand a number of salient terms in the political vocabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describe and discuss the categorization of state forms, and the criteria on which they are based</td>
<td>Analyze the relationship between the individual and the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have an understanding of the differing assumptions and practices of western pluralistic systems</td>
<td>Apply the various concepts and theories learned to understand of Hong Kong, China and America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compare three political systems and analyze the roles of political actors</td>
<td>Examine the government and politics of Hong Kong with special reference to its transition from British dependent territory to a Special Administrative Region of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss the relationship between Government and the governed with different, but specified, political systems</td>
<td>Discuss the underlying philosophies, institutions, and the operation of the Government and politics between China and America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be aware of the Government and politics of Hong Kong and its relationship with other political systems</td>
<td>Evaluate both similarities and differences of the Government and politics between China and America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cheung, 1995

Compared with the 1985 *Guidelines*, the 1996 revised version could be seen as a “great leap forward” but it still invite certain criticisms for its
conceptual framework with inadequate knowledge on citizen rights and responsibilities. As Tsang criticized, “[T]he conceptual framework of the 1996 Guidelines obviously lacks discussion on the sovereignty of state, especially the nature of the Republic. What is more serious is that the conceptual framework is its complete silence on the issue of power, not mentioning the issue of power delegation to and empowerment of the citizens which is the foundation of the movements for citizen rights and responsibilities” (1996).

4.1.1.4 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Civic Education after 1997: Learning for Life, Learning through Life: Reform Proposals for the Education System in Hong Kong in 2000

After the re-unification with China, the importance of Civic Education in Hong Kong has come to surface of the table under the review of academic system. According to the Education Blueprint for the 21st Century, “Hong Kong is facing unprecedented challenge. All those who care about their children and Hong Kong’s future would agree that there is a pressing need for reform in education” and aim at “cater(ing) for the needs of individual students so that each of them can have all-round and unique developments (Hong Kong Education Commission, 1999: 1) to the “future well-being of the nation and the world at large” (Ibid: 2). In other words, the post-1997 education policies will
be most likely been carried out in various education reforms during the 21st century.

One year later, Learning for Life, Learning through Life: Reform Proposals for the Education System in Hong Kong has been introduced and stating the aims of Hong Kong's education for the 21st century that is “[B]uilding an education system conducive to life-long learning and all-round development” (Hong Kong Education Commission, 2000: 3) by creating to “a new culture of learning and teaching” such as “[S]hifting from over-emphasizing academic studies to focusing whole-person development” (Ibid: 60). To achieve its goal, a new vision of the education reform to “acknowledge the importance of Moral Education (life experience)” would be endorsed in providing students with structured learning experiences by helping them develop healthy outlook to life (Ibid: 35), which has been at the top five essential learning experiences (Ibid: 58). For instance, “[S]chools should conduct various forms of learning activities inside and outside classrooms with a view to integrating Moral and Civic Education in various key learning areas and to provide students with a comprehensive life experience” (Ibid: II-1).

Compared with the Civic Education regarding the transitional period,
the post-handover *Civic Education* has played a very crucial role for the 21st
century Hong Kong’s Education Reform with strong support from the HKSAR
Government. “Apart from providing resources support, the Government should
gather and disseminate successful experiences in providing *Moral and Civic
Education* systematically among schools through different effective channels
(such as the Internet and production of videos)” (Ibid).

Concerning the importance of *Civic Education* after 1997, two new
subjects namely *Integrated Humanities* in addition to *Science and Technology*
have been introduced to the current secondary school curriculum since 2003 to
“further enrich the pool of resources and pedagogical knowledge relevant to
the implementation of *Liberal Studies* in the New Senior Secondary Curriculum”
(Hong Kong Education and Manpower Bureau, 2005). Unlike the previous
circumstances, from 2009 onwards, *Liberal Studies* will ultimately become a
core subject along with *Chinese Language, English Language* and *Mathematics*
for all senior secondary schools students, which aim at “broaden(ing) students'的知识库 and enhanc(ing) their social awareness through the study of a
wide range of issues” (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Council and Hong
Kong Examinations and Assessment Authority, 2005: 1). Not only “Modern
China” will be included as one out of the six modules in this core subject, but an issue-based enquiry approach will also be adopted for learning and teaching Liberal Studies in order to “encourage students to develop capacity for independent learning in the pursuit of knowledge and openness to new possibilities” (Ibid: 4) at the same time.

Though the Hong Kong Education and Manpower Bureau has already published four successive Progress report on the education reform: Learning for Life, Learning through Life from 2002 to 2006 to present its one-sided supportive view towards the implementation of Education Reform in post-handover Hong Kong, the most striking evaluation does make me difficult to judge at this minute. As far as I am concerned, similar with the opinion of Chan, Liberal Studies will absolutely act as an undergoing vehicle for Civic Education and the stronger “political awareness would thus be a natural by-product of studying the syllabus” (as cited in Lee and Bray, 1995: 365) throughout the community sooner or later.

4.1.2 Citizenship development in Hong Kong

As mentioned earlier, the notion of citizenship nowadays can be generally identified as the rights, obligations and power inherent in the status of
full members in a modern polity such as a Government or “nation-state”. Aim at making laws and decision-making authoritative in a community, Civic Education is always acting as a means of “political socialization” (Almond and Verba, 1989: 266-274) to achieve the ends of “civic cohesion” in the words of Merriam (as cited in Lister, 1996: 87).

In exploring the correlation between Civic Education and citizenship development in further, the concept of substantive citizenship which emphasizes the culture and attitude (Bottomore and Marshall, 1992: 70-74) can obviously provide a full picture of citizenship development in Hong Kong from a British Crown Colony to the “Special Administrative Region”. In the words of Pye, political culture is thus seen as “the sum of the fundamental values, sentiments and knowledge that give form and substance to political process” (1995: 962). Whether it is parochial, subject or participant (Almond and Verba, 1989: 16-19; also referred to Table 6 below) in nature, the building blocks of political culture are still the beliefs, opinions and emotions of individual citizens towards their form of Government. As a result, it is convincing that the citizenship development of Hong Kong from a British Crown Colony to the “Special Administrative Region” could be figured out in the changing context of political attitudes from individual
citizens towards the Government as time goes on.

### Table 6: Types of political culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>System as general object</th>
<th>Input objects</th>
<th>Output objects</th>
<th>Self as active participant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Almond and Verba, 1989: 16

To figure out the citizenship development in Hong Kong, the relevant data of changing context in political attitudes from individual citizens towards the Government would be collected from two electoral studies in 1995 and 1998, which were the two elections of Legislative Council in geographical constituencies from the pre-handover to post-handover Hong Kong (Tsang, 2006: 251-285). Both electoral studies were just conducted after the elections, which based on the random sampling for the Hong Kong registered voters.

As for the survey conducted in 1995, the registered voters in twenty Geographical Constituencies from the list of Final Registered Electors 1995 were randomly selected from the Registration and Election Office. A total number of 4,017 registered voters were picked up after the election and 2,359 of them were interviewed successfully. Similar with the survey conducted in 1995, the registered voters in five Geographical Constituencies from the list of Final
Registered Electors 1998 were also randomly selected from the Registration and Election Office three years later. A total number of 4,842 registered voters were chosen as the respondents after the election and finally 2,993 of them were ultimately interviewed.

With reference to both electoral studies in 1995 and 1998, the questionnaires had also been structured into twenty common items to measure the perception on political attitudes from individual citizens towards the Hong Kong Government. All of these common items can be characterized as “faith of democracy”, “sense of citizenship”, “distrust in government”, “political helpfulness” and “political skepticism”. In this project, what I am going to pick up is the response of four common items under the umbrella of sense of citizenship between 1995 and 1998, and to analyze the Hong Kong’s citizenship development from colonial era to the re-unification period (also referred to Table 7 below).
Table 7: Mean difference of sense of citizenship in general political attitude between the registered voters for Hong Kong Legislative Council between 1995 and 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common items (Sense of citizenship)</th>
<th>1995 voters</th>
<th>1998 voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Election is a wasteful activity.</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. And so many people vote, mine doesn’t count much.</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The current electoral system is too complicated for me to understand.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I shall not vote unless if it concerns my vested interest.</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tsang, 2006: 259

Referring to the findings indicated from Table 6 above, all remarkable mean difference provided by respondents would undoubtedly draw our attention between the 1995 and 1998 Legislative Council elections. For the number 1, 2 and 4 common items, it is noted that the respondents showed the disagreement towards “[E]lection is a wasteful activity”, “[A]nd so many people vote, mine doesn’t count much” and “[I] shall not vote unless if it concerns my vested interest.” In other words, compared with the 1995 election, the respondents would be paying more attention in the 1998 one. Besides, concerning the common item of number 3, a sharp increase of consensus towards “[T]he current electoral system is too complicated for me to understand” from 1995 to 1998 also signifies that more citizens have a higher incentives but difficulty to participate in the election after handover in the reason of changing the electoral system from solely “single seat, single vote” or “first past the post” (i.e. direct
(election) in 1995 to a complicated one as partially including “listed voting” with the implementation of “largest remainder” formula (i.e. proportional representation) in 1998 (Cheung, 2002: 49). In obvious, this implies that the sense of citizenship among individual citizens towards the HKSAR Government has been strengthened after the reversion of sovereignty since 1997.

Similar survey about political attitude from individual citizens towards the Hong Kong Government was also being carried out previously by Kuan and Lau (1997: 1-17) from 1985 to 1993. What I am going to pinpoint is one significant question picked up from the questionnaire, which had also brought the similar results from the respondents in both electoral studies conducted between 1995 and 1998. The statement asked was: “[T]hough imperfect, the existing political system is already the best under the circumstances” and the findings of this question can refer to the Table 8 as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8: Satisfaction with the existing political system (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kuan and Lau, 1997: 16

Even though various political reforms have been put into practice
continuously during the decolonization period, especially for the Direct Election for Geographical Constituencies in Legislative Council was being held in 1991, with the primary duties of “check(ing) of the administration on behalf of their constituents, which cast them in the role of discerning customers and consumers of the public services and those providing the services in the Government” (Louie, 1992: 53-55), the data collected did reflect the dissatisfaction with the existing political system was going to increase from 16.6 percent in 1985 to 22.9 percent in 1993 whereas the satisfaction was sharply declining for around 10 percent in the same period of time.

With the consistent tendency of such political attitude generated from the data, two possibilities seem to be interpreted with regard to either the dissatisfaction on the slow pace of political reform among Hong Kong people during the decolonization period or further democratization might lead to political or socio-economic instability, or both specifically. As such, it identifies that Hong Kong’s political development has increasingly drawn its people attention with the rise of sense of citizenship since the decolonization period, and would be stronger in this sense after 1997 in particular as predicted. To a very large extent, the evidence shown in the 1998’s Legislative Council Election above has explicitly
proved this forecast to be accurate.

In spite of various quantitative data above collected from historical research, qualitative data will also be picked up to present as supplement to describe process and develop holistic description (Weiss, 1994: 9-11) in this project. For the citizenship development in Hong Kong, Wong and Shum (1998: 36-51) had also conducted an in-depth interview with seventeen persons including eleven Hong Kong students about civic awareness of young people one year after the handover. The above mentioned interview schedule were for the face-to-face in nature and confidentiality was assured with fictitious name in ethical consideration.

As for the findings about civic awareness among the young people, one respondent who was called “Student A” provided a detail explanation which could not be figured out why “[T]he current electoral system is too complicated for me to understand” from both electoral studies. In the opinion of “Student A”, she claimed “Hong Kong people do have political apathy and not willing to participate. Participation cannot change anything. For instance, the Provisional Legislative Council was not elected by Hong Kong citizens. (The researchers thus asked about the perception towards 100 percent direct election of Legislative Council.)
This will be absolutely different. I believe many Hong Kong people will participate and with higher voting rate.” Clearly then, the authoritarian political climate making people difficult to participate in politics with political apathy was the “reason” rather than a “result”. Perhaps this can also be explained by the literature of Lau, Hong Kong people are in fact “utilitarian” and strongly believe they just employ the “ethos” of political apathy instrumentally (1984: 14). Apparently, the 1 July Protest Rally could be a good example on this.

Regardless the political attitudes reflected from quantitative research in both studies or qualitative research in terms of in-depth interviews, all findings can safely conclude that the idea of citizenship has been strengthened among the Hong Kong people in a transition from a British Crown Colony to “Special Administrative Region”. To familiarize whether there is any correlation with Civic Education in Hong Kong, we can have a more in-depth discussion in chapter 5.

4.2 National Education and citizenship development in Communist China

In the previous section, we have already seen through the Civic Education in Hong Kong with the characteristic of “depoliticization”, in order to achieve the goal of “civic cohesion” (Merriam, as cited in Lister, 1996: 87). Tracing
back to the early years and Cultural Revolution, obviously, this should not be the case in Communist China as in Hong Kong.

Since 1949, National Education has received strong state support and been carried out in schools nationwide. As Fitzgerald suggested, the intention behind of Chinese Communist Party can be explained by the willingness of the state-builders to legitimize its authority by yielding “a wider recognition of the distinction on one hand, and between the state and the nation on the other” (1996: 85) that the majority of population would no longer put such question to threaten its one-party dictatorship in Communist China. Prior to 1978, it emphasis was being put in the name of Political Education whereas its focus has been shifting to the Patriotic Education from 1978 to present on the shifting state-defined goals.

Viewing the case in Communist China, schools and other societal institutions have been called upon in shaping the knowledge, attitudes in addition to behaviour from individual citizens towards the society, nation as well as the state under one-party dictatorship of Chinese Communist Party through National Education. As mentioned in the paragraph earlier, political attitudes have been nurtured under either Political Education or Patriotic Education in accordance with the Government policies.
4.2.1 National Education: A historical account

Before the historical account of National Education in contemporary China, it is a must for me to clarify the terminologies under the umbrella of National Education.

In Communist China, the concept of National Education has been coined to be Moral Education, Ideological Education, Political Education and Patriotic Education in Chinese literature interchangeably with reference to the words used by Ministry of Education in early period and later taken by State Education Commission as “the supreme administrative authority for the education system in (Communist) China” (State Education Commission, The People’s Republic of China, 1989: 36-37) since 1985. In the explanation of Li, “[T]his kind of education tends to change with every new wave in the troubled political sea” (1990: 159). For instance, referring to the Notice on Strengthening the Moral Education Work in Secondary and Primary Schools issued by the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party in 1988, “[M]oral Education is Ideological and Political Education. It plays an important role in upholding the socialist nature of school” (as cited in Lee, 2005: 210). Clearly then, the meaning of National Education is not static along with the political and socio-economic
development.

4.2.1.1 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Political Education prior to 1978

On 21 September 1949, the First Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was held in Beiping. At the meeting, the Organic Law of the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China and Common Programme were promulgated as the Provisional Constitution of the newly-established state.

With regards the document adopted in Common Programme, its Article 41 specifically mentioned “[T]he culture and education of the People’s Republic of China shall be new democratic - national, scientific, and popular. The main tasks of People’s Government in cultural and educational work shall be the raising of the cultural level of the people, the training of personnel for national construction work, the eradicating of feudal, compradore, and fascist ideology, and the developing of the ideology of service to the people” (as cited in Wu, 1973: 796). The quotation had clearly identified its developmental line of Chinese Government on this official document. In the opinion of Hu, its implication behind should be regarded as the justification in “the process of industrialization and national construction” (1974: 31).
Despite the education goal written in the Article 41 of the Common Programme, the following Article further wrote the term of Five Loves explicitly that should be “[P]romoted as the public spirit of all citizens” in terms of “[L]ov(ing) for fatherland and people, lov(ing) of labour, lov(ing) of science and the tak(ing) care of public property … … of the People’s Republic of China” (as cited in Hu and Seifman, 1976: 11). To celebrate what the revolutionary characteristics of National Education mentioned in Five Loves, regarding the comments made by Hu, “[I]t cannot be considered sufficient for Five Loves education to consist merely of obtaining a few dogmatic items of knowledge about the so-called Fives Loves as happened in the former ethics and citizenship courses … … Consequently, the implementation of Fives Loves education is not the responsibility of the political information teachers only, but is the common task of the entire body of teachers” (Ridley et al., 1971: 39)

As already noted the target of promoting public spirit written as Five Loves, Ministry of Education further promulgated a set of Rules of Conduct for all Middle Schools Students in 1952 (also referred to Table 9 below) according to the Temporary Regulations for all Secondary Schools as “the basic principles of discipline, of study and of daily conduct” as “positive education”, which
intended to be a vehicle “in carrying Communist ideology, raising political consciousness of the students, developing the spirit of collectivism, and cultivating both good character and good habits in students” (Ibid: 43) with the implementation of these rules. Teachers were accordingly expected to explain the meaning and purpose of these rules to their students by “inspiration and persuasion” in the supervision of their behaviour.
**Table 9: Rules of Conduct for all Middle Schools Students**

1. Endeavor to learn; learn to be good in health, good at study and good in conduct. Prepare to serve the Motherland and the people.
2. Respect the National Flag. Respect and love the leader of the people.
3. Obey the Regulations of the school. Obey the instructions of the principal and teachers.
4. Arrive at the school punctually and attend the classes punctually. Never be late; never leave school before the time; and never miss a class without reason.
5. When attending school every day, bring all the textbooks and stationery required. Before the class begins, prepare all the things required for the lesson.
6. During the class, assume a correct posture; listen to the lecture attentively; do not talk unless when necessary; do not do anything else besides your class work. When desiring to leave the classroom, ask the teacher’s permission first.
7. Stand up when answering the teacher’s questions. Sit down when the teacher permits you. When you want to ask the teacher a question, raise your hand first.
8. Perform your self-study carefully. Finish your work in all the subjects in time.
9. Respect the principal and the teachers. Stand up and salute your teacher when the class begins and again at the end of the class. When you meet the principal or the teachers outside the school you also salute them.
10. Be sincere and friendly with your schoolmates, unite with them and help one another.
11. Respect and love your parents. Love and protect your brothers and sisters. Help your family do house work.
12. Respect your elders. Respect the aged. Love and protect the children; take care of the sick and infirm; give them your seat on a carriage; give way to them on the road.
13. Be honest, sincere, modest and polite to people. Do not tell a lie. Do not curse people. Do not fight. Do not disturb people’s work, study or sleep.
14. Do not smoke. Do not drink. Do not gamble. Do not take away other people’s things without their permission. Do not do anything that may be harmful to yourself or to others.
15. Take plenty of exercises and make your body strong. Keep your body, clothes, quarters and all public places clean and hygienic.
17. Value and protect the reputation of the class and of the school.
18. Always have your student identity card with you and see that you do not lose it.


Following both Article 41 and 42 from the policy document of *Common Programme*, the newly-established Chinese Government has begun to implement such *National Education* as a major role in the name of *Political Education* from 1949 to 1978.
Upon coming to power in 1949, one of the significant policies firstly undertaken by the Chinese Government to promote Political Education was the removal of any Kuomintang’s ideas from the post-war education system in China (Price, 1992: 216-217). Borrowing from an official interpretation, however, this is only due to adhering too closely to Soviet model (China’s Education Yearbook Editorial Board, 1984: 433). Whether the explanation made by the Chinese Government would be reflecting the truth or just for window-dressing in purpose, the answer is undoubtedly clear in the forthcoming discussion.

By the way, this ultimately made the gradual abolishment some special courses namely Party Principles, Civics and Military Studies those about Moral-political Education for Kuomintang’s ideas among the secondary schools from 1951 to 1956 (Ibid: 420), which were replaced by three required courses on political theories, namely On the New Democracy, Marxist Political Economics, Dialectical and Historical Materialism, from 1952 onwards (Ibid: 422). Such removals would not come to an end until a set of course outline for Political Education was published by Ministry of Education during 1959 (Ibid: 435), Political Knowledge as a separate subject, in the purpose of shaping the
curriculum and pedagogy which still continue to be implemented at the school level currently.

What also deserves me to mention would be the outbreak of Korean War in the early 1950s as well. North Korea, one member country came from the communist bloc, was being defeated by the American-led United Nations forces that had edged towards the Chinese borders. For the security reason, Chinese Government did decide to take military intervention in supporting North Korea with staving off any possibility from American aggression.

In line with the Government policies, there was a campaign called *Defense against America to Save Korea* at the same time, the initial emphasis of *Patriotic Education* was throughout all secondary schools over China (Li, 1990: 162). In particular, Ministry of Education in 1951 ordered all secondary schools to teach patriotism within the certain new courses, known as *Common Knowledge of Chinese Revolution, Basic Knowledge of Social Science and The Common Programme* (Price, 1992: 217), in the goal of put various public spirits for all citizens written in *Five Loves* in addition to *Rule of conduct* into practice.

Following the three-year Korean War, as regards a meeting held by the
Central Political Bureau of the Party, Mao Zedong has further called for the publication of “good textbooks” for both primary and secondary schools students since 1953. Responding his concern, and directed by Ministry of Education, the People's Education Press was consequently founded “to the need of reform and development of National Education”, which has been responsible to “undertake overall tasks of researching, compiling, publishing, and distributing teaching materials ... ... and various other textbooks and educational books” for all primary and secondary students used nationwide at both national and ministerial levels (Ministry of Culture, The People’s Republic of China, 2003). As Yan specifically pointed out, the History Editorial Department within People’s Education Press has clearly stated several goals for all history textbooks used by secondary school students and the fourth one did emphasize that “[T]extbooks of history should promote patriotism, nation pride and self-confidence” (as cited in Choe, 2003: 40-41), which was also in line with the policies of Chinese Government.

Situating at a bi-polar world after the Second World War, in spite of the assistance from Soviet Union, there was an additional growing nationwide repercussions which forced the newly-established Communist China to dig out
its particular developmental model with getting rid of economic isolation in a long run. During the late 1950s, after the success of the First Five Year Plan (1952-1957), Mao said that “[i]t was necessary to make a Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) in the production warfront”, in order “to bring a vast scale of agricultural production and construction to a climax” as “dual technology” to “walk on two legs” for the future of Communist China. Aside from that, when he later visited Moscow in November 1957, he did touch by the encouraging aim of Khrushchev that “the Soviet Union will catch up and overtake the United States in fifteen years” as well. (Wang, 2002: 22-24)

Though the Great Leap Forward eventually failed in the end, we shall see what was done by Chinese Government marked the beginning to explore a new road which was an alternative towards Soviet Union in the first place, including the education arena. In 1958, both Political Literacy and Socialist Foundations were introduced to the curriculum and therefore schools were order to provide the National Education about Marxist-Leninism in nurturing the new mindsets for all teachers and students. According what was surveyed by Ridley et al., both components namely collectivism and altruism were emphasized throughout the school textbooks everywhere at that period, in
terms of “devotion to duty and obedience”, “self-sacrifice”, “co-operation”, “solidarity”, “role acceptance” and “the willingness to accept advice and criticisms” (1971: 137-138).

By 1959, the problems brought about from Great Leap Forward were gradually becoming apparent and serious. In the early 1960s, the mindless and radical economic plans under Three Red Banners were subsequently abandoned but still bringing the Three Bad Years from 1960 to 1962. In light of the criticism on Mao’s decisions in the words of “thirties percent in natural disaster but seventy percent of human mistakes” for the diastral result on Great Leap Forward, Mao was forced to resign from his position of State Chairman to the “second line” and his place was secured by Liu Shaoqi, which the Two Lines Struggle between “red” and “expert” (also referred to Table 10 below) was going to begin at this boiling point. (Wang, 2002: 24-26)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Red” (Mao’s policy line)</th>
<th>“Expert” (Liu’s policy line)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political thoughts</td>
<td>Highly important</td>
<td>Less important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Personal ability</td>
<td>Less concern</td>
<td>Highly concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Role of masses</td>
<td>Leadership role</td>
<td>Supporting role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Role of technical experts</td>
<td>Supporting role</td>
<td>Leadership role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Views on natural constraints</td>
<td>Overcome by masses</td>
<td>Overcome by experts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As identified in Table 10 above, within the Central Government in the
first half of 1960s, there were two controversial schools of thought regarding the direction of modernization on contemporary China. As regards the intra-party struggle, Mao had been continuously losing his power in Central Government, who finally decided to strike back at Liu for his “survival” within the party. For the unequal distribution of power, we could somehow characterize the ten-year Cultural Revolution as the continuation of Two Lines Struggle between Mao and Liu.

With reference to Mao’s work named On New Democracy, he claimed the nature of Cultural Revolution to be “an ideological reflection of the political and economic (arenas)” (as cited in Hu and Seifman, 1976: 188). As far as his concern, the ideological reflection on political arena would be class struggle by then. From 1966 to 1976, including education arena within the decade, the Chinese Communist Party was actually influential by Mao to follow his policy line to “hold high great banner of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, thoroughly expose the reactionary bourgeois stand of those so-called academic authorities who oppose the Party and socialism, thoroughly criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois ideas in the sphere of academic work, education, journalism, literature and art and publishing, and seize the
leadership in these cultural spheres” (Ibid: 189).

As Sharma wrote, the primary objective of the Cultural Revolution greatly shifted from the elitist education system to “reduce the distinction between mental and manual labour and thereby to create a socialist, classless, egalitarian society” in the sphere of education (1993: 31-32). After the release of 5.16 Circular of Central Government, most students throughout the country were formed as “red guards” to hold up the “down with the capitalist roaders” as well as “destroying the four olds to establish the four news” banners, sometimes even put their words into practice for every subject anywhere.

In referring to the ten years of Cultural Revolution, with the guidance of Mao’s policy line, “education serving proletarian politics and ... combined with productive labour” (as cited in Hu and Seifman, 1976: 192) actually led to the absence of formal schooling. All students were expected to learn industrial work, agricultural and military affairs to criticize those bourgeoisies for class struggle. Worse still, many teachers and students were even being sent to remote areas (i.e. “Up to the mountains and down to the villages”) to re-learn the “revolutionary experience” from physical participation (Bernstein, 1977).
The role of school was totally changing. Throughout the territory, “[A]ll colleges, secondary schools and primary schools must resume classes to make revolution” (as cited in Hu and Seifman, 1976: 193) in the purpose of class struggle. Quite a large number of school leaders and the so-called “black five elements” were the targets of attack in this period. In severe, mass criticism rallies and the appearance of “big-character posters” did bring a halt for all regular learning activities, including what was formally done for Political Education within the school-settings. Indeed, it was not exaggerating to say that the Cultural Revolution did greatly undermine the previous seventeen years efforts regarding Political Education.

From the eyes of Schurmann, “Chinese Communism came to power and created the present People's Republic of China through revolutionary struggle. The last decade and a half in China have witnessed a human drama played out by great and small men who have used organized political power for many different ends. ... ... What holds it together is ideology and organization” (1968: 1). Nonetheless, such “revolutionary struggle” really made “[E]ducation suffer from serious abuse and affliction. The catastrophic trauma like Cultural Revolution was extremely rare in China’s education history” (Mao and Shen,

With respect to the extensive interviews and observation, Madsen has come as the impact on *National Education* brought by *Cultural Revolution* according to what he heard and saw in a small village in Southern China. In his perspective, “[W]hen Maoism exploded into absurdity, the moral basis of Chinese culture disintegrated into its diverse themes. The Communist gentry, the Communist rebel, the moralistic revolutionary, and the peasant technocrat emerged in all their one-sided, incompatible purity. Being thus one-dimensionally moral as persons, they became immoral as politicians. And thus Chinese political culture became demoralized – an ironic, tragic end for Mao’s attempt at moral revolution” (1984: 262). In this regard, this is not an exaggeration to say that the *Cultural Revolution* could be characterized as a kind of aggressive attempt to put the whole “nation” into “an ideological classroom-theatre” for revitalizing their revolutionary spirit as the ends. The nature of *Political Education* was hence changing to be practical, which was guided by an extremely detached moral agenda, at the service of economics and particularly politics. Unavoidably then, the inculcation of moral values in *National Education* has nearly fetched up for this decade.
4.2.1.2 Government policies and subsequent implementations on Patriotic Education beyond 1978

The year of 1978 could be known as a pivotal point in contemporary Chinese history. With the end of Cultural Revolution with the downfall of Gang of Four, immediately tracking the Two Whatevers down voiced out by Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping eventually came to the power pillar of Central Government in directing China's road to socialist modernization for nearly fifteen years after his political career in “three rises and three falls” between 1949 to 1976, and then Communist China has been undergoing fundamental changes since 1978 until today.

In March 1979, as for the speech of Deng, “all kinds of development have to suit the conditions in China and open up a road to modernization in the Chinese style”, which 4 years later promulgated as the idea of Socialism in Chinese Characteristics. As Deng argued, “[T]he criterion for judging our work in all fields should be whether it contributes to the building of Socialism in Chinese Characteristics, to national prosperity and to the welfare and happiness of the people” (as cited in Deng, 1987: 13) More importantly, he had once remarked that “[T]he path (of Socialism in Chinese Characteristics) is correct and the policies won’t change” (Ibid: 18) for the future's development
in China. For the final example, one of his popular statements that “whether the cat is black or white in colour, as long as it catches mice” also illustrated his practical and non-ideological approach to deal with problems in addition to promote modernization in Communist China.

From what was thought by Deng, the new policy line adopted after 1978 has already shifted its focus from “class struggle” with bourgeoisies to “decentralization (i.e. rational decision-making) and liberalization (i.e. economic modernization)” at large. With reference to the explanation made by Christiansen and Rai, “([F]rom now on,) all economic activities in the socialist economy should be quantified in contractual relationships ... ... in order to enhance productivity, rationalize the allocation of resources, and do away with bottlenecks in the economy (as the past)” (1996: 218-219).

Also in an important speech at the National Education Work Conference in 1978, in which he stressed the need to link by shifting Moral-political Education towards modernization. As Deng argued, “revolutionary ideals and communist virtues should be fostered from childhood” and ended this section of speech with the following aims by claming that “[W]e should work to inculcate in young people the revolutionary style of learning diligently,
observing discipline, loving physical labour, taking pleasure in helping others, working hard and daring to fight the enemy so that they will be trained to be fine and competent workers, loyal to the socialist motherland, to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat and to Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought. Then, some day when they take up a post, they will become workers with a high sense of political responsibility and collectivism, firm revolutionary ideals, a method of working to find truth from facts and following the will of the people, and will be able to observe discipline strictly and will work wholeheartedly and actively for the people” (as cited in Price, 1992: 213-214).

As obvious as above, also regarding the field in education, the construction of Socialist Civilizations has then become the new and significant theme (Li, 1990: 165) to draw people’s attention in that scenario during the post-Mao era. As Deng strongly believed, two Socialist Civilizations should be regarded as both “high materialistic standards” in productive forces and “high cultural and ideological standards” that people should be imbued with communist ideals, have moral integrity and a good general education and observe discipline” (as cited in Deng, 1987: 17). To nurture both new standards for all people in Communist China, according to the thought of Deng, the role
of education, especially for the school-settings, “should be oriented to modernization, the world, and the future” (as cited in Sautman, 1991: 678) on this.

To achieve the first goal in Socialist Civilizations, by upgrading the “materialistic standard” in productive forces, the road of National Education in Communist China beginning in 1978 mostly changed from Political Education into the stage of “depoliticization and deideologicization” in terms of Patriotic Education, in which the Central Government emphasized the “pragmatic and managerial approaches” (Li and White, 1988: 371-399) to favour economics rather than politics, in order to meet a “high(er) cultural and ideological standard” along with the materialistic achievement in a meantime.

Within the school-settings, the amended curriculum in early 1980s on political courses at the national level could significantly be seen as the case for this concern. It was no longer a must for all students to be “re-educated” at the countryside from physical participation as during the Cultural Revolution. As compared in Table II as follows, even regarding the formal curriculum in junior secondary schools since the early 1980s, those courses introduced under the umbrella of Political Knowledge till the late 1970s on teaching scientific
socialism for those secondary students almost disappeared, or greatly eliminated at least. The previous emphasis on collectivism as the primary unit of a socialist state has gradually been replaced by regulated individualism until today.

Table 11: Comparative politics curriculum for junior secondary schools prior to and beyond 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-1980s Courses on Political Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junior Secondary schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General History of Societal Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Knowledge of Scientific Socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Knowledge of Scientific Socialism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1980s to Present Courses on Political Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junior Secondary schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-cultivation of Youngsters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Knowledge of Laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General History of Societal Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As expected originally, the “materialistic standard” in productive forces has been somehow improved from 1978 onwards under the implementation of new policies to match market-style reforms and the Open door Policy to foreign investments for Socialist Civilizations. Compared with the GDP per capita between 1978 and 2004 conducted by State Statistical Bureau regarding Table 12 in the following, the post-Mao economic reforms did generate both rapid and sustained economic growth throughout the China’s 30 provinces since 1978. The result on this, then, was not only to achieve larger production units, but also to sharply increase the level of technology, production, in addition to
management abilities so that the material needs of a number of people can be somehow fulfilled.

Yet, challenges still remained while in the shortages of economy. Regarding an extensive research done with almost 4,000 students in Fujian Province, most students agreed that the state did pay attention on dealing the problem of bureaucratic corruption. However, only 1.1 percent or 40 respondents believed they were “comparative satisfied”. By contrast, 58.73 percent or 2,118 respondents complained with dissatisfaction at all (Lin, as cited in Rosen, 1993: 317). As Ogden concerned, almost entire bureaucrats were further empowered to offer access to scarce resources, commodities as well as services in exchange for their own favours (1995: 280-283). Excessive bureaucraticism has led both problems on corruption and therefore unequal distribution of wealth throughout the territory as indicated in the Table 12 below. In a real sense, the use of “personal relationship” (i.e. “guanxi”) with the bureaucrats to get what is originally unavailable has come to be popular. Most significantly, the substantial loss of state revenues in this scenario has also been seen as a big obstacle for the further Government-led economic modernization in a long run.
Far beyond which was previously expected, nonetheless, the "high cultural and ideological standards" was out of the original expectation with regard to Central Government while implementing the market-style reforms and Open door Policy. The ideologies found among most people did change a lot before and after the Cultural Revolution. Also with an influx of various western ideas to Communist China in post-Mao era, in spite of Four Modernizations (of agriculture, industry, defense, with science and technology) which was proposed by Deng, many Chinese had come to believe that "political democracy as the Fifth Modernization, without which a true modern transformation would not be possible" (Hsu, 2000: 872-873). Borrowing the
words of some students during the demonstration in mid-1980s, they said
“[W]e want democracy. We want liberty. We want freedom of press. No
democracy, no modernization” (Ibid: 874).

Facing such caught-off guard, what the Central Government attributed
the source of discontent and disharmony would only be the “Western
Bourgeois Liberalization”. As People's Daily criticized, “[I]t is the process of
poisoning our youth, imperiling our social stability and unity, interfering with
our reforms and opening-up policy, and obstructing modernization's move
forward” (as cited in Hsu, 2000: 876-877).

To deal with the social unrest with such cultural and ideological
confusion, a large-scale educational reform has started to launch since 1985
before various Anti-spiritual Pollution Campaigns broke out from 1987 onwards,
aimed at a complete “overhaul of the educational system” with instituting
9-year of Government-funded compulsory education (as cited in Cheng, 1986:
255) to restore the “high cultural and ideological standards” by “improv(ing)
the quality of the whole people” (as cited in Sautman, 1991: 679).

Though the secondary students only played a minor role in such
demonstrations in the mid-1980s, there were still several surveys on their “re-education”. Table 13 below indicated the secondary school students’ views on the 1987 and 1989 demonstrations. On this, a definite increasing trend could be figured out for psychological participation on demonstrations for those secondary students from 1987 to 1989, whereas the non-participation trend was dropping in contrast. Since then, the people’s discontent could be summed up as an increasing intensification in Communist China at that moment.

Table 13: Comparison of secondary school students’ views on the 1987 and 1989 demonstrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1987 sample</th>
<th>1989 sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not participate</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch the excitement</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not participate and also dissuade others from participating</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Song, as cited in Rosen, 1993: 316

Since most “re-education” campaigns was less workable to settle the problem of cultural and ideological confusion among the people, various demonstrations repeatedly broke out during the second half of 1980s to demand for further democracy, liberty and freedom of press in Communist China. Finally in 1989’s summer, the most serious student demonstration formed by various universities’ students happened in Tiananmen Square of Beijing, which was ended up by the military crackdown on 4 June 1989, as well
as consequent stepping down of Zhao Ziyang from the core of Central Government (Dassu and Saich, 1992: 234-237). As Nathan suggested, the implications behind *June Fourth Incident* could be regarded as a kind of neo-authoritarianism, which the economic modernization for Communist China solely required an absolute political authority rather than any component of democracy (1990: 113) as a strong vehicle to move on under the leadership of Central Government.

Immediately after the *June Fourth Incident* and the downfall of Zhao, what the Central Government was extremely worried should be how to maintain its legitimate status in China. Responding the public concern for all side-effects brought by those policies on raising “materialistic standard” from 1978 onwards, the Central Government has been forced to launch relevant campaigns and thus implement consequent actions in dealing with over-involvement of bureaucratism on economic modernization and the problem of official corruption in a likewise (Baum, 1996: 3). And Deng also pointed out, “[T]he movement (i.e. *June Fourth Incident* in 1989) was the result of the spread of capitalist liberalization and the weakness of *Political and Ideological Education*” (as cited in Cheung and Pan, 2006: 44).
As a result, aimed at achieving the “high(er) cultural and ideological standards”, Patriotic Education was going to be emphasized in the whole Communist China. At both national and local levels, various policy documents on promoting Patriotic Education have begun to appear. Taking the 1991’s one as an example, the *Outline of Moral Education for all Secondary Schools* which was originally introduced three years previously has actually been implemented in full (State Education Commission, The People’s Republic of China, 1988). With reference to this official document, the role of Moral Education in schools was firstly mentioned to be an independent subject in Communist China rather than a mixture with other political ideologies as in the past. Despite the teaching on Patriotism as a collective goal for the whole country as in previous condition, the adoption of a motivation approach to develop moral standards and behaviour for individual students was firstly called upon by the Central Government.

With the actual implementation at school level, one of the earliest policies was being seen as the imposition on a one-year military training course for those secondary schools that their graduates were more likely to be promoted to some well-known universities nationwide. Apart from the both
Chinese and English classes, only various military classes could be selected in that year, including one course that justified the action of Central Government on June Fourth Incident in 1989 (Lubman, 1990: 46-47). Besides, a new propaganda called Learn from Lei Fung was launched within all schools from early 1990s. The Central Government wanted to portray Lei Fung as a role-model for all Chinese youngsters to learn in searching their meanings for their livelihood (Reed, 1991).

Unfortunately, both policies introduced for Patriotic Education on did invite serious criticisms with certain uncertainties for their effectiveness in finals. For example, a study of secondary school students conducted by Zhang and Zhang in Jiaocheng county of Shanxi province during 1990 revealed Lei Fung was extremely unpopular in the eyes of most students. What was done by Lei Fung should be a naïve and being a laugh of them, and most students agreed that only money would be their concern by instead (Rosen, 1993: 320).

Written above, similar with Crothall’s observation and comments in a negative way, “Patriotic Education (in Communist China) has worked where political science (i.e. Communist ideologies) failed. Today’s students are far less willing to criticize the party because to do so would be seen somehow as being
unpatriotic” (1994). Resultantly, it was predictable that such *Patriotic Education* could only keep most people in silence rather than effectively settle the problem of “political and economic dilemma” in a long run (Howell, 1993: 39-41). Starting from early 1992, that was why Deng began his visit in Southern China as a “capitalist promoter” again to support further economic modernization in Communist China, who continued to accelerate his previous belief on building *Socialism in Chinese Characteristics* in re-building the legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party. Later in June, Jiang Zemin formally expounded Deng’s idea into the term of *Socialist Market Economy* that there was still a room for a market economy to develop in a socialist society. In the words of Jiang, what the China currently happened could also be considered to be the “primary stage of socialism” (as cited in Saich, 2004: 73-78).

Borrowing the idea of *Socialist Market Economy* as a “primary stage of socialism”, more open areas could be found after Deng’s visit along the coastal areas, inland rivers and in 314 counties and with a total population of 330 million that has legally enjoyed those preferential policies of expanded rights for foreign-investment projects and foreign trade rights (Wu, 1993: 16).

By protecting those legal rights among those open development zones
to attract more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for further economic modernization, what was most significant policies would be the Education Law passed in National People's Congress during 1995. According to Article 3 and 5, all nationwide education institutions were responsible for undertaking the political tasks, including the *Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought* and Deng Xiaoping's *Socialism in Chinese Characteristics*, in the pursuit of serving socialist modernization, training constructors and successors for the socialist course, and transmitting worldviews of patriotism, collectivism as well as socialism to all students within the school-settings (Ministry of Education, The People's Republic of China, 1995). Since then, the role of *Patriotic Education* was not only equated with love for the Chinese Communist Party as in the past, but also the focus was shifting from “the 1959’s internationalism” to “avoiding any chauvinistic and narrow nationalism”. But at least, of course, it has still put efforts to mention the sacrificing more or less individual's rights for the whole nation as the basis in pursuit of national pride, particularly facing an increase of foreign influence for further economic modernization from early 1990s onwards.

In this way, law education has become a new component in *Patriotic*
Education to teach students the basic needs and human rights that they should be paying attention to. For all secondary schools nationwide, the students were required to learn “laws relating to national identity, including National Constitution, National Emblem Law, National Flag Law, and Regulations on Social Security ... .... (in the pursuit of) upholding (The People’s Republic of China) ‘long-term’ dominated leadership, ... ... reinforcing students’ identity to China, and increasing students’ awareness of preserving the state’s stability” (Cheung and Pan, 2006: 41). Meanwhile within the legal framework, of course differing from the past, the students were allowed as act themselves as they wish.

From the mid-1990s also, it has been a further wave of state-led education reform to prepare for economic globalization. More guidelines on developing Patriotic Education just as the 1988’s one has been issued repeatedly since then. In 1996, the Guidelines on Ideopolitical Education in Full-time Secondary Schools was published (China’s Education Yearbook Editorial Board, 1997), which did place more foci on both psychological health and moral judgments for individual students to develop than before.

As the accessibility of updated information has been a global trend to develop the knowledge-based economy during 21st century, the popularity on
using computers in addition to internet access in Communist China is inevitably to avoid at the same time. *Table 14* below giving a dramatic increase on internet usage from 1997 to 2004 could be the obvious evidence on this. To keep an eye on the fast growing use of Information Communication Technology (ICT) in the field of education, China Educational and Research Network (CERNET) was established in 1994 and directly managed by the Ministry of Education to “provide services for Chinese universities, institutes, schools and other non-profit organizations in (Communist) China, including network connection, .edu.cn domain name and IP address assignment, and educational and research resources and super computing services” (China Educational and Research Network, 2006a) for teaching and learning as a common good to all students. Four years later, Central Government further pinpointed that “the use of the ICT in education should be promoted in order to provide students with more educational resources, and expecting students to grasp new capabilities of searching and accessing information from multiple sources” (Cheung and Pan, 2006: 45).
Table 14: The growth of internet usage in Communist China (1997-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of computers connected to the internet</th>
<th>No. of internet service subscribers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>299,000</td>
<td>620,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>747,000</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>8,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8,920,000</td>
<td>22,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12,540,000</td>
<td>33,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>20,830,000</td>
<td>59,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>30,890,000</td>
<td>79,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>41,600,000</td>
<td>94,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: China Internet Network Information Centre, as cited in Ng, 2006: 40

In 2000, Jiang further presented his *Three Represents* as the basic task for Communist China to concentrate largest efforts in developing “advanced social production forces, the most advanced culture and fundamental interests” at all. According to Saich, Jiang’s further explanation on *Three Represents* has greatly lined up the relationship in political economy, so that the cadres are encouraged to “plunge into the sea (i.e. commercial sectors)” (as cited in 2004: 85) for the success of economic modernization. One year afterwards, while China has become one of those prominent members in World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2001, competition is going to be keen than before as Central Government will be responsible as an active facilitator rather than a provider to create an amiable economic environment and provide the delivery of public goods. In the words of Zhu Rongji, “[G]overnment functions are mainly for regulating the economy, monitoring the market, and delivering social
management and public services" (Zhu, as cited in Ng, 2006: 27).

In this scenario, along with the trend regarding those guidelines issued in both 1988 and 1996, two more in-depth official documents namely *Guidelines on Ideopolitical Education in Junior Secondary Schools* as well as *Guidelines on Ideopolitical Education in Full-time Compulsory Education* were again initiated in 2001 and 2003 respectively (China’s Education Yearbook Editorial Board, 2002; Ministry of Education, The People’s Republic of China, as cited in Zhan and Ning, 2004: 517-519) for further liberalization to a more flexible curriculum framework on *Patriotic Education (also referred to Table 15 below)* for those individuals, in order to foster the development of *Socialist Market Economy* rather than a sole “hard sell” political indoctrination as in Mao’s era.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Courses</th>
<th>Aims and objectives</th>
<th>Teaching contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mental health</td>
<td>Knowing self</td>
<td>Communication and understanding positive attitudes towards social development and progression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>Self-esteem and self-encouragement morality in communication</td>
<td>Responsibility to motherland, society and natural environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Legal learning and application</td>
<td>Law and social order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National conditions</td>
<td>Learning cultural identity as a commitment to Chinese culture as common ideals</td>
<td>Understanding national conditions and love Communist China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nonetheless, being a “double-edge sword”, the popularity of ICT under economic globalization has really brought a number of new challenges on *Patriotic Education* in Communist China since the late 1990s. As Jiang said, the platform of “internet is a new battle zone” which was a public sphere available for political enemies to challenges the authority of Central Government, particularly “the cross-border flow of ‘unhealthy information’ might ‘pollute’ the environment of *Political and Moral Education* at schools, and the increasingly individual freedom in the cyber space might result in the spread of anarchism and laissez-faire” (as cited in Cheung and Pan, 2006: 45).

To win this “battle” for the education circle in Communist China, with the support of Central Government, CERNET has quickly expanded as a counter-alternative and hence played a dominate role on the internet in these few years. For instance, CERNET establishing its mega on-line learning centre, which collaborating with the Blackboard Company, the largest distance education platform provider in United States, from 2003 to present could be a specific case on this (China Educational and Research Network, 2006b).

With regards the curriculum reform also, as mentioned before, the publishment of various official guidelines on *Patriotic Education* have been
regarded as the beginning rather than an end for future's China. During the early 21st century, the Ministry of Education has still been moving forward to design a more interesting and enjoyable curriculum on *Politico-ideological Education*, in order to arouse the interests for all students in schools (2005) as well as act as a strong vehicle against the “spiritual pollution” brought by the cyber information across national boundaries. Although the effectiveness on such “adaptation” amendments for actual implementation on *Patriotic Education* has still been uncertain at this minute, many of us do believe that a more user-friendly and practical based *Patriotic Education* will more likely to be promoted since then.

### 4.2.2 Citizenship development in Communist China

Similar with the case of Hong Kong, *National Education* promoted in Communist China can also be regarded as a vehicle for “political socialization” (Almond and Verba, 1989: 266-274) to achieve the ends of “civic cohesion” (Merriam, as cited in Lister, 1996: 87). In this paradigm, the China’s citizenship development could be figured out in the context of changing political attitudes from individuals towards the Government along with the flow of time.

Before exploring the citizenship development in Communist China,
what I am going to point out in the first instance is the nature of Chinese Communist Government for present-day China. As Manion concerned, “[F]or now, as in the past, the design of the communist party-state is a fair model of the organization of political power in China” (2000: 427). Since today’s China is no longer being recognized as communist in any traditional sense, it still remains as an authoritarian regime at large. For the political system in Communist China, Chinese Communist Party has still acted to be an “avant-garde” status in practicing the non-democratic nature’s “democratic centralism”, in order to monopolize various powers throughout the whole society, leading to an all-encompassing bureaucratic state (Hague and Harrop, 2001: 179).

To guarantee its rule in a long run, the party of course sought to secure its unchallengeable position through complete social control just as a mobilization regime, such as trying very hard to mobilize its citizens in voting. Compared with voluntary voting practice among those Western democracies or just the condition in Hong Kong whether prior to or beyond handover in 1997, the voting rate is relative higher in those mobilization regimes like Communist China whereas its significance should be less important (Verba et al., 1978: 46) because such voting is just a legitimation tool for Chinese Communist Party
rather than an efficacious channel reflecting the political will for individual citizens.

Still in this scenario, the inter-generational voting behaviour on this could somehow reveal the distinctive political attitudes on Communist Government in China among those individual citizens. The analysis below is based on a survey conducted in December 1990, in co-operation with the Social Survey Research Centre of the People's University of China, about the generational differences in political attitudes and political behaviour in Communist China (Shi, 1999: 1-31). A stratified multi-stage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) was employed to select the samples. Excluding those who live in Tibet Autonomous Region because of both low accessibility and communication difficulties, only 18-year old or above adult population nationwide would be picked up as representative samples in this survey, who residing in family household at the time. To come up in the process of data collection, a number of college students in sociology and statistics were employed as field workers. This survey eventually interviewed 3,200 people within the national boundaries and 2,896 numbers of questions were collected, representing a very high response rate in 90.5 percent among all
interviewees.

Mentioned in the earlier paragraph, political participation such as voting can always be regarded as certain legal acts from an individual citizen’s attempt on influencing the Government. Even as a mobilization regime liked Communist China, voters can still choose among alternative candidates rather than alternative platforms for such limited elections. As shown in Table 16 in the following, we can easily find the youngest generation group voted least, whatever the gender they were. Compared with other older generation groups, both youngest men and women did vote less than 20 percent in the elections. Apart from those respondents belonging to such youngest generation group, no substantial distinction in voting behaviour could be found across various generations in Communist China.

Table 16: Political participation (i.e. voting behaviour) by gender and age group in Communist China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Voting for the Chinese Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 to 30</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 to 45</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 - 55</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 or above</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shi, 1999: 23

Actually, the generational interpretation can give a well-known explanation how different life experience among various age groups would
determine distinctive political behaviour for those individuals at that cohort. As a result, being socialized under a different political environment and already experienced critical social movements like Cultural Revolution and June Fourth Incident, those young people in Communist China might be varying differently from the older generations among several indicators as follows.

Above everything else, political orientation of the youngest group would largely be different from the older ones. Youngest persons were socialized in both formal and informal curriculum by the merits of economic modernization in terms of Socialism in Chinese Characteristics in post-Mao era whereas the older ones were strongly influenced by Mao’s perspective in “class struggle” all the time. After the Cultural Revolution, the notion of “politics in command” has almost disappeared and then shifted to “economics in command” in Communist China nowadays. More importantly, neither serious punishment nor any political purge for those non-voting behaviour on state-controlled elections since 1978 as in Mao’s China also made the young people less likely bear such a meaningless burden than the older generations. For me, these were some of the most important reasons to explain why those youngsters dared to refuse in participating for such political behaviour (i.e. voting) than the older people
generally.

Aside from that, as the youngsters were born late, they also had a diverse views and expectations towards the Chinese Government under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party as such “social contract” (Hobbes, as cited in Parsons et al., 1965: 869-870) was varying differently across generations in Communist China. When the older generations were young in age, they did see many efforts paid by the Chinese Government for “national re-construction” to improve their living standard at most. Therefore, it was not strange that those would more likely respect the Government and be willing to participate in state-controlled elections as responsible citizens as one of their obligations in return. Instead, what were seen by those youngsters would largely attribute to bad things done by the Government, including the deconstruction during the Cultural Revolution, the 1989’s crackdown in Tiananmen Square etc. If the youths believe such voting was only a good for the ruling party but not for whole society, didn’t they still participate in these “wasteful activities” repeatedly? The answer was absolute.

Judging from the explanations above, we can conclude that many older people were willing to attach as well as involve in political participation such as
voting in state-dominated elections but the youths didn’t in general. Compared with those older people, the younger generations tend to be less likely to accept the official norm that encourages people in giving up their own interests to those collective ones as defined by the Chinese Government. Perhaps this can be partially explained by the youths that have not only been more programmatic and determined to pursue their own goals, but they also bring more resources to facilitate their interest articulation.

And we all see definitely, the changing context of political attitudes between different generations does imply the concept of citizenship has also been developing from the politicized citizenship to depoliticized citizenship prior to 1978 and beyond 1978 respectively. In this scenario, many of us will predict, whatever the degree it will achieve, similar trend on developing the notion of depoliticized citizenship will be expected to stretch more or less in the 21st century.

During the late 1980s, a research conducted by the Department of Sociology in the Academy of Social Sciences (1993: 1-362) about the political attitude from altogether 4,000 young individuals towards the Chinese Government had also come up with a similar result of depoliticized citizenship.
as indicated above. In the questionnaire, one of these questions asked for the criteria of those respondents on electing their representative in their mindset. As low as you cannot imagine, only 10.5 percent youngsters would consider choosing those candidates whose ideas were falling into the expectation of Chinese Government at that time. That clearly implies that the authoritarian characteristics of Chinese Government was least popular for the majority, for those younger generations in particular. In fact, what they really needed should be the *Fifth Modernization* in terms of democracy, liberty and press of freedom (Hsu, 2000: 872-873) that I had pinpointed earlier. Due to the elections were largely influenced by the state, however, most young people would tend to choose not to vote as a passive action to boycott such limited elections as usual, which is identified in the previous survey also.

Aiding with the selective studies in the changing context of political attitudes of individual citizens towards Chinese Government as above, all of you can more or less generate a simple picture on the depoliticization of citizenship in Communist China, especially in Deng, Jiang and Hu’s eras when have been after 1978. In the forthcoming chapter, I am going to apply the conceptual framework regarding chapter 3 for further discussion in Communist
China, and compare with post-war Hong Kong as well, to explore whether there is any correlation between National Education and citizenship development fundamentally.
CHAPTER 5  DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

With reference to what has been described in chapter 4, we have more or less been seeing through the *Civic Education* in Hong Kong and *National Education* in Communist China, along with both their citizenship development in a meantime. For both cases, in the words of Dewey, the role of schools could be known as an “assimilative force” to educate the “nation”, in the process of “intermingling in the school of youth of different races, differing religions, and unlike customs creates for all a new and broader environment” (1916). As Merriam further put it explicitly in his classical work, “[S]chool system is the basic factor in the development of civic interest and loyalty, and the chief instrument for that purpose”, so that various school systems and their *Civic Education* do always help a society to achieve the goal of “civic cohesion” (as cited in Lister, 1996: 87) in the target of nurturing its particular citizens in a modern polity.

Hence, the *Civic Education* practiced in Hong Kong can less likely be characterized as the same product in terms of the *National Education* in Communist China for these several decades. Certainly, it does not necessarily meant both Hong Kong’s *Civic Education* and China’s *National Education* have been mutually exclusive, despite various distinctions, they do collectively share certain similarities in terms of
Aims and objectives, teaching methods, implementation approach as well as the outcome of such education, which will be discussed in a comparative approach as follows.

5.1 Aims and objectives

According to Anderson, the notion of “nation” is just known as an “imagined political community” (1991: 6) and thus nation-building should be an effective means for a state to legitimize its political authority. Borrowing the idea from Ramiez and Boil, a kind of particular citizenship could be nurtured among those people from the schooling system under Governmental control (1987: 13).

Being a British Crown colony from the 19th century onwards and a newly-established nation-state since 1949, the teaching objective throughout school education in both societies (i.e. Hong Kong and the Communist China) would be varying differently, especially from time to time, in the process of political transition. As follows, I am going to identify both HH1 and CH1 whether the political transition would lead to the change of nature for Civic or National Education.

5.1.1 Aims and objectives in Hong Kong

In line with the policies of Hong Kong Government prior to 1985, the
aims and objectives of *Civic Education* was mainly at creating a kind of both nationally and culturally neutral citizenship in the colonial Hong Kong. In the words of Hong Kong Curriculum Development Committee, the role of *Civic Education* was performing a function “with the promotion of social responsibility” and thus “becom(ing) a method of political socialization” (1985: 9) in Hong Kong.

Clearly then, this kind of *Civic Education* could be seen as a politically socializing force to promote civic responsibility among all individuals, in order to perpetuate the post-war colonial rule with the characteristic of status quo to avoid any “imperium in imperio” (England and Rear, 1975: 209) under the leadership of Kuomintang or Communists in Hong Kong.

As regards the *Civic Education* in colonial Hong Kong before 1985, the fact of such changing depoliticized nature in education could actually be elaborated in the following reasons.

Mentioned above, being a British Crown colony since the 19th century in which the “imagined political community” has never existed in Hong Kong, the Colonial Government has been unable performing the role of narration with the past (i.e. historical narration), in the purpose of constructing an “ascribed status”
for all local population. As King wrote, the Government at that moment was just practicing a kind of “administrative adsorption of politics” (1981: 129-130), which both the prominent members of the Chinese society and educated elites were “absorbed” through those official appointment to the legislature and consultative bodies, and recruitment to administrative positions in the Civil Service structure. At this point, what could be done by Hong Kong Colonial Government was just introducing a type of “ahistorical and apolitical” education to come up with its “achieved status”. To perpetuate its ruling power after the Second World War, the Colonial Government always put the principle of status quo as the top priority in Civic Education to legitimate its political authority without mentioning any nationalist content in Hong Kong, whether it was pro-Kuomintang or pro-communist in nature. In view of Morris, “[T]he period up to about 1985 saw the Government consciously pursue an apolitical curriculum in an attempt to avoid raising political consciousness of a population who might begin question Hong Kong’s colonial status” (1997: 120).

What also deserves to be said here was the “utilitarianistic familism” rooted among Hong Kong’s people that had largely affected the development of Civic Education during the period of living out the “Hong Kong Dream” prior to
mid-1980s. Looking back to the end of 1940s, three large-scale Civil Wars successively occurred in China had resultantly led to an influx of refugees to Hong Kong, whose primary concerns were mainly daily survival and the accumulation of sufficient earnings from post-war economy to return to their home country (i.e. Communist China) thereafter. As Lau and Kuan believed, such refugee mentality explicitly identified that Hong Kong's people were strongly influenced by the idea of “utilitarianistic familism” to maximize their materialistic gains with the familial goal, instead of politically apathetic (1988: 54) in that period of time. As most Hong Kong's people were characterized as “sojourners” and willing to return to their home country ultimately, there was another reason to expound why no room had been available for Hong Kong Colonial Government to construct its ascribed status. The other way round, in terms of constructing the achieved status, it was a must for the Colonial Government to maintain socio-economic stability in ensuring the materialistic gains among the people in Hong Kong.

Entering into the mid-1980s, just after the signing of Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 to finalize the reversion of sovereignty thirteen years later, two Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools were respectively issued by the
Curriculum Development Committee in 1985 and 1996 for all Hong Kong secondary schools. For the *Education Commission Reform* in 2000, it was further recommended a change to strengthen *Moral and Civic Education* that thus placed this at the top of five important learning experiences.

As shown from those evidence above, the Hong Kong’s *Civic Education* has gradually shifted its ahistorical and apolitical focuses to the role of preparing “political knowledge, political attitudes, and political skills of secondary students” (Leung, 1995: 287) as a result of the handover issue to Communist China during 1997. Even though certain criticisms have still been invited through these policies documents and subsequent implementation for the secondary schools in Hong Kong, undeniably, in the process of decolonization, Hong Kong has obviously been in transition from depoliticization to increasing politicization and democratization (Bray and Lee, 1993: 555) to arouse a greater sense of civic awareness in addition to develop a new “re-colonized” identity that compared with the past several decades.

Similar with what is identified in HH1, with regards the process of decolonization in Hong Kong since 1985, it is convincing to say that the political transition from Colonial Government to HKSAR Government would lead to the
change of nature of Civic Education. Compared with the colonial era, Civic Education does actually promote more content of nationalism on citizenship building after the handover (Lam, 2005: 317-318).

5.1.2 Aims and objectives in Communist China

Differing from the case of Hong Kong, the aims and objectives of National Education in Communist China prior to 1978 aimed at nurturing a kind of “citizenship” for its “imagined political community” based on an “achieved nationality” instead of the ascribed one, in pursuit of the goal on “nation-building”. As People's Daily wrote, there was a series of drawbacks of the educational system in Confucian China because “[T]he school system of old (i.e. Confucian) China was an imitation of the system of capitalist states and reflected the reactionary ideology of landlords, bureaucrats, and the semi-colonial, semi-feudal society … … The labouring people had no position in the culture and education of old (i.e. Confucian) China” (as cited in Hu and Seifman, 1976: 4).

According to Mao's work called On New Democracy, so that there was an urgent need for Communist China to call for the reform on the Kuomintang's educational system that could build a new revolutionary culture in terms of “democratic, national and scientific” (Ibid: 4-5) as the fundamental principles to guide and
then shape the “new direction of education” for the interests of “broad mass” in
the process of “cultural reproduction”.

Obviously then, this kind of *National Education* could be seen as a
vehicle for Communist China to emancipate itself from both the American and
European models which had been previously put during the Kuomintang’s China.
Emphasis was placed on the requirement that the “democratic, national and
scientific” education should serve the needs of “industrialization and national
construction” (Hu, 1974: 31) against imperialist encroachment and replace the
feudal superstitions with “scientific and historical truth” in Communist China from
1949 to 1978.

With respect to the *National Education* till about the end of *Cultural
Revolution* in 1976, the fact of such “achieved nationalistic” education with
strong emphasis on politics could be somehow explained as follows.

Becoming a newly established “nation-state” since 1949, the
Communist China has been promoting a break of with Confucian system that
differed from Kuomintang’s one. That should be an important reason to interpret
why the construction of “ascribed nationality” for such “imagined political
community” in new China was not workable in this scenario.

Instead of constructing an “ascribed nationality” in Communist China, what was done by the Chinese Government should be regarded on the stressing a new “socialist” system of personal attitudes and social values, in order to nurture a kind of “achieved nationality” for the whole. Throughout the school education, people were encouraged to be politically sensitive and positively involved in political programmes and personalities which touch them. In the words of Ridley et al., “[E]ducation, then, is a tool of politics; in China, it is a tool of political leadership” (1971: 3). Li also asserted a similar concept that the “Moral Education in (Communist) China is basically the expressed thoughts of political leaders, which intrude into other branches of education. As such, it is a means of political indoctrination” (1990: 159). Put it simply, these “citizens” were meant to assume the roles of “broad mass” such as those industrial workers, farmers, soldiers and cadres to be “model citizens” with such particular “achieved nationality” (Ridley et al., 1971) under the engineering of Political Education in Communist China prior to 1978.

More significantly, one can be certain, the “nationalistic” nature of future generations and those of first generation have been substantially different
as “model citizens” in their nature of “nationality”. For the first generation, they were mostly socialized to possess their particular “achieved nationality” in Communist China as mentioned above. But for the future generations, they have more likely started to be socialized in pursuit of a kind of “ascribed nationality” which has been already “achieved” by the first generation previously. The school education, in this context, would certainly provide a new portion of National Education along with the changing “nationality” as predicted.

However, with the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976 and from the start of Open Door Policy since 1978, the Communist China has entered a stage of “depoliticization” in which the Chinese Government deemphasized the role of politics in favour of economics, and shifted toward development in the principle of market socialism. Beginning with Deng Xiaoping from 1978 onwards, all political leaders seemed to bear a finely calculated risk by pursuing the goal of Four Modernizations while sticking closely to the ideological agenda founded in Chinese Communist Party and preserving the one-party dictatorship in contemporary China at the same time.

In the field of education, those political leaders have resultantly promoted an approach that would be “apolitically academic, decentralized, and
somewhat pluralized, in keeping their economic orientation” (Sautman, 1991: 673) for the “imagined political community” in Communist China. As Deng said, “we mean Marxism that is integrated with Chinese conditions, and ... ... we mean socialism that is tailored to Chinese conditions and has Chinese characteristics” (as cited in Deng, 1987: 54). Needless to say, the aims and objectives on National Education in regard to “Chinese condition” have been gradually shifting from the Political Education to Patriotic Education in pursuit of another type “achieved nationality” consisting of “Chinese characteristics”.

For one of the most important reasons behind the shifting of aims and objectives on National Education in post-Mao’s China, this can be probably illustrated by the stressing of Moral Education as a vehicle to support the economic modernization in pursuit the goal of Four Modernizations after 1978. Therefore, it is a must to let all students know about the needs and importance of economic modernization as a common good for Communist China (Yang, 1985: 4). As Hutchision pointed out, “[A]ny discussion of the goal and contents of a curriculum for Moral Education in contemporary (Communist) China can be meaningful only with reference to (Communist) China’s modernization. ... ...”, the practice of modernization in (Communist) China has placed heavy emphasis on
social and economic development rather than on the cultivation of human potential or talent” (1990: 45), which would be the case on this.

In line with what is set in CH1, with regard to the aims and objectives of education shifting from “class struggle” led by Mao Zedong to “economic modernization” since 1978, we all can see that the political transition from Mao Zedong to post-Mao political leaders would lead to the change of nature on National Education. Compared with the Political Education mainly focusing on “ideological and class struggle” in Mao’s China, the Patriotic Education promoted after 1978 has been characterized as both patriotic and economic useful with “contributing more to the country” (Li, 1988: 88-98) than the one prior to 1978.

5.1.3 Comparing aims and objectives in both societies

Since the “achievement” is importantly placed on aims and objectives of Civic or National Education for those “imagined political communities” in both societies, the degree of nationalistic contexts and practices on such Values Education have still been varying differently.

Being a British Crown Colony, the pre-handover Civic Education was almost put zero emphasis on nationalistic content. Before 1997, the people in
Hong Kong were mostly inclined to believe that they had been living in “a borrowed place” and surviving on its “borrowed time” (Hughes, 1976). What they intended to acquire was only the practical and instrumental orientation towards the political system. The colonial administration was mainly judged whether the Government can maintain the stability and prosperity for the whole society, instead of evaluated on the basis of democratic legitimacy or supported by a traditional sense of Confucian moralism. Nevertheless, there is a slow pace trend reversing the focus on more nationalistic content after the handover, which also being expected to work out similarly in the 21st century. The most possible explanation for this focus shift can be interpreted as Hong Kong would be consistently benefited from the reversion of sovereignty to Communist China in a long run, unless it has faced a number of shortcomings that occurred just after 1997. But for why there is only a slow pace trend rather than imposing any radical attempt to place a higher proportion of nationalistic content on Civic Education since 1997, a more further elaboration would be demonstrated later on.

From 1949, a very distinctive picture has been shown in Communist China which differed from that of Hong Kong. As a newly-established
authoritarian “nation-state”, the state-value orientation has been a crucial factor to support the political system – “democratic centralism” with the dictatorship of Chinese Communist Party (Hague and Harrop, 2001: 179). High levels of belief in state priority and in national unity tend to be associated with high levels of support for the Government to dominate in such political system. Since the political stability seems to rest on nationalism, nationalistic content has then played a significant role on National Education but its orientation has shifted from “political in command” to “economic in command” in 1978 regarding to the change of Governmental policies.

At this point, a through examination illustrates that the nationalistic contexts and practices on Civic or National Education have not been static all the time, so it is necessary for both Governments in Hong Kong and Communist China to mostly justify in themselves or exempt from any criticism at least. When they are reflectively and critically reviewed and examined the aims and objectives on Civic or National Education, they should somehow avoid of taking a short-sighted, distorted or exclusive perspective, so as to provide various desirable considerations for Civic or National Education.
5.2 **Teaching methods**

Borrowing the views from Berger and Luckmann, the social construction of reality significant elements, which included “externalization”, “objectivation” as well as “internalization”, can be eligible to construct and also re-construct the historical memories for all human beings in their mind (1967: 207-211). Children are unlikely to learn about abstract concept as the nation by themselves, most political authorities (i.e. Governments) are tending to construct these historical memories through political socialization in the ways of top-down education as a means to achieve their political ends in particular.

Through the process of political socialization, most societies demonstrate conscious efforts to teach knowledge and shape attitudes about the nation, including what the nation is, its characteristics and those of its members, its political and socio-economic systems, in addition to the relationship of individuals to the nation. Seen through the case of Hong Kong and Communist China, both teaching methods can be brought out from teachers to students in formal schooling, known as “Transmission approach” out of three approaches in education (Giroux, 1983: 176-192) to a very large extent. In the following, both HH2 and CH2 will be going to be tested in order to figure out whether the Governments are
Influential on Civic or National Education throughout the school education.

5.2.1 Teaching methods in Hong Kong

In Hong Kong, whether the pre-handover or post-handover education policies, determining the range and content of school subjects, the provision of curriculum guidelines as well as textbooks selection for subsequent implementations at school level, have been characterized as autocratic that some principals operating schools like “little emperors” and strong hierarchical top-down structure (Hong Kong Education and Manpower Branch and Education Department, 1991: 14), which has been similar with the nature of “Transmission approach” in these several decades although the Civic Education in schools is theoretically expected to develop “critical thinking dispositions and problem solving skills that would allow them to analyze social and political issues objectively and to arrive at a rational appraisal of these issues” (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Council, 1996: 6) with the same idea of both reflective-inquiry and critical approaches. Of course, this might greatly attribute to the authoritarian foundation of a political authority, which only requires its citizens to conform a set of values and norms in a passive way.

As described in chapter 4, such power was centralized in the hands of
Curriculum Development Committee earlier or Curriculum Development Council after 1988 under Hong Kong Education Department to perform the function of “develop(ing) teaching syllabuses recommended for use in primary and secondary schools”, in order to “increase opportunities for practicing teachers to participate actively in all stages of the curriculum development process” (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Council, 2003) as the common good for all students in schools. According to General Guidelines on Moral Education in Hong Kong issued in 1981, the role of teacher in Civic Education was clearly stated as the “key person supported by his headmaster and other colleagues. There are ample opportunities for him to instil in his pupils the proper attitudes and the right set of values” (Hong Kong Education Department, 1981: 9). This was because “teachers are expected to use their professional judgment in tailoring this approach to their pupils’ needs” (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Committee, 1985: 13).

In line with the Government policies as stated above, a number of key decisions, such as specific subjects and combinations of subjects to be studied; strategies and weighting of internal assessment systems; allocation and streaming of pupils; language of instruction and pedagogy (Morris and Chan,
have also been taken up by schools for the subsequent implementations. As A Study on the Development of Civic Awareness and Attitudes of Pupils of Secondary Schools in Hong Kong similarly pointed out, the purpose of Civic Education was to provide an useful insight of pupils’ civic awareness and attitude throughout both formal and informal curriculum in schools and recommended what should be done by schools, teachers and parents to achieve the goal (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Council, 1995). However, six out of seven recommendations were assigned what should be done by both schools and teachers to achieve the goals on Civic Education whereas parents had just been required to pick up one only.

Parallel to what is written in HH2, whether the ruling power was in the hands of Colonial Government or has been under the HKSAR Government, it can safely come up with the idea that both Governments have been influential throughout the schools education. Besides from that, unlike in the era ruled by Colonial Government, a more demanding managerial approach involving a bureaucratic process for the quest for quality of education in terms of professionalism of front-line teachers (Chan, 2002: 246-250) has been worked out under the Education Commission Reform by the HKSAR Government after
the handover.

5.2.2 Teaching methods in Communist China

Lining up with the case of Hong Kong, as “Transmission approach” suggests, the school education in Communist China can be characterized as a kind of “top-down standardization”, since the formulation of State Education Commission as “the supreme administrative authority for the education system ... ..., (which) is responsible for formulating major education policies, designing overall strategies for promoting the cause of education, coordinating educational undertakings supervised by various ministries, directing and guiding work related to the reform of the education system” (State Education Commission, The People's Republic of China, 1989: 36) at national level, then by “monitoring the evaluation and assessment of all sub-national education administrative organs and institutions” (Ibid: 37) at the local level, and finally with respect to subsequent implementations at schools level for all students nationwide as the end.

Putting it simply, the higher the level the broader and more abstract are the policies, becoming more detailed and specific as they get closer to the subsequent implementations throughout all classrooms and school-settings in
Communist China. At national level, *National Education* has been directed by specific departments within the State Education Commission. At local level, however, such responsibilities would fall into the Propaganda and Education Office or Moral Education Office (Ibid: 48-49).

As far as the practice of *National Education* is concerned, those administrative departments at both national and local level in Communist China would be responsible to design curriculum, syllabus, guidelines and content, in addition to establish standards for evaluation and oversee the development of all teaching materials. For example, at national level, Department of Political Education within the State Education Commission has been assigned to handle the "draft(ing) policies and regulations for strengthening *Political Education* in higher education institutions in accordance with the Party's education principles. It is responsible for the building up of a contingent of political workers or educators. It gives guidance to the teaching of Marxist and Leninist theories in further and higher education institutions and *Political Education* for university students" (Ibid: 42).

With respect to the implementation level, in line with the "Transmission approach", all schools, colleges and universities nationwide are also directed to
operate *National Education* under the above-mentioned directives. In a teacher-oriented classroom and school-settings, also characterized as a kind of dogmatic pedagogy, the role of teacher has just performed as an authority figure to dispense knowledge and values whereas all students are required to act as the receivers to “learn” in a passive way (Hawkins, 1983: 168-169). Taking school education during the *Cultural Revolution* as an example, schools had become a platform to criticize “bourgeois intellectuals” in achieving the goal of “class struggle”. What knowledge, values and norms passing on students during the ideological lessons in schools should be regarded as *Mao Zedong Thought*, propaganda literature and the slogans (Li, 1990: 164) in favour of the *Cultural Revolution*.

Besides, the students are not encouraged to raise questions and criticism as both “Reflective-inquiry approach” and “Critical approach” suggested respectively. To a very large extent, they are normally required to memorize what they have learnt for examination instead.

Looking at what is identified in CH2, whether from the national and local levels’ administration or even to subsequent implementation across schools, the Government in Communist China has been influential on *National Education*
while practicing the “Transmission approach” at large, although such doctrinaire and dogmatic approach has been addressed as a serious pedagogical problem for almost twenty years.

5.2.3 Comparing teaching methods in both societies

For the case of Hong Kong and Communist China, since the Governments are influential on Civic or National Education as both HH2 and CH2 claim, the teaching method in school education has mainly put the passing on knowledge for students as “Transmission approach” suggests. Rather than encouraged any civic participation among individuals, the main concern on Civic or National Education in both societies has been primarily provided civic knowledge and developed civic attitudes on the side of regimes, which can ultimately nurture a patriotic citizen, or just responsible at least.

Addressing the problem of such teacher-oriented classrooms and school-settings on Civic or National Education, as a result, those teaching methods emphasizing reflective and critical thinking known as “Reflective-inquiry approach” and “Critical approach” are going to be recommended in both societies as well. Both Government in Hong Kong and Communist China have thus called for a more interesting and enjoyable Civic or National Education since 2000 and
2005 respectively.

In practice, however, the teaching methods have howbeit fallen into the direct transmission of knowledge, values and norms until now that the traditional “Transmission approach” in authoritative nature still strongly persists. According to Ridley et al., one of the most possible intentions behind the limitation on developing a kind of reflective and critical thinking as the alternative teaching method in both societies could be interpreted that “[A]lthough they seek initiative and independence in solving problems, they (still) advocate obedience to rules and deference to authority (i.e. preserving “political legitimacy” as the top-priority than changing the teaching methods on Civic or National Education in classrooms and schools agenda)” (1971: 197).

In regard to the structural shortcoming of “Transmission approach” in school teaching, both students in Hong Kong and Communist China have been generally poor in cognitive and analytical abilities, and in communication and participation skills. As far as I am concerned, it should be a high time to promote a kind of student-centred and individualistic pedagogies, instead of such doctrinaire and dogmatic “Transmission approach” that was worked out in schools previously. As both the HKSAR and Chinese Government have proposed a
more interesting as well as an enjoyable *Civic or National Education* since 2000 and 2005 respectively, what this dramatic change will be the only eligible method to bridge the distance between Government policies on their intended curriculum design and the actual implementations at school level.

### 5.3 Implementation approach

As already noted, values can be socially constructed and also re-constructed in the process of “externalization”, “objectivation” and “internalization”, in order to frame the historical memories for all human beings in their mind (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 207-211). Hence, what a modern polity constructing and re-constructing historical memories for its citizens via education should be solely regarded as “education in values” rather than “values in education” (Halstead, 1996: 201).

Given this scenario, “education in values” has been manipulated and worked out differently in secondary schools between Hong Kong and Communist China. With regards various subjects operated in secondary schools, both Governments do have their specific intentions behind policy documents and curriculum design for school textbooks in the reason of political transition. Identified as follows, both HH3 and CH3 would be put to verify whether the hidden
curriculum always exists from the *Civic or National Education*.

### 5.3.1 Implementation approach in Hong Kong

In accordance with the implementation approach throughout all secondary schools in Hong Kong, *Civic Education* “should be merged into widest possible programme of inter-disciplinary or ‘integrated’ studies but not to the extent that it loses its focus and identity in the minds of teachers and pupils. Teachers of social subjects will continue to play a central role in the school’s *Civic Education* programme but teachers in other areas of experience should be aware of the social and political dimensions and incorporate these in their teaching” (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Committee, 1985: 25). In the words of Morris and Chan, such “permeated approach” or “whole-school approach” in *Civic Education* can be known as “a cross-curricular theme”, namely *Civic, Moral, Environment* and *Sex Education* along with the formal curriculum in all Hong Kong’s secondary schools (1997a: 250-252), which can be attributed to learning and studying *Civic Education* as “everybody’s responsibility and that within the context of the school it should not be treated as just another subject for which exclusive responsibility rests with a particular member or members of staff” (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Committee, 1985: 4). Under this
framework, as shown in the chapter earlier, a number of new subjects have been introduced and thus operated for “the role of Civic Education in (secondary) schools” (Morris, 1997: 113) in these several decades.

Till about the late 1970s, Civic Education promoted “education in values” in the subjects like Civics and Economic and Public Affairs was always regarded as a counter of Communist and Kuomintang ideologies. Being the ruling power in Hong Kong, the Colonial Government which had a strong interest and responsibility to maintain prosperity and stability in providing a stable environment conducive for private economic activities (Scott, 1989: 8), did not want any “imperium in imperio” (England and Rear, 1975: 209) or raise political consciousness among Hong Kong’s citizens to question its authority and legitimacy.

Based on the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed in 1984, Hong Kong will become a SAR under the People’s Republic of China in terms of “One Country Two System”. In this point, the explicit decision on Hong Kong’s future however made a shift of Civic Education in Hong Kong as “a politically socializing force for promoting stability and prosperity” in light of the Hong Kong’s political development (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Committee, 1985: 9) since
the *Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools* has been published in 1985. As Morris commented, “[S]ubstantial emphasis is put on developing the pupils’ awareness of and identification with Chinese culture, and on developing their knowledge of how the Government functions and the characteristics of a good citizen” (1996: 146).

For instance, the syllabus of junior secondary *Social Studies* was revised in 1989 to include on the Chinese people as one of the five areas for students to learn and study. Unlike the prior *Economics and Public Affairs* in the characteristic of “description” as a whole, a new subject known as *Government and Public Affairs* was introduced at the Advanced Level first in 1988 and at the Certificate Level one year later on to analyze “concepts, structures, and process involved in the study of Government, political science, and public affairs” (Lee and Bray, 1995: 361-362). Topics like “Hong Kong and China” and “China Today” have been included in the syllabus. One year before the handover to Communist China, more specific changes on the syllabus of “Government and Public Affairs” was further made on emphasizing “conceptual analysis” so that the students could have a better “understanding on China, China-U.S. relations, and Hong Kong’s colonial transition” (Ibid).
Prior to 1997, such “permeated approach” or “whole-school approach” for Civic Education in schools has its own limitation during the actual implementation. As most of these subjects are just elective but not compulsory in nature, there is only a few numbers of schools to operate these subjects and thus encourage students to take one or more under the “pragmatic examination-oriented approach” (Tsang, 1998: 245) throughout all the Hong Kong’s secondary schools. More significantly, a lack of relevant teachers training on Civic Education has also been a big obstacle to the subsequent implementations at school level. Before handover, neither undergraduate programmes nor postgraduate studies on Civic Education were provided to train the relevant teachers throughout the eight UGC-funded universities or tertiary institutions.

After the reversion of sovereignty since 1997, there is obviously more talk about the strengthening on Civic Education. In accordance with the presence of Guidelines in 2000 and introducing a compulsory subject called Liberal Studies in the New Senior Secondary Curriculum since 2009, up to now, the enhancement of Civic Education has already marked its beginning in Hong Kong SAR though it is not a very radical attempt compared with other countries.
Whether it will be eventual successful to arouse the civic consciousness of people in the foreseeing future, this should be highly depending on how the capability of HKSAR Government’s attempt to bridge the gap between new curriculum design and the actual implementations in schools that I have already discussed in the previous section.

Despite of the fact that there are still a number of uncertainties on the actual implementations of *Civic Education* in secondary schools, HH3 is at least supported that different kinds of hidden curriculum can always be found from *Civic Education* in Hong Kong as time goes by. Along with the political development, unquestionably, special attentions in *Civic Education* have in fact been given to the nature and role of knowledge, skills and values for all students usually, as purposing to promote their similar understanding in line with the Hong Kong Colonial or HKSAR Government as the idea of “education in values”.

**5.3.2 Implementation approach in Communist China**

In referring the case of Communist China, such implementation approach on *National Education* in schools has actually differed with the one in Hong Kong. Those “education in values” have not only been promoted in “diffusion approach” across various subjects throughout the curriculum in
schools as in Hong Kong, but all the schools have also obligated to operate courses about Political Knowledge in meeting the goal of National Education.

To diffuse “education in values” (of National Education) throughout all subjects in the curriculum, in spite of the most explicit vehicle that those courses in the umbrella of Political Knowledge as shown in Table 11 regarding the previous chapter, a number of other subjects about current events and policies like Chinese Language, History and Geography have also been very significant. What is more, certain subjects such as Economics, Population Education and Natural Science can also place the nationalistic content where appropriate. As Zhang claimed, the purpose of this “diffusion approach” aiming “to cultivate ethics and behaviour of a high calibre through subtle and silent transformation” (as cited in Price, 1970: 132) that the “basic or core values in which the Chinese leadership wishes to inculcate its citizens” (Ridley et al., 1971: 3).

By the end of Cultural Revolution, one of the main values on Political Education was to cultivate in the students an attitude of obedience to the prescribed goals of Communist China as specified by the national construction, and to ensure strict compliance. Achieving this educational goal, schools instruction did rely heavily on the inculcation of collectivist ideals for new China,
which required strict submission of individual interests to suit the societal needs.

A textbook widely used during the 1950s as a result stated that “[C]ollectivism and only collectivism is the correct way of managing the relations between individuals and the collective. The principle of collectivism requires us to put collective interests first, and individual interests second” (Cheng, 1994: 65).

According to the Chinese textbooks’ analysis done by Martin on “basic personal ‘virtues’ and attributes”, similar result could be figured out that the Chinese texts did not allow children to be socialized as independent and individualistic actors bent on “achievement”. Instead, other attitudes like “concern for others”, “self-sacrifice”, “collective involvement”, “ability to learn from others” and “accept criticisms” which largely encouraged a strong group consciousness were all equally in evidence (1975: 244-248). In other words, those individuals might be well socialized to combine their personal achievement with group activity and direction by the time that they were ready for induction into the new Chinese Government.

From what is discussed above, the values orientation behind the Political Education prior to the late 1970s had been no doubt as to the dominance of those collective over any individual characteristics in which the elements of
“achievement” and “self-sacrifice” standing up particularly, in the purpose of training personnel for national construction work in the newly-established Communist China (Wu, 1973: 796).

Nevertheless, during the past twenty years, the Communist China has gradually become to open up to the west economically, culturally and diplomatically. Since 1978, the Open Door Policy and engagement of Socialist Market Economy have really shaken the foundation as “steady-state structure” and “Asian production model” (Jin and Liu, 1992) in contemporary China, making it a necessary to transform the National Education from political to the patriotic one. As Lu pointed out, the advent of market economy in Communist China would definitely give rise to a new kind of human relationship in terms of the development of an independent character, so as the individualistic personalities should be included in Moral Education along with the socio-economic changes (2004: 74).

With reference to the latest Guidelines for Patriotic Education published by Ministry of Education in 2005, its aims in secondary schools have shifted to “four main dimensions – ideological, humanistic, practical and integrative” (Han, 2003, as cited in Zhan and Ning, 2004: 517) as indicates on Table 15 above.
Clearly in this direction, such new tasks such as the 2005 Guidelines discussed above have actually put the state’s permission on the cultivation of individualism in *Patriotic Education* in post-Mao era, in which the teaching content, knowledge, experience and skills of life greatly reflecting the individualistic content compared with before.

Similar with the case of Hong Kong, however, we also cannot ignore the fact that there is also a great lag between the proclamation of Government policies on *National Education* and its actual implementations at school level. Since the 1985’s universal 9-year compulsory education could be seen as a strong vehicle to speed up the *Patriotic Education* nationwide (Cheng, 1986: 255), at the same time, the allowance has been made for rural areas up to now, where the actual implementations on such *National Education* is assumed to be a long range goal only. Perhaps this should be attributed by the differences between cities and remote areas, which most city schools are more likely to chip in ample resources to provide *National Education* than the rural ones. As Zhao claimed, the “simpler primary school provision in some rural areas, only Chinese language and arithmetic is enjoined” (1984: 104), which has clearly reflected the impossibilities of implementing *National Education* in the countryside. To the best
of my knowledge, what the recent China’s education reform suggested by State Affairs Council on March 2007 to “exempt the entire school fee of universal 9-year compulsory education in rural areas” (as cited in Yeung, 2007) could be a great measure to deal with this issue. Whether the efforts will only be a slogan or finally changing as a reality, we should keep an eye on its corresponding development later on.

Apart from some difficulties on subsequent implementations in Communist China, as above mentioned, the hidden curriculum of *National Education* can be definitely founded across various subjects in the process of political transition as CH$_3$ wrote. After 1978, we can say that the values orientation has somehow changed from collectivism to a kind of regulated individualism “portraying the new pattern of individual-collective relationship which differs from traditional collectivism in Mao’s China” (Cheung and Pan, 2006: 46-47). In brief, the Chinese Government will be expected to lessen more control over individuals in Communist China, and most of them can be allowed to enjoy certain freedom to choose their own goal for further development within the framework.
5.3.3 Comparing implementation approach in both societies

In referring to the implementation approach on Civic or National Education in both societies, seeing through the syllabuses across various subjects in secondary level, it turns out that Hong Kong has better dealt with this issue than the Communist China.

While comparing the 2009’s Liberal Studies curriculum in Hong Kong and the Guidelines on Ideological Education in Full-time Compulsory Education issued by Communist China in 2003, Hong Kong is more concerned with the global contexts than the National Education in Communist China, which intends to maintain a balance between national and global values during the implementation of Civic Education.

The drawbacks of Communist China on this can be largely attributed to the emphasis on nationalistic context seriously and primarily, in that it adopts the global contexts on National Education more or less limitedly. This supports the fact that a number of countries such as today’s China which do not or cannot take an initiative in globalization as a whole tend to place more efforts on establishing a national identity in order to secure for its survival and success (Heater, 1990: 155) in return. For those reasons behind both societies to put distinctive
proportion on national and global values during the implementation of *Civic or National Education*, more discussion and analysis will be addressed in the forthcoming section.

5.4 The outcome of *Civic or National Education*

As discussed above, whether from the declarations of policy documents or actual implementations at school level, we do see both politics and education that always inter-play with each other continuously, especially at the time of political transition. In most cases, the change of political sovereignty would usually result in the politicization of the society (Iannaccone, 1984: 9-10).

In that sense, while figuring out the outcome of *Civic or National Education* between Hong Kong and Communist China to consider whether the students' attitude are in line with the official original expectation, the political context should be always taken into account as necessary. Where the distinction between values orientation of students and the nature of Governmental policies is non-existent, then both the HH₄ and CH₄ could be totally proven as the case of both societies undoubtedly.
5.4.1 The outcome of Civic Education in Hong Kong

During 1984, the declaration of Joint Declaration signified Britain, with the co-operation of Communist China, that eventually settled the question of Hong Kong's future after 1997. Apart from defense and foreign policy, Hong Kong would become a highly autonomous "Special Administrative Region" with the idea of "One country, Two systems" which differs from the Mainland ones. This definitely identifies that Hong Kong's re-integration with Communist China rather than a transition to a modern polity with an independent sovereignty (Bray, 1997: 158-159) was the most striking feature to distinguish its situation from the other colonial territories in the wave of decolonization.

Looking back the colonial regime prior to the early 1980s, despite the abandonment of "Young Plan" proposed to create a Municipal Council with 32 out of 48 elected members in 1946, Hong Kong was thus being characterized as a "quasi-bureaucratic authoritarian structure" (Sing, 2004: 44) in the synergy between powerful bureaucrats and local un-official elites without any political participation for the majority prior to early 1980s. Obviously, the constitutional responsibility in this scenario was absolutely not an issue for all Hong Kong's people (Sweeting, 1995: 105-106) before the question of Hong Kong was being
settled.

Yet, once the Sino-British Joint Declaration was made in 1984, the issue of re-unification with Communist China in 1997 has inevitably come to the surface of the table. Regarding the Guidelines on Civic Education in schools, it had explicitly made the correlations between Civic Education and political transition in the words of “[T]he civic learner needs to know the cultural and political identity of Hong Kong as a Chinese community, as a British colony for a certain period, and as the HKSAR of China from July 1997. At a time of political transition, we need our citizens to adopt a new national identity, and to be participative and contributive to bring about smooth transitions, to sustain prosperity and stability and to further improve the Hong Kong society” (Hong Kong Curriculum Development Council, 1996: 21).

Under this circumstance, the “政治化 of education” has firstly introduced since 1985 in Hong Kong for the process of decolonization and hence transfer of political sovereignty resulting in politicization of a society compared with the past, which can be measured by both criteria known as “internal politics of education” and “general politics of the state” (Iannaccone, 1984: 9-10) as well.
As Iannaccone (Ibid) claimed, in spite of the “internal politics of education” was driven by the “ politicization of education” at the time of political transition, what had been done by the last Governor, Chris Patten, also contributed to the politicization for “general politics of the state (i.e. indicated as modern polity here)” in Hong Kong from the early 1990s onwards. In the opinion of Scott (2000: 38), Patten has revolutionary changed the image of Hong Kong Governor from a skilful diplomat to a populist politician, who was willing to co-operate with pro-democratic forces in Legislative Council (Legco) as well as address public opinion in the streets. The specific example was his plan for political reform whereby the three tiers of Councils would be wholly elected by 1995 though the Legco was replaced by the Provisional Legislative Assembly with “three violations” in 1997. Undeniably, both his open-minded attitude and populist actions would more or less stimulate the political awareness for the public expectations towards the executive-led political system in Hong Kong.

With regards the efforts of “internal politics of education” and “general politics of the state” on the road of politicization of a society as written above, perhaps this can partially expound why both data and findings drawn from both quantitative research and qualitative research in previous chapter would come up
with the similar increasing trend on “sense of citizenship” for those students just after the handover for several years (*also referred to Table 17 below*), which eventually result in HH4 suggesting that the outcome of *Civic Education* in Hong Kong is in line with the official original expectation.

Table 17: Values orientation of Hong Kong youngsters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You identify yourself as a Chinese</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You have a sense of belonging to Hong Kong</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups, 1999: 175; Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups, 2001: 176

Yet in accordance with the *Civic Education* study launched by International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) in two phases (Lee, 1999: 313-340), the changing values orientations of Hong Kong youngsters as listed in *Table 17* above would only skim the surface and hence prove the validity of HH4 in this research. Although the IEA *Civic Education* study across more than 20 countries has figured out Hong Kong students as the top five of the participating countries on their attainment on “civic knowledge” in terms of “knowledge of content”, “skills in interpretation” and “civic knowledge”, a very distinctive picture would be found in the aspect of “civic participation”. The score of Hong Kong’s students on the importance to citizenship in participating in
conventional political activities had just reached the international mean, and the scores on the social-movement-related activities for confidence in participation at schools were even explicitly lower than the international means. What the area of “civic participation” that could obtain a higher mean score than the international was only known as “expected participation in political activities”.

Not surprisingly, what is meant by the outcome of Civic Education lining up with the official original expectation in Hong Kong as HH4 stands, findings in two phases of the study did show the consistent weakness in “civic participation” among the Hong Kong’s students although they have sufficient “civic knowledge” on citizenship, democracy and responsibilities of the HKSAR Government. Perhaps this can be partially explained more with respect to those civic-related activities in schools. Their primary objective has been mostly facilitating an “understanding of political affairs” in terms of “civic knowledge”, instead of any proactive and critical discussion on politics”.

5.4.2 The outcome of National Education in Communist China

Similarly, for the case of Communist China, I am also going to pick up one study about the moral values held by early adolescents (Yuan and Shen, 1998: 191-206) as evidence to prove whether the students’ attitude has been
falling into such official original expectation in accordance with the outcome of
National Education. Nonetheless, due to the samples were being drawn from two
cities in 1992 and 1993, what would be the focus for further discussion has been
just including Patriotic Education beyond 1978 instead of the Political Education
in the first thirty years since 1949.

In this study, both “Rokeach Value Survey” (RVS) and “Chinese Value
Survey” (CVS) were selected to measure the importance of terminal and
instrumental values, and value dimensions in the Chinese culture respectively
among those early adolescents, who were from 11 to 16 years old. As shown in
Table 18 as follows, the respondents were tending to prefer values in which
relating to competence and personal effectiveness. Besides, referencing the idea
of collectivism, the respondents then prefer more task-oriented values which aim
toward the service and society. Being a socialist state in the first place, that was
an important factor motivating most Chinese students to choose “patriotism” and
“secure country” as their top-priority in both CVS and RVS’s terminal values.
Moreover, the characteristic called “ambitious” has ranked the highest position in
RVS’s instrumental values could be attributed to the individual achievements
serving a kind of collective good for the entire society.
Table 18: Moral values held by early adolescents in Communist China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values in CVS</th>
<th>Values rated higher in Communist China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Patriotism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hard work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Knowledge/Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sense of righteousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values in RVS (Terminal)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Self-confidence and self-pride</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Freedom of choice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values in RVS (Instrumental)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Intelligent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Courageous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Competent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yuan and Shen, 1998: 200

To the best of my knowledge, the emphasis on “patriotism”, “self-confidence” and “intelligent” as their top-priority in the survey could be expounded by the effectiveness of *Patriotic Education* with the characteristics of “depoliticization” in addition to “deideologization” (Sautman, 1991: 677-681) in Communist China from 1978 onwards.

As “students have seen living standards rise and China’s position in the world improve markedly” (Crothall, 1994) under the economic modernization and *Open Door Policy* to the outside world since 1978, what they want to do should be as a supporter of the country to promote further economic liberalization and decentralization and pursuit the both collective and individual good at the same time. To be obvious here, supporting by the study already discussed above, the
outcome of *National Education* does line up with such official original expectation in Communist China that CH₄ has already put it in chapter 3.

Since the CH₄ has been proven as valid as above, however, we still cannot ignore the fact that both “de politicization” and “de ideologization” (Sautman, 1991: 677-681) today would also be a “double-edged sword” for the whole Communist China in a long run. On one hand, these two components can undoubtedly act as a vehicle to unite people in boosting up further economic modernization during the 21st century as I had mentioned before.

Yet, at the same time, this kind of “national identity” in Communist China would be infused with hate and contempt with United States, Japan and the pro-independent camp (e.g. Democratic Progressive Party) in Taiwan on the other hand. This kind of “militaristic nationalism” with full of hate and legitimating military action to rationalize all defensive measures by holding the country together and thus avoiding China to be bullied has resultanty brought the future’s development in favour of those militarists, hardliners and conservatives.

Given to those “foreign threats” for future’s China, this should be a good
excuse for the Chinese Communist Party to spend every effort in dealing with this issue but only pay little attention on solving those dominating social problems or introducing constitutional reforms, and eventually secure the one-party dictatorship of Communist China in a long run.

5.4.3 Comparing the outcome of Civic or National Education in both societies

Illustrated in Table 19 below, the thirteen qualities of “good citizenship” between Hong Kong and both cities in which Guangzhou and Hangzhou obviously indicates that the “sense of citizenship” obtained by Hong Kong students have relatively weak than those in regard to Guangzhou and Hangzhou. Even though sometimes the Hong Kong students have a clear picture on those qualities on “good citizenship”, they are not willing to act accordingly.
Table 19: Summary of mean scores for the thirteen qualities of “good citizenship” obtained in Guangzhou, Hangzhou and Hong Kong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of “good citizenship”</th>
<th>Ranking and mean score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guangzhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participation of community or school affairs</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Acceptance of an assigned responsibility</td>
<td>5.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Concern for the welfare of others</td>
<td>5.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Moral and ethical behaviour</td>
<td>5.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Acceptance of authority in supervisory roles</td>
<td>4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ability to question ideas</td>
<td>5.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ability to make wise decisions</td>
<td>5.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Patriotism</td>
<td>5.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Fulfillment of family responsibilities</td>
<td>6.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Knowledge of the world community</td>
<td>5.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Tolerance of diversity within society</td>
<td>6.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lee, 2005: 227

Since the reversion of sovereignty in 1997, the socio-economic as well as political changes in Hong Kong has made Hong Kong's citizenship development move on a crossroad. Perhaps the limited change on the sense of “national citizenship” for most Hong Kong's residents can be explained by a phenomenon so-called “Two-track system on citizenship development”. Simply speaking, the role of Civic Education in the post-colonial educational system could then be seen as a kind of preparation for Hong Kong's younger generation in pursuit the goal of both national integration and global competition at the same time.
Being part of the Communist China’s territories since 1997, it has been essential for the newly-established HKSAR Government to reverse those previous strategies used prior to 1997 on “building a kind of nationally and culturally neutral citizenship” to avoid any “imperium in imperio” (England and Rear, 1975: 209) that would challenge the colonial ruling authority, and begun to initiate a slow pace instead of any radical attempt to “renationalize the Special Administrative Region.” Otherwise, the Hong Kong SAR will be more or less “marginalized” as another Chinese city like Guangzhou or Hangzhou, where Hong Kong would be finally losing out its importance of a global city, particularly in the challenge of globalization during the 21st century.

Most importantly, in the mechanism of “One country, Two systems”, Hong Kong SAR should keep certain distance from Communist China as “a highly autonomous city” on one hand. But on the other hand, also as a “dependent polity” on Communist China, the HKSAR Government is not allowed to stress too much sense of “local citizenship” on Hong Kong’s residents in a meantime. In this scenario, both nationhood and local community building would be regarded as a kind of co-existed strategy to nurture the citizenship in post-handover Hong Kong.

Apart from any strong intervention on “citizenship building” taken by
the HKSAR Government, which is distinctive with the one in Communist China, the “sense of citizenship” in Hong Kong would hence highly depend on how life-cycle conditions and other personal experiences to modify the values orientation for those individuals. In the new century, the role of families has become important to inculcate attitudes, values, knowledge and aspirations on the development of citizenship in Hong Kong.
CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS

In this research project, I have traced the transformation of school education and citizenship development across two Chinese societies. In sum, both Hong Kong and Communist China would have distinctive prospects on *Values Education*, which are coined as *Civic Education* and *National Education* respectively.

In spite of certain limitations, the data and findings of this study are more or less consistent with the conceptual framework with other supplementary data on further discussion and analysis in both societies.

6.1  Conclusion

Based upon the previous chapters above, this concluding chapter would like to demonstrate what the origin of “citizenship” is, how about the notions of “citizenship” change as time goes by, and what the role of school education plays in this dynamic process between Hong Kong and Communist China.

In the first place, what is meant by “citizenship”? The explanation has clearly shown “citizenship” is a very complicated concept and can be taken in various forms in distinctive space-time settings. In the West, “citizenship” means acquiring a set of civil, political and social rights. Yet in Hong Kong and Communist
China, a very different picture indicates that the British Colonial Government always placed the emphasis on nurturing a kind of passive, obedient, law-abiding role of a nationally and culturally “citizenship” in pre-1997 Hong Kong whereas “collectivism” was strongly stressed over the “individualism” as an ideal “citizenship” in Maoist China prior to 1978, especially during the Cultural Revolution.

Then, how about the notions of “citizenship” change in both societies? Being a dynamic process as time goes by, particular “citizenship” gained in one period can be lost in another. In Hong Kong, after the reversion of sovereignty since 1997, the HKSAR Government’s “re-nationalizing Special Administrative Region” policies have been constrained in a slow pace by securing the Hong Kong’s position as a global city. Similarly, in Communist China, once the “citizenship” to nurture a new kind of selfless persons and devote to the collective failed in Maoist China, the “regulated individualism” has been thus introduced as a substitute of the previous “citizenship”, which intended to favour the further economic modernization in post-Mao’s China.

Last but not the least, what the role of school education actually plays in the transformation of “citizenship” between Hong Kong and Communist China.
Instead of providing a dogmatic description on the transformation of *Civic or National Education* in both places, this project has put the foci on discussion and analysis of aims and objectives, teaching methods, implementation approach and the outcome of *Civic or National Education* between two countries in a comparative approach.

As the nature of *Civic or National Education* is not “politically neutral”, both Governments in Hong Kong and Communist China have always considered *Civic or National Education* as the crucial means of transforming individuals into the “imagined political communities” in these two places and eventually determining the nature of their role as “good and responsible citizens”. Consequently, schools would become a vehicle to provide all students a form of *Civic or National Education*, and expect them to be inculcated with a “common ground” of civic knowledge and attitudes, in that serve to define them as part of the “collective sense of identity”, whether anationalistic or nationalistic, apolitical or political, in which to pursue the legitimate function for the authorities.

Since all hypotheses have been proved as valid in both societies as in chapter 5, this project has finally answered entire research questions with all positive answers. First, the *Civic or National Education* will be ever changing as
time goes by. Second, those Governments’ policies would be usually related to
*Civic or National Education*. Third, there are a variety of implications behind the
*Civic or National Education*. And the last one, the outcome of *Civic or National
Education* will largely fall into the original expectation of both Governments.

In view of the building of national awareness and consciousness in these two regions, especially for the post-handover Hong Kong, it is obvious that schooling experiences could be considered as political socialization or sometimes indoctrination but there are still skeptics against the endeavours made by the Government. So that whether they will be ultimately divergent or convergent in future, or just a combination of both, it is still too early for me to comment at this minute.

Still in this research project, in the process of uncovering those hidden curriculum of school education in both places, this experience does successfully call for a task of rationale building, in line with most educationalists not only ask the empirical questions of “how”, but those normative questions of “why” also. Besides, apart from top-down education, the provision of this study could be somewhat regarded as an alternative literature for a life-long learner in the globe to re-examine the correlations between school education and citizenship.
development. Since the socio-political need to nurture “citizenship” is the most crucial function of school education in both societies, people would be somehow clear the methods to upgrade their polities as a “competitive state” or “international city” once they know more about the transformation on Citizenship Education.

To conclude my research project, researchers who are interested in this topic should be taking various factors like “the meaning of a nation”, “the Government’s intentions and efforts paid”, “the nature of that modern polity”, “the transition of a political authority” in addition to “the market forces toward the society” back into consideration, so as to provide a better understanding of the school education and transformation of “citizenship” between Hong Kong and Communist China.

6.2 Limitations of this project

The study is not without its limitations and could be somehow further along the following lines if necessary.

6.2.1 Absence for primary research

Being a study based on historical research, the data and findings has
already existed in archives, libraries and so forth so as the source might be
outdated or not necessarily suit the purpose in this project although I have
already tried my best to do so.

Therefore, if the resources were available, the findings of this study can
be also done in primary research which can provide a more complete picture of
this topic.

**6.2.2 Short of informal curriculum**

Since the “citizenship” can be socialized by both primary agents” and
“secondary agent” including the child – the family, the peer group and the school,
the scope of this study has solely put the emphasis on school education (also
called formal curriculum) instead of other agents as informal curriculum on
citizenship development in Hong Kong and Communist China.

If possible also, various investigations on informal education and
citizenship development across distinctive societies could be a good research
topic for further exploration in particular.
REFERENCES


Hong Kong Education Department. (1986). *Report on the evaluation of the implementation of the “Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools”*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.

Hong Kong Education Department. (1987). *Second report on the evaluation of the implementation of the “Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools”*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.


Hong Kong Examinations Authority. (1996a). *Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination annual report*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Examinations Authority. (in English and Chinese)

Hong Kong Examinations Authority. (1996b). *Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination annual report*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Examinations Authority. (in English and Chinese)

Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups. (1999). *Analyzing the changing trend of Hong Kong youths*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups. (in Chinese)

Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups. (2001). *Analyzing the changing trend of Hong Kong youths*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups. (in Chinese)


